Apologetics

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APOLOGETICS

VOLUME I.

FUNDAMENTAL

APOLOGETICS

OR

THE RATIONAL VINDICATION OF CHRISTIANITY

BY

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WITH AN INTRODUCTION

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IN THREE VOLUMES

VOLUME I.

FUNDAMENTAL APOLOGETICS

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TO

My Wife

WHOSE CHEERING PRESENCE AND PATIENT SERVICE

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THIS VOLUME

IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED

"And be ready always to give a reason for the hope that is in you with meekness and fear."—THE APOSTLE PETER.

"And in the defence and confirmation of the gospel, knowing that I am set for the defence of the gospel."—THE APOSTLE PAUL.

"Hold that fast which thou hast, that no man take thy crown."—THE APOSTLE JOHN.

"A double-minded man is unstable in all his ways."—THE APOSTLE JAMES.

PREFACE.

THIS treatise seeks to give a somewhat complete account of the rational grounds upon which the Christian system securely rests. Christianity proclaims a changeless gospel to an ever-changing world. This implies that its message and its vindication must be wisely adapted to constantly changing conditions. And this being the case, the task of Apologetics is ceaseless, and its service is ever needed.

While we place a very high value upon Apologetics in its own proper sphere, we are careful not to overrate the service it can render. Christianity in its essence does not stand or fall, is not made or unmade, by the effectiveness of any apologetic proposed for it. In the last analysis, the Christian system is its own best vindication, for the reason, mainly, that the foundations of Christianity lie deeper than any apologetic on its behalf can go. Apologetics neither plans nor lays these foundations; it can only exhibit their inherent strength and abiding security. Nor must it be supposed that Apologetics is able to construct the contents of the Christian religion; these are provided in the gracious revelation of the redeeming activity of God, as it is working out its divine purpose among men all along the ages. Still less must we expect that Apologetics can convert a single soul; only the gospel of the grace of God can effect this. But when all this is said, it is still true that, from the very nature of the case, Apologetics must ever retain its most important place and task. It is bound to present to each succeeding age the

most effective vindication it can of the rational validity, of the divine redeeming reality, and of the unique supernatural character of Christianity.

The fact just stated provides, in part at least, a reason for the publication of another treatise upon a subject whose literature is already extensive and valuable. At the same time, another word of justification for sending forth a treatise like this may be uttered. It can hardly be said that we have in our own English tongue a work which fully covers the whole wide field of Apologetics. We have such treatises from German sources, but these, even when well translated, do not suitably meet the needs of the average English-speaking student. In addition, while we have from the pens of English writers very many most excellent treatises on natural theology, theism, the philosophy of religion, and the evidences of Christianity, there is not, so far as we are aware, a single comprehensive treatise from such a source, which binds the entire defence and vindication of Christianity into a well-organized whole, so as thereby to present what may be properly called a scientific system of Apologetics. This treatise ventures to supply this need, but with what success the reader must be the final judge.

The general plan and view-point of the treatise may be merely indicated. It proposes to organize, according to the inner nature of Christianity, as the only truly redemptive religion, the whole materials of its defence and vindication. It makes an attempt to exhibit, in a somewhat scientific way, a complete apologetic for the Christian system, drawn from its inner nature, as the only redeeming religion.

As thus regarded, Christianity may be construed in three well-defined relations. First, its philosophical foundations

are to be carefully examined; secondly, its historicity and divine authority must be taken fully into account; and, thirdly, its practical results in the world, in relation to the pressing problems of thought and life among men, must be diligently considered. From these three view-points we derive the three main branches of Apologetics. They may be termed Fundamental, Christian, and Applied Apologetics, respectively. The first leads us to construe Christianity mainly in relation to its underlying *philosophy;* the second calls upon us to interpret Christianity in the light of its unique redemptive *history;* while the third bids us test the Christian system by means of its splendid *fruitage* in the world. These three branches of Apologetics are closely related to each other; yet they are so well defined, in a logical way at least, that each merits separate treatment. Hence emerges the plan for the three volumes of this treatise. The present volume is the first, and it deals entirely with Fundamental or Philosophical Apologetics. Therein the underlying philosophy involved in Christianity is to be vindicated.

Not much need now be said concerning the general standpoint of this treatise, as this can be best gathered by the careful reader from the discussion itself. In philosophy it stands firmly on the ground of rational realism, as against both materialism and idealism. As to its epistemology, it holds, against empiricism and skepticism, to the rationality of human cognition. In its philosophy of religion, it maintains a definite vital theism, over against deism and pantheism. In regard to Christianity, it asserts a well-defined supernaturalism, against all types of naturalism. As to the essence of Christianity, it finds this in the redeeming

activity of God, mediated in the world by Jesus Christ, and administered by the Holy Spirit, as against all other systems of religion. As to its doctrinal standpoint, it rests confidently on the basis of the historic Reformed system. And in its temper, it seeks to cherish, over against a hopeless pessimism, a hopeful meliorism, which believes that things are getting better, and that the world is surely moving on towards that welcome day when the eternal sun of optimism shall brightly shine in a cloudless sky. Such is the standpoint of this treatise.

Some care has been taken to make this work useful to the average English-speaking student, and at the same time to supply some aid to any who may wish to pursue their reading more widely in this inviting field. To this end, a partial bibliography is given in connection with each chapter. This bibliography in no case claims to be complete. It simply gives the titles of a few of the books easily accessible to the average English reader. It is hoped, however, that this bibliography may in each case serve a useful purpose. A well-digested table of contents is affixed to each chapter, to further aid the student in grasping the discussions contained therein. An index is added at the end of the volume.

Professor Benjamin B. Warfield, D. D., LL. D., of the Theological Seminary at Princeton, N. J., has been kind enough to accede to the author's request to write an Introduction for the treatise, which greatly enhances its value. For this splendid service the reader will no doubt be deeply grateful, as the author is truly thankful.

The other two volumes are in course of preparation, and will be issued without undue delay. The three volumes represent, in their own way, the results of twenty years of

reading and reflection upon these themes, fifteen of which have been devoted to teaching these topics in the theological class-room. If there really be any need for such a treatise, it is humbly hoped that this may to some extent supply this need, and be useful as a sort of hand-book in Apologetics. Above all, if it shall do anything to make it plain that Christianity has philosophical validity, historic reality, and redemptive sufficiency, the author will be more than rewarded for all his labors. May the Head of the Church accept it, and grant it some measure of usefulness!

Francis R. Beattie.

Louisville, Ky. 1903.

"Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God is our Lord."—DEUT. vi. 4.

"God is a Spirit: and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth."—JOHN iv. 24.

"The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handiwork."—PSA. xix. 1.

"Lift up your eyes on high, and behold who hath created these things, that bringeth out their host by number: he calleth them all by names by the greatness of his might, for that he is strong in power; not one faileth."—ISAIAH xl. 26.

"Canst thou by searching find out God? canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection?"—JOB xi. 7.

"Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence?"—PSA. cxxxix. 7.

"God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth."—SHORTER CATECHISM, QUES. 4.

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

By BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD, D. D., LL. D.

IT gives me great pleasure to respond to Dr. Beattie's request that I shall say a few words by way of introduction to his comprehensive work on Apologetics. I am purposely laying stress on the comprehensiveness of the work. It is always a satisfaction to have placed in our hands a treatise on one of the theological disciplines, which develops with serenity and sanity its entire content. In the case of Apologetics, however, such an achievement is particularly to be welcomed. We have had many apologies; perhaps no branch of scientific theology has been more fruitful during the past two centuries. But we have had comparatively few surveys of the whole field of Apologetics. Perhaps Dr. Beattie's is the first to be produced by an American Presbyterian.

The fact is, despite the richness of our apologetical literature, Apologetics has been treated very much like a step-child in the theological household. The encyclopædists have seemed scarcely to know what to do with it. They have with difficulty been persuaded to allow it a place among the theological disciplines at all. And, when forced to recognize it, they have been very prone to thrust it away into some odd corner, where it could hide its diminished head behind the skirts of some of its more esteemed sisters.

This widespread misprision of Apologetics has been greatly fostered by the influence of two opposite (if they be indeed opposite) tendencies of thought, which have very deeply affected the thinking even of theologians who are in principle antagonistic to them. I mean Rationalism and Mysticism. To Rationalism, of course, Apologetics were

an inanity; to Mysticism, an impertinence. Wherever, therefore, Rationalistic presuppositions have intruded, there proportionately the validity of Apologetics has been questioned. Wherever mystical sentiment has seeped in, there the utility of Apologetics has been more or less distrusted. At the present moment, the Rationalistic tendency is perhaps most active in the churches in the form given it by Albrecht Ritschl. In this form it strikes at the very roots of Apologetics by the distinction it erects between religious and theoretical knowledge. Where religion is supposed to seek and find expression only in value-judgments—the subjective product of the human soul in its struggle after personal freedom—and thus to stand out of all relation with theoretical knowledge, there, obviously, there is no place for a vindication of Christian faith to reason and no possibility of Apologetics. In a somewhat odd parallelism to this (though, perhaps, it is not so odd, after all) the mystical tendency is showing itself in our day most markedly in a widespread inclination to decline Apologetics in favor of the so-called *testimonium Spiritus Sancti.* The convictions of the Christian man, we are told, are not the product of reasons addressed to his intellect, but are the immediate creation of the Holy Spirit in his heart. Therefore, it is intimated, we can not only do very well without these reasons, but it is something very like sacrilege to attend to them. Apologetics, accordingly, is not merely useless, but may even become noxious, because tending to substitute a barren intellectualism for a vital faith.

We need not much disturb ourselves over such utterances when they are the expression, as they often are in our modern church, of the intellectual distress of those whose own Apologetic has proved too weak to withstand the Rationalistic assault, and who are fain, therefore, to take refuge from the oppressive rationalism of their understandings in an empty irrationalism of the heart. In these cases the extremes have met, and the would-be mystic preserves

nothing but his dialect to distinguish him from the Ritschlite rationalist. What he needs for his cure is clearly not less Apologetics, but more Apologetics—lacking which he must ever remain of a "double mind," clinging with the desperation of a drowning man to a faith on which his own intellect has passed the sentence of irrationality. The case is very different, however, when we encounter very much the same forms of speech on the lips of heroes of the faith, who depreciate Apologetics because they feel no need of "reasons" to ground a faith which they are sure they have received immediately from God. Apologetics, they say, will never make a Christian. Christians are made by the creative Spirit alone. And when God Almighty has implanted faith in the heart, we shall not require to seek for "reasons" to ground our conviction of the truth of the Christian religion. We have tasted and seen, and we know of ourselves that it is from God. Thus, the sturdiest belief joins hands with unbelief to disparage the defences of the Christian religion.

Dr. Abraham Kuyper, one of the really great theologians of our time, is a very striking instance of thinkers of this tendency. It is not to be supposed that Dr. Kuyper would abolish Apologetics altogether. He has written an *Encyclopædia of Sacred Theology,* and in it he gives a place to Apologetics among the other disciplines. But how subordinate a place! And in what a curtailed form! Hidden away as a subdivision of a subdivision of what Dr. Kuyper calls the "Dogmatological Group" of disciplines (which corresponds roughly to what most encyclopædists call "Systematic Theology"), one has to search for it before he finds it, and when he finds it, he discovers that its function is confined closely, we might almost say jealously, to the narrow task of defending developed Christianity against philosophy, falsely so called. After the contents of Christianity have been set forth thetically in Dogmatics and Ethics, it finds itself, it seems, in a three fold conflict. This is waged with

a pseudo-Christianity, a pseudo-religion, and a pseudo-philosophy. Three antithetic dogmatological disciplines are therefore requisite—Polemics, Elenchtics and Apologetics, corresponding, respectively, to heterodoxy, paganism, philosophy. The least of these is Apologetics, which concerns itself only with the distinctively philosophical assault on Christianity. Meanwhile, as for Christianity itself, it has remained up to this point—let us say it frankly—the great Assumption. The work of the exegete, the historian, the systematist, has all hung, so to speak, in the air; not until all their labor is accomplished do they pause to wipe their streaming brows and ask whether they have been dealing with realities, or perchance with fancies only.

Naturally it is not thus that Dr. Kuyper represents it to himself. He supposes that all these workers have throughout wrought in faith. But he seems not quite able to conceal from himself that they have not justified that faith, and that some may think their procedure itself, therefore, unjustified, if not unjustifiable. He distributes the departments of theological science into four groups, corresponding roughly with the Exegetical, Historical, Systematic and Practical disciplines which the majority of encyclopædists erect, although for reasons of his own, very interestingly set forth, he prefers to call them, respectively, the Bibliological, Ecclesiological, Dogmatological and Diaconiological groups of disciplines. Now, when he comes to discuss the contents of these groups in detail, he betrays a feeling that something is lacking at the beginning. "Before dealing separately with the four groups of departments of study into which theology is divided," he says,[1] "we must give a brief résumé from the second part of this *Encyclopædia,* of how the subject arrives at the first group. Logical order demands that the first group bring you to the point where the second begins, that the second open the way for the third, and that the third introduce you to the fourth. But no other precedes the first

[1] *Encyclopædie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid,* Deel III., p. 4 sq.

group, and it is accordingly in place here to indicate how we arrive at the first group." Just so, surely!

Dr. Kuyper proceeds to point out that the subject of theology is the human consciousness; that in this consciousness there is implanted a *sensus divinitatis,* a *semen religionis,* which impels it to seek after the knowledge of God; that in the sinner this action is renewed and quickened by the palingenesis, through which the subject is opened for the reception of the special revelation of God made first by deed, culminating in the Incarnation, and then by word, centering in the Scriptures. Thus, by the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti,* the subject is put in possession of the revelation of God embodied in the Scriptures, and is able to proceed to explicate its contents through the several disciplines of theological science. Now, what is it that Dr. Kuyper has done here except outline a very considerable—though certainly not a complete—Apologetics, which must precede and prepare the way for the "Bibliological Group" of theological departments? We must, it seems, vindicate the existence of a *sensus divinitatis* in man capable of producing a natural theology independently of special revelation; and then the reality of a special revelation in deed and word; and as well, the reality of a supernatural preparation of the heart of man to receive it; before we can proceed to the study of theology at all, as Dr. Kuyper has outlined it. With these things at least we must, then, confessedly, reckon at the outset; and to reckon with these things is to enter deeply into Apologetics.

As the case really stands, we must say even more. Despite the attractiveness of Dr. Kuyper's distribution of the departments of theological science, we cannot think it an improvement upon the ordinary *schema.* It appears to us a mistake to derive, as he does, the *principium divisionis* from the Holy Scriptures. The Scriptures, after all, are not the object of theology, but only its source; and the *principium divisionis* in this science, too, must be taken, as Dr. Kuyper

himself argues,[1] from the object. Now, the object of theology, as Dr. Kuyper has often justly insisted, is the ectypal knowledge of God. This knowledge of God is deposited for us in the Scriptures, and must needs be drawn out of them—hence "Exegetical Theology." It has been derived from the Scriptures by divers portions and in divers manners, for the life of the Church through the ages, and its gradual assimilation must needs be traced in its effects on the life of the Christian world—hence "Historical Theology." It is capable of statement in a systematized thetical form—hence "Systematic Theology." And, so drawn out from Scripture, so assimilated in the Church's growth, so organized into a system, it is to be made available for life—hence "Practical Theology." But certainly, before we draw it from the Scriptures, we must assure ourselves that there is a knowledge of God in the Scriptures. And, before we do that, we must assure ourselves that there is a knowledge of God in the world. And, before we do that, we must assure ourselves that a knowledge of God is possible for man. And, before we do that, we must assure ourselves that there is a God to know. Thus, we inevitably work back to first principles. And, in working thus back to first principles, we exhibit the indispensability of an "Apologetical Theology," which of necessity holds the place of the first among the five essential theological disciplines.

It is easy, of course, to say that a Christian man must take his standpoint not *above* the Scriptures, but *in* the Scriptures. He very certainly must. But surely he must first *have* Scriptures, authenticated to him as such, before he can take his standpoint in them. It is equally easy to say that Christianity is attained, not by demonstrations, but by a new birth. Nothing could be more true. But neither could anything be more unjustified than the inferences that are drawn from this truth for the discrediting of Apologetics. It certainly is not in the power of all the demonstrations in the

[1] *Encyclopædia*, E. T., p. 629.

world to make a Christian. Paul may plant and Apollos water; it is God alone who gives the increase. But it does not seem to follow that Paul would as well, therefore, not plant, and Apollos as well not water. Faith is the gift of God; but it does not in the least follow that the faith that God gives is an irrational faith, that is, a faith without grounds in right reason. It is beyond all question only the prepared heart that can fitly respond to the "reasons"; but how can even a prepared heart respond, when there are no "reasons" to draw out its action? One might as well say that photography is independent of light, because no light can make an impression unless the plate is prepared to receive it. The Holy Spirit does not work a blind, an ungrounded faith in the heart. What is supplied by his creative energy in working faith is not a ready-made faith, rooted in nothing, and clinging without reason to its object; nor yet new grounds of belief in the object presented; but just a new ability of the heart to respond to the grounds of faith, sufficient in themselves, already present to the understanding. We believe in Christ because it is rational to believe in him, not though it be irrational. Accordingly, our Reformed fathers always posited in the production of faith the presence of the *"argumentum propter quod credo,"* as well as the *"principium seu causa efficiens a quo ad credendum adducor."* That is to say, for the birth of faith in the soul, it is just as essential that grounds of faith should be present to the mind as that the Giver of faith should act creatively upon the heart.

We are not absurdly arguing that Apologetics has in itself the power to make a man a Christian or to conquer the world to Christ. Only the Spirit of Life can communicate life to a dead soul, or can convict the world in respect of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment. But we are arguing that faith is, in all its exercises alike, a form of conviction, and is, therefore, necessarily grounded in evidence. And we are arguing that evidence accordingly has its part to play in the

conversion of the soul; and that the systematically organized evidence which we call Apologetics similarly has its part to play in the Christianizing of the world. And we are arguing that this part is not a small part; nor is it a merely subsidiary part; nor yet a merely defensive part—as if the one end of Apologetics were to protect an isolated body of Christians from annoyance from the surrounding world, or to aid the distracted Christian to bring his head into harmony with his heart. The part that Apologetics has to play in the Christianizing of the world is rather a primary part, and it is a conquering part. It is the distinction of Christianity that it has come into the world clothed with the mission to *reason* its way to its dominion. Other religions may appeal to the sword, or seek some other way to propagate themselves. Christianity makes its appeal to right reason, and stands out among all religions, therefore, as distinctively "the Apologetic religion." It is solely by reasoning that it has come thus far on its way to its kingship. And it is solely by reasoning that it will put all its enemies under its feet. Face to face with the tremendous energy of thought and the incredible fertility in assault which characterizes the world in its anti-Christian manifestation, Christianity finds its task in thinking itself thoroughly through, and in organizing, not its defence only, but also its attack. It stands calmly over against the world with its credentials in its hands, and fears no contention of men.

It is a standing matter of surprise to us that the brilliant school of Christian thinkers, on whose attitude towards Apologetics we have been animadverting, should be tempted to make little of Apologetics. When we read, for instance, the beautiful exposition of the relation of sin and regeneration to science which Dr. Kuyper has given us in his *Encyclopædia,* we cannot understand why he does not magnify, instead of minifying, the value of Apologetics. Perhaps the explanation is to be found in a tendency to make too absolute the contrast between the "two kinds of science"

—that which is the product of the thought of sinful man in his state of nature, and that which is the product of man under the influence of the regenerating grace of God. There certainly do exist these "two kinds of men" in the world—men under the unbroken sway of sin, and men who have been brought under the power of the palingenesis. And the product of the intellection of these "two kinds of men" will certainly give us "two kinds of science." But the difference between the two is, after all, not accurately described as a difference in *kind—gradus non mutant speciem.* Sin has not destroyed or altered in its essential nature any one of man's faculties, although—since it corrupts *homo totus*—it has affected the operation of them all. The depraved man neither thinks, nor feels, nor wills as he ought; and the products of his action as a scientific thinker cannot possibly escape the influence of this everywhere operative destructive power; although, as Dr. Kuyper lucidly points out, they are affected in different degrees in the several "sciences," in accordance with the nature of their objects and the rank of the human faculties engaged in their structure. Nevertheless, there is question here of perfection of performance, rather than of kind. It is "science" that is produced by the subject held under sin, even though imperfect science—falling away from the ideal here, there and elsewhere, on account of all sorts of deflecting influences entering in at all points of the process. The science of sinful man is thus a substantive part of the abstract science produced by the ideal subject, the general human consciousness, though a less valuable part than it would be without sin.

It is well that it is so; for otherwise there would be no "science" attainable by man at all. For regeneration is not, in the first instance, the removal of sin: the regenerated man remains a sinner. Only after his sanctification has become complete can the contrast between him and the unregenerate sinner become absolute; not until then, in any case, could there be thought to exist an absolute contrast between his

intellection and that of the sinner. In the meantime, the regenerated man remains a sinner; no new faculties have been inserted into him by regeneration; and the old faculties, common to man in all his states, have been only in some measure restored to their proper functioning. He is in no condition, therefore, to produce a "science" differing in *kind* from that produced by sinful man; the science of palingenesis is only a part of the science of sinful humanity, though no doubt its best part; and only along with it can it enter as a constituent part into that ideal science which the composite human subject is producing in its endless effort to embrace in mental grasp the ideal object, that is to say, all that is. Even if the palingenesis had completed its work, indeed, and those under its sway had become "perfect," it may be doubted whether the contrast between the science produced by the two classes of men could be treated as absolute. Sinful and sinless men are, after all, both men; and being both men, are fundamentally alike and know fundamentally alike. Ideally there is but one "science," the subject of which is the human spirit, and the object all that is. Meanwhile, as things are, the human spirit attains to this science only in part and by slow accretions, won through many partial and erroneous constructions. Men of all sorts and of all grades work side by side at the common task, and the common edifice grows under their hands into ever fuller and truer outlines. As Dr. Kuyper finely says himself,[1] in the conflict of perceptions and opinions, those of the strongest energy and clearest thought finally prevail. Why is not the palingenesis to be conceived simply as preparing the stronger and clearer spirits whose thought always finally prevails? It is not a different kind of science that they are producing. It is not even the same kind of science, but as part of a different edifice of truth. Through them merely the better scientific outlook, and the better scientific product, are striving in conflict with the outlook and product of

[1] *Encyclop.*, etc., E. T., p. 151.

fellow-workers, to get built into the one great edifice of truth ascertained, which is rising slowly because of sin, but surely because of palingenesis.

Only in the Divine mind, of course, does science lie perfect—the perfect comprehension of all that is in its organic completeness. In the mind of perfected humanity, the perfected ectypal science shall at length lie. In the mind of sinful humanity, struggling here below, there can lie only a partial and broken reflection of the object, a reflection which is rather a deflection. The task of science is, therefore, not merely quantitative, but qualitative; the edifice must be built up to its completion, and the deflection induced by sin must be corrected. This cannot be accomplished by sinful man. But he makes the effort continuously, and is continuously attaining his measure of success—a success that varies inversely with the rank of the sciences. The entrance of regeneration prepares men to build better and ever more truly as the effects of regeneration increase intensively and extensively. The end will come only when the regenerated universe becomes the well-comprehended object of the science of the regenerated race. It would seem, then, a grave mistake to separate the men of the palingenesis from the race, a part of which they are, and which is itself the object of the palingenesis. And no mistake could be greater than to lead them to decline to bring their principles into conflict with those of the unregenerate in the prosecution of the common task of man. It is the better science that ever in the end wins the victory; and palingenetic science is the better science, and to it belongs the victory. How shall it win its victory, however, if it declines the conflict? In the ordinance of God, it is only in and through this conflict that the edifice of truth is to rise steadily onwards to its perfecting.

In the fact thus brought out, the ultimate vindication of the supreme importance of Apologetics lies, and as well the vindication of its supreme utility. In the prosecution of the

tasks of Apologetics, we see the palingenesis at work on the science of man at its highest point. And here, too, the "man of stronger and purer thought"—even though that he has it is of God alone—"will prevail in the end." The task of the Christian is surely to urge "his stronger and purer thought" continuously, and in all its details, upon the attention of men. It is not true that he cannot soundly prove his position. It is not true that the Christian view of the world is subjective merely, and is incapable of validation in the forum of pure reason. It is not true that the arguments adduced for the support of the foundations of the Christian religion lack objective validity. It is not even true that the minds of sinful men are inaccessible to the "evidences," though, in the sense of the proverb, "convinced against their will," they may "remain of the same opinion still." All minds are of the same essential structure; and the less illuminated will not be able permanently to resist or gainsay the determinations of the more illuminated. The Christian, by virtue of the palingenesis working in him, stands undoubtedly on an indefinitely higher plane of thought than that occupied by sinful man as such. And he must not decline, but use and press the advantage which God has thus given him. He must insist, and insist again, that his determinations, and not those of the unilluminated, must be built into the slowly rising fabric of human science. Thus will he serve, if not obviously his own generation, yet truly all the generations of men. We may assure ourselves from the outset that the palingenesis shall ultimately conquer to itself the whole race and all its products; and we may equally assure ourselves that its gradually increasing power will show itself only as the result of conflict in the free intercourse of men.

Thinking thus of Apologetics and of its task, it is natural that we should feel little sympathy with the representation sometimes heard, to the effect that Apologetics concerns itself only with "the *minimum* of Christianity." What is "the *minimum* of Christianity"? And what business has

Apologetics with "the *minimum* of Christianity"? What Apologetics has to do with is certainly not any *"minimum,"* but just Christianity itself, whatever that may prove to be. Its function is not to vindicate for us the least that we can get along with, and yet manage to call ourselves Christians; but to validate the Christian "view of the world," with all that is contained in the Christian "view of the world," for the science of men. It must not be permitted to sink into an "apology" for the Christian religion, in the vulgar sense of that word, which makes it much the synonym of an "excuse"; and much less into an "apology" for what is at best an "apology for the Christian religion"—possibly nothing more than "a couple of starved and hunger-bitten dogmas," which for the purposes of the moment we may choose to identify with "the essence of Christianity." The function of Apologetics is not performed until it has placed in our hands God, Religion, Christianity and the Bible, and said to us, Now go on and explicate these fundamental facts in all their contents. When men speak of "the Apologetical *minimum,"* we cannot help suspecting that they have for the moment lost sight of Apologetics itself altogether, and are thinking rather of some specific "Apology" which they judge might usefully be launched in the behalf of Christianity, in the conditions of thought for the moment obtaining. If such an "Apology" were identifiable with "Apologetics," we might well sympathize with those who consider Apologetics a department of "Practical Theology," and it is doubtless because they do not rise above such a conception of it that many encyclopædists have so classified it. But the Apologetics with which we are concerned is a much more fundamental, a much more comprehensive and a much more objective thing. It does not concern itself with how this man or that may best be approached to induce him to make a beginning of Christian living, or how this age or that may most easily be brought to give a hearing to the Christian conception of the world. It concerns itself with the solid

objective establishment, after a fashion valid for all normally working minds and for all ages of the world in its developing thought, of those great basal facts which constitute the Christian religion; or, better, which embody in the concrete the entire knowledge of God accessible to men, and which, therefore, need only explication by means of the further theological disciplines in order to lay openly before the eyes of men the entirety of the knowledge of God within their reach.

It is because Dr. Beattie's treatise conceives Apologetics after this fundamental, comprehensive and objective fashion, and develops its contents from that point of view, that we accord it our heartiest welcome.

A TREATISE ON APOLOGETICS

INTRODUCTION

"Who hath put wisdom in the inward parts? Or who hath given understanding to the heart?"—Job xxviii. 36.

"Whom, therefore, ye 'gnorantly worship, him declare I unto you."—Acts xvii. 23.

"That they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, and find him, though he be not far from every one of us."—Acts xvii. 27.

"For in him we live and move and have our being."—Acts xvii. 28.

"For the invisible things of him [God] from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead."—Romans i. 20.

APOLOGETICS.

INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER I.

THE SCOPE, THE SPHERE AND THE SPIRIT OF APOLOGETICS.

CONTENTS.

Apologetics the Previous Question of Christianity.—Raises Profound Problems.—Their Solution Vital.—An Age long Conflict.—The Divine Redeeming Activity.—Its Vindication Required.—The Mode of Defence Varies.—Must be Adjusted to Modern Thought.—The Spirit of Apologetics.—Needs a Wide Outlook.—Must be Candid and Fair.—Without Bigotry or Prejudice.—With Earnestness and Reverence.—Its Aim to be Practical.—Its True Function.

LITERATURE.

Ebrard's *Apologetics*, Vol. I. Introduction.—H. B. Smith's *Apologetics*, Chap. I.—Bruce's *Apologetics*, Chap. I.—Macgregor's *Apology of the Christian Religion*, Chap. I.—Schaff's *Theological Propædeutic*.—Articles on *Apologetics* in the Schaff-Herzog *Encyclopædia of Religious Knowledge*, in McClintock and Strong's *Cyclopædia*, in Johnston's *Universal Cyclopædia*, and in the *Britannica Encyclopædia*. Some works on *Apologetics* less accessible to the ordinary reader may be merely mentioned: Planck.—P. E. Müller.—Frank.—Stein.—Sack.—Von Drey.—Schleiermacher.—Delitzsch.—Baumstark.—Dorner.—Hirzel.—Sieffert.—Stirm.—Luthardt.—Riggenbach.—Düsterdieck.—Ritschl.—Kaftan. At the beginning of their treatises these authors discuss the questions dealt with in this chapter. In Orr's *Christian View of God and the World* there are some useful hints.

I. *The Scope of Apologetics.* § 1.

1. APOLOGETICS is concerned with the previous questions of Christianity. It is that important branch of theological inquiry which investigates the great questions which lie at the very foundations of the Christian system. It even ventures, at times, into the very heart of that system, and undertakes to unfold its inner reasonableness and sufficiency.

The questions which thus come before it are many and varied, and they urgently press for satisfactory answers. In seeking to supply these answers, Apologetics has to deal with the intelligible grounds of the Christian religion, and it has to consider the varied evidences which provide its rational vindication. In rendering this useful service, it finds itself face to face with philosophical, historical, ethical and religious problems of the deepest import.

2. It has to make earnest inquiry regarding the existence and nature of God, and concerning the constitution and destiny of man. It has to grapple with many perplexing problems which are involved in the relations of God to man and the universe. The questions of what knowledge man can obtain concerning God, and of how far God can make himself known to man, have also to be considered. The claim which the sacred Scriptures make to set forth a special message from God must be examined with care. In this connection Apologetics has to make good the complete historicity of these Scriptures, and at the same time to vindicate their divine authority.

It has also to deal with Jesus Christ, and it is called upon to give some satisfactory account of his unique personality, and of his most remarkable historical career. His wonderful influence on human affairs, as seen in the history of the Christian church, in the personal experience of its members, and in its splendid fruitage in modern civilization, calls for careful study. Nor can Apologetics be indifferent to the dark facts of moral evil as it appears in its various degrading aspects in the world. Of this it must give some reasonable account, and it dare not overlook the far-reaching issues of immortality for man. The abiding moral relations between God and man, and man's proper place in the scale of existing things, must be seriously pondered.

3. And are not these momentous questions? They are not merely theoretical speculations far removed from the affairs of men, but they are pregnant with vital practical

meaning for this life, and with vast import for that which is to come. If knowledge has any relation to the activity of men, and if belief has any bearing upon their conduct, then the questions to be considered and settled by Apologetics are of profound interest and of vital meaning. They cannot be set aside in a hurried way, nor is a superficial treatment of them likely to be satisfactory. Is Christianity true? Has it claims upon my attention which I dare not disregard, save at my peril? Is there a supreme and perfect Being who has made me, and still upholds me and all things else in the world? Am I endowed with a moral and religious nature, by means of which I find myself placed in definite relations of responsibility to a moral ruler who is over me? Am I so constantly and completely dependent upon this ruler that, by no possible effort of mine, can I shake myself free from his oversight and control? Is the Bible not only true and excellent as a matter of fact, but does it also unfold a divine revelation of the holiness and love, of the power and saving grace, of God in Christ, over against the sin and woe of men? Is the gospel message, with its divine and gracious remedy for this sin and woe, really needed by men? Is there proper ground for confidently accepting what the Bible says regarding the salvation which is in Christ, and are there good reasons why men should act upon the warnings and invitation of the gospel? Above all, is there a future state of reward and punishment, wherein the issues of this life will have their proper fruition, and is a personal interest in the Lord Jesus Christ necessary for the present and eternal welfare of men?

4. To ask these questions is to reveal the tremendous import of the issues which are wrapped up in Christianity, for each one of them is freighted with the deepest significance. Christianity is either *everything* for mankind, or *nothing*. It is either the highest certainty or the greatest delusion. If it be a hoary superstition, from which advancing modern thought is slowly but surely delivering us, we

ought to examine very carefully the grounds upon which such a conclusion rests, lest we be found acting hastily, and heedlessly casting away the pearl of greatest price. While this demand of modern thought cannot be ignored, yet it should not be too readily conceded, lest we be found guilty of treating with contempt those priceless realities of the Christian faith which have long had such an abiding place in the living experience and dying hopes of multitudes of men and women. A persistent delusion should at least be treated with consideration and respect.

But if Christianity be *everything* for mankind, it is important for every man to be able to give a good reason for the hope that is in him in regard to the eternal verities of the Christian faith. To accept these verities in an unthinking way, or to receive them simply on authority, is not enough for an intelligent and stable faith in these restless times. If our Christian heritage be a treasure of unspeakable value for us, we should examine carefully whether its rational, historical, moral and religious titles are valid and complete. The task of Apologetics is not so much to draw up these titles, as to exhibit them in an orderly and intelligible way. A clear head, a brave heart and a strong hand are needed for this task. To make good the title which reason and conscience, as well as heart and life, unite in giving to the reality, validity and adequacy of the Christian verities, is an undertaking of widest scope and deepest moment. One cannot but ask, earnestly though not hopelessly, Who is sufficient for such a task?

II. *The Sphere of Apologetics.* § 2.

In a preliminary way, the precise point of departure for Apologetics may now be indicated. This leads to the deepest view of the sphere of Apologetics, and raises inquiry as to its fundamental source. In making this inquiry, the underlying conditions which render the service of Apologetics to Chris-

tianity necessary will be unfolded. The setting forth of these fundamental conditions will make it plain that the service thus rendered is neither needless nor optional, but essential and necessary. It will be made evident that there are deep and abiding conditions that pertain to the very nature of Christianity, which constitute the fundamental sphere wherein the genesis of Apologetics is to be found. These conditions form its point of departure and constitute its real source.

1. These underlying conditions are involved in that deep-seated and age-long *conflict* between good and evil going on in the universe. They are conditions which really grow out of this conflict. In the universe there are operative two principles or agencies, which are sometimes conceived of as two kingdoms, or sets of organized forces. They are now, and long have been, in truceless antagonism against each other. These antagonistic principles, or sets of agencies, are denoted by various terms. Sometimes the symbols of light and darkness are used to denote them. Again, they are called good and evil, truth and error, right and wrong, sin and holiness. As the universe now subsists, as an object of reflection, there is observed in it a deeply seated dualism, wherein opposing forces are in irrepressible opposition. The Persian, the Hindoo, and the Norse forms of expressing this dualism are undoubted witnesses to this incessant conflict. In certain philosophical systems, like Gnosticism, and in pagan forms of demon worship, there are evidences of the same inveterate contest. With this conflict Christianity is directly and vitally concerned. The very reason for Christianity, to a large extent, lies in the fact of this conflict, for it is the very evils which give rise to it that Christianity proposes to remedy or conquer. These evils, however, are not inherent in the universe at its deepest roots; they are rather abnormal and destructive agencies with which Christianity proposes to deal. Apologetics undertakes to plead the cause of Christianity in this conflict.

The profound question of the origin and precise nature of those evil and destructive agencies with which Christianity finds itself in conflict is not now formally raised. The fact that this deadly conflict exists is simply assumed, as the sphere in which Christianity finds her appointed mission. Light and darkness, truth and error, good and evil, right and wrong, sin and holiness, are in such inherent opposition that peace between them is not possible, save by the defeat of the one and the victory of the other. Light can have no fellowship with darkness, and good can have no agreement with evil. In the last analysis, the real function of Apologetics is to vindicate Christianity, and to exhibit her defensive and offensive resources for this conflict.

2. In this same sphere there are also evidences that a divine *redeeming* activity is silently, but surely, at work. For it is to be remembered that Christianity is not to be conceived of as merely a principle or set of agencies, which is well able to hold its own against the opposing forces of evil in the universe. It is rather to be thought of as a set of redeeming and restoring agencies, with ability not only to defeat and destroy evil, but also to conserve and construct the good. Ever since the introduction of moral evil into the current of human history, there are evidences, not only of persistent conflict, but also of a potent redeeming and restoring activity. As the conflict continues from age to age, there are indications in the onward march of Christianity that the victory is declaring itself more and more plainly in favor of truth and righteousness. There seems to be a far-off glorious goal, where the light shines undimmed by the darkness; near by that goal there stands a noble palace, where truth and goodness are enthroned; beside that palace there is a splendid temple, whose walls and pillars are righteousness; and in that temple there is a shrine of holiness, on whose altar the pure fires of devotion ever burn. Christianity has her face towards that goal; and, with her heart full of faith and hope, amid the moral conflict of the

ages, she leads the universe, by the persistent power of her redeeming agencies, towards that glorious goal.

This divine redeeming activity resident in Christianity must be taken into account as we seek to get our deeper view of the real sphere of Apologetics. This activity has appeared in the world in various historic forms, culminating in Christianity, but the redeeming activity itself has always been essentially the same. This makes the conflict not merely a contest from without, but a restoration of the good and a subjugation of the evil from within. It is an overcoming evil with good. The Evangel which Christianity proclaims represents this redeeming activity, and Apologetics is commissioned and prepared to vindicate Christianity as adequate for her task.

3. From all this, it follows that the task of Apologetics is not self-imposed, but arises *naturally* from the nature of the case. The conflict already described is a persistent fact, and Christianity is committed to her long and arduous campaign. If the serpent is bruising the heel of the woman's seed, the seed of the woman will, in the end, surely bruise the serpent's head. In this moral warfare Apologetics vindicates the ability of Christianity to conquer in due time. Even though it be true that the redeeming activity operative through the gospel in the world is, in a sense, its own effective advocate and valiant defender, yet the exposition of the resources of Christianity for her divine mission made by Apologetics is of great value. Evidences of this value have appeared in all the periods of this conflict. The redeeming activity of God in the world, as it appeared in Old Testament times, in the hands of the prophets, is sometimes consciously, and often unconsciously, a distinctively apologetical service. In like manner the apologies of apostolic and patristic ages were well fitted to serve the same purpose. These apologies were not the redeeming activities themselves, yet they served to vindicate and exhibit these redemptive acitivities. The same is true in modern times. The gospel, which is the heart of

Christianity, exerts its renovating and subduing agency in the world, and, in the very nature of the case, Apologetics finds its call to exhibit Christianity in a defensive and vindicatory way.

4. It is evident, also, that the mode in which Apologetics shall undertake and best discharge its task will *vary* from age to age. As already indicated, the redeeming activity is always essentially the same, but the circumstances in which it is exhibited are subject to change. This naturally requires that Apologetics should be prepared to show how fully Christianity is qualified for every emergency in the conflict. Hence Apologetics must be ever watchful and ready to discern the signs of the times. In this service, to be forewarned is often to be forearmed. The assault may now be at one point, and again at another. Hence, Apologetics must be always alert, and ready for the foe at every turn; for the defences of one age may not suit another, and the vindication which served at one time may not be sufficient for another.

In our own age, when the service of Apologetics is greatly enlarged, and its resources so fully drawn on, it is of the utmost importance to have the methods and materials of apologetical service carefully adapted to our own restless and inquiring age. We do no injustice to the Apologetics of a century ago, when we say that it scarcely serves the demands of the present day, though it nobly served the needs of the day in which its service was called for. But in our own age new phases of the conflict have emerged, and a fresh setting of the defences is needed, and additional forms of vindication may be required. The Apologetics which was effective against the deism, materialism and rationalism of a century ago, may not be altogether effective against the monistic philosophy, the evolutionary science, and the historical criticism of current times. Hence an extension of the lines, and a recasting of the materials of Apologetics, is a service which presses upon modern apologetical activity, in

order that it may render as useful a service in the newer conditions as it did in the older.

5. It is proper to add, even at this early stage of the discussion, that the sphere of Apologetics is not fully apprehended until it undertakes to so present the *vindication* of Christianity as to supply a valid defence against every possible assault. As the real nature of the moral conflict going on in the universe is more fully understood, and as the true genius and inner resources of Christianity are more and more adequately exhibited, it will be shown, in ever increasing degree, what the sphere of Apologetics is. The result will surely be that just as Christianity represents an all-conquering and ever-renovating spiritual activity in the world, so will Apologetics undertake to exhibit its ability to present a rationally complete defence and vindication of Christianity. With no lower an ambition should modern Apologetics be content.

III. *The Spirit of Apologetics.* § 3.

It is important that Apologetics should possess the right temper for its work, so this opening chapter may properly conclude with some remarks upon the *true apologetical spirit.* It is well to catch the best spirit at the outset of our work, for the temper in which we commend Christianity to others often does more than anything else to win them. In general, no sentiment inconsistent with the mind of Christ, or the spirit of the gospel, should ever enter into Apologetics.

1. Apologetics should be *calm* and *elevated* in spirit. There should be no bitterness in its tone, nor should it ever be unkind. It should be firm, yet gentle; always alert, yet never hasty. If called to repel attacks that are bitter and unjust, it should never lose its temper, but ever maintain a serene spirit and exhibit a calm self-possession. Apologetics should ever keep in mind that to rule its own spirit is better than to take a city. Such a spirit will give strength to the

service it renders, and afford it satisfaction in that service; for it is humiliating to lose temper, even in the defence of a good cause.

So, also, the spirit of Apologetics should be elevated, and maintain true dignity and nobility. Only by this elevated spirit can it obtain a wide outlook over its extensive field, and secure that comprehensive view of its work which is necessary. If Apologetics is to vindicate Christianity at every point, it must not be content to take narrow views, or spend its strength on unimportant details. It should rather, in the noblest manner possible, engage itself with the main defences. In a well-balanced way, and with nobility and elevation of mind, Apologetics should look at all the lines of assault and defence, and, with a brave spirit and hopeful temper, address itself to its work. A wide outlook, an elevated temper, and a strong, manly grasp of its task, is what Apologetics needs at this time.

2. In spirit, Apologetics should be *candid* and *impartial*. It ought not to play the part of a mere advocate or special pleader, nor should it enter upon its task in an apologetic way, as if it thought that Christianity rested on somewhat insecure foundations. It should rather seek to exhibit, in a fair and judicial way, the rational grounds, the historical facts, and the experimental realities upon which Christianity securely rests. Nothing will be gained by unfair advocacy of a good cause, nor by taking any undue advantage of an antagonist. The candor and directness of the Scripture narratives, and especially of our Lord himself, may well be heeded by Apologetics. No defence that is not founded on sound reason, even though it may silence an adversary for a time, is ever likely to do Christianity much permanent good. Christianity, as the cause of truth and righteousness, needs no doubtful defences, and care should be taken that her good cause does not suffer from unfair advocacy. Apologetics is not an attorney or special pleader serving for a fee, but rather a judge, seeking to render a just and candid verdict.

3. In the spirit of Apologetics there should be no *bigotry* nor *prejudice*. The spirit of the bigot is bad, and the temper of prejudice may be hurtful. There may be the bigotry of the reason and the prejudice of the heart arrayed against Christianity, still the Apologetic for Christianity should not cherish narrow bigotry or perverting prejudice. If it does, it may not see things at quite the right angle, and by an intolerant spirit may wound Christianity in the house of its friends. If the opponents of Christianity have anything to say, and say it in a courteous way, Apologetics should patiently listen and faithfully seek to make reply. To abuse these opponents is not to answer their objections, and to call hard names does not serve to refute error. If the attack on Christianity be bold, impudent and blasphemous, silence may be the golden response which Apologetics ought to make. Only in rare and extreme cases should Apologetics be cutting and sarcastic, answering a fool according to his folly. Patience is usually power for Apologetics.

It should be added that when we exhort Apologetics to be free from bigotry and prejudice, it does not mean that we are to cast away that splendid heritage of religious truth of which this age is the heir. In no case are we to cast this away at the bidding of the skeptical opponent of Christianity. Apologetics holds this heritage most dear, and will allow no rude hand to take it away. Still, we hold it, not only as a heritage, but as truth which can be defended without intolerance or bigotry.

4. Apologetics must cherish an *earnest* and *reverent* spirit. The subjects with which Apologetics deals are the noblest about which the human mind can be engaged, and the issues involved in Christianity are of immense import. No flippant temper, no irreverent spirit, no half-hearted manner, are in harmony with the discussions in which Apologetics must engage. These discussions are concerned with the great problems of God, of the world, of man, of the relations of the universe and man to God, of revelation and miracles, of

sin and redemption, of Jesus Christ and his career, of a future state, and of rewards and penalties therein. Surely Apologetics shall feel that it is in the presence of majestic realities, and realize that the place where it stands is holy ground. The assault may often be made in a frivolous spirit, or with a sneering tone, and the temptation to make reply in the same spirit may often be strong. But it is usually best to treat all questions, that are worthy of treatment at all by Apologetics, in an earnest and reverent way. If the objections do not deserve such a treatment, it will usually be best to pass them over in silence. In presenting the positive strength of the grounds for accepting Christianity, thorough work is needed at the present day, for the controversy often is concerning the very foundations of Christianity, rather than regarding the superstructure itself. Such being the case, Apologetics must gird on its whole armor, and take its best weapons. Strenuous effort, earnest purpose, and profound reverence must mark modern Apologetics, if it is to serve its day in a virile and heroic manner.

5. Apologetics must always be conducted in a very *practical* spirit. It is not to enter upon its defence, and debate merely for the sake of the discussions which arise. The service which it renders is not simply a speculative one. The apologetical arena is not a mere intellectual amphitheatre, where the contestants meet for a exhibition of their skill in controversy; it is rather a battlefield, where the contest is serious, and the issues of the conflict are weighty. Apologetics thus seeks an end beyond itself in the defence and vindication of the Christian system. As the task of Apologetics in pleading the cause of Christianity grows out of the conflict with evil in which she is engaged, that task partakes of the nature of that conflict, and it calls for a practical performance of the duty thereby imposed. Apologetics does not exhibit Christianity on dress parade or fighting a sham battle; it rather presents her in campaign service, or on the battlefield in actual conflict with real foes.

This does not mean that men are made Christians by Apologetics, or that it is the real spiritual agent in gaining victories over evil. The gospel of the grace of God, and the energy of the Spirit of life, alone secure these results. But Apologetics renders useful service in removing stumbling blocks out of the way, in showing the inadequacy of the proposed substitutes for Christianity, and in exhibiting the reasonableness and sufficiency of the Christian religion.

6. Apologetics should be *courageous,* and never forget its true function. It has no excuse to make for Christianity, but a brave and heroic defence. It is to be animated by the spirit of the martyr and the hero. While the antagonist is always to be treated with courtesy, yet he is to be confronted boldly and bravely. Christianity, in one sense, needs no apology, for in the last analysis the Christian system is independent of Apologetics. The real foundations of the Christian system lie deeper than the results of Apologetics, but the service it renders is none the less valuable on this account. It exhibits the stability of these foundations, and enables us in various ways to test their security. With a brave heart, and with its eye ever steadily fixed on its true function, Apologetics seeks to do her noble duty. The Mount Zion of the Christian system rests securely upon the enduring foundation of the redeeming activity of God in Christ by the Spirit, seeking to remedy and conquer the evil that is in the world. But Apologetics takes us by the hand as we "walk about Zion, and go round about her," and as we "tell the towers thereof," and "mark well her bulwarks, and consider her palaces, that we may tell it to the generation following." "For this God is our God for ever and ever; he will be our guide even unto death." (Psalm xlviii. 12–14.)

CHAPTER II.

THE DEFINITION, THE AIM AND THE NATURE OF APOLOGETICS.

Contents.

The Meaning of the Term.—Apology and Apologetics.—The Usage of the Term.—Classic.—New Testament.—Patristic.—Scholastic.—Modern.—Definition.—Defective Definitions.—The Accepted Definition.—The Aim of Apologetics.—Defence.—Vindication.—Refutation.—The Nature of Apologetical Service.—Controversy.—Exposition.—Criticism.—Must take into Account the Fact of Sin.

Literature.

The Encyclopædia articles noted in Chap. I., especially that in the Schaff-Herzog.—Also the German treatises named in the same chapter, with the addition of Lechler.—Ebrard's *Apologetics,* Vol. I. Introduction.—H. B. Smith's *Apologetics,* Chap. II.—Crooks and Hurst's *Theological Encyclopædia and Methodology,* pp. 425–437.—Cave's *Introduction to Theology,* pp. 506–523.—Bruce's *Apologetics,* Chap. II.—Shedd's *History of Doctrine,* Vol. I., pp. 103–216.—Frank's *System of Christian Certainty,* pp. 18–25.—Hodge's *Outlines of Theology,* pp. 19, 20.—Van Oosterzee's *Christian Dogmatics,* pp. 75–228.—Foster's *Systematic Theology,* pp. 29–31.—*The Presbyterian Quarterly,* Vol. IV., pp. 337–370.

I. *The Meaning of the Term.* § 4.

THE term Apologetics is closely related to apology. They are both derived from the Greek *απολογια*, which means a defence or a pleading. The Greek verb *απολογεω*, as used in the middle voice, means to defend ourself, or to plead one's own cause. To make a plea in self-defence, or to present a vindication against certain charges, is the precise meaning of the word. The word *apology* was used exclusively in early times, but it did not convey the idea of excuse, palliation or making amends for some injury done. It rather denoted a plea or vindication. The plea of an attorney in the court-room is, in this primary sense, an apology for the cause or client. The advocacy of any set of opinions, either by speech or pen, is really an apologetical service.

1. The term Apologetics, however, has come into vogue only in recent times, and is now used in a technical sense, to denote the science of apology, or of defence and vindication. In general, this applies to any sort of *pleading* or vindication, such as that of the court-room, or as that of the public vindication or advocacy of any cause. Apologetics is thus the science of pleading, or advocacy, or vindication in general. It covers the whole ground of the exposition of the principles of effective pleading, and of the art of applying these principles in any given case.

2. Apologetics in relation to religion is the advocacy of the cause of religion in general, whereby the religious view of man and the universe is unfolded. Then, Christian Apologetics is the science of pleading the cause of Christianity, or of vindicating the claims and contents of the Christian system. An apology is a specific defence against some definite assault. Apologetics, however, is the science of all the defences, the vindication of Christianity from every possible assault. Apologetics for the Christian system is the science of the presentation of the whole plea for Christianity in such a way as to fortify it from all attacks, and to effectively commend it to the minds and hearts of men. Christian Apologetics is the organized defence and the systematic vindication of the whole area of the Christian system. It is not merely defence at one point; it is the science of all the defences.

II. *The Usage of the Term.* § 5.

To trace the usage of the term would require the writing of a history of Apologetics. This cannot be attempted here, but a few remarks may be of some interest and value, for the term *apology* is found in frequent and continuous usage, although the technical term, Apologetics, has come into use only in comparatively recent times.

1. In classic Greek, Xenophon uses the term apology, in

his *Memorabilia,* Chapter IV., several times. He employs it when presenting his noble defence of his master, Socrates, against the several charges which were made in reference to his teaching. Here Xenophon not only defends Socrates against the charges of impiety, of corrupting the youth, and of introducing new deities, but he also vindicates, in various effective ways, his master as one of the noblest and best of men. This defence and vindication is Xenophon's apology for Socrates.

2. In the New Testament the Greek word for apology occurs several times. In Acts xxii. 1, and in Phil. i. 7, it is translated "defence"; but in Acts xxv. 8, and 1 Cor. ix. 3, it is rendered by the word "answer." The meaning is the same, however, in all of these passages, for the Greek word is identical in them. If a man makes answer for himself, his procedure is a defence, and when a man makes a defence his doing so may be regarded as a reply or answer to some charges made against him. Stephen's splendid defence of himself, of his Master, and of the gospel cause, recorded in Acts vii., is very properly called his apology. When Paul said, in Phil. i. 17, that he was set for the defence of the gospel, he distinctly announces that he held an apologetic attitude towards that gospel. It is thus evident that the function of Apologetics in relation to the Christian system has a well-defined scriptural basis. In the Scriptures there are various apologies; and, by inference, Apologetics, as the science of these apologies, has also a biblical foundation.

3. During patristic times, as is evident from the writings of the Apostolic and early Greek and Latin Fathers, much apologetical work was done. From Eusebius, the Church historian, we learn that Aristides, Quadratus, and others whose writings have perished, wrote defences of Christianity. Justin Martyr, Tatian, Athenagoras and Hermas, whose writings have survived in whole or in part, also did much of the same useful work. Justin Martyr's two Apologies, written about the middle of the second century, are

important and valuable works. They are addressed to the Roman Emperor, and they first make an able defence of Christianity against assaults which, from pagan and other sources, had been made against it; and then they exhibit the main beliefs and practices of the early Christians.

Clement of Alexandria defended Christianity against the pretensions of Greek philosophy, and Origen answered the various attacks which Celsus made upon the Christian system. Tertullian vindicated Christianity against the Gentiles on the one hand, and the Jews on the other, while Athanasius wrote against Greek paganism, and Cyril replied at length to Julian. Augustine also wrote an Apology.

4. In scholastic times there was little apologetical activity. The energy of human reason during this period was devoted to the relations between philosophy and the doctrines of Christianity, and the activity of men's hands was engaged in warlike conflicts with the followers of the prophet of Mecca. Abelard and Aquinas did some apologetical work towards the close of the scholastic period.

5. After the Reformation began the discussions in the sphere of religion were largely polemic. It could scarcely be otherwise in the circumstances. But about a century after the Reformation, when human reason began to realize its freedom in various ways, serious assaults upon the Christian system began to be made from several quarters. These were promptly met by suitable apologies. Lardner, Stackhouse, Addison, Butler and Paley did good work in England, while Pascal and Turretin came to the rescue on the Continent. It is to be observed, however, that these apologies were always definite defences against specific assaults. They served an excellent purpose, but they did not, in any single case, supply a complete Apologetic. Butler came nearest to this in his *Analogy,* whose principles are by no means out of date for our own day. There were many noble treatises on natural theology, and excellent books on Christian evidences, produced in this age; but the scope of Apologetics

was not clearly conceived during the last century, with all its apologetical activity.

6. In Germany, about the same time, the need for the defence of Christianity also arose, largely on account of the advent of a widespread rationalism. The early German treatises were mainly apologies also, but about the beginning of this century more systematic treatises of an apologetical nature began to appear. The term Apologetics by degrees came into general use. Planck was the first to employ it, about 1794; but it was only by slow degrees that this technical term came to be generally employed, so that it is only about a generation since Apologetics succeeded in obtaining its rightful place in the theological encyclopædia. Even yet some hesitate to give it a separate place.

III. *The Definition of Apologetics.* § 6.

The way is now open to give a general definition of Apologetics. The precise form of definition to be adopted will be determined by the view taken of religion in general, and of the Christian religion in particular. And, in framing the definition, it may be best not to make any clear distinction between what is called natural and revealed religion, for Christianity, broadly viewed in the interests of Apologetics, really includes both. All that is insisted on at this stage is that the Christian religion is truly divine in its nature, and that it is the only adequate religion for sinful men, for the reason, mainly, that it is the only one which properly and effectively represents God's redemptive activity in the world.

Aid may be given in framing a definition of Apologetics by briefly noticing some of the defective definitions which have been proposed. In this way the accepted definition may the more clearly appear to be, in some measure, satisfactory. In doing so, H. B. Smith is followed in part.

1. Schleiermacher says, in substance, that "Apologetics is

a preparatory discipline, having to do with the fundamental principles of theology." It has thus to do with all the ideas, truths and facts which logically precede or historically antedate the system of theology proper. There is not a little that is true in this conception, for Apologetics is a preparatory discipline in relation to theology. But this definition rather describes its place in relation to theology proper than defines what it really is. In addition, it gives too wide a sweep for Apologetics, and includes under it much material which belongs to Introduction. Moreover, it scarcely denotes the specific aim of Apologetics, which is the defence and vindication of Christianity.

2. Hännell takes Apologetics to be "the science of the common ground of the church and theology." On this rather curious view the question at once arises as to what is this common ground. Till this is clearly answered, one cannot tell what the materials of Apologetics really are. If the Scriptures be that common ground, or underlying principle, then Apologetics is the science of the Scriptures. Or, if Christ be made the common ground, then it is the science of Christ. Or, again, if the common ground be the creeds, then it is the science of the creeds. From this it would appear that this definition is rather too vague to be of much service. And, in addition, it is open to the same objection as the previous definition, in that it gives no proper place to the main function of Apologetics in the defence and vindication of Christianity.

3. Von Drey defines Apologetics as "the philosophy of the Christian revelation and its history." From this viewpoint it becomes a branch of philosophy in general, and of the philosophy of religion in particular. This view is right, however, in giving prominence to the historical character of Christianity, and in finding the philosophy of history in it. But it reduces Apologetics to a branch of the philosophy of religion, whereas the philosophy of religion is, properly speaking, a branch of Apologetics. And it is perhaps better

to avoid the use of the word philosophy in defining Apologetics, since it may more properly be regarded as a branch of theological science than as a department of philosophy.

4. Sack describes Apologetics as "that branch of theology which treats of the ground of the Christian religion as divine fact." According to this view, Christianity is held to be real and supernatural, in its principles or ground, and the function of Apologetics is to make this claim good. It further prepares the way for dogmatics or systematic theology. The ideal side of Christianity is treated by systematic theology, and the real side by Apologetics. This definition has some merits, for Apologetics has, as part of its task, to make good the divine reality of Christianity. Still, it is rather one-sided and incomplete, for it lays exclusive stress upon the historical evidences, and leaves little place for the moral and other lines of defence and vindication which have much apologetic value.

5. Lechler gives quite another turn to the definition when he says that "Apologetics is the scientific proof that the Christian religion is the absolute religion." The function of Apologetics is to exhibit the ordered and systematic proof which suffices to show that Christianity is the only adequate religion for men. This definition points in the right direction, and yet it scarcely supplies what is now needed. The term absolute is a little vague, and Apologetics has not so much to show that Christianity is this sort of a religion as to make out its reality and sufficiency. Then, Apologetics is not best described as proof, even though that proof be scientific in its form. It is rather the science of the defence and vindication of Christianity as the divine redemptive religion. This definition, however, signalizes the fact that Apologetics is a science rather than a philosophy, and this is a good feature of it.

6. Baumstark leads us a further step in the right direction when he says that "Apologetics is the scientific defence of Christianity as the absolute religion." This definition is

nearer the mark than any yet given, though it still retains the term, absolute religion. But it has the merit of substituting the idea of defence for Lechler's notion of proof. It makes the main function of Apologetics to be the scientific defence of the Christian system in general, and in this it is so far correct. But it would have come still nearer the mark if it had said "the science of the defence," instead of "the scientific defence." A defence at a single point may be scientific, yet it may not be the science of all the defences, as Apologetics now claims to be.

7. Ebrard's briefest definition is to the effect that "Apologetics is the science of the defence of Christianity." This is brief, clear and pointed; and it indicates, better than any of the foregoing definitions, the main function of Apologetics. It may err by defect, though Ebrard, in his exposition of his definition, lays stress upon the vindication of Christianity, so that Apologetics really comes to be the science of the vindication of Christianity. Thus taken, it at least forms the point of departure for a correct definition. H. B. Smith agrees with this view, and lays stress on the vindication of Christianity.

8. Bruce, in theory, practically agrees with Ebrard, and speaks approvingly of his general positions. But he is inclined to take a much narrower view when he begins to unfold his defensive statements of Christianity. "Apologetics is a preparer of the way of faith, an aid to faith against doubts whencesoever arising, especially such as are engendered by philosophy and science. Its specific aim is to help men of ingenuous spirit who, while assailed by such doubts, are morally in sympathy with believers." [1] This view of the central function of Apologetics is scarcely adequate, and it leads almost necessarily to a constantly concessive treatment of the grounds and contents of the Christian system. And, further, Bruce's view scarcely gives scope to the presentation of the defences as a whole in a scientific way, according to some principle inherent in the

[1] *Apologetics*, Introduction, page 37.

very nature of Christianity. It makes Apologetics little more than a series of varying apologies. And, in addition, instead of properly defining Apologetics, it indicates, and that correctly enough, the homiletical use and value of Apologetics, rather than gives a proper definition of the science.

9. The following definition is the one which underlies this treatise: *Apologetics is that branch of theological science which presents a systematic defence and vindication of the reality of that divine redemptive agency which is resident in, and operative through, Christianity upon the world.* This states the function of Apologetics in harmony with the view already presented of its deeper point of departure.[1] In Christianity there is a divine redemptive activity operative in the world; for the Christian religion is not merely a system of truths, it is also a set of redemptive agencies or activities. Apologetics is here defined in such a way as to indicate that its fundamental aim is to make good the reality of these divine redeeming agencies resident in, and operative through, Christianity. This view, moreover, enables Apologetics to deduce its principle for a scientific presentation of all the defences from the inherent nature of Christianity, regarded at its root as a set of divine renewing activities operative in the world. In this there may be some gain in clearness and in completeness.

As a further definition, somewhat expository of the one just given, and as presenting more fully its concrete details, *Apologetics may be regarded as that branch of theological science which presents a reasoned defence and vindication of the essential truth, supernatural origin, divine authority, and inherent sufficiency of the Christian system of doctrine, of worship, of ethics, and of redemption, together with the systematic refutation of all opposing systems.* These two forms of the definition serve to determine the idea of that branch of theological science which is the theme of this treatise. The former indicates its point of departure and

[1] Chapter I., page 20.

inner function. The latter exhibits its task more in detail, and its practical function. Taken together, they serve the theoretical and practical ends of a definition of the Apologetics of the present day.

IV. *The Aim of Apologetics.* § 7.

Apologetics deals with Christianity from a certain point of view. This point of view is expressed in a general way by the definition of it just given. An exposition of this definition will serve to exhibit more fully the noble aim of this branch of theological science. When Apologetics understands clearly what its peculiar task is, it will be the better able to proceed with its performance. From the definition proposed, the aim of Apologetics is threefold in its nature.

1. It undertakes to *defend* Christianity. From the very nature of the case, it is the legitimate defender of the Christian system. This system represents the divine redeeming activity operative in the world, and it is natural to expect that the agencies of evil, also ever active in the world, shall make assaults upon Christianity. It is the professed aim and proper function of Apologetics to ward off these assaults. It must not only meet these attacks in detail, but take a position where it can defend the citadel of Christianity from every attack. And it may sometimes happen that the weapons with which the enemy assaults Christianity are actually captured and transformed into armor of defence for it.

No attempt is made, at this stage, to sketch the varied attacks against which Apologetics must make valiant defence. The attacks may be made upon the truthfulness of the doctrines, and reality of the worship of the Christian system, or upon the trustworthiness of its ethical system, and the potency of its redemptive scheme. These attacks Apologetics must resist and ward off. The assaults may be

directed against the supernatural origin, and hence against the divine authority of the doctrines, ritual, ethics and redemption implied in Christianity. These assaults, in like manner, are to be boldly met and bravely resisted. And, again, the inherent adequacy of Christianity to be a suitable and sufficient religion for sinful men, in the matter of doctrines, worship, ethics and redemption, may be called in question. If so, Apologetics must bear in mind that it is set for the defence of Christianity. And the lines of its defence must encompass the Christian system on every side, in order that its aim may be properly conceived, and its duty fully discharged.

2. Apologetics also aims at the *vindication* of Christianity. It not only meets the assailants of this true religion, but it fortifies the citadel itself. To defeat these assailants is not enough, for this defeat might only exhibit the skill and courage of the defenders, and do but little to reveal the inherent sufficiency of the Christian system. Hence Apologetics proceeds to vindicate Christianity, as the adequate and all-conquering redemptive activity of God in the world. This vigorous aim of Apologetics is exceedingly important and serviceable. The truth, the divine origin and authority, and the complete adequacy of the grounds and contents of Christianity are to be unfolded in such a positive and effective way that its inherent power and glory will be made manifest.

This opens up a wide field, which cannot even be sketched here. The adequacy of the Christian view of the world about us, of man as part of the world and with definite relations to Almighty God, is to be fully exhibited. The Christian doctrine of sin, and of the redemption from it provided in Christ, together with all the excellencies which centre in Jesus Christ, must be plainly opened up. The true nature of the Bible, and of historic Christianity, as well as the reality of the religious experience of the Christian, are to be unfolded in all their beauty and power. To this noble

task of vindication Apologetics is committed, and its fitness for this task is undoubted; so it may bravely do its duty.

3. The further aim of Apologetics is to *refute* opposing systems and theories. This is its offensive function. Having repelled the assaults of the foe, and having exhibited the impregnable nature of the Christian citadel, the final service of Apologetics is to assail the opposing systems, and to reveal their weakness and inconsistency. For this purpose Apologetics takes the open field, and enters on a vigorous campaign against the foes of the Christian faith. Not only are the assaults of these foes to be met, but the foes themselves are to be driven from the field. Every anti-theistic system, and all anti-Christian schemes, are to be carefully considered, and their claims and pretensions are to be rigidly scrutinized. As the children of Israel were commanded to drive out, conquer or destroy all the Canaanites from the land of promise, so Apologetics is commissioned to drive off, conquer or destroy all the opponents of Christianity at the present day, and to take full possession of the promised land, which God's redeeming activity in the world pledges to her. Hence, Apologetics aims to *defend* and *vindicate* Christianity, and to *refute* opposing systems.

V. *The Nature of Apologetics.* § 8.

The aim of Apologetics largely determines its nature, so that some remarks upon the latter topic may very properly conclude this chapter. As the function of Apologetics really springs from the conflict between light and darkness, good and evil, in the world, so, in its very nature, Apologetics must be controversial and polemic. As its threefold aim leads to defence, vindication and refutation, so its controversial or polemic nature emerges on these same lines.

1. In apologetical service there is an element of *controversy*. This feature of this service grows out of the assaults made upon Christianity, against which Apologetics defends

it. With these assailants Apologetics has a controversy which will not be content without victory. The controversy which thus arises takes many forms. Is the reality of the supernatural factor involved in the Christian system questioned, or is the validity of the redemptive activity of God resident in Christianity assailed; then Apologetics, by a vigorous controversy, makes its defence. Is the historicity of the Old and New Testament records impugned, and does a destructive historical criticism impair the authority of these records; then Apologetics has earnest work to do in making a proper defence at this point. If the assailant dons the garb of the philosopher, and in a learned way assails the validity of the grounds upon which belief in God rests, or boldly asserts that God is beyond the scope of human knowledge, or presents a false view of the relation between God and his works, then Apologetics must enter the lists of controversy, and resist the assault. If the attack approaches with the apparatus of the scientist, threatening, with weapons found in the open field or framed in the laboratory, to destroy Christianity, Apologetics must be prepared to drive back this foe with the weapons of a true and reverent science. And if these invasions planned against Christianity are at times bold, bitter or blasphemous, then Apologetics is to calmly stand its ground, and repel the onslaught; and, if at times it seems to be contending in a losing cause, it may simply have to stand still and see the salvation of God, and, when it least expects it, its wondering eyes may behold the horse and his proud rider cast into the sea.

2. Apologetical service has in it the factor of *exposition.* This feature appears as the vindication of the Christian system is faithfully conducted. This vindication necessarily requires thorough exposition of the grounds, and, to some extent, of the contents of this system. This opens up a wide field of apologetic activity. The Christian idea of God, as the infinite tri-personal Spirit, and the source and ground of all finite things, and as the righteous and gracious moral

ruler, whose mighty power and tender mercy are over all his creatures, is to be expounded in all its fulness of meaning. The relation of God to his works, as both immanent in all things, and yet transcendent in relation to all finite things, must be faithfully set forth. Here the theistic philosophy is doing a splendid apologetical service at the present day, in expounding that relation of God to the universe which provides a real and rational basis for the redemptive activity of God in Christ by the Spirit which Christianity represents.

A similar expository service is rendered by Apologetics on behalf of the sacred records of the Christian system. Apologetics opens the Bible, and lets it speak for itself. As it speaks, we hear historians telling of events which happened when the nations of antiquity were young; we hear its prophets, with great solemnity, speaking, as they were taught by God, of things yet far in the future; we are held spell-bound by its poetry, as it sings, in lofty strains, the praises of God in the accents of heaven; we also hear parables and proverbs which stand unrivalled through all the ages; and, above all, we listen to the story of the transcendent life and tragic death of the man of Nazareth, the Saviour of sinners; and as we do so, we are compelled to confess that this wonderful book has no equal.

The apologetical vindication of Christianity presents, as its central, peerless personage, Jesus of Nazareth, and gives its challenge to the world to produce his equal. His life, so unlike his degenerate and formal age; his teaching, so different in all respects from that of his own time; his moral heroism, so marvellous at every turn; his death, with all its mysterious meaning; his resurrection and ascension, with the redemptive influences which flow from him into the world, all combine to present Christianity to the world with an apologetic that is simply invincible. Christianity vindicates itself at the bar of reason and before the tribunal of conscience. It commends itself as fully satisfactory to the heart, and as potent for the life all along its pathway. It is

found to be like the godliness which it commends, profitable both for this life and for that which is to come.

3. In its nature, Apologetics has also an element of *criticism*. This is the polemic aspect of Apologetics. It emerges when the refutation of opposing systems is pursued. This refutation necessarily leads to a searching criticism of all those theories and schemes which profess to supply the place of Christianity. This polemic of thorough criticism is of much value in our own time, for modern thought is proposing many substitutes for Christianity. The critique of atheism need not detain Apologetics long; for there are no tribes of atheists, and few individual atheists feel absolutely secure in their denial of God. Then materialism, in its scientific and philosophic forms, and especially in the view of man which it teaches, must be carefully criticised. So, too, pantheism, in its various idealistic, monistic and evolutionary phases, has to be examined with the utmost diligence, for it is subtle and seductive. In like manner, positivism and agnosticism, as the twin brothers of a certain modern type of thought, are not to be passed over without minute examination. And pessimism must have its mask taken from it, and false moral theories must be exposed. Skeptical and naturalistic theories of the Scriptures, of the Christ of history, and of the facts of Christianity in the world, are to be put into the witness-box and cross-questioned by Apologetics. In addition, rival religions, and non-religious social theories, are to be scanned by means of competent criticism, and tested by the light of reason and experience. Thus, it will appear that when all these opposing systems are weighed in the balances of Apologetic criticism, they will be found wanting.

Such is the nature of Apologetics. Blended together, and aiding each other in the service rendered to Christianity, there will be controversy, exposition and criticism, as defence, vindication and refutation proceed.

CHAPTER III.

THE PLACE, THE METHOD AND THE DIVISIONS OF APOLOGETICS.

Contents.

The Place of Apologetics as a Theological Discipline.—Various Views.—With Practical Theology.—With Exegetical Theology.—With Systematic Theology.—As Fundamental to all Disciplines.—The Accepted View.—The Method of Apologetics.—The Philosophical or Cosmological.—The Psychological or Anthropological.—The Historical or Bibliological.—The Christological and Redemptive.—The Theological and Redemptive.—The Accepted View.—The Divisions of Apologetics.—Various Schemes.—The Plan Adopted has Three Divisions.—The First, Fundamental or Philosophical Apologetics.—The Second, Christian or Historical Apologetics.—The Third, Applied or Practical Apologetics.

Literature.

The Encyclopædia articles mentioned in former chapters, especially that in McClintock and Strong for the Place and Method of Apologetics.—Also the authors named in these chapters, with the addition of Hagenbach, Pelt, Kienlin and Kuyper.—Schaff's *Theological Propædeutic,* and H. B. Smith's *Apologetics,* Chap. II., have value for the Divisions.—Cave's *Introduction to Theology,* pp. 509–522.—Warfield's article in *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review,* Vol. VII., p. 243.—Inaugural Addresses of Professor Hobson, of McCormick Seminary, and of Professor Greene, of Princeton Seminary.—*Presbyterian Quarterly,* Vol. IV., p. 337.—Consult treatises on Theology by Calvin, Hodge, Thornwell, Dabney, Shedd, Strong, Van Oosterzee, Miley and Foster, where, in the opening chapters, there is much apologetical material treated as introductory to Systematic Theology, under the titles of Theism and Natural Theology.

I. *The Place of Apologetics.* § 9.

IT was scarcely to be expected that, so long as the defence and vindication of Christianity consisted in nothing more than separate apologies to resist specific assaults, Apologetics would be given any definite place in theological science. And until the precise function of Apologetics was clearly conceived, its proper *place* in relation to the other theological disciplines could not very well be understood.

In addition, the fact that many English writers, in their defences of Christianity, treated Natural Theology and the Christian Evidences quite apart from each other, increased the difficulty of making any claim on behalf of Apologetics for a place of its own in the circle of the theological sciences. But so soon as Apologetics was understood to be the science of the defence and vindication of Christianity, in that it sought to unify all its separate apologies, the question of its rightful place beside the other branches of theology soon arose. But, even after the question was raised, it was not easily answered in a satisfactory way. For some time there was wide diversity of opinion upon the question, and it can scarcely be regarded as entirely settled even yet.

1. Some make it a division of Exegetical Theology. Planck, who first used the term in a systematic way, so regarded it. This certainly seems a peculiar view. It appears to have been determined largely by the fact that many of the objections made against Christianity arise from the Scriptures, with whose interpretation Exegetical Theology is concerned. Taking Exegetical Theology to cover questions of the genuineness and authenticity of these Scriptures, it came to pass that Apologetics, which in part has to deal with these questions, should in some way be regarded as a part of Exegetical Theology. It seems quite evident that this opinion takes too limited a view of the scope of Apologetics; for while it is true that some of the assaults upon Christianity are lodged against the Scriptures, yet Apologetics is much broader in its scope, and may deserve a distinct place of its own.

2. Others place Apologetics with Practical Theology. It thus becomes a branch of Homiletics. Delitzsch, Düsterdieck and Kienlin so regard it. Sack is inclined to make it consist in the apologetic treatment of Systematic Theology by the preacher. This general view of the place of Apologetics is based upon the fact that the preacher, in his practical work, must at times deal with various aspects of Christianity

in a defensive way. This being the case, it belongs properly to Practical Theology.

There is some force in this claim, from one point of view, for Apologetics always has a practical end before it in the defence and vindication of Christianity; and the preacher is called to defend its reality at every assailable point. It does not follow, however, that Apologetics, on this account, belongs to Practical Theology, any more than Exegetical, or Systematic Theology belongs to Practical Theology, because they provide some of the materials which the preacher uses. Even though Apologetics is to be used for practical ends by the preacher, it may still be necessary to give it a place of its own as a theological discipline.

3. Many writers are disposed to make it a part of Systematic Theology. According to this view, it becomes the introductory division of Systematic Theology. Hagenbach leans to this view. Pelt also regards it as having to deal with the first principles of theology. Dorner looks upon it as the first part of Christian Doctrine. Schaff makes it the first division of Systematic Theology. Cave, in a somewhat confused way, places Natural Theology as an introductory discipline, and then makes Apologetics a branch of Comparative Theology, to be known as Fundamental Theology, in contrast with Doctrinal Theology. Kuyper gives it an obscure place under Dogmatic Theology. Then, many representative theologians, like Calvin, Hodge, Dabney, Shedd, Strong, Foster and Miley, deal at length with apologetical material in their books on Systematic Theology. Nearly the whole of the first volume of Hodge's splendid treatise deals with apologetical topics, and many pages at the beginning of the other treatises mentioned are devoted to the same themes. This mode of treatment arose, in part, from the fact that the place of Apologetics was not very clearly defined when these works were planned, and in part from a difference of opinion as to what was the legitimate materials of Apologetics. Then, too, the fact that in teach-

ing, these apologetical topics were usually handled by the same preceptor as dealt with Systematic Theology, naturally threw these two disciplines into intimate, practical relations with each other, and brought them forth in the same treatises.

If Apologetics is not to have a separate place, its most natural affiliation would be with Systematic Theology. It would then stand as an introductory, or preparatory section, for the subject of Systematic Theology, broadly viewed. As the case now stands, this can scarcely be regarded as the best view. It somewhat narrows the function of Apologetics, and confines it almost entirely to Systematic Theology. But it has also to deal with the authenticity and divine character of the holy Scriptures, and this brings it into relations with Exegetical Theology. Then, too, this location of Apologetics with Systematic Theology unavoidably burdens the latter subject with many philosophical and bibliological questions, which should be discussed and settled beforehand, so that Systematic Theology may be made as free from speculation, and as biblical as possible. This can be best effected by giving Apologetics a separate place among the theological disciplines.

4. It may be best, therefore, to give Apologetics a place of its own, and to regard it as *an introductory discipline to the whole system of theology*. Schleiermacher was the first to announce this view. Ebrard adopts it. Warfield also gives Apologetics this fundamental place, and so do many other living teachers. This, no doubt, is the best view. We might agree with Pelt in making it deal with the fundamental principles of theology, if the term theology be taken in its widest sense. Hagenbach almost comes to this position when he says that the other branches of theology must be covered before Apologetics can do its work fully. This is a confession that Apologetics holds some sort of relation to all these branches of theology, and the question is as to how this relation should be regarded.

The simple view is to regard it as preliminary to all the theological disciplines. It is the fundamental discipline which underlies and has relations with all the others, and, consequently, it stands logically first. It makes good the reality of the existence of God, and exhibits the relations subsisting between God and his works. It also vindicates the historical accuracy and the divine authority of the holy Scriptures, and makes good the validity of the divine redemptive activities resident in Christianity. By means of the service it thus renders, Exegetical and Systematic Theology have their ground-work provided, and Historical and Practical Theology obtain their proper support. This gives Apologetics its natural place, and supplies it with its proper materials. And it leaves the way open for a systematic treatment of it, as the science of the vindication of Christianity.

At the same time, Apologetics has points of close contact with Systematic Theology, and there is force in the suggestion of Hagenbach that before Apologetics can fully discharge its office, the other branches of theology must have been studied. This means that after Exegetical, Systematic and Historical Theology have fully exhibited the inner nature and the beneficial effects of Christianity, Apologetics is able greatly to enrich its resources for the vindication of the Christian system. This might be termed the verification of Christianity and the crowning service of Apologetics.

II. *The Method of Apologetics.* § 10.

By the *method* of Apologetics is meant the starting point of the investigation it conducts, or the central principle, according to which its materials are arranged and its discussion is pursued. It is very evident that where the material is so vast and varied as is that of Apologetics, a proper method is indispensable to a systematic treatment of the whole subject. The method adopted will be largely

determined by the conception of Christianity which is entertained, and by the view taken of the function of Apologetics in relation to it. For the present discussion, this point has been practically determined already.[1] From this fundamental position the discussion of the *method* of Apologetics now proceeds.

1. Some pursue what may be termed the philosophical, or *cosmological,* method in Apologetics. Treatises on the Philosophy of Religion, like those of Pfleiderer and Caird, to some extent represent this general type of view. According to it, Apologetics begins with the existing world about us, and views it either in its philosophical principles or in its cosmological unity, and then discovers in Christianity the highest metaphysics and the truest philosophy of the universe about us. Pursuing this general method, the apologetic for Christianity is often constructed on an elaborate scale.

As an aspect of apologetical service, this is quite sound and useful. Christianity is the best philosophy of the universe. But this view of apologetical method is in danger of overlooking the concrete historical reality of Christianity, and of reducing Apologetics to little more than a metaphysical scheme or a system of philosophy. Moreover, this method necessarily gives the whole treatment too much of the abstract to serve the best ends.

2. Others prefer what may be called the *psychological* or anthropological method. Delitzsch formally adopts this method, and the writings of President Edwards, so far as they are apologetical, have the same feature. If this view of the method be adopted, the point of departure for the discussion, and the principle for the development of Apologetics, is found in the nature and needs of mankind. Man's nature is so constituted, and his needs are of such a character, that some provision must be discovered to fit this nature and meet these needs. Christianity is found to fully supply

[1] Chap. I., Sec. 2, dealing with the Scope of Apologetics.

what is required for this purpose. Apologetics, pursuing this method, undertakes to show how Christianity fulfils this demand.

This view, again, is in a measure true; and so far it is very important. Christianity is perfectly suited to man's nature, and it supplies all that sinful men need in the religion they feel they require. But this view is scarcely deep enough; for Christianity has its doctrine of God and of the universe, and it has its sacred records in holy Scripture. Apologetics must find and apply its central principle in such a way as to organize all these, as well as its anthropological factors, into a complete system.

3. Some others prefer to follow the *historical* or bibliological method. Writers like Paley and Rawlinson, though they do not announce any definite principle, are practically following this method. Recent writers who lay special stress on the historical evidences in general also belong to this class. Here the external evidences of Christianity are made prominent, and various lines of reasonings which serve to vindicate the historicity of the sacred Scriptures and of the Christian origins, constitute the burden of Apologetics. The confirmation of the biblical history from profane history and from the monuments, is a large feature in the working out of this method. Little stress is laid upon the philosophical side of the case for Christianity. The main contention of Apologetics is to show that the Christian system is essentially true.

This, too, is a very important part of apologetical service, for the historicity of the Christian documents is to be made good by Apologetics. But this view of its method hardly reaches to the root of the problem. The real question of Apologetics relates to the redemptive activity of which these records speak; for Christianity is not merely historic truth, it is also a divine dynamic in the world. Therefore, the principle which determines the apologetical method must go beneath the historical and bibliological aspects of Christi-

anity, though that same principle must also take into account the historicity of the Scripture records.

4. In more recent times many are inclined to adopt what may be described as the *Christological* and *redemptive* method. Bruce, so far as he has any definite method, represents this view. H. B. Smith is perhaps a better type of it. Writers like Fairbairn incline more or less definitely to this conception of apologetical method. This view is often presented in a rather vague and pretentious way. In general, it projects Apologetics from the person, mission and activity of Jesus Christ, and it finds its principle for the distribution of the apologetical material in the redeeming agencies which proceed from Christ into the world. In many ways this is the popular view in our day.

There is much in this view to be commended. It gives a proper place to the redemptive aspect of Christianity. It also honors the person and activity of the divine Mediator and Redeemer, who is the head of that kingdom of light, and truth, and holiness, which is in inevitable conflict with the kingdom of darkness, error and sin. If this view be not confined merely to the historic career of Jesus Christ, but is taken to embrace this entire redeeming activity, it is almost on the correct ground in regard to the proper apologetical method. Its only defect, in the hands of some who adopt it, is that nearly all the stress is laid on the earthly historic period of the redeeming activity and teaching of our Lord.

5. There remains, therefore, a somewhat deeper, though not entirely different, view to take, in order to rightly seize the true apologetical method at its deepest root. This method may be denoted by the term *theological* and *redemptive*. This view of the method or principle of Apologetics is in harmony with the position already taken in regard to the true function of Apologetics in relation to Christianity. Christianity represents the redeeming activity of God in the world, which is rendered operative through Christ by the Holy Spirit, and Apologetics vindicates the Christian system

from this deeper point of view. Hence its point of departure is from the mission of Christianity in the world, and the principle, which is to determine its proper method, roots itself in God as he exercises his redeeming agency in the world and in conflict with evil. The relation of God to the world, and man's knowledge of God are fundamental.

Not only does this provide us with the deeper view of a comprehensive apologetical method; it also gives proper place to what is sound in all the other proposed methods. These start from the world, man, the Bible and Christ, respectively. Now, the redeeming activity of God presupposes a certain relation between him and the world; it discovers in Christianity what suits and supplies man's need; it has its authentic records given in the sacred Scriptures, which give a true knowledge of God, and it is mediated through Jesus Christ. This theological redemptive principle, consequently, supplies the best method, and the one, therefore, which is adopted in this treatise.

III. *The Divisions of Apologetics.* § 11.

The *divisions* of Apologetics relate to the way in which its materials are distributed into the various branches of the science, in order to its logical development and systematic discussion. It was some time after this branch of theological science began to take definite form that any positive attempt was made to distribute its materials in a logical manner. So long as Natural Theology and the Evidences of Christianity were discussed separately by apologists, the somewhat mechanical division of the materials into two branches prevailed; but this division was of little logical value.

The distribution of the materials must be determined by the principle already announced in the method adopted. If the universe, or man, or the Bible, or Christ, or God and his redeeming activity, be the point of departure for Apologetics, then the principle of the division of its materials will

correspond with the method adopted. In this treatise the last of these supplies the method followed, and this consequently gives the key to the division to be made. It may illumine the exposition of this topic to note some of the proposed plans for the divisions of Apologetics.

1. Bruce has three divisions: First, Theories of the Universe, Christian and Anti-Christian; secondly, The Historical Preparation for Christianity; and thirdly, The Christian Origins. This can scarcely be regarded as sufficiently comprehensive. It gives no adequate place for the theistic proofs, and it does not exhibit the relation of Christianity to other forms of religion as fully as it should. And it scarcely seems proper to separate the historical preparation for Christianity from the Christian origins, as both constitute the historic aspect of God's redeeming activity in the world.

Cave regards Apologetics as Fundamental Theology, and makes it one of the branches of Comparative Theology. He then makes four divisions of it: First, Natural Theology; secondly, Ethnic Theology; thirdly, Biblical Theology; and fourthly, Ecclesiastical Theology. These might be termed philosophical, ethnic, biblical, and ecclesiastical apologetics, respectively. This cannot be regarded as a really practical division. It is not made on any single principle which clearly appears.

Ebrard, after a useful introduction, makes two main divisions, with various subdivisions, and works out the whole plan so as to include most of the apologetical material: First, The eternal contents of the truth of Christianity, according to the facts of nature and human consciousness. This is opened up in two main sections. One deals with the positive development, which is elaborated at great length. The other considers critically some of the leading anti-theistic schemes, but is not so fully wrought out as the other. Secondly, Christianity as a historic fact, in its organic connection with the history of religion. This division is broken

into two somewhat unequal sections. One contains a very complete historical survey of the non-Christian religions. The other gives a somewhat brief treatment of the revelation of God set forth in the Christian system.

There are many strong features about Ebrard's work. Its treatment of the facts of nature and man's consciousness, and its exposition of the theistic proof founded thereon, are very thorough. And its comprehensive outline of comparative religion is one of its strong features. But it is not without defects. It lays stress upon the purely philosophical side of Apologetics, and scarcely does full justice to the historical materials of the science. And relatively too much space is devoted to the non-biblical systems, and far too little to the revelation of God which Christianity represents. In spite of these defects, however, Ebrard's treatise is a noble work.

H. B. Smith adopts a simple threefold division, in which he is substantially followed by Foster in his *Systematic Theology*. First, Fundamental Apologetics, in which the underlying philosophical questions regarding God, man and the universe are treated. Secondly, Historical Apologetics, which deals with the supernatural in historical form as it emerges in the Christian system, especially in its sacred records. Thirdly, Philosophical Apologetics, wherein it is shown that Christianity is the highest truth and the final solution of the problems of existence.

This comes very nearly up to the requirements of a good division. The only defect about it is that it is not easy to see clearly how the discussion of the first and third divisions can always be kept logically separate. In both cases philosophical inquiries arise. These regard the same matters from only slightly different view-points, so that confusion or repetition is almost sure to arise. On this account, Ebrard's twofold division has some advantages. In the first, philosophical problems are expounded; and in the second, historical questions are considered. Hence there is little

danger of confusion. By a combination of the plans of Ebrard and Smith, a workable division may be obtained.

2. The plan for the division and distribution of the apologetical material adopted in this treatise may now be outlined. This plan keeps in mind the true function of Apologetics in relation to Christianity. It is also determined by the method already adopted in this chapter, which provides the principle by which the division is to be effected. That principle is the redeeming and restoring activity of God in the world as it appears in Christianity. This implies a certain underlying relation of God to the world and man. It also exhibits a certain definite historical form in the world. And it is face to face with the various problems of a practical nature with which Christianity proposes to deal. This key to the division of the material opens up a threefold classification of it.

First, there is *fundamental* or philosophical Apologetics. This is concerned mainly with three problems, God, man and the world. The underlying problem involved in these three refers to the relation between them. This opens up important aspects of the philosophy of religion, and the exposition to be entered on under this division covers the whole field of the theistic discussion. The nature and origin of theistic belief, the rational grounds for man's knowledge of, and belief in, the existence of God, together with an adequate criticism of all the anti-theistic theories constitutes the burden of this division. In the conclusion reached, the organic and rational relation of God to man and the world is to be carefully educed.

The second division may be termed *Christian* or historical Apologetics. This is engaged chiefly with the historical nature of the revelation of himself which God has given in the Christian system. Here his redemptive activity resident in, and operative upon, the world through Christianity, appears in historic form; and its real historical nature, as well as its true divine authority, must be fully vindicated.

And its sacred documents in the Scriptures must be carefully considered in this connection. And the relation between Christianity and the various other religious systems has to be fully understood. Hence the inquiry here is largely historical in its nature, dealing first with the non-Christian systems, and afterwards weaving into a complete whole the evidences of Christianity as a truly redemptive religion. This division gives the Bible, Christ and redemption.

The third division, for want of a better name, may be called *applied* or practical Apologetics. In this division Christianity is viewed in its relation to the various practical problems with which it has to deal in the life and thought of men. Its relation to modern science and recent social theories, its bearing on the various pressing evils which rest on men in the world, and its ability to adjust itself to these and provide the practical and effective remedy for these evils, are to be unfolded under this division. Here Christianity is ready to meet with the practical test of its ability to cope with all these evils, and of its adequacy to effect the complete evangelization of the world. By its ability to do this Christianity abundantly vindicates itself, and thereby reveals the undoubted reality of the divine redemptive agencies which it possesses. This practical test constitutes the verification of Christianity, as competent to fulfil its divine mission. Thus the task opened up is threefold. The philosophical validity, the historical reality, and the practical efficiency of Christianity are to be shown. This gives Philosophical, Christian and Applied Apologetics respectively.

CHAPTER IV.

APOLOGETICS AND THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

Contents.

The Spiritual Principle in Man.—Body and Soul Distinct.—Different.—Yet Closely Related.—Mode Mysterious.—The Powers of the Spiritual Principle.—A Misconception.—The Mental Faculties.—Their Classification.—Various Plans.—The Modern Scheme.—The Intellect.—Sense-Perception.—Understanding and Reason.—The Sensibility.—The Appetites.—The Affections and Emotions.—The Will.—Its Nature.—Freedom.—The Moral Nature.—The Religious Activity.—The Mode of Knowledge.— Epistemology.— Theories.— The Empirical and Rational Contrasted at Three Points.—The Objects of Knowledge.—Knowledge Defined.—Its Tests.—The Objects Sketched.—The Reality of the Subjective and Objective in Knowledge.—Truth.

Literature.

The articles on *Psychology* and *Knowledge* in the Encyclopædias already mentioned.—Sir W. Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics,* with J. S. Mill's *Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy.*—Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason,* with Spencer's *First Principles.*—Dabney's *Sensualistic Philosophy,* with Bain's *Mental and Moral Science.*—McCosh's *Intuitions,* with Watson's *Kant and His English Critics.*—Treatises on *Psychology,* by Baldwin, Davis, James, Porter, McCosh, Ladd, Sully, Dewey, Murray, Hickok and Spencer.—Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics,* p. 13.—Harris' *Philosophical Basis of Theism,* p. 44.—Ebrard's *Apologetics,* Vol. I., p. 25.—H. B. Smith's *Apologetics,* p. 46.—Bowne's *Metaphysics,* p. 403, and his *Studies in Theism,* p. 9.—Diman's *The Theistic Argument,* p. 35.—Bowne's *Theory of Thought and Knowledge.*—Ladd's *Philosophy of Knowledge.*—Sabatier's *Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion,* p. 277.

AS a man's philosophy goes far to determine his type of theology, so the theory of knowledge he adopts will greatly affect his Apologetics. On this account, Apologetics has a vital interest in *a sound theory of knowledge.* It would be an initial mistake to accept an epistemology which leaves the Christian system without a rational foundation, and Apologetics without any constructive materials. Inquiry as to the nature and powers of the human mind, and careful

scrutiny of the conditions and bounds of the knowledge it may acquire, are of pressing importance for Apologetics. Hence, even at this early stage in these discussions, some preliminary positions must be understood in regard to the mind of man and its powers of cognition. Though the thorough discussion of these questions must be deferred till Materialism and Agnosticism are reached, yet a few broad lines of safety should even thus early be marked out.

I. *The Spiritual Principle in Man.* § 12.

The whole personality of man is the subject of religion. This personality is complex. It is composed of a material organism, which is called the body, and of a spiritual principle, which is known as the mind or soul. Though related, these two factors are essentially distinct, and religion pertains to both. From this it follows that Apologetics cannot be indifferent to the views held touching either of these factors in man's complex constitution. It dare not allow materialism to exclude the spiritual factor, nor can it permit idealism to do injustice to the material element in the nature of man. Nor can Apologetics consent to accept any theory of knowledge which closes the door of cognition against the supersensible, and thus rules out the knowledge of God on the part of man. Above all, the reality of the spiritual factor in man must be guarded with the utmost care.

1. The material and spiritual factors in man are essentially *distinct*. They differ in their nature, and are unlike in the conditions of their existence. The former is material substance; the latter is spiritual. Both, therefore, have substantial reality; the one, that of an organic structure; the other, that of an intelligent principle. Life is resident in the former, and thought belongs to the latter. The organic life of the body is not to be identified with mere physical force, nor is thought to be confounded with the

purely vital activities of the body. Consciousness may involve brain movement, but brain movement is not identical with consciousness. Thought processes may imply an activity of the nerve system, but the nerve system alone does not account for these processes. If consciousness and thought processes generally have not their seat in the bodily organism, there must be another factor in the personality of man to which they belong. This is the spiritual factor in man; and the reality of this factor is now insisted on in the interests of Apologetics.

2. Not only are these factors distinct in man; they are also *different* in their nature. This difference has already been denoted by the terms material and spiritual. The bodily organism belongs to one category of being, the spiritual principle to another. The body is directly concerned with organic, or vital, functions; the soul exhibits intellectual, moral, emotional and volitional activities. As spiritual, the soul is not subject to the conditions of material existence, nor can physical predicates be applied to it. Its nature is spiritual and personal, and its activities are psychical and rational. This position Apologetics earnestly maintains in the interests of religion.

3. Though the body and soul in man are distinct and different, yet they are most intimately *related*. In order to the completeness of the human personality both are required. Though the seat of personality may be located in the soul, yet the body is necessary to the fulness of that personality. So far as continued existence in this earthly state is concerned, the union between them must abide. If the bond binding them together is broken, the organic condition of the body dissolves, and the spiritual principle no longer finds its proper abode on earth. The fact of the resurrection illustrates the intimate relation between body and soul, and confirms the view that both are requisite to complete personality. As to the precise nature of the union between them, and as to the exact mode of their interaction, not very

much may be said. It can scarcely be regarded as mechanical or external; it may rather be looked upon as dynamical and internal. To say this, however, is to do little more than assert the fact of their personal union, and of constant interaction between them. Few, if any, now would agree with Descartes that the soul is lodged in the pineal gland. Most would, in some sense, accept Hamilton's suggestion that the soul is in proximate relation with the entire physical organism. And though modern physiological investigations in relation to psychology have made great advances since Hamilton's day, it is yet true that psychology and physiology together have not yet been able to lift the veil from that mysterious holy of holies in the personality of man, wherein nerve excitation is translated into actual sensation. Physiology may trace the nerve movement up to the threshold of this holy of holies, but it cannot lead into its secret chamber. Yet this movement seems to be the necessary antecedent to the mental affection called sensation. All of which goes to show how intimately the two factors are interwoven in the human personality. As religion relates to both soul and body, Apologetics is bound to protect the interests of both. In a very special manner must it stand for the defence of the spiritual principle in man.

II. *The Powers of the Spiritual Principle.* § 13.

Some inquiry is now to be made regarding the powers of the spiritual principle in man. This raises the question of the faculties of the human mind, and introduces the discussion into the realm of psychology. The powers or faculties of the human mind denote those capacities which enable it to exercise certain activities or undergo various experiences. In this connection it at once appears that, although the spiritual principle in man is a unit, yet its activities and experiences are quite numerous and varied. This opens up the sphere of that science which deals with the faculties of

the human mind and their various operations. The facts of consciousness in general are the materials of psychology.

1. An initial, though a rather superficial, misconception has to be guarded against at the outset. It is sometimes supposed that, just as the brain has its various real divisions, so the mind has also its several actual sections. In this way the various powers of the human mind come to be regarded as separate divisions of it. In one section is located the memory, in another the imagination, and in another the conscience. Certain types of phrenology of materialistic tendencies, and some recent investigations into the physiological antecedents of psychology, may have fostered this popular error.

It need scarcely be said that this way of thinking in regard to the spiritual principle in man, and of its various powers and capacities, is quite superficial, and entirely misleading. This principle, in its very nature, is a single, indivisible, spiritual unit, incapable of any kind of partition. From this it follows that the several faculties of the human mind are not to be regarded as sections of it, but rather as modes of its unitary activity. For it must not be concluded that because various nerve excitations can be localized in certain sections of the brain, the sensations associated with these excitations must also be located in diverse departments of the mind. The entire spiritual principle which is the seat of personality in man is involved in each and all of these activities. Hence, intellect and conscience and will, perception and memory and imagination, do not denote several diverse sections of the mind, but express various activities and experiences of the one indivisible spiritual principle, which is the subject of these activities and experiences in man.

2. Various plans for the classification of the powers of the human mind have been proposed. The Greeks, in their philosophy, inclined to classify the materials of human knowledge, rather than to make any formal division of the

mental activities involved in its acquisition. As the result of this, dialectics, physics, ethics and politics appear in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. To some extent, the scholastic philosophy followed the leadership of the Greeks in this matter. The earlier Scottish philosophy adopted a twofold division of the mental powers. Reid divided them into the mental, or intellectual, and the moral, or active, powers. This is good as far as it goes; but it places the will under the active or moral powers, instead of by itself. Sir W. Hamilton centered his type of the Scottish philosophy in consciousness, and his division of the mental powers naturally grew out of his analysis of consciousness. To some extent, Kant follows the older Scottish school. He has pure, or theoretical, and moral, or practical, reason. But he adds the faculty of judgment, and gives prominence to it in a somewhat peculiar way. Other older modes of classification cannot be noted.

3. The psychology of the present day has come to substantial agreement in regard to the classification of the mental powers. They are now usually divided into three classes.

The first division includes the *knowing* powers, and is usually called the *intellect*. These powers are concerned in the various cognitive activities of the spiritual principle in man, and the result of the operation of these powers is knowledge. Of the knowing powers, three subdivisions are usually made.

The first is sense-perception, by means of which the human mind relates itself to the external world through the senses. Here the fact of sensation, which is an affection of the soul through the senses, and perception, which is rather an operation of the mind unifying the sensations into a percept proper, have to be considered. The result here is presentative knowledge.

The second subdivision of the knowing powers is the understanding. This is the discursive faculty, the faculty

of comparison, or the logical faculty. It is exercised in comparison, generalization and abstraction. It utilizes the materials given in sense-perception, and by means of its laws, or categories, it unifies, in various ways, these materials. Out of percepts it constructs concepts, and thus transmutes presentative knowledge into representative.

The third subdivision of the intellect is the reason. This is that capacity of the spiritual principle by which it relates itself to the supersensible realm of thought. This is the mental faculty which deals with principles and laws. These laws regulate the activity of the spiritual principle of human intelligence in the supersensible realm of pure thought. It deals not so much with percepts, or concepts, as with rational principles which lie at the basis of cognition. This is a very important activity.

The second general class of the mental powers is the *feelings.* This is known as the *sensibility,* and it relates to certain experiences of the soul which are usually associated with the exercise of the knowing powers. On this account, various forms or aspects of knowledge produce corresponding affections in the sensibility. These affections will be weak or strong, agreeable or disagreeable, according to the character of the exercise of the knowing powers which condition them. Three subdivisions are usually made in this class also.

The first is the appetites. These are the lowest, and are, in a measure, instinctive and spontaneous. The second is the affections. These are higher, and they denote those feelings of like and dislike which pertain to the sensibility. The third is the emotions. These are the highest, and they denote those aspirations of the soul which reach out beyond it. These three subdivisions cannot be very strictly separated, and there runs through them all the striving activity, or desire, operative in the spiritual principle in man, viewed as sensibility. Some writers, consequently, call these

the conative powers, meaning thereby to prepare the way for the distinction between desire and will.

The third general class of the mental powers is the *will*. This is the faculty of choice, or of *volition*, or of self-determination. If the sensibility be the basis of self-expression in man, then will is the source of self-determination. If the former produces desire, the latter effects choice; if the former is voluntary, the latter is volitional. Many problems arise in connection with this aspect of the activity of the spiritual principle in man. The nature of volition, the relation between motives and volitions, and the great question of the freedom of man in his volitions, all arise here, but cannot be discussed. It can only be remarked that, in the interests of Apologetics, the utmost care must be taken not to adopt a psychology which leads to a mechanical theory of the faculty of volition, or which would, in any way, invade the essential freedom of the spiritual principle in man.

4. Growing out of these three general classes of the powers of the human mind, there are two additional aspects of the activity of the spiritual principle in man which are to be mentioned in connection with Apologetics. These activities are sometimes ranked along with the intellect, sensibility and will; but most writers are now inclined to regard them, not as different classes of activities, but as the same powers exercised in other spheres and upon different materials.

One of these is known as *conscience*, or the moral faculty. This is really the spiritual principle in man viewed in relation to moral facts and experiences. Its activity, thus viewed, implies an exercise of the intellect, the sensibility, and the will. This activity apprehends moral distinctions, and announces the opposition between the right and the wrong. It also asserts, in an authoritative way, the fact of moral obligation, and administers approval or disapproval as the conduct of the moral agent deserves. This whole area of experience and activity is sometimes called man's moral

nature; still in it we have intellect, and sensibility and will, engaged with morality.

The other activity of the spiritual principle in man to be noted here is that involved in *religion*. Some are inclined to place the religious powers in a class of their own, and to speak of man's religious nature and powers as they do of his intellectual. So far as the objects involved in these activities are concerned, there is some force in this view. But when the activity of the spiritual principle in itself is considered, it scarcely seems necessary to place the religious activities in a class by themselves. It may be sufficient to look upon the religious activities and experiences of man as the exercise of his various powers upon the highest and noblest objects with which they can possibly be engaged. Hence, the religious activity of the spiritual principle in man involves the operation of the knowing powers, the experience of the sensibility, the exercise of the conscience, and the activity of the will, upon the highest objects with which they have to deal. These objects are the facts, the truths, and the experiences which are involved in the knowledge and love, the worship, and service of God.

From this, it is evident that Apologetics has a profound interest in a sound psychology, which shall provide a secure rational basis for religion on its subjective side, as grounded in a certain activity of the spiritual principle in man.

III. *The Mode or Method of Knowledge.* § 14.

In the first section of this chapter the reality of the spiritual principle in the constitution of man was asserted, and in the second the various powers or capacities of this principle were indicated. This prepared the way for the consideration of the nature of the processes implied in these activities of the human mind. This leads to a much deeper view of the subject, and raises profound questions which are of vital importance. The inquiry now is as to the very

possibility of a true knowledge of real things, and as to the scope and limits of this knowledge.

1. In the preceding section the discussion moved almost entirely in the sphere of *psychology;* in this section it passes on to the realm of *epistemology*. As the scene is changed, so the problems are different. As psychology deals with what may be called the natural history of the mental powers and their operations, so epistemology takes up what is really the metaphysics of these powers and of their operations. So it comes to pass that as the materials of psychology are found in consciousness, the problems of epistemology lie in the sphere of self-consciousness. The question now is as to the possibility, conditions and limitations of the activity of the spiritual principle in man. This is a question which must be answered chiefly by investigating the nature of that activity at its root in self-consciousness, as the unifying principle of that activity. Here agnosticism, with its denial of the possibility of knowledge save in a narrow sphere, and positivism with its plea for the relativity of all human knowledge, appear on the scene. So, too, empiricism and idealism are at hand; the former to say that all knowledge is determined from without, and the latter to assert that it is altogether constructed from within, the mind. In the one case the nature of things produces the laws of thought, and in the other the laws of thought produce the nature of things. Are we shut up to any one of these views? Can we discover a stable and balanced theory of knowledge amid all this confusion? Surely we can.

2. Touching this problem, two opposite types of view have always prevailed. The one may be termed the *empirical* or sensational, and the other the *rational* or intuitional. For this discussion they may be called the empirical and the rational theories of cognition. The former maintains that all knowledge comes from without the mind. It begins with, and is conditioned by, our sensible experiences. The other argues that the mind, or spiritual principle in man, has

inherent in its very nature certain principles which it brings to experience. These principles really make experience possible, and condition it in a definite way. These opposing views are to be seen in all ages, and between them there has always been open warfare. This appears in the disputes between Socrates and the Sophists, in the reasonings of Plato against the Heraclitics, and in the controversy of Aristotle with the Epicureans, in ancient times. In modern speculation, the same warfare emerges in the reasonings of Leibnitz against Locke, of Kant against Hume, and of Mill against Hamilton. And in our own day the antagonism is as great as ever, and perhaps more clearly defined, between sensationalism and intuitionalism, between empiricism and rationalism, as to the theory of knowledge.

And this contest is in progress in the moral sphere, as well as in the intellectual. The question as to whether conscience is an original factor in man's nature, or the product of certain of his experiences, is earnestly debated. The inquiry into the nature of moral distinctions, so as to discover whether they are primitive and ultimate, or the result of some simpler factors, such as pleasure or utility, is answered in two widely different ways. The same debate arises also in regard to the nature and origin of theistic belief. Some contend that it is a derived, empirical product, and others that its germ, at least, is native with the spiritual principle in man. It is evident, therefore, that Apologetics has profound interests at stake in the sphere of epistemology.

3. The contrast between these two contending views may be pretty fully brought out by some critical comparison at three points. The result of this critique may elucidate and confirm the correct doctrine.

The initial point of contrast is found in the diverse views taken of the human *mind at first,* and prior to any cognitive experiences. Touching this point, the empirical view is that the mind is negative, empty and passive in its original state. It is at first like a sheet of blank paper, with nothing written

upon it, and not even any ruled lines on it, by which the writing is to be directed. The rational doctrine maintains that the human mind, at the very outset, has in its inner nature certain principles, conditions or rules, according to which the spontaneity of the spiritual principle in man is determined in all its cognitions. This principle is active according to certain rules which pertain to its very nature. Prior to experience it may be like a sheet of blank paper, with nothing actually written on it; but the ruled lines are there already, and the writing of experience upon it must be conformed to these lines.

That the rational is the better view upon this point, is evident from the fact that only on its ground can human knowledge have any order or system in it. Empiricism leaves the fabric of knowledge in confusion. The very fact that human experience exhibits certain great uniformities plainly implies that the mind is not at first entirely blank, colorless and passive. Even if it be allowed, as Spencer contends, that the law of heredity accounts for those elements in knowledge that are universal and necessary, the question would still press as to how it comes to pass that the law of heredity operates so uniformly in a certain way if there be no subjective rule according to which its activity is determined. Empiricism, therefore, cannot account for the universal and necessary elements in knowledge, and even heredity requires a subjective rule in order to produce the uniform results claimed for it.

The second point of contrast between the empirical and rational theories of knowledge is in regard to the *genesis* of knowledge. How does cognition arise, and what are its initial factors? The empiricist says that all knowledge comes from without, and enters the mind, so to speak, by the avenue of the senses. Sensuous experience is at once the occasion and the source, the condition and the origin, of knowledge. The rational doctrine, on the other hand, maintains that while experience may be the occasion of

knowledge, yet the mind itself always makes a contribution to the origin of knowledge, and is, in a sense, its source. The mind itself brings certain laws or rules, which give form to cognition at the very first. Even in sensation this is true, for single, unrelated sensations are not knowledge. They are the unrelated materials of knowledge, and they become knowledge in sense-perception only when the mind itself, by a primitive spontaneous act, binds the separate sensations together according to a rule inherent in the mind. The result is the knowledge of some external object as a percept.

The view here vindicated is not to be confounded with the traditional doctrine of innate ideas, which is commonly supposed to have been held by Descartes, and is criticised by Locke in the first book of his *Essay*. It seems more than likely that Locke exaggerated the Cartesian philosophy at this point, just as Cousin exaggerated Locke's system at several points in his celebrated critique of the English philosopher. In both cases the man of straw was set up, for it is doubtful if any reputable philosopher ever held the doctrine of innate ideas as Locke criticised it, and there is no reason to believe that Cousin rightly understood Locke at all the points of his criticism.

All that is contended for, on behalf of the rational theory of knowledge, is that in the spiritual principle in man, and underlying all its activities, there are certain rules or conditions of cognition which are spontaneously brought by it to the beginnings of knowledge. This subjective rule is the *a priori* factor which springs from the mind itself and conditions knowledge. Leibnitz against Locke suggests the true doctrine when he says that the mind itself precedes experience. And Kant against Hume is right when he says that experience may be the occasion, but is not the sole source, of knowledge. In like manner, modern thinkers who insist that the spiritual principle in man possesses a spontaneous activity which operates, not at random, but

according to certain rules inherent in it, are clearly in possession of the key to a sound epistemology.

The third point of contrast between empiricism and rationalism remains. This relates to the manner in which the higher and more complex elements of knowledge are *constructed*. Touching this point, the empiricist holds that all the more complex forms of knowledge are elaborated out of the simpler factors which come by the senses. This elaboration takes place by means of habit, association and heredity, without any determining subjective factor contributed by the mind itself. The rational theory maintains that to every advance in the elaboration of knowledge, and as it increases in complexity, the mind always supplies the rules and principles by which this progress takes place. These rules condition and unify every form of knowledge to which the mind attains. Just as the initial knowledge of the external world in sense-perception implies an activity of the mind, exercised according to a rule, by means of which the isolated and unrelated elements in sensation are bound together into a percept in cognition, so, in the higher operations of the understanding, the activity of the spiritual principle in man, operating according to the categories or rules of this activity, elaborate and unify what may be termed discursive knowledge into a systematic whole in the form of concepts. And so, also, in the exercise of reason, this same activity proceeds to unify, according to certain rules or ideals, the supersensible elements of human knowledge, and in this way still higher unities, where concepts become thoughts, are reached. At every stage the spontaneous activity of the spiritual principle is the pedagogue that conducts the elaborative process of human knowledge according to certain inherent rules.

Did space permit, it might be shown that the same is true in regard to the moral nature and experiences of the spiritual principle in man. Ethical empiricism, as well as intellectual, is rejected, for the reason that in man's moral nature certain

principles or rules must be presupposed, in order to explain the nature of moral distinctions and the fact of moral obligation. The significance of all this will appear more clearly when the nature and origin of theistic and religious belief is investigated. Meantime, the foundations of a sound epistemology are laid.

IV. *The Objects of Knowledge.* § 15.

It now remains to make some remarks concerning the things actually known. This inquiry relates to the objects which the spiritual principle in man, in the exercise of its various powers, can apprehend, with full assurance that those things subsist just as they are apprehended. To put it more definitely, Are the convictions of the human mind in the matter of knowledge in harmony with real facts, and what are the real facts or things to which these convictions stand directly related?

1. At the very outset, an ambiguity in the meaning and usage of the term, knowledge, meets us. Sometimes the term denotes the act, or mode of mental activity involved in knowing. To have knowledge of anything thus means to exercise the mental activity involved in acquiring knowledge in any sphere. This was the meaning mainly under notice in the previous section of this chapter. Again, knowledge sometimes denotes the result of the activity called knowledge. When used in this sense, it signifies the sum of things actually known. To have knowledge thus, means to have information about any subject. This is evidently the sense in which the term is used in discussing the question of the objects of knowledge.

The discussions of this entire chapter thus bring before us three main topics. In the second section the inquiry lay in the realm of psychology, in the third the problems arose in the sphere of epistemology, and now the investigations open out upon the field of ontology. Are there real objects to be

truly known? Can there be a true correspondence between real things and the activities of the spiritual and intelligent principle in the nature of man?

2. In order to answer this question with any degree of accuracy, it is necessary to define more clearly than has yet been done what knowledge really is. This is no easy task. In making an attempt to do this, let the matter be put in several ways. In general, knowledge implies a relation; a relation between an intelligent subject and an intelligible object. If this relation be founded in the very nature of things, then it is real knowledge. If there be a real, not an arbitrary, correspondence between the knowing subject and the object known, then there is true cognition. Hence, knowledge may be defined as the direct apprehension of reality. In this apprehension the cognitive capacity of the spiritual principle in man comes into direct relation with the object known, and there arises in the mind the full assurance that the relation thus established is an accurate one, by which the subjective conviction has objective validity. To vary the statement a little, knowledge is the firm inward conviction that percepts, concepts, or thoughts, are in rational correspondence with the facts, truths or the realities of things which are related to the mind as objects of knowledge. A descriptive definition like this is valid for all the varied forms in which the objects of knowledge are to be found.

3. A brief allusion to the tests or marks of true knowledge may confirm and illumine this definition. There are three chief tests or criteria of true knowledge. The first is self-evidence. That which is apprehended clearly in its own direct light may be regarded as real knowledge. In other words, that which is *autopistic,* and in its very nature carries conviction, is true knowledge. Truths like the axioms are matters of real knowledge, because in and of themselves they compel conviction. A second test of knowledge is *necessity.* This means that what, in the nature of the case, must be

accepted, and whose acceptance is essential to the validity of other accepted convictions, is to be regarded as actual knowledge. This is what may be termed the apodictic feature in certain aspects of knowledge, which are of such a nature that to suppose their opposite is to enter on the pathway to contradiction and absurdity. The third test, which is in a sense implied in the two already stated, is *universality*. Facts or truths which are held by all men in all ages to be true, and as really known, constitute genuine knowledge. To make denial of the reality of such knowledge is to enter the highway to nescience by the gateway of agnosticism.

4. In regard to the *objects* of knowledge, it may be said, generally, that whatever is *directly* apprehended by any of the powers of the spiritual principle in man is *known*. All those convictions of the human mind which are autopistic, apodictic and universal constitute real knowledge. The objects of knowledge thus understood are usually divided into three classes, though these classes are not to be too widely separated from each other. The first class includes the objects known in *sense-perception*. This class implies the reality of the external world of existing things, and the rational correlation and correspondence of the mental apprehensions with its reality. The second consists in the facts of *consciousness*. This class implies the reality of the spiritual principle in man, and the possession by that principle of certain experiences of whose reality it is impossible to doubt. The third class of the objects of knowledge is found in connection with the rational *principles* or inherent rules of the activity of the human mind. These principles which are thus involved in the activity of the human mind are immediately apprehended as necessary to the very possibility of knowledge in any sphere. Another division might be adopted. There are the objects of intellect, of sensibility, of will, of conscience, and of the religious nature in man. In all these cases there are elements of knowledge in the strict sense. But the threefold classification of the objects

of knowledge will serve present purposes, for it includes all.

5. A profound and far-reaching question yet remains. What is truth? What is the reality which is immediately apprehended in that knowledge of things which the mind acquires? Is there a fixed reality in the external world of things which forms the basis, alike in the intellectual and moral spheres, of a real correspondence in cognition between the immediate apprehensions, or the fixed convictions of the mind, and the reality of the objects known thereby? Is there objective, rational and moral truth which is ultimate in its nature? This is one of the burning questions of the day, and we must be careful not to make a treaty of peace with agnostic skepticism or positivist empiricism, by which we unwittingly cede to either the whole territory of cognition. Is there a system of real things which constitutes the fixed objects of knowledge? And does the spiritual principle in man, in the exercise of its intelligent activity, come into real and rational correspondence with this system of things? Does the intelligence of man obtain such an apprehension of this real system of existing things that its apprehension has objective validity as knowledge? Was Socrates or the Sophists, Plato or the Heraclitics, Aristotle or the Epicureans, right in their day? And for our day, is Descartes or Condillac, Leibnitz or Locke, Kant or Hume, Reid or Berkeley, Hamilton or Mill, empiricist or intuitionalist, correct?

The answer given to this question must turn largely upon the view taken of the real nature of the external world, where so many objects of knowledge lie. Shall we say, with the idealist, that this world is a system of mere relations, dependent, in whole or in part, upon the process of cognition for its constitution? Or shall we assert, with the empiricist, that things in the external world are not a system, but disconnected units, which do not in any sense constitute a rational system? The answer here will largely determine our theory of knowledge. According to the former view,

there are relations, but no real things; and, on the latter theory, there are real things, but no relations. The one hides the real in the rational, and the other loses the rational in the real. Both, therefore, seem to be one-sided and incomplete, though there is a truth in each.

It is better to maintain, in some sense, the reality and rationality of both the knowing subject and the objects known in cognition. According to this view, the external world, as an object of knowledge, is neither a system of mere relations nor a collection of unrelated things. It is rather a system of related things, in whose very nature there is reality and rationality. According to this view, the external world, as the object of knowledge, presents a rational and a real unity as an object for the activity of the spiritual principle in man. This activity has rational rules by which it is determined, and in cognition this activity comes into real correspondence with the external world as a system of related things. To put it briefly, the laws of thought and the laws of things are correlated in cognition, and this correlation is real knowledge. The basis for this correlation is found in the fact that the world of related things, being rational at its roots, is intelligible as an object of knowledge for the principle of rational intelligence in man. There is, therefore, a distant kinship between the subject and object, according to the view just set forth. This kinship subsists between the spiritual principle in man, with its rules of activity, and the rational unity in the system of related things in the world. This supplies a fixed bond between the subject and object, whereby the reality of things and the certainty of knowledge can be maintained. Hence, there is an objective truth and reality, and a real knowledge of this truth and reality is attainable.

This view of truth and knowledge is deemed of very great value to subsequent discussion of apologetical questions. It avoids the defects of idealism and agnosticism, for the spiritual and rational principle in man discovers rather than

constructs the rational system or unity of things in the world, and it protects from the errors of empiricism and positivism, which afford no possible bond of kinship between the subject and object save on the basis of materialism. It also fully meets the Ritschlian denial of metaphysics. This may be termed the theory of rational realism, inasmuch as it finds in rationality the basis for objective truth and for the reality of knowledge. Moreover, this view supplies the rational foundation for a true scientific knowledge of nature. Nature is intelligible by intelligence, because it is a rational system of existing things. This is the philosophical basis for the scientific knowledge of nature. The question of the way in which nature has been constituted a rational unity is deferred to later discussions.

CHAPTER V.

APOLOGETICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF BELIEF.

CONTENTS.

Nature of Belief.—Belief and Faith.—Their General and Special Senses.—Taken in Wide Sense.—Knowledge and Belief Compared.—Knowledge and Belief not Contradictory.—But Reciprocal.—Grounds of Belief.—Evidence, its Ground and Measure.—Subjective and Objective Grounds of Belief.—Two Classes of each.—Knowledge and Belief Closely Related.—The Objects of Belief.—Many and Varied.—In Ordinary Life.—In Matters of History.—Information Based on Testimony.—In the Hypotheses of Science.—Fact and Theory.—In Matters of Religion.—Apologetic Service.

LITERATURE.

The articles on *Belief, Faith,* and *Evidence* in the Encyclopædias already named.—Also the treatises on *Psychology* noted in the last chapter.—Butler's *Analogy,* Chap. I.—Bowne's *Studies in Theism,* Chap. II.—Luthardt's *Fundamental Truths of Christianity,* Chap. VI.—Jevon's *The Principles of Science,* Chap. X.—Frank's *System of Christian Certainty,* Part II., Secs. 1 and 2.—Kaftan's *The Truth of the Christian Religion,* Chap. IV.—Balfour's *The Foundations of Belief,* Parts I. and II.—Principal Caird's *The Philosophy of Religion,* Chaps. I. and II.—And his *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity,* Vol. I., Chap. II.—Fraser's *Philosophy of Theism,* Vol. I., Chap. V.—Lindsay's *Recent Advances in the Theistic Philosophy of Religion,* Chap. XI.—Edward Caird's *The Evolution of Religion.*—James' *The Will to Believe.* In the writings of the Common Sense School of Philosophy, and in the treatises of those who are in sympathy with the Faith Philosophy of Jacobi, there are some useful hints for the subject of this chapter.

KNOWLEDGE and belief are closely related. In many of the convictions of the human mind they are blended, and they both imply some of the same conditions of mental activity. To some extent, therefore, the discussions of the last chapter laid the foundation for the expositions to be made in this one. In that chapter the reality of the spiritual principle in man was asserted, and the nature of the powers of that principle was explained. In addition, the soundness of the rational, as against the empirical theory of knowledge,

was vindicated, and the deep and abiding rational basis for the reality of the objects of human knowledge, and for the validity of that knowledge itself, was laid. It was maintained, not only that the spiritual principle in man is real and rational, but also that the external world, which is related to this principle in cognition, is also real and rational at its root. This view of the relation subsisting between the subject and object in cognition provides a rational bond, which brings them into real correspondence in true knowledge. This same bond is still presupposed as the mental activity called *belief* is considered.

I. *The Nature of Belief.* § 16.

1. The terms belief and faith require some explanation at the outset. They mean very much the same thing, and are often used interchangeably. So far as their derivation or etymological meaning is concerned, they are practically identical. And in ordinary usage it is not easy to discover any well-defined distinction between them. If there be any shade of difference in their meaning and usage, it is to the effect that belief denotes the acceptance of truths, and faith implies trust in persons. Men believe truths, and have faith in their friends. But this distinction must not be pushed too far, as the usage may not be uniform.

Both *belief* and *faith* are used in a general and in a special sense. In a *general* sense, they describe all those activities of the spiritual principle in man by means of which truths are received, facts accepted or persons confided in, on certain grounds. This includes a wide area of this activity, and it assumes many forms. To a large extent, this is what emerges in the discussions of this chapter. In a more *restricted* sense, belief and faith relate to that special activity of the soul in the religious sphere, by means of which the truths of the gospel are received, and the Lord Jesus Christ is accepted and trusted as Saviour and Lord. It is to receive

and rest upon Christ alone for salvation. Hence, we find in the Scriptures that to believe in Christ, and to have faith in him, signify the same activity of the soul. The truths of the gospel are believed to be true, and Jesus Christ is confided in for salvation.

In the discussions of this chapter the term is used in the wider sense, to include all forms of the faith activity of the human mind. It may be better to use the term belief rather than faith, for the latter word has, in popular religious usage, come specially to denote saving faith in Christ. The term belief will, therefore, be uniformly used in this chapter to cover that wide field of mental activity by means of which certain convictions or persuasions are reached in an indirect or mediate way. This raises the problem of the philosophy of belief in its widest sense.

2. Perhaps the nature of *belief,* as a mental activity, can be best understood by putting it in contrast with *knowledge.* If knowledge be the direct apprehension of the truth or reality of its object, belief is the indirect or mediate apprehension of its object. If knowledge be conviction of the truth, as it shines in its own light, belief is persuasion of the truth as it is seen in the light of proper evidence. If knowledge produces complete certainty, belief is content with probability of greater or less degree. In the case of knowledge, its grounds are, so to speak, in itself, and compel acceptance by all minds so soon as apprehended; in the case of belief, its grounds lie, as it were, outside of itself, and do not necessarily produce conviction in every mind. The axioms of mathematics illustrate the former, and the molecular theory of matter the latter. The axioms are known to be true in their own nature; but the molecular theory may or may not be believed in, since it is not the theory itself, but the evidence for it, which induces belief in it. Hence, belief may be defined as mental assent or conviction, founded upon evidence. It is the persuasion, more or less assured, of the truth of anything, resting upon

grounds which rationally justify that persuasion. To believe without evidence is irrational, and to profess to believe against evidence is wilful, if not absurd. The grounds for knowledge are good for all minds, and have what may be called objective validity; but the grounds for belief are not necessarily good for all minds, and hence they have only more or less of subjective validity. For one mind this validity may be quite complete, but for another it may not be so strong. It thus appears that evidence is the measure of belief, and that the stronger the evidence the firmer will be the belief. In saying that the ground of belief is evidence, it is not implied that knowledge is devoid of rational grounds. It rather means that in the case of knowledge the ground of the correspondence between the mental apprehension and its object is given in the apprehension itself; while in the case of belief the ground of this correspondence does not lie in the apprehension itself, but in something which has an external, rather than an internal, relation to it. It is earnestly insisted that both knowledge and belief have rational grounds, and that both lead to well-grounded convictions of the truth and reality of their objects. But in the case of knowledge the ground bears an internal relation to the conviction, while in the matter of belief the relation is external.

Another remark seems almost necessary to make this point still clearer. In belief, the evidence which forms its ground is often directly apprehended, and is thus a matter of knowledge. This makes it evident that knowledge and belief are really interdependent. Certain facts come under immediate observation, or certain truths are perceived to be true in their own clear light, and on these, as grounds or evidence, certain valid beliefs may be founded. Bodies may be observed falling towards each other, and we come to believe in the truth of gravitation; we perceive the truth of the axioms, and we are led to many valid beliefs on this ground.

3. It thus becomes evident that knowledge and belief are in no sense to be regarded as contradictory of each other. To say that we may believe what is devoid of evidence, or irrational, is absurd. Both are valid rational activities of the spiritual principle in man: and both lead to legitimate convictions of the truth or reality of their respective objects. Hence, they are *reciprocal*, and mutually support each other. A fatal mistake is made if they are regarded as in any sort of inherent conflict. Belief rests on evidence, and evidence, in turn, is a matter of knowledge, and knowledge implies a primary belief in the reliability of the faculties involved in it. And this clearly shows that they are so closely related as to be reciprocal and complementary. It may also be admitted that what to one person is an object of knowledge, may to another be a matter of belief. The knowledge of an expert in chemistry, working in the laboratory, may be a matter of belief to the amateur who reads the writings of the expert, and accepts the information as true on the evidence given by the expert. In a certain sense, it can be truly said that we know when we believe, and that we believe when we know. In all spheres of mental activity this is true.

II. *The Grounds of Belief.* § 17.

1. It has just been shown that *evidence* is the ground and measure of belief. A few things must now be said in regard to its nature and functions. As already indicated, belief includes a very wide area of the activity of the spiritual principle in man: and from this it follows that evidence assumes a great variety of forms. And since so many phases of the activities of men in the ordinary affairs of life are at root of the nature of belief, the inquiry concerning evidence as the *ground* of belief has also an exceedingly practical bearing upon life. In matters of business and social life, as well as in every branch of scientific inquiry, belief has a large place, while the whole fabric of history, and the entire pro-

cedure of our courts of justice, rest upon evidence as the ground of various beliefs. Butler, in the opening chapter of his *Analogy*, illustrates this when he speaks of probable evidence, and shows that probability is, after all, the main guide of human life. In matters of religion, we may expect the same to be true, so that evidence, as the basis of belief, needs careful understanding at the outset.

2. It is, perhaps, not possible to make any clearly logical classification of the *grounds* of belief, or kinds of evidence which justify rational belief, for in every phase of the activity of the human mind they appear. To sketch all the grounds of belief would require an inventory of all our knowledge, for knowledge really supplies the evidence upon which belief erects its edifice of rational convictions.

For practical purposes, the grounds of belief are to be discovered in two spheres. This provides two sets of evidence. The one set consists in certain facts or feelings that lie within the soul; the other in certain facts or events in the outward world of nature and human life. The former may be called subjective grounds of belief, and the latter objective. This gives one sort of evidence lying in the mind, and another found without it. Each of these, in turn, somewhat naturally divides itself into two closely related classes. This gives four main divisions of the grounds of belief.

a. The first of these is subjective, and consists in the contents of *consciousness*. This class is very comprehensive, and includes all the varied facts of the conscious experiences of the spiritual principle in man. These facts are known directly, and they constitute a large part of our true knowledge of real things. Then, on the ground of these facts or experiences, viewed as evidence, various beliefs are more or less confidently entertained by the human mind. From the facts of consciousness involved in sense-perception, men are led, with much confidence, to believe in the reality of the external world. From the facts of consciousness implied in the activity of man's moral nature, belief in the reality of

moral principles, if not in a moral ruler, is induced. So, in other well-defined phases of consciousness, there is supplied internal and undoubted evidence, which forms the secure grounds of many valid beliefs. The veracity of consciousness is pledged to their rational validity.

b. The second kind of evidence is also subjective, and is more subtle, and not so easily described. It consists in what may be termed the ground of the native *spontaneous* beliefs of the soul. It embraces those various subtle forms of instinctive feeling which are found in the human mind, as firmly rooted convictions therein. These grounds of belief seem to lie deeper even than the facts of consciousness, and from them spring those primitive beliefs which seem to be the spontaneous expression of man's nature. These are sometimes described as the intuitive factors in man's constitution. They are spontaneous, instinctive feelings, in which there is involved, in some way, a conviction of the reality of the objects to which these beliefs relate. The instinctive conviction that our faculties do not systematically delude or deceive us, our own conviction that we have a real existence, our belief in the validity of space and time, and, in a sense, the belief in the existence of God, illustrate this class of the grounds of belief. These things must be believed in, else all knowledge and belief is groundless. So, also, in ordinary life, many things are believed in and acted on in an apparently instinctive way. There is firm belief exercised; and though reason, and even consciousness, may not clearly reveal the grounds of the belief, yet it is instinctively felt that the belief is not devoid of rational grounds. Many such beliefs underlie the complex fabric of human life, and if an analysis of their ground be made, it will be found to be some instinctive feeling within the soul. At this point the question as to how much of this instinctive feeling is native to the mind, and how much of it is the product of habit and heredity is not now raised. The fact that these feelings form the grounds of not a few valid theoretical, and

of many potent practical beliefs, is merely emphasized, as a second class of evidence grounding certain beliefs.

c. A third class of the grounds of belief is objective and more palpable, for it consists in certain outward *facts* in the world about us. By fact here, is meant some real thing, or object, in the external world. These lie under our powers of observation, and in that sense are known.[1] They are apprehended as real, and they constitute the materials of the various sciences which deal with the wide realm of nature. Upon these facts thus known, various beliefs are founded, for the human mind seems to have an impulse to inquire into the causes of these facts, to unify them, and thus to give some rational explanation of them. In this way various hypotheses and theories are formed, and these elicit belief in proportion to the force and pertinency of the evidence by which they are supported. Thus, in all branches of science, the facts are known, and form the grounds upon which various hypotheses are founded. These hypotheses are believed in, and when they are securely established on evidence, they become assured truths of science. The various facts of bodies falling to the earth are observed and known, but the law of gravitation, as a well-grounded theory to account for these facts, is believed in. So with the molecular theory of matter, the hypothesis of the luminiferous ether, the supposition of the conservation of energy, and the theory of evolution. These, and scorces of other theories, are matters of belief, and the cogency of the evidence determines their probability, and is the measure of rational belief in them.

d. The fourth branch of evidence is also objective, and is very comprehensive. In general, it may be designated as valid or reliable human *testimony*. This testimony assumes

[1] The knowledge here implied is not necessarily the strict notion of it discussed in the preceding chapter. It is rather that observation of the facts of nature which the scientist calls his knowledge or apprehension of these facts in any sphere.

many forms, and it provides the evidential ground for a great multiplicity of beliefs. If this testimony be reliable, it constitutes knowledge, and it becomes the basis of belief in many things. The whole function of evidence in the courts of law illustrates this phase of belief. Evidence given in court by witnesses, to have value, must be matters of their own knowledge, while the guilt or innocence of the accused is of the nature of a belief founded upon this evidence. This belief is based on the evidence, and is expressed in the verdict.

The same is true regarding all history which records past events, and of the reports of the happenings of our own day. The testimony of the eye-witnesses of these events is the ground on which thousands of things are believed. If that testimony is reliable, the belief is well founded. And what is true of secular history is also true of the sacred Scriptures, and in particular of the gospel narratives. We believe the things therein recorded because the testimony of the men who gave the record is that of trustworthy and capable witnesses. To refuse belief of the gospel records on this ground, is to take a position which makes all history impossible. Here belief plays an important part in Christian Apologetics, and its validity is, at this early stage, so far vindicated.

It should also be kept in mind that vast areas of what passes for scientific knowledge is neither more nor less than a collection of authentic beliefs. As the knowledge of the various sciences is obtained largely from text-books, the testimony of the author is really the ground upon which that knowledge rests. In such cases much of the information which the student acquires in physics, chemistry, biology, geology and astronomy is of the nature of belief.

From this sketch of the grounds of belief, it again appears that knowledge and belief are intimately related. The evidence which supplies the basis of belief must be, as far as possible, a matter of knowledge, in some of the general

forms just sketched. And vast masses of information which often pass for knowledge are only reliable beliefs. Where the evidence is strong, the beliefs reach a high degree of probability; and, for the practical purposes of life, they may serve the ends of knowledge. All of which shows the intimate relations between these two forms of mental activity. When we say that we know that a certain event happened a thousand years ago, or a thousand miles away, we simply mean that we have sufficient ground for believing that it did so happen.

Moreover, it is evident that in all the spheres of the activity of the spiritual principle in man, knowledge and belief go together. Both have their rights, which must be recognized alike by science and philosophy; and in religion they have also claims which must not be ignored. They cannot be divorced in any sphere without serious injury to many vital human interests. Hence, science, philosophy and religion have equal interests in the vindication of the claims of both. In each sphere certain things are matters of knowledge, and certain other things are of the nature of beliefs, and both are legitimate activities of the powers of the human soul. Hence, science, philosophy and theology have no reason to quarrel, or be jealous of each other. True science, reliable philosophy, and sound theology, each being careful to keep within its own bounds, are not to be looked upon as in any inherent or necessary conflict with each other.

III. *The Objects of Belief.* § 18.

The field wherein the *objects* of belief lie is exceedingly broad. The boundaries between these objects and those of knowledge may not be clearly defined, and their outer limits may fade away in the vista of slender probability. As the things which are accepted on evidence may be more numerous than those which are immediately known, so the objects of belief are greater in number than those of knowledge.

And as the objects of knowledge give rise to well-defined certainty, so the objects of belief have every degree of probability, from the highest moral certainty down to the very lowest probability. In general, the things believed are all the objects of those mental persuasions which are taken to be more or less probable, according to the convincing nature of the evidence upon which they are founded.

1. In the ordinary affairs of *life* many of the objects of belief are to be found. These are things which are not, and perhaps cannot be, certainly known, yet they are matters of assured rational belief. In business, all plans and enterprises which look to the future are matters of belief. Confiding in the experience of the past, as ground of action for the future, men make their business plans, and in doing so belief plays a large part. Take belief away, and the whole fabric of commercial life would fall to pieces. In the home circle, and in the relations of social life, the same is true. The things which often lead men to action are nothing more than beliefs. If men were to wait till they had positive knowledge, they would seldom act in these spheres, and the bonds which bind home and society together would become very slender. Men really know much less, and believe much more than they often think. They often act with confidence upon what is simply belief. Hence, the greater part of man's activity in the ordinary affairs of life flows from belief. The certainty of these matters is in proportion to the clearness and consistency of the evidence. And, in this connection, it should be kept in mind that if men act on such grounds in ordinary secular affairs, they ought to be ready to act consistently with this principle in the concerns of religion. If assured probability be the acknowledged guide of action in secular affairs, it should also be admitted as valid and sufficient in matters of religion. Many who reject religion on this ground are glaringly inconsistent.

2. In all forms of *historical* information there is another large class of the objects of belief. By means of testimony,

more or less reliable, we learn about the events which transpired in the days that are gone, and belief in their reality is entertained. All our information concerning the past is really a collection of beliefs, rather than knowledge in the strict sense. The whole fabric of history, and all that acquaintance with passing events in our own time which rests on testimony, are of the nature of belief. This is also true of those beliefs which relate to the future. Relying upon the permanency, under God, of the existing order of things, men entertain certain beliefs, more or less securely grounded, in regard to the future. This future cannot be an object of knowledge, but it may be the object of belief. This is true of secular and sacred history alike, and also of the secular and the religious in human experience looking to the future.

3. Very many of the objects of belief lie within the circle of the several *sciences.* In what is usually called scientific knowledge in general, there is reason to distinguish between the *facts* and the *theories* involved in it; and there is also need to make sure that what are regarded as scientific facts are realities, and not illusions. Sometimes an opinion about something in nature is regarded as a fact, and at other times what is merely a more or less reasonable theory to account for the facts is tacitly assumed to be as real or certain as the facts it proposes to explain. True scientific facts are real things actually known, while theories, or hypotheses concerning the facts, are the objects of belief. A little reflection will show that much of current scientific information is nothing more than beliefs more or less securely founded on evidence. These beliefs relate to the various hypotheses which are proposed to explain certain facts. Only when these hypotheses are verified, and it is shown that no other supposition will explain the facts, do they take their place as part of the body of ascertained scientific truth, which corresponds with the reality of nature. This is true of every branch of science, and scores of illustrations could be

adduced from physics, chemistry, biology, geology, astronomy and anthropology at the present day. Even in psychology and ethics the facts and the theories must be very carefully distinguished; and in the sphere of religious experience the same exhortation is not to be ignored. The variable factor in these sciences is that of theory, to which belief relates. The facts rightly apprehended are the permanent factor, while the theories to account for the facts are constantly changing, and only a few theories, from time to time, become the established truths of science. It thus appears that the function of belief in the realm of science is very large, and its objects in this realm are very many. Nor is there any essential difference between science and religion in regard to the function of belief. Both rightly use it, as both possess a basis of fact which is known.

4. In matters of *religion* belief has a large place, and consequently many of its objects lie in this sphere. In religion certain things are known, and on these many assured beliefs rest. The belief in God, in the future state, and in the reality of spiritual things, alike illustrate this. In connection with these beliefs, Apologetics renders a useful service in unfolding their rational grounds. So, also, the contents of divine revelation, the earthly career of Jesus Christ, and the reality of the power of the gospel to save from sin, are objects of belief resting on evidence. Concerning these questions, Apologetics undertakes to vindicate the grounds of these beliefs. In like manner many valid objects of belief are found in the reality of religious experience, in the blessings it bestows upon the individuals, and in its excellent fruitage in the world. Here, again, Apologetics will find occasion to utilize belief, and to exhibit the reasonable grounds of Christianity. As a comprehensive theory to solve the manifold problems of man and the universe, of thought and things, of sin and its remedy, Christianity makes its claim to be adequate and sufficient, and thus, in the broadest possible way, Christianity becomes,

in its totality, an object of rational belief. One of the crowning tasks of Apologetics is to show that the Christian solution of all these complex problems is scientific in its method, and sufficient in its contents.

This must suffice concerning the nature, the grounds, and the objects of belief. What has been said goes to show how important an activity of the spiritual principle in man belief is, and to reveal the fact that the function of belief in relation to Christianity is not essentially different in its method from that which it discharges in the ordinary affairs of human life, and in the ever-widening sphere of modern science. It thus comes to pass that Apologetics, in presenting the grounds for Christianity, finds an open door to exhibit these grounds in a scientific way at every turn. So far, therefore, as the method of procedure is concerned, science in making its investigations, and Apologetics in vindicating the Christian system, are on the same ground. Hence it is made plain that Apologetics is rightly described as the rational vindication of Christianity, or the science of the vindication of the Christian system.

This completes introductory matters. Definition and description of Apologetics have been given. The theory of knowledge and the philosophy of belief have been sketched in outline, so that solid ground may be under our feet as we proceed. This clears the way. Our task now is to vindicate and verify Christianity as a divine redemptive religion.

"I will assuredly reach truth, if I only fix my attention sufficiently on all the things I conceive perfectly."—DESCARTES.

"My certainty of reality is simply my consciousness of knowing; which, whether I attend to it or not, is essential to every act of knowledge."—HARRIS.

"All knowledge rests ultimately on faith. I must at last believe in my own soul, and in the perceptions of my own soul."—LUTHARDT.

"Knowledge and faith cannot be severed from one another, like the bulkheads in a ship, the first of which may be crushed in, while the other still keeps the vessel afloat."—ROBINSON.

"We can rationally believe that a thing is, without knowing how or why it is. It is enough for the true dignity of man, as a rational creature, that he is not called upon by his Creator to believe without knowledge, to receive as true propositions which convey no meaning to his mind."—HODGE.

"A man is but what he knoweth. The mind itself is but an accident of knowledge; for knowledge is the double of that which is."—BACON.

"By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by God."—EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.

THE FIRST PART

FUNDAMENTAL OR PHILOSOPHICAL APOLOGETICS

"O God, my soul is restless till it rests in thee!"—AUGUSTINE.

"A little philosophy inclineth a man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion."—BACON.

"Intelligence stands first in the order of existence."—HAMILTON.

"If education be not already preceded by an innate consciousness of God, as an operative predisposition, there would be nothing for education and culture to act upon."—NITZSCH.

"We see before we know that we have eyes, but when this is known, we perceive that we must have preëxisted in order to enable us to see."—COLERIDGE.

"To think of God is to be certain of his existence."—LUTHARDT.

"God is the most certain fact of objective knowledge."—BOWNE.

"Tradition can perpetuate only what has already been originated."—PATTON.

"Cogitable existence cannot be produced out of incogitable."—MARTINEAU.

"Agnosticism in philosophy involves agnosticism in religion."—STRONG.

THE FIRST PART.

FUNDAMENTAL APOLOGETICS.

CHAPTER I.

THE MEANING, THE DEFINITION AND THE DIVISIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL APOLOGETICS.

CONTENTS.

Christianity in its Inner Principle.—Presupposes a Certain Relation between God and the Cosmos.—Fundamental Apologetics Finds its Task Here.—The Term Theism Approved.—The Meaning of the Term. —Used in Two Senses.—Wide Sense.—Mind Prior to Matter.—Illustrations of this Usage.—Special Sense.—A Definite Theory of God and His Relation to the Cosmos.—This the Philosophical Basis for Christianity. — Theism.— Deism.— Pantheism.— Definition of Theism.— Its Significance.—Flint and Others.—Accepted Definition.—Three Questions in it. —The Central Problem Set.—The Divisions of Theism.—The Point of Departure.—Psychology of Theism.—Ontology of Theism.

LITERATURE.

The Articles on *Theism, Natural Theology* and *The Philosophy of Religion* in the Encyclopædias.—Cave's *Introduction to Theology,* p. 119.—Flint's *Theism,* Chaps. I., II.—Patton's *Syllabus on Theism.*— H. B. Smith's *Apologetics,* Part I., Chap. I.—Cocker's *Christianity and Greek Philosophy,* Chap. II.—Diman's *The Theistic Argument,* Chap. I.—Bowne's *Philosophy of Theism,* Chap. I.—Thomson's *Christian Theism,* Chap. I.—Redford's *The Christian's Plea,* Part II., Chap. I.—Tulloch's *Theism,* Chap. I.—Stearns' *The Evidence of Christian Experience,* Chap. II.—Caird's *The Evolution of Religion,* Vol. I., Chap. I.—Fraser's *Philosophy of Theism,* Vol. I., Chap. I.—Lindsay's *Recent Advances in Theistic Philosophy,* Chap. I.— Dabney's *Theology,* Chap. I.—Hodge's *Systematic Theology,* Vol. I., Chap. I.—Miley's *Systematic Theology,* Part I., Chap. I.—Pfleiderer's *The Philosophy of Religion.*—Orr's *Christian View of God and the World,* Chap. I.—Martineau's *A Study of Religion,* Vol. I., Chap. I.

I. *Preliminary.* § 19.

1. CHRISTIANITY in its inner principle expresses the redeeming activity of God in its historic form in the world. This activity is mediated through Jesus Christ, administered by the Spirit of God, and formally expressed in the Holy Scriptures. The sphere of the operation of this

activity is, first of all, in the souls of men, and then, through them, it has its influence on the world. This is the underlying conception of the Christian system which is carried with us through this discussion. Christianity is at once a system of truths to be known, and a set of redeeming agencies to be experienced. It is revealed truth and divine energy, and these two factors are closely related. The truth reveals and expresses the energy, and the energy, in turn, is experienced through the reception of the truth. It thus appears that Christianity involves both a doctrine and a life. This life is realized through Christ by the Holy Spirit, and the doctrine implied in the life is found in Holy Scripture. This is the general view of Christianity here adopted.

2. The conception of the Christian religion just sketched not only presupposes the existence of God, but also assumes that certain organic relations must subsist between God and the world, which is the sphere of his redeeming activity. If God through the ages is conducting the movements of this activity in the world, he must of necessity sustain certain intimate relations with the world in general, and with man in particular. If God be not in vital contact with his creatures, the conditions for the exercise of his redeeming activity are wanting. This makes it plain that atheism and materialism are inadequate, because they deny the existence of the agent in this activity. It is equally clear that both deism and pantheism cannot supply the ground for the operation of the divine redemptive activity resident in Christianity, because they both misconstrue the relation of God to his works. We are thus led to the conclusion that Christian theism is more adequate, since it announces such relations between God, man and the universe as provide an ample basis for the unimpeded exercise of the redemptive aspects of Christianity. This being the case, there at once arises the rational demand for a proper exposition of the Christian philosophy of these three facts, and of the relations subsisting between them.

3. Fundamental Apologetics undertakes to deal with these basal questions. Since it seeks to give a sound philosophy of these three facts, it may be termed philosophical Apologetics. This first main division of Apologetics has to examine the very foundations of Christianity, and to vindicate the security of these foundations. A glance at some of these questions shows their vital importance. Is there such a being as the one infinite personal God? Is the universe self-existent, or does it derive its being from God? What are the relations of God to the world? How are God and man related? How is the moral evil which is in the universe to be regarded, and what has been its effects on man? How is the redeeming activity of God introduced into the sphere where moral evil is operative? And what relation between God and the world does this activity presuppose? With these and related questions fundamental Apologetics is earnestly engaged.

4. The exposition of these questions is sometimes entitled the philosophy of religion. This title is correct only so far, for the reason that the philosophy of religion embraces not a few questions which grow out of the revealed features of Christianity. The term natural theology is at other times applied to the exposition of these problems. This is also true only in part, because natural theology is usually taken to include mainly the exposition of the leading arguments for the existence of God. It has less to say concerning the universe, and God's relation to it, than the discussions of the present day demand. Thus, while this term emphasizes the rational theology, it scarcely does justice to the theistic cosmology of the questions involved in fundamental Apologetics. Natural theology has usually been regarded as a doctrine of God on grounds of reason, rather than as also a doctrine of the world and man. In our own day the term theism has come to be applied to the field wherein the materials of fundamental Apologetics lie. As now used, this seems the best single term to denote the first great

division of Apologetics. Theism seeks to make good, on grounds of reason, the belief in the existence of God. It also has its doctrine of the world and man. It further gives a very careful exposition of the relations between them. Theism proper covers the positive side of the discussions, and the anti-theistic theories constitute the negative side. Under the general title of theism and the anti-theistic theories, the problems of fundamental Apologetics are now to be expounded. The result will be a theistic philosophy.

II. *The Meaning and Scope of Theism.* § 20.

The term *theism,* derived from the Greek, θεος, has now its well-defined meaning and usage. Though the word from which it is derived is simply a name for some divine being, yet the term theism has come to denote a certain view of the world in its relation to God. Theism is at once a certain doctrine of God, and a definite theory of his relation to the world and man.

1. In the discussions of the philosophy of religion, the term theism is used in two widely different senses. A brief explanation of each of these may remove some confusion, and make plain that aspect of theism which forms the philosophical basis of Christianity.

a. Theism is sometimes used to denote any theory which puts *mind* before matter. Any view of the world which seeks to explain it from a rational or spiritual principle, rather than from a materialistic, is regarded as a theistic theory. Such a theory strongly asserts the priority of spiritual forms of being, and proceeds to explain the material from the spiritual. In the broad sense this may be termed speculative or metaphysical theism. It is really a philosophy of all existence on the basis of mind or spirit.

This aspect of theism excludes the polytheistic idea of God, for it asserts a unitary spiritual principle as the explanation of the world. This view of theism is also the

direct negative of atheism, because it asserts the reality of the spiritual principle which atheism denies. In like manner, it necessarily excludes all materialistic theories of the world, since it firmly maintains that the world can only be rightly construed in terms of mind. In this wide sense theism represents some of the noblest types of philosophy.

The history of philosophy is rich in illustrations of this usage of the term. The principle of intelligence announced by Anaxagoras, as the organizing principle of the world; the noble teleology of Socrates, which led him to a doctrine of deity far above the popular polytheism of his day; the speculative theism of Plato, which forms the culmination of his ideal theory; the cosmology of Aristotle, with its notion of a world-former and a world-mover, who is himself not moved; and the natural theology of Cicero, which is the forerunner of that of Paley, are all splendid examples of theism in its speculative or metaphysical aspects.

In Oriental theosophy the same theistic tendency appears, though with a constant movement towards pantheism. In the monotheistic stage of Zoroastrianism, in Vedic Brahmanism, and in the philosophy of Buddhism, we have further examples of speculative theism in the widest sense. And in modern philosophy the same type of theism is found, often also with a tendency to pantheism. In Hegel's idealistic scheme of all existence, in the popular ethical monism of the day, and in all those rational systems which refuse to construe the world in terms of atoms and force, this phase of theism appears.

Against atheism and materialism these speculative schemes are of much philosophical value; and in every age they have rendered excellent service in providing a lofty philosophy of existing things. But they are scarcely definite enough to provide the rational basis for Christianity, with its system of revealed truths and its set of redeeming agencies.

b. The term theism has come in recent years to have a

more definite technical signification. According to its modern usage, it denotes not merely a theory of the universe which puts mind prior to matter, but rather the doctrine of *one personal God,* who sustains certain well-defined relations with the universe. According to this view theism is a clearly-conceived doctrine, and it is the function of fundamental Apologetics to uphold and expound this doctrine. For the philosophical basis of Christianity, it is not enough to have a theory which places mind, in a general way before matter. It is needful to vindicate the reality of one infinite personal God, who is in vital relations with his creatures in the cosmos.

Like the wider view of theism, this technical meaning of it also excludes polytheism, atheism and materialism. And, in addition, it is also opposed to deism and pantheism, both of which have defective views of the relation between God and the universe. Deism frankly admits the existence of one infinite personal God, who is the creator of the world, and who has endowed it with all its potencies, and constituted it according to its laws of activity. But deism of all types refuses to admit that God has now any immediate oversight or direct control of the universe. He simply set the cosmos in order at first, and initiated its operations, and then retired from all direct relations with it. It is evident that a doctrine such as this does not provide a suitable rational basis for Christianity.

And pantheism, which has always been attractive to speculative minds, goes to the opposite extreme. Instead of separating God and the cosmos, pantheism tends to identify them in some way, so that their relation is regarded as merely internal, instead of external, as with deism. Moreover, pantheism either obscures or destroys the personality of God; and, in some monistic way, it either loses the cosmos in God, or hides God away in the cosmos. It is evident that this conception of the relation of God to his creatures fails to supply the philosophical ground which Christianity requires.

Hence theism, in the technical sense, excludes both deism and pantheism, mainly on the ground of their defective views of the relation subsisting between God and the universe. As deism asserts the transcendence of God, and denies his immanence, so pantheism affirms his immanence and ignores his transcendence. But theism, in a carefully balanced way, which is to be fully expounded in fundamental Apologetics, consistently maintains that God's relation to the cosmos is at once immanent and transcendent. This is the theistic philosophy which forms the abiding rational basis for Christianity.

III. *The Definition of Theism.* § 21.

Theism, in the technical sense just explained, is now to be defined. This *definition* sets the central problem for fundamental Apologetics. It is a noticeable fact that few of the writers on theism give any formal definition of the subject they discuss. In some cases it is taken to be simply the belief in God, and its discussion consists mainly in unfolding the grounds for this belief. In other cases theism is regarded as almost identical with natural theology. The result is that some of the treatises on theism are rather vague, and not very many of them balance natural theology and theistic cosmology in a careful and complete way. Even Ebrard and Bruce fail to define very clearly what they mean by theism, though Bruce very properly distinguishes between speculative and Christian theism.

1. A glance at some of the definitions proposed by certain leading writers upon the subject may pave the way for the accepted definition. Tulloch (*Theism,* p. 370) says that "theism is the doctrine of one almighty, wise and living will, in which personality is the central and most essential element." This definition is of value against pantheism, but it may not be best to define God as merely will. He is a personal being. The whole idea presented by this definition

is rather too general, and it announces no relation of God to the cosmos. Luthardt (*Fundamental Truths,* p. 22) suggests the single idea that theism is the doctrine which regards God as "the principle of all things." As the starting point of a definition this has some real merit, but it does not clearly distinguish between theism and pantheism as any proper definition should. Miley (*Systematic Theology,* Vol. I., p. 57) says that "theism means the existence of a personal God, Creator, Preserver, and Ruler of all things." This is evidently rather vague, and can scarcely be regarded as a definition in the strict sense.

Flint (*Theism,* p. 18) defines theism as "the doctrine that the universe owes its existence, and continuance in existence, to the reason and will of a self-existent Being, who is infinitely powerful, wise and good." By way of explanation, he adds that "it is the doctrine that nature has a creator and preserver, the nations a ruler, and men a Heavenly Father and Judge." This is a fairly good definition. It announces a doctrine of God and a theory of the universe, such as theism proposes to maintain. It may, perhaps, go more fully into details than is necessary, yet all it states is properly contained in theism. In his secondary definition Flint possibly goes beyond the proper contents of theism, when he introduces the idea of God as Father. It may be doubted whether theism, without borrowing from revelation, has this factor in it. That Christian theism comes to possess this idea there can be no doubt, but it may be going too far to make it an element in theism as the philosophical basis of Christianity. At the same time, we would be very careful not to conceive of theism in a purely abstract way, for there is evident propriety in the remark of Professor Orr (*The Christian View of God and the World,* p. 49), to the effect that "a true theism should be a living and not a barren one."

2. The following definition is presented to set forth the idea of theism suitable for fundamental Apologetics: *Theism is that doctrine concerning the origin and continued exist-*

ence of the world which affirms the being and constant activity of one infinite personal God who sustains definite natural and moral relations with the world, and which presents this affirmation as the necessary and adequate explanation of the problems thereby presented for rational solution.

This definition involves three things. It affirms a *natural theology* when it asserts the existence and continued operation of one infinite personal God. It also announces a *theistic cosmology* when it states that the problems presented by man and the world require and justify the postulate of an ever-active God. And it further involves certain well defined natural and moral *relations* between God and the world. These relations are at once external and internal, so that God is both immanent and transcendent. Each of these three questions will emerge from time to time in the progress of this discussion.

It is evident that this definition not only sets the main problem for fundamental Apologetics, but also raises many profound questions. These inquiries gather mainly round three facts and the relations between them. These facts are God, man and the world. How is God to be conceived? How far is he intelligent, and how far active? What is his abiding relation to man and the world? What is man? What is his relation to God, and what is his relation to the world? Has man the power to come into cognitive relations with God? Has he also the capacity to be taught by God through special revelation? How is the world to be regarded, and how is it related to God? What is the precise mode of God's activity in the world?

3. It is evident from these queries that we are at once called to enter on a wide and interesting field. In addition to the questions just stated, the problem of evil must not be ignored. Theoretically, theism might be discussed without reference to this problem, yet practically it must do what it can to explain it and indicate its place in the world. The

main task for theism in connection with this problem is to be careful to vindicate such a relation between God and his creatures as does not involve God, in any causal way, with the production of moral evil, and that leaves the way open for the free play of those redemptive activities of God which constitute the essential principles of Christianity. An organic relation between God and the cosmos is announced in theism, and fundamental Apologetics seeks to elucidate this relation in such a way as to provide its ample philosophy.

IV. *The Divisions of Theism.* § 22.

1. The definition of theism just given suggests its main *divisions.* While there may be no serious difficulty in arranging the materials of theism in an orderly way, yet it is no easy task to decide where the exposition should begin. Some writers commence with an exposition of the various proofs for the existence of God, and make this the main part of the discussion. Others proceed at once to unfold the theistic significance of the cosmos, and in doing so have much to say about the order and design which it exhibits. This gives two types of theistic method. In neither case is much attention given to the initial question of the nature and origin of theistic belief on its subjective side. This, however, is perhaps the first question which should engage attention. Ever since Kant's day, inquiry into the origin, nature and limits of human knowledge is of primary importance in any field. In the field of theism this may be specially true. To reach some assured conclusions in regard to the nature and origin of theistic belief may be of interest in itself, and of value for the discussions which are to follow. It may supply an experimental basis for the first steps in the discussion, and afford a good foothold against agnosticism at the outset.

2. It also deserves to be noted that writers on theism do

not always distinguish between what may be called the *subjective* and *objective* aspects of theism. This means that the contrast between the belief in God as it lies in the mind, and the existence of God as an actual fact is not always clearly conceived. It may prevent confusion to keep in mind that the belief in God is one thing, and that the existence of God is another. The former is mainly a question in psychology, and the latter a problem in ontology. Though closely related as a matter of fact, yet it may conduce to orderly treatment to consider them separately. And in the order of their treatment, it may be natural and best to begin with the subjective side.

It may be well to bear in mind, also, that the wider question of the nature and origin of religion is involved in the discussions of theism to some extent. If God be the object of religion, and man its subject; and if in theistic belief this subject is related to that object, then theism and religion are closely related. It may be going too far to say that theism, in some sense, is involved in all religions, yet the fact remains that the question of the nature and origin of religion, and that of theistic belief, can scarcely be kept entirely apart in this discussion.

3. The contrast already indicated between the subjective and objective aspects of theism provides the key for the classification of its material. The first division deals with theistic belief as a psychical fact. This division may be described as the *psychology* of theism. In this division two distinct questions arise. One relates to the essential nature of theistic belief and the other to its origin. The former leads to an analysis of that belief, and the latter to an exposition of its genesis and growth.

4. The second main division of theism turns attention to the reality of the outward object of theistic belief. This belief itself is an undoubted fact. Is there a being called God really existing, over against the belief in such a being which the human mind entertains? In a word, Has the

subjective belief in God objective reality as fact? This division of the subject, also, naturally falls into two sections. In the first, the various proofs or reasonings which show that the belief in the existence of God is a rational, well-grounded belief, are to be unfolded. This leads to the presentation in detail of the theistic arguments. The second section of this division undertakes to investigate all those schemes which either deny the validity of the theistic inference, or propose some substitute for it. This raises the extensive controversy in regard to the anti-theistic theories. Some of these deny the main positions of theism altogether, others propose to modify these positions, and still others venture to propose certain substitutes for theism. This whole second main division of the subject may be termed the *ontology* of theism, inasmuch as it has to do with the real being of the object of theistic belief.

The *psychology* and *ontology* of theism thus await discussion. Under the former the nature and origin of theistic belief are to be considered, and under the latter the theistic proofs and the anti-theistic theories are to engage attention. To the survey of this wide field we at once proceed.

THE FIRST DIVISION.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THEISM.

THE FIRST SECTION.

CHAPTER II.

THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS AND THEISTIC BELIEF.

CONTENTS.

Religious and Theistic Belief Related.—Religion on the Subjective Side.—Definition Difficult.—Reasons.—Definitions Recited.—Spinoza.—Kant.—Hegel.—Goëthe.—Mill.—Clarke.—Schleiermacher.—Caird.—Pfleiderer.—Müller.—Köstlin.—Foster.—Cocker.—Martineau.—Flint.—Cave.—Ritschl.—Kuyper.—Kellogg.—De La Saussaye.—Definition Adopted.—Contents of Theistic Belief.—Pertains to the Whole Personality of Man.—Cognition of Deity.—Belief in God.—Feeling of Dependence.—Sense of Obligation.—Instinct of Worship.—The Problem of the Self-Revelation of God.—The Precise Nature of Theistic Consciousness.—A Definite Connatural Factor.—Also a Distinct Empirical Element.—The Rational Psychology Gives the Basis for this.—The Terms Innate and Intuitive Explained.—The True Doctrine Stated.—Three Facts.—Theistic Predications.—Theistic Hypothesis.—Instruction by Revelation.

LITERATURE.

The Articles on *Religion* and *Theism* in the Encyclopædias.—Calvin's *Institutes,* Book I., Chaps. I.–III.—Flint's *Theism,* Chap. II.—Diman's *The Theistic Argument,* Chap. XII.—Van Oosterzee's *Christian Dogmatics,* Part I., Chap. I.—Luthardt's *Fundamental Truths,* Chap. VI.—Müller's *The Origin of Religion,* Chap. I.—Müller's *Natural Religion,* Chap. II.—Pfleiderer's *Philosophy of Religion,* Sec. II., Chap. I., of Vol. III.—Stearns' *The Evidence of Christian Experience,* Chap. III.—Kellogg's *The Genesis and Growth of Religion,* Chap. I.—Schurman's *Belief in God,* Chap. II.—Lindsay's *Recent Advances in the Theistic Philosophy of Religion,* Chap. II.—Orr's *Christian View of God and the World,* Chap. III.—Caird's *Philosophy of Religion,* Chap. IV.—Caird's *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity,* Chap. III.—Caird's *The Evolution of Religion,* Chap. III.—Kuyper's *Encyclopædia,* Div. II., Chap. II.—De La Saussaye's *Manual of the Science of Religion,* Chaps. VII., VIII.—Martineau's *Studies in Religion,* Chap. II.—Iverach's *Theism,* Chap. VIII.—Lang's *The Making of Religion,* Chap. XVII.—Tigert's *Theism.*

I. *The Nature of Theistic Belief.* § 23.

1. THEISTIC belief is so intimately associated with religion that some account of the latter is necessary to understand the former. It may be assumed that religion is a persistent fact in human life, and a constant element in the history of mankind. In a general way, religion may be said to consist in certain beliefs which have associated with them certain ritual and other acts. The present inquiry has to do, not so much with the objects of these beliefs, as with the experiences of the soul involved in them. Hence, it is a certain condition of the soul of man, rather than the outward ceremonies of religion, with which attention is now to be engaged. In a word, it is the subjective, rather than the objective, side of religion which is to be considered. What, then, is religion as an inward experience of the human soul?

It is not easy to define what the essential nature of religion is. The derivation of the term, religion, either from *relegere,* "to gather up," or from *religare,* "to bind back," does not go very far in giving a clear idea of the essence of religion. And the Greek term, *θρησκεια*, which really means the service of deity in general, does not give much additional light, as it is used in the New Testament by Paul and James. As a matter of fact, the interpretation of religion on the subjective side has all the difficulty involved in any psychological inquiry, and it is also invested with all the perplexities peculiar to religious belief. All introspection is difficult; but that which seeks to observe and interpret the religious experiences of the human soul is the most difficult of all.

This interpretation is all the more difficult, for the reason that religious belief, as it now appears in any soul, is more or less complex. Its simple, primitive, subjective elements have been affected by many influences of heredity, tradition and education, so that it now becomes very hard to determine what in it is native to the soul, and what is the product of experience. And this task is made still more perplexing

by reason of the vagueness of the idea of religion found in the human mind. Few persons can state very clearly what religion is as a fact in the human soul, and few of those even who are under the power and experience of the true religion would give the same account of it.

2. In addition, it is not easy to decide what type of religion should be kept in view, as the investigation into its nature proceeds. We have the pagan, the Jewish, the Mohammedan and the Christian religious consciousness among men. Which is the proper field of observation, or should we seek to compass all of them? If we say that we should take the consciousness of the Christian, we are not yet free from difficulty, for the Roman Catholic and the Protestant aspects of it appear. And even among nominal Christians there is the difference between the natural religious consciousness of the unrenewed man, and that of the renewed man, who is under the experience of divine grace. Amid all this diversity, it is no easy matter to so isolate the subjective factor which may be common to all religion, as to have it clearly in view for proper interpretation.

And even when this isolation is effected a further difficulty arises. Under what category is religious belief to be construed? What is the dominant factor in religious experience in general? Is it mainly a matter of cognition, as Cousin said; or of faith, as Jacobi held; or of feeling, as Schleiermacher taught; or of conscience, as Kant argued; or of will, as Hegel maintained? This variety of opinion shows how perplexing the question of the nature of religion really is, and it suggests the conclusion that it probably touches all the inner activities of the soul, and calls into play all the complex powers of men. This view would certainly account for the fact that religion affects the whole life and permeates the entire history of mankind.

3. The recital of some of the definitions of religion which different writers have given may be of some value in show-

ing what the real nature of it is. Those definitions which make religion consist in fear or selfish desire may be set aside as useless, and the familiar definition that religion is a mode of knowing and worshipping God need only be noted.

Spinoza made religion consist in "the love of God, founded upon a knowledge of the divine perfections." Kant said that "religion is the recognition of all our duties as if they were divine commands." Hegel's brief definition is that "religion is perfect freedom," which he expands into "the relation of the subjective consciousness to God, who is Spirit." Goëthe makes religion "a feeling of reverence for what is above, around, and what is beneath us." Mill says that it is "a craving for an ideal object." Schleiermacher's well-known definition of religion is, "The absolute feeling of dependence." J. F. Clarke describes religion as "the worship and service by man of invisible powers, believed to be like himself, yet above himself." Principal Caird regards religion as "the elevation of the human spirit into union with the divine." Edward Caird looks upon it as an evolution, whose essence consists in "a conscious relation of God," who, as the highest unity, is the "ultimate presupposition of consciousness." Pfleiderer gives a careful definition to the effect that "the kernel of religion in all its forms, is that reference of man's life to the world-governing power, which seeks to grow into union with it." Martineau describes religion as "a belief in an everliving God; that is, a divine mind and will ruling the universe, and holding moral relations with mankind."

Müller's definition of religion has been much discussed. He says that "religion consists in the perception of the infinite under such manifestations as are able to influence the moral conduct of men." Köstlin, in a very good article on "Religion" in the Schaff-Herzog *Encyclopædia*, says that religion means "the conscious relation of man and God, and the expression of that relation in human conduct." R. V. Foster gives a different turn to the definition when he says

"that in its inmost core religion may be defined as the spirit of worship." This view is somewhat in harmony with the scriptural idea of it. Flint says that "religion is man's belief in a being, or beings, mightier than himself, and inaccessible to his senses, but not indifferent to his sentiments and actions, with the feelings and practices which flow from such belief." Cave prefers to say that "religion consists in the perception of the supernatural," which is something like Muller's definition; but he adds, "together with the effects of that perception upon the complex nature of man." Ritschl, rather strangely, owing to his peculiar theory of knowledge, says that "religion is, primarily, a means of solving the problem of the world, and of man's relation to it." With Ritschl, man's relation to the world, rather than to God, is the fundamental fact in religion. Kuyper's idea of religion, at its root, is "communion with something which transcends the cosmos, the cosmos being taken subjectively and objectively." This means that religion, in its essence, is communion with something above man and the world. De La Saussaye suggests that religion is "a belief in supernatural powers, combined with their worship." Kellogg gives a somewhat elaborate definition, as follows: "Religion consists essentially in man's apprehension of his relation to an invisible power, or powers, able to influence his destiny, to which he is necessarily subject, together with the feelings, desires and actions which this apprehension calls forth." This is a little like Flint's definition, and is quite comprehensive.

4. From these definitions, and others which might be added, it is very evident that the inner nature of religion is very variously conceived by different writers. Some lay stress upon one factor, and some on another, in this complex experience. If we were to venture another definition, we would be inclined to say that *religion is a mode of knowing, believing, feeling and acting on the part of man, which naturally arises from the inherent relations which subsist*

between him and some superior being called God. This definition presupposes an abiding relation between man and deity, and makes religion, on the subjective side, consist in a mode of man's complex activity. It pertains to the whole personality of man, and embraces the entire area of his activity. This agrees with what was said in the Introduction of this treatise, to the effect that religion did not belong to some single faculty of the soul, but rather consisted in the combined activity of all its powers in relation to the noblest objects with which this activity can possibly be exercised.[1] God is its object, man is its subject; and religion is a complex experience growing out of the realization of this relation.

II. *The Contents of Theistic Belief.* § 24.

1. The exposition of the previous section has opened the way for the analysis of theistic belief on the subjective side. It has been shown that this belief is one of the various phases of religious belief. As it appears in Christian theism, it is more clearly defined than anywhere else. As theism was carefully defined in a former chapter, its contents are now to be exhibited as clearly as possible. What does theistic belief imply as an experience in the human soul? What is the nature of the idea of God as it exists in the human mind? What is the real import of the religious consciousness involved in theistic belief? By adapting the definition of religious belief given in the first section of this chapter to the topic now in hand, we may very properly say that theistic belief, on the subjective side, is a mode of knowing, believing, feeling and acting on the part of man, which arises from a realization by him of the natural and moral relations which subsist between him and the infinite personal God, whose existence and constant activity theism asserts.

[1] Introduction, Chap. IV.

2. It is assumed that the experience now under consideration involves the exercise of all the complex powers of the personality of man. In that experience there are various factors, and it is of such complexity that some further exposition of it is necessary. This exposition addresses itself to the exceedingly difficult task of attempting to make an analysis of the contents of the idea of God, and of exhibiting in an orderly way the factors which enter into theistic belief. This analysis is presented in five particulars.

a. First, there is an element of *knowledge*. This is the intellectual or rational factor in the theistic consciousness. This is the product of reason as the faculty of the supersensible, and it consists essentially in the cognition of divinity. This means that in the idea of God in the human mind, the knowing powers play a part, and by means of certain exercises of these powers the soul comes into cognitive relations with God. By this means there is introduced into the soul of man an experience which has a definite rational quality about it. We need not now discuss the question as to how this comes to pass. It is only necessary to maintain the fact that belief in God is rational, and that the consciousness implied in that belief possesses a definite intellectual factor. The experience of men, viewed generally, seems to confirm this position. Almost instinctively men assume that a cognition of deity is a fact in their religious consciousness, and in the common, yet significant, usage of language, men very generally say that they know God. This means, not merely that men know that God is, but rather that in their theistic consciousness they find themselves in cognitive relations with God. Thus there is an element of knowledge in this experience.

b. Secondly, there is an element of *belief* in this experience. This is the faith factor which some writers make very prominent. It naturally follows from the reciprocal relations between knowledge and belief that both should have a place in theistic consciousness. Indeed, it may not be too much

to say that knowledge and belief mingle with each other in it. This belief is not merely a vague impression or a simple probability. It is rather a rational conviction resting on ample evidence. This belief may be regarded in two aspects. It may be looked upon as an instinctive conviction rising up spontaneously in the human soul. Those who hold theistic belief to be intuitive in the sense in which Jacobi taught, illustrate this view of the faith factor in it. In the deepest sense this factor is a rational belief. Theistic belief, however, may be considered in another light. Belief is, as has been shown, rational conviction based on evidence.[1] In the case of theistic belief there are many undoubted facts which supply valid evidence to justify belief in God. The activity of the human mind in making the inference from this evidence is of the nature of belief. Both of these aspects of the belief are properly included in the second factor of theistic belief. Care, however, must be taken not to regard this as a distinct God-consciousness. It is rather that experience of the soul which is implied in theistic belief in either of its aspects just described.

c. Thirdly, theistic belief includes the sense of *natural dependence on God*. This consists in an affection of the sensibility, and supplies, to a large extent, the emotional element in religion. Schleiermacher gives this factor great prominence in his system. Some regard it as mainly a sense of our finiteness over against the infinite one. Others look upon it as the natural sense of dependence which the creature properly feels towards the creator. This feeling of dependence, this sense of finiteness, this feeling after God, is undoubtedly an element in the theistic consciousness. Closer analysis might lead to the conclusion that this feeling is to be regarded as the natural concomitant of the intellectual and faith factors already described. Yet in the consciousness itself they are all so blended as to be inseparable,

[1] Introduction, Chap. V.

except by way of logical analysis. This sense of dependence is natural, and may be regarded as an affection of the sensibility.

d. Fourthly, there is the sense of *moral responsibility*. This may be termed the moral factor in theistic belief. It is quite different in its nature from the sense of natural dependence just described. Here that experience which is usually known as moral obligation is implied. This feature is given great prominence by the Kantian school, which makes it the dominant feature of theistic belief. It implies moral law, under which man finds himself, and the possession of a moral nature by man. Out of these facts rises the feeling of obligation, or moral responsibility to the divine moral ruler; and this element is a fixed fact in the theistic consciousness, of which we are now making an analysis.

e. The fifth factor in this analysis may be called the *instinct of worship*. This is the more distinctly religious factor. It consists in that sentiment, or impulse, in the soul which prompts it to give homage to the object of religious belief. This instinct of worship expresses itself in certain acts of a ritual and devotional nature. The sentiments which prompt to these acts, and the experience realized thereby, are what appear in this factor of theistic belief. This instinctive impulse to worship some object is so universal among men, that it may be confidently regarded as an abiding factor in the religious consciousness. It is the native tendency to reverence some superior being, and this reverence finds expression in certain rites and ceremonies. This instinct really involves the other factors in theistic belief, and it may be looked on as their proper goal. The cognition of deity, the belief in God, the sense of natural dependence, and the feeling of moral responsibility, all lead out towards, and culminate in, sentiments of adoration, and in acts of worship towards the being who is the object of all these other features in theistic belief.

These, then, are the five factors which constitute the main

contents of theism on the subjective side. They are all bound together in the unity of that experience of which they are the complex expression, and are separable only in the way of logical analysis such as has been made. It is also made more clearly evident than ever that in religious and theistic belief all the powers of the human soul are called into exercise.

3. A profound problem now comes partly into view. At this stage this problem is merely suggested, but it must be fully considered later on in these discussions. That problem consists in an inquiry as to how far the theistic consciousness in man involves an activity on the part of God, which is of the nature of self-revelation. This is a question of deepest import. At present it is merely suggested that the theistic experience of the human soul, of which an anlysis has just been made, may imply, as its abiding background, a movement of God towards man, in the way of self-expression or self-revelation. Some think that the experience of man, in his theistic consciousness, may be his response to the activity of God in self-revelation. If this view be valid, then a revelation of God in the soul may, in the last analysis, be the condition of the possibility of the complex experience involved in that consciousness. The relation between God and man which theism announces provides the ground for this natural revelation, and this natural revelation would then be the basis and the pledge of a supernatural revelation, such as is recorded in the holy Scriptures.

III. *The Precise Nature of Theistic Belief.* § 25.

In the previous section the constituent factors in theistic belief were unfolded. It now remains to consider this belief in its totality, with a view of giving a careful description of its essential nature as a whole. This now raises the question of the real psychological nature of the belief in God. Here a few simple remarks must suffice.

1. Theistic belief, at its root, is not, as it first appears in the soul, to be regarded as a fully formed idea of God. It is not innate as a well-defined notion of deity. The controversy about innate ideas has been conducted with a good deal of confusion of thought and no little ambiguity of language. In regard to no idea, belief or principle, perhaps, is this more evident than in the case of the idea of God. It has sometimes been asserted that the idea of God is a well-defined innate idea, and at other times that there is no connatural factor in it at all. The inference from the analysis of the previous section is that both of these are extreme positions. Against the view that the idea of God is entirely innate, it is held that there is in theistic experience a concrete empirical factor; and against pure empiricism it is argued that there is in theistic belief, at its root, an abiding connatural factor, which is not the product of experience, but is rather necessary to this experience. It is not asserted, therefore, that the human soul all at once has a clear cognition of one infinite personal God, nor is it for a moment admitted that the belief in God is entirely the product of some process of experience. It is simply maintained, on the basis of the theory of knowledge already laid down, that the germinal principles of theistic belief must be presupposed to be in the human soul, in order to the validity of the experiences involved in theistic belief.[1]

2. The analysis made further assumes that theistic belief, in its essential nature, is not a merely empirical product. As a matter of fact, to begin with experience alone makes it impossible to attain to the notion of God, which is associated with theistic belief. And if the soul be regarded as non-theistic in its inherent nature, education in the knowledge of God would be impossible. As the empirical theory of knowledge in general has already been rejected, so now it cannot be admitted as valid in the sphere of theistic experience. In this experience there is a native factor which the

[1] Introduction, Chap. IV.

soul itself brings to the occasion upon which this experience takes definite form in the theistic consciousness. There are, therefore, two factors in this consciousness. The one is *original,* the other *acquired;* the one intuitive, the other experimental; the one connatural, and the other empirical.

3. In these discussions it may be well to avoid the frequent use of the terms innate and intuitive, because they are somewhat ambiguous, and are at times misapplied. The term used by H. B. Smith to denote the truth here seems a good one, when he speaks of the connatural knowledge of God. This simply means that in the very constitution of the human soul there are the elements of theistic belief. This does not imply a complete knowledge of God, but only the existence in the soul of its principles. The term intuitive must not be taken to mean that man has a distinct God-consciousness as he has an immediate self-consciousness. Yet, again, it may be going too far to admit H. B. Smith's position, when he says that the denial of the existence of God does not involve an absolute contradiction, for the reason that the logical outcome of the connatural theistic principles in the human soul is a definite theistic consciousness on the occasion of experience. This is simply saying, in a round-about way, that atheism is illogical; and, it might be added, is unnatural.

4. From this it follows that if man's native theistic endowment is not at first a distinct consciousness of God, it will require certain suitable experiences to bring this endowment into distinct consciousness. The true doctrine thus emerges. Man is so constituted by his Maker that he comes, in the course of the natural development of the native principles of his soul, to attain to definite belief in and idea of God, and to realize the consciousness which theistic belief involves. As the powers of the human soul unfold their native resources, they rise to the apprehension of the notion of God in a perfectly natural way. In this process both the

connatural condition in the soul and the occasion in experience are involved. The universality of religious belief, and an analysis of man's constitution, fully confirm this conclusion.

5. Three striking facts flow from the contents of the theistic consciousness. The first is the power man has to use *theistic predicates*. How comes it to pass that untutored men can call any natural or artificial objects their gods? This seems possible only on the supposition of the reality of the connatural factor in the nature of man. This fact also greatly confirms the description given of the nature of theistic belief.

The second of these facts consists in the ability men possess to frame the *theistic hypothesis* of the universe. This arises from reflection upon the universe. They see the starry heavens above, and the fruitful earth below, and observe law, order and design in the cosmos, and these things press for an explanation. Then the theistic hypothesis is brought forward as the best solution of the various problems thereby presented. The ability to make and use this hypothesis argues for the reality of the connatural theistic factor in man's constitution, and further vindicates the exposition of the theistic consciousness already made.

The third fact is the most significant of all. It consists in the capacity to receive and understand a *special revelation* from God. This fact is worthy of note here, and will come up for fuller discussion under Christian Apologetics. The fact that man can receive and understand the things set forth in the Scriptures, and so obtain instruction in divine things thereby, is possible only on the assumption that man's constitution is endowed with a theistic capacity. There is thus a certain kinship between God and man, so that man finds himself made for God; and, in turn, it appears that God may communicate a knowledge of himself to man in some special way. And this fact still further confirms the view presented of the nature of theistic belief.

These three facts, taken in connection with the analysis made of theistic belief, greatly illumine and confirm the definition of theism given some time ago. It was asserted that God was immanent, as well as transcendent, in relation to the universe. This means that he is always in contact with the cosmos in general, and with man in particular. This being the case, the door is open for both the natural and supernatural forms of revelation on the part of God to his creature, man. This position will be repeatedly insisted on.

THE SECOND SECTION.

CHAPTER III.

THE ORIGIN OF RELIGIOUS AND THEISTIC BELIEF. THE FETICHISTIC THEORY.

Contents.

Religious and Theistic Belief Related.—Burning Questions in Apologetics.—Problems Difficult.—Diversity of Method.—Descriptive, Historical and Psychological Methods.—All Methods Needed.—The Real Question.—Classification of Theories.—Cocker.—Patton.—Plan Adopted. —Nine Theories.—Superstition and the Craft of Cunning Men.—No Philosophical Value.—The Fetichistic Theory.—Positivism and Natural Evolution.—Comte and Shultze.—Term Fetich Defined.—Its Usage and Application.—Used in Two Distinct Senses.—Its Strict Sense.—Its Religious Interpretation.—The Symbolism of the Fetich.—Waitz and Müller.—The History of the Case.—The Fetichistic Theory Explained. —Criticism of the Theory.—Not Complete at this Point.—The Theory is Superficial.—It is Historically Defective.—Assumes the Rudest to be Oldest.—Too Readily Adopts Natural Evolution.—A Psychological Difficulty.

Literature.

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I. *Preliminary.* § 26.

1. THE question of the origin of religion in general, and the problem of the genesis of theistic belief in particular, are so involved in each other, that the discussion of the one necessarily requires some consideration of the other. It is evident that the inquiry into the origin of the belief in an infinite personal God roots itself in the much wider question of the beginnings of religion among men. The question now is, How did men come to be religious at first? How is it that all the tribes of mankind have some sort of religion? Are the simple and crude forms of religion the earliest, or are the higher and purer types first in time? Are the lowest and degraded religions to be explained as degenerations from the noblest and best? If the former are first, how did they originate, and how do the latter arise from them? If the latter are earliest, what is their genesis, and how are the degraded forms related to them? In particular, how did theistic belief, with its noble view of God and of his relation to his works, first come into the possession of the human race?

These are burning questions in Apologetics at the present day, and on this field the conflict is now fiercely waged. The influence of the evolutionary philosophy, and of the historical method of investigation, are both sensibly felt in the sphere of religion. This has led to a renewed discussion of the whole subject of the genesis of religious and theistic belief, and of the rites and ceremonies associated with that belief. The mode of the development of this belief has also had to be considered in the light of modern thought, so that the older views scarcely seem to fully meet the conditions of the problem in its new form.

2. These questions are confessedly difficult. The difficulty arises from various causes. The views taken of religion differ. The question as to whether the beliefs in the mind, or the outward rites and customs of religion, are to have

prominence in the problem, introduces some confusion. Then the general viewpoint assumed in the investigation varies. Some take for granted that all religious systems are purely natural products, which have been gradually evolved from their primitive form. This is one extreme. The other extreme is to assume that all religion originated exclusively in external revelation from God, and that the degeneration which takes place has produced the degraded systems of the pagan world.

3. The difficulty in dealing with these problems is enhanced by the diversity of method followed in their study. There are at least three general methods adopted by different scholars. Some follow almost exclusively the *descriptive* method. They are content to study and compare the various systems as they exist at the present day, or as they are exhibited in their sacred books. Little attention is given to the historical connections of the various religions, or to their inner genetic relations. Though this method gives much useful information, yet it does not go very far towards the solution of the problem of the origin of religion.

Others adopt the *historical* method, which has given good results in other departments of inquiry. This method seeks to trace back the various religions to their sources, or to follow them down from their distant fountains in the remote past. This method has certain decided advantages, for it seeks to ascertain the facts in their historic relations. Yet the practical difficulty with this method lies in the fact that history proper leads us back only so far, but does not enable us to reach the very first stages of religion among men. Sooner or later we come to a prehistoric period in almost every case. Even if the aid of philology and archæology be called in, the difficulty is not entirely removed, for inferences in this field are always more or less uncertain. The historic method, therefore, has its limitations.

Still others are inclined to deal with these problems by the *psychological* method. In this case the individual, rather

than the race, is the direct subject of inspection. The inquiry, then, is, How does religious and theistic belief arise in the individual soul? This, however, makes a difficult problem. Even with the aid of the careful analysis of theistic belief made in the last chapter, the difficulty still presses, because the belief in the adult reflective mind is complex, and it is not easy for such a mind, by the aid of memory, to go back to its first distinct religious impressions, and to explain clearly how they were obtained. Nor is the case materially helped by careful observation of the first religious impressions of children, either in pagan or Christian lands. No one has ever yet been able to give a very satisfactory account of the way in which the child-mind first comes to entertain the idea of God, and to have certain religious sentiments associated with that idea.

4. It would seem, therefore, that no single method can fully solve the whole problem, but that advantage should be taken of them all. The description of the manifold phases of religion is useful, the study of the historic development of different religions is of much value, and the observation of the rise of religious belief in the soul is of great importance. But it is only by letting the light shine from all quarters upon the perplexing problem of the genesis of religious and theistic belief that trustworthy conclusions may be reached. Thus we have the problem of the origin of theistic belief in the individual soul, the question of the genesis of that belief in the history of the human race, and the evidence of the extant religions of the day, to consider. What is the origin of religious belief in the human soul? How did various religious institutions, like sacrifice and worship, first arise? How has the race come to possess the idea of God? In particular, how did men first come to entertain the belief that there exists one infinite personal being called God, who is over all, and who sustains abiding natural and moral relations with all his creatures? Was there ever a time when religion was not a factor in the life

of the race? If, historically, religion is as old as the race, then the problem of its genesis comes round again to be a question of its origin in the individual. How did the first man come to be religious and believe in God? In what sense are the germinal principles of theistic belief in the very constitution of man? The exposition of this profound problem requires several chapters.

II. *The Classification of Theories.* § 27.

Various schemes for the classification of the theories to account for the origin of religion have been proposed. Some make two main classes. One includes all those theories which propose a purely naturalistic explanation, and the other embraces those which find the origin of religion in some form of supernatural revelation. This plan of division can hardly be regarded as satisfactory, for it scarcely does justice to the psychological aspects of the problem.

1. Cocker arranges the theories upon this subject in five classes, and has a good discussion of the whole subject.[1]

First, those theories that find the origin of religion in some phase of superstition, which arises largely from a fear of invisible and superhuman powers, that are supposed to operate in nature.

Secondly, theories which discover its genesis in a process of the evolution of the absolute, according to which the impersonal ground of all finite things gradually unfolds itself in nature, in human history and religious experience.

Thirdly, theories which regard the beginnings of religion as a natural and moral feeling, which is of the nature of an instinctive faith or intuition of the soul.

Fourthly, theories which, in various ways, regard the origin of religion as the outcome of the spontaneous apperceptions of reason. This class of theories agree in holding that the necessary ideas of human reason, such as those of

[1] *Christianity and Greek Philosophy*, p. 55.

infinity and causation, coming into consciousness over against the changing world, constitute the source of theistic belief.

Fifthly, theories which assert that religion is due at first to some form of external revelation from God, the reception of which by the human soul explains the origin of religious and theistic belief.

It is evident that the problem mainly before Cocker's mind is the origin of theistic belief in the individual soul, and from this view-point his classification seems quite complete. He rejects the theories of the first three classes, and adopts the fourth as the true one. At the same time, he couples with it certain elements of the last class, and thus gives revelation a certain place in the solution of the problem.

2. Patton, in his *Syllabus of Theism*, gives a slightly different scheme. He treats of the theories to account for the genesis of theism under four classes.

First, those theories which involve the principle of natural development. Under this class several subdivisions are made.

Secondly, theories which find the genesis of theistic belief in outward revelation of some kind.

Thirdly, theories which find the beginnings of theistic belief in some sort of inference or logical process of the mind.

Fourthly, theories which regard this belief as the outcome of a certain form of intuition. The last view, rightly understood, is the one which Patton adopts; and he argues for it with much force.

3. The following classification slightly modifies and expands those just outlined, and is adopted for this discussion.

First, those reasonings which seek the origin of religious and theistic belief in superstition, the cunning or craft of men.

Secondly, theories which deny the original theistic nature of man, and find the origin of religion in fetichism.

Thirdly, those schemes which discover the beginnings of religion in naturism or animism.

Fourthly, somewhat similar speculations which regard spiritism or ancestorism as the source of religion.

Fifthly, those peculiar intermediate views which propose henotheism as the starting point of theistic belief in connection with the infinite.

Sixthly, those views which give a foremost place to some mode of reasoning or reflection.

Seventhly, the speculative proposals of idealistic evolution to account for the origin of this belief.

Eighthly, the theory which proposes outward revelation from God as the source of theistic belief.

Ninthly, the accepted doctrine, which may be termed the rational, intuitional or inspirational theory. This theory is outlined in harmony with the view taken in the last chapter touching the nature of theistic belief.

The first of these schemes has no philosophic value, and may be dismissed in a few sentences. The next four will be found to be inadequate solutions of the problem. In the next three theories, aspects of truth will be found, and these must be carefully educed. The last-named view will be vindicated as the true doctrine of the genesis of religious and theistic belief. It will also incorporate what is true in some of the other theories.

4. The first class of theories is associated with a materialistic philosophy, and a thorough-going skepticism in regard to spiritual forms of being. It is as old as Epicurus and Lucretius, and as new as the latest superficial skepticism of our own day. It denies that man's nature is essentially religious, and then seeks to give some purely empirical explanation of the way in which religion, as a universal fact among men, at first arose. There are several shades of

opinion among the advocates of this view as to the best explanation.

Some say that *fear* or dread of some supposed superhuman powers led to the belief in deity and produced religion. In particular, alarm at the rough moods of nature, and the experience of the evils which befall men in the world, caused them by degrees to believe in certain supposed agencies behind them, and to perform certain rites with a view to obtain or preserve the favor of these agencies or deities.

This theory has no real value, for the reason, mainly, that fear is an emotion which is associated with some belief or conviction already entertained. Hence, before reverential regard or superstitious fear could have arisen, men must already have had some sort of belief in these superhuman powers or agents. But it is the origin of this very belief for which search is now instituted. This search reveals the fact that it is not fear which produces religious belief, but that this belief rather conditions this fear. The conviction produces the emotion, not the emotion the conviction.

5. The other main aspect of this skeptical theory is to the effect that religion arose from the *cunning* of priests and the *craft* of rulers. It argues that these classes of men planned belief in the deities and formulated systems of religion among men for purely selfish ends. They sought thereby to secure and retain influence and authority over men for their own personal advantage. To this end, therefore, they invented religion.

This view is also entirely *superficial*. Before priests or rulers could have had any such influence over men as this theory asserts, it must be presupposed that men already possess religious convictions and sentiments. Before these cunning priests and crafty rulers could possibly find any point of contact with the men they sought to influence, these men must already have become possessed of religious senti-

ments. The question now under consideration relates to the origin of these very sentiments, which constitute the essence of religion. Thus, it turns out again that religion makes priests possible, instead of priests having produced religion at the first. And civil rulers can only bring religious influences to bear upon men under the supposition that the men under them already possess the essential elements of religion in their lives.

III. *Statement of the Fetichistic Theory.* § 28.

1. In general, this theory finds the origin of religious and theistic belief in what is called *fetichism.* It maintains that man at first was non-theistic and non-religious, and it assumes that fetichism is the lowest form of religion. From it, as the starting-point, and by a strictly natural evolutionary process, all phases of religious belief, culminating in definite monotheism, have gradually arisen. The term fetichism is used in various senses, and not a little confusion has arisen from this ambiguity. And the precise relations of fetichism, animism and naturism are by no means very clearly defined. Nor is the precise place of magic and taboo in relation to fetichism yet uniformly understood among writers upon this theme.

The fetichistic explanation of the genesis of religion is advocated by *positivists* generally. Comte for the earlier, and Schultze for the later positivists, advocated this theory, though Schultze was prepared to admit an early belief in spirits along with fetichism. In general, this theory denies that man is theistic and religious in his very constitution, and it maintains that religion in general, and the belief in God in particular, grew out of fetichism. A generation or two ago many were content to hold this theory, and some were its earnest advocates. But at the present day the priority of fetichism has been seriously questioned, not only by Christian apologists, but also by many students of

religion who argue on merely naturalistic grounds that some other form of religious belief antedated fetichism.

2. The term *fetich* comes from the Portuguese *feitico,* which, in turn, is connected with the Latin *factitius.* It thus means something that is artificial, or made by the skill of man. Whether it should be connected with the word *fatum* may be considered doubtful. Le Brosse, who lived about the middle of the eighteenth century, was the first to use the term. In a curious old book he describes how the term *feitico,* from which fetich is derived, was applied by Portuguese explorers on the coast of West Africa to certain objects which the natives of that region regarded with religious veneration. By degrees the term fetich came to denote these and various other objects.

3. In the course of time the application of the term was extended, until at the present day its usage is varied and comprehensive. Indeed, in the popular mind fetichism is often taken to embrace all those lower forms of religious belief and worship wherein certain natural and artificial objects are regarded as having connected with them certain superhuman powers for good or evil. The term thus comes to have a very wide application. It includes not only various natural or artificial material objects which are regarded as in some sense superhuman or divine, and possessed of some sort of magical powers. It also embraces many other things such as bits of metal, pieces of cloth, and locks of hair, as well as relics, amulets and carved images of all sorts. In addition, various animals, birds and reptiles, when they become objects of veneration, and even the heavenly bodies when they are worshipped, are called fetiches. This, of course, is a rather indefinite use of the term. Strictly speaking, *the fetich is any natural or artificial object which is supposed to possess some magical virtue,* in bringing good or warding off evil, and which consequently is held in reverential regard.

4. In its religious applications it is obvious that the term

is used in two distinct senses. In a wide and somewhat popular sense it is used to denote all those objects just mentioned which are regarded by certain men with religious veneration. It is this vague usage which has introduced confusion into the discussion. Properly speaking, the term should be confined to the worship of certain tangible inanimate objects in nature, or to certain artificial objects made by the skill of man, and in which some peculiar magical virtues reside. Fetichism, as a religious scheme, is that phase of religious belief and worship which implies the veneration of these objects as divine, and as endowed with magical powers.

In this strict sense it is distinct from animism, naturism and spiritism, and it excludes zoolatry and astrolatry as well, since its objects are simple and inanimate. It is merely a crude form of idolatry, coupled with the belief in magic. At times it scarcely deserves the name of a religion, yet positivists claim that it is the fountain of all religion.

5. A perplexing question now arises in regard to the proper interpretation of the religious significance of the fetich. How are these various objects called fetiches to be regarded? In what sense are they divine? Do they point to something beyond themselves? What is the import of the magical virtue which is supposed to reside in them and to be exercised by them? The answer given to these queries will evidently affect the view taken of the fetichistic theory touching the origin of religion among men. The result is that there are really two quite distinct opinions upon this point.

The one opinion is, that the fetich, as a tangible object of veneration, is the *goal* upon which the worship terminates. The object called the fetich is regarded as the deity, and no symbolism whatever is attached to it. This is the opinion held by the thorough-going positivists, alike of earlier and later types. They earnestly contend that there is nothing else than the fetich to be taken into account, and that the

worship begins and ends with the object so denoted. In support of this view, facts are adduced mainly from the lowest types of paganism, where the impression of the divine has almost faded from the consciousness of men.

The other opinion is to the effect that the object called the fetich is the sign or *symbol* of the divine. The fetich is not all there is, nor does it exist for itself alone. It is a tangible or visible sign of that which is intangible or invisible. In its higher forms the fetich becomes the symbol of the divine. Waitz and Müller, in arguing against the fetichistic theory, insist strongly upon this interpretation of the fetich. They maintain that among pagan peoples generally there prevails a conviction, often very vague indeed, of the reality of the unseen and superhuman. According to this view, the fetich comes to represent something beyond the object. The testimony of Waitz is of great value upon this point, for the reason that he has studied, as perhaps few others have, the religious beliefs and practices of the African peoples, upon which the positivists chiefly rely in support of their views. He, and others since his day, assert with confidence that even among the degraded tribes of Africa there exists a generally diffused, though often vague, impression of the reality of the supernatural, along with their fetichistic beliefs and practices.

6. There is good reason to believe that this was the state of the case when the objects called fetiches first came to be regarded with veneration. This is not inconsistent with the position that some of these rude peoples in Africa or the islands of the sea have in later times largely lost a vivid sense of the invisible and divine, and have confined their worship entirely to the object known as the fetich. It has simply to be assumed that a process of degradation, of which there are varied evidences, has taken place, and that as a result the original symbolism of the fetich has been almost entirely lost. It will be observed in this connection that if this be true, fetichism, in its strict sense, cannot have been

the first form of religion, and hence not the source of religious belief.

7. It only remains to explain a little more clearly how religious and theistic belief originated, according to the theory under notice. Since different authors give diverse details of explanation regarding this problem, only general outlines of exposition can now be given. The central principle of the theory is natural evolution. Its starting point is the lowest phase of religious belief and practice. This is assumed to be *fetichism*. This marks the condition of primitive men when they first began to feel the religious impulse moving within them. Certain natural objects round about them arrested their attention, as this impulse moved in their souls, and by degrees a vague sense of the supernatural began to be associated with these objects. Certain magical powers were also connected with them. By degrees men began to suspect that there was some peculiar hurtful or helpful influences in these objects, so that they gradually came to be regarded with superstitious fear. The conviction also came into the minds of these early men that the powers supposed to be exercised by these objects had some relation to human affairs and destiny.

Then, as the evolution proceeded, men began to extend the scope of the term fetich, and to apply it to various other objects. Under this impulse these other objects were endowed with magical powers and regarded as fetiches. By this means fetichism virtually became a system of polytheistic idolatry. It next came to pass that a belief in souls or spirits arose, to account for these magical powers in the fetiches, and by this means mythology in general, and ancestor worship in particular, are accounted for. Thus, step by step, according to this theory, by reason of an impulse in primitive men, and by the influence of environment without them, religion was gradually elevated and purified, till at length monotheistic belief, with its appropriate modes of worship, was evolved from its lowly origin in fetichism.

In this way simple reverence for certain natural or artificial objects, with which some magical or superhuman powers were somehow associated, developed into the cruder forms of polytheism; and these, in turn, passed on into the great mythologies. These, again, pushed their way slowly upwards, till at last Judaism and Christianity appeared. The process throughout is naturalistic evolution, and the result is the derivation of theistic belief from fetichism.

IV. *Criticism of the Theory.* § 29.

Extended criticism of this theory to account for the origin of religion is scarcely necessary, partly for the reason that it has little effective advocacy at the present day, and partly because the critical review of subsequent theories will, indirectly at least, serve to refute the fetichistic theory. The points of criticism now made relate mainly to those phases of this theory that pertain to the origin of religious belief, rather than to its development.

1. The latest researches into the question of the origin and growth of religion, made by eminent men, go far to show that the fetichistic theory is *superficial* and inadequate. These researches fully justify the suspicion that fetichism may not have been the earliest form of religion. Indeed, they make it reasonable to believe that prior to fetichism some other form of religion was extant among men. Some say that this earlier form was animism, others naturism, others spiritism, and still others argue for a primitive monotheism. If any of these views be made good, the claim of fetichism to priority is overthrown. Müller, in his elaborate review of the religions of India; Ebrard, in his comprehensive exposition of the religions of savage and civilized peoples; Waitz, in his exhaustive survey of the religious customs of many African tribes; Pfleiderer, in his profound philosophic critique of the question of primitive religion; Spencer, in his earnest advocacy of ancestorism;

Tylor, in his elaborate study of the whole subject; Lang, in a careful review of the beginnings of religion, and Jevons, who makes it pretty clear that Le Brosse misunderstood the facts concerning the tribes of West Africa, all argue against the priority of fetichism in religion. Even though these writers differ widely in regard to their own positive views, still, negatively, as against fetichism, they are all at one. Those who take still higher ground, and argue for a primitive monotheism, are able at the present time to adduce strong evidence for their position. They can at least show that their conclusions are not unreasonable. It may be safely said, therefore, that the fetichistic theory is now practically abandoned by the leading scholars in this field.

2. The fetichistic theory largely *misses the mark*. Even if it were shown to be historically true that the first men did venerate the objects called fetiches, this would not go very far to solve the problem of the origin of religion, for the reason that the real question relates to the origin of the impulse towards this veneration in these men. Even if men in the earliest times came to regard these objects as in some sense divine, and as possessing certain magical powers, the question at once arises as to how it came to pass that these men were able to exercise the impulse which led them to associate the idea of deity with these objects. This, on the psychological side at least, is the real question involved in the origin of religious belief, and the fetichistic theory really assumes that primitive men possessed and used the notion of deity in order to attain to fetichism. Spencer, Müller and Tylor use this point against the positivists with great effect.

3. The fetichistic theory assumes that the lowest form of religion was necessarily the *earliest in time*. This is one of the main implications of a purely evolutionary theory. The rudest and simplest forms of existence must be first, and the more complex and purer come from these, by an entirely natural process. Fetichism is assumed to be the simplest

form of religion, and the more complex forms must have come from it. But this assumption is really not sustained by the history of civilization in general, nor by the history of religion in particular. This history shows that degeneration has often taken place, especially in the case of religion. In Egypt, Babylonia, Persia and India, inscriptions on tombs and temples, and the literature of these lands, bear undoubted testimony to the fact that decline has often taken place in religion. Just in proportion as this is true, fetichism must abandon its claim to priority, for instead of the rudest being first in time, it may be the result of degeneration in later days. Mere crudeness in form does not prove priority in time.

4. Naturalistic *evolution may not be true* in the sphere of religion. Even if that hypothesis were true in the organic realm, it would still have to be established by its own appropriate evidence in the case of religion. This can scarcely be said to have been accomplished as yet. Hence, the fetichistic theory for the origin of religion can have no greater logical validity than natural evolution has scientific truth in the sphere of religion. In addition, it may be proper to remark, that even if it be made out that evolution is true in this sphere, it must be borne in mind that in its actual operation this principle has a twofold movement. If in certain cases there may be progress from the simple to the complex, there may in other cases be decline from the purer to the cruder forms of religious belief. This twofold movement is fully confirmed by history, and most evolutionists now admit it. Thus there is advance in Judaism and Christianity, and degeneration in the pagan systems generally. If this be true, fetichism is not necessarily the primitive type of religion. It may rather be a decline from a purer type, and consequently its claim to be the source of all religions cannot be confidently maintained, even on the supposition of the truth of evolution in the sphere of religion.

5. The fetichistic theory has to face a serious *psychological difficulty*. The question is as to how the first men were able to call any material object a god. The object called a fetich is one thing, and the notion of deity is another. A piece of wood, a bit of a bone, a pebble, a carved image, or anything else which is regarded as a fetich, belongs to one category of existence, and the notion of deity pertains to another. The question, now, is as to how untutored men, away back in the dawn of religious experience, were able to associate these two things, and thus call the object a god, and endow it with divine or magical powers. The fetichistic theory assumes that primitive men did this. Now, how was this possible, unless it be assumed that these early men already had in their minds the notion of deity? This is an initial obstacle in the way of this theory. It is bound to surmount this obstacle, for the real question is as to the origin of the very idea in the minds of primitive men which must be presupposed in order to the possibility of fetichism. The problem thus raised is to be considered in the light of the analysis of theistic belief made in the last chapter. It was there explained how it came to pass that man is able to apply theistic predicates to certain natural objects. It was shown that the capacity to do this is latent in man's constitution, and that, in the last analysis, the question of the origin of religion and theistic belief resolves itself into the question of the genesis of this capacity in man. We are under the psychological necessity of presupposing that primitive men had already in their minds the notion of deity before they could call any fetich a deity. If this be so, then fetichism cannot be the fountain whence religion springs. On the other hand, it seems pretty clear that theistic belief conditions fetichism psychologically. This fact effectually refutes the positivist theory, which discovers the genesis of religion and theism in fetichism.

CHAPTER IV.

THE ORIGIN OF RELIGIOUS AND THEISTIC BELIEF. NATURISM AND ANIMISM.

Contents.

Same Problem.—Another Solution Proposed.—Naturism and Animism.—Naturism, Animism, Spiritism and Ancestorism Defined.—Statement of Naturism.—Pfleiderer.—Nature in a Poetic and Mythical Aspect.—Naturistic Mythology.—Origin of Religion thus Explained.—Relation of Morality.—The Development of Religion.—Examination of Naturism.—Same Objections as Fetichism.—If Fetichism be a Degeneration, so may Animism.—Naturism may not Represent Primitive Men.—The Psychological Difficulty.—Statement of Animism.—Its Definite Meaning.—Tylor and Tiele.—Belief in Souls.—Distinct from Spiritism.—Origin of Religion thus Explained.—Examination of Animism.—Some of the Same Difficulties as Before.—Others of a General Nature.—The Weakness of the Historical Method.—Need of the Psychological.

Literature.

The Encyclopædia Articles on *Naturism* and *Animism.*—Pfleiderer's *Philosophy of Religion,* Vol. I., Chap. I.—Tiele's *Outlines of the History of Religion,* Chap. I.—Spencer's *Sociology,* Part I., Chaps. XXII.–XXIV.—Müller's *Natural Religion,* Chap. VI.—Fiske's *Cosmic Philosophy,* Vol. I., Part III., Chap. V.—Kellogg's *Genesis and Growth of Religion,* Chap. II.—Lindsay's *Theistic Philosophy of Religion,* Chap. III.—De La Saussaye's *Science of Religion,* Chap. VI.—Menzie's *History of Religion,* Chap. II.—Tylor's *Primitive Culture,* Chaps. XI.–XVII.—Lang's *The Making of Religion,* Chap. VIII.—Fairbairn's *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion,* Chap. I.—J. Leighton Wilson's *Western Africa,* Part II., Chap. XII.

I. *Preliminary.* § 30.

THE problem here is still the same. How did men first attain to the conviction of the divine? How did they come to have the idea of God in their minds? What is the relation between the simpler and the more complex forms of religious belief and practice? What was the first form of this belief, and what has been the law of its historical development among men?

1. In the last chapter one answer to these questions was considered and found defective. Several other proposed solutions of a somewhat similar nature remain to be explained and examined. These solutions are, as a matter of fact, very closely related, and may, for the purpose of orderly discussion, be grouped under four heads: Naturism, Animism, Spiritism and Ancestorism. These proposed theories to account for the origin of religion all agree in denying the inherent religiousness of primitive men. Moreover, the various facts with which these theories propose to deal are so blended together in the experience of men in early times, that a strict analysis of them, even into these four classes, is practically impossible. Nor are the leading writers upon this subject at all agreed as to how these four types of theory ought to be regarded in their historic relations. All that may be safely affirmed is that the several principles involved in these four theories may be supposed to have had something to do with the genesis of religion among men.

It is, therefore, mainly for the purpose of definite discussion that this fourfold division of kindred theories is proposed. These four theories form a group of two pairs. One pair will be discussed in this chapter, and the other in the next. In the last chapter it was shown that fetichism is simple image worship, a rude form of idolatry and belief in magic. It is now to be explained that *naturism* is a sentiment of reverence towards nature as a whole, and veneration for certain specific aspects of nature in particular; that *animism* is that somewhat more definite view of nature which regards it as animated by certain activities, or permeated by active forces which are often idealized or personified; that *spiritism* lays stress upon the primitive belief in souls or spirits, as having at first some sort of separate existence, and also as capable of entering into, and possessing, various natural objects; and that *ancestorism* is a development from spiritism, by means of which primitive

men are supposed to have been led in some way to regard their dead ancestors as still living, and as worthy of veneration. Thus we have to examine naturism, animism, spiritism and ancestorism, as proposed solutions of the problem of the origin of religion in general, and of theistic belief in particular.

II. *Statement of Naturism.* § 31.

2. The leading exponent of this view is Pfleiderer, and one class of mythologists agrees in the main with him. He argues that religion cannot have had its beginnings, either in external revelation or in fetichism. He claims that we must discover its origin in some middle view lying between these extremes. He further contends that this middle view can be neither henotheism nor ancestorism, because these are more mature forms of religious belief. Nor can it even be animism, as this term is generally understood. He rather finds the solution of this difficult problem in what he is pleased to call *naturism* which may be looked upon as the most primitive form of nature worship. In the main, Réville agrees with Pfleiderer.

It is not easy to give a lucid and complete statement of this theory in the few paragraphs which can be devoted to it here. It is a form of religious consciousness higher than that implied in fetichism, and, at the same time, not so high as that involved in animism. In general, it is a theory which has regard to nature in a somewhat ideal or poetic way. It argues that primitive man, at the very outset of his career, was naturally inclined to look upon certain processes and activities of nature with sentiments of awe or reverence. Just as fetichism lays hold of tangible material objects near at hand with reverential regard, so naturism looks abroad upon the beautiful world all around, and lifts its eyes to the heavens above, and views the varied objects therein presented with sentiments of veneration, which find

expression in acts of worship. Thus the conditions of the first dawnings of the sense of the divine in the soul are supposed to lie in the simple half-poetic and half-mythical view which primitive man took of nature, and in the corresponding feelings which that view stirred within him. The somewhat childlike fancy of men, when the race was in its infancy, led them to look upon nature as interpenetrated by numberless activities, whose varied operations were conceived after the analogy of animal life, or after the manner of the conscious life of mankind. These activities, as seen in the beautiful world about them, or in the majesty of the heavens above them, made a profound impression upon primitive man. By degrees these activities, by a sort of mythical process, came to be personified in an almost unconscious way. Thus it came to pass that the sun, moon and stars, the lightning, the thunder and the storm, and the river, the mountain and the sea, were clad with certain divine qualities; and, in turn, they stirred, in the receptive souls of primitive men, those sentiments which constituted the beginnings of religious feeling, and led to acts of homage.

In this way, according to this theory, men first began to believe in deity, and to have devout experiences in their souls. It does not claim that man, in this initial stage of religion, had a well-defined belief in deities, existing apart from or independently of nature. At first, nature and the deity were blended or identified. Yet it was from this view of nature, or from what may be termed the mythical conception of nature deities, that the original gods of all religions took their rise. And it is in the reverence borne towards these deities that the beginnings of all religious worship are to be discovered. In one respect this belief and worship constitute that widely prevalent phase of mythology in which a great variety of striking poetic views of nature appear in the form of the nature myths of all sorts. Did space permit, it would be of much interest to give

concrete illustrations of some of these simple mythical views of nature.

3. This theory further contends that a sense of moral obligation among primitive men gradually grew out of the feelings of mingled awe and confidence, and from the desire to be in harmony with these nature deities. In this way the origin of morality, and its relation to religion, is explained. As primitive men found that their welfare was conditioned in various ways upon the everchanging moods of nature, so they became the subjects of an impulse to act in such ways towards the nature deities already described as would be for their best interests. Thus the primitive piety connected with simple mythical naturism is the root out of which the ethical life of primitive men grew.

And it is from this early mythical naturism that all religious beliefs and practices have arisen. Here various writers give different explanations of the mode in which this development has been effected. Pfleiderer says that the progress which has taken place in religion has moved along three main lines among different peoples. The result is the production in due time of polytheism, spiritism and henotheism. Pfleiderer explains at length the mode of development in each of these cases. He also announces that two principles have been operative in the growth of religion from its primal roots in naturism. The one consists in an intellectual impulse which prompts man to seek a rational understanding of nature; and the other is an impulse, partly ethical and partly religious, which leads to suitable sentiments of homage, and urges to appropriate acts of worship. The result of the operation of these two impulses was the onward progress of religion in the experience of men. In due time, through various intermediate stages, definite monotheism, and modes of worship in harmony with the belief in one personal deity, originated among men.

III. *Examination of Naturism.* § 32.

Some of the points made against the fetichistic theory in the last chapter are also effective against naturism. They both assume, without good reason, that man was in a non-religious state at the outset of his career. On this account they are both inconsistent with the analysis of man's religious constitution made in a former chapter. Some additional points of criticism bearing directly on the naturistic theory may enable us to estimate its validity.

1. It is open to nearly *all the objections* made against any purely naturalistic explanation of the origin of religion. Every such theory proposes to find the conditions of the genesis of religion from without man, and consequently it does injustice to certain fundamental factors in man's constitution. If that constitution be inherently non-religious, then the origin of belief in God, and the beginnings of religious emotions and actions can only be of the nature of a kind of spontaneous generation in the human soul, according to which something appears in the consciousness of man whose germs even were not to be found in his constitution.

In like manner, every onward movement in the progress of religion must be accounted for on the supposition that the lower stage produced the higher without any contribution from the nature of man. This does serious injustice to the law of causation, for it assumes something in the effect which is not in the cause. In addition, if the law of natural evolution rules in this sphere, fetichism has certain logical advantages. Fetichism is professedly the lowest stage of religion, so that naturism, which is a higher form, could scarcely be the primitive phase of religion, if a thoroughly naturalistic theory which admits of no degeneration be maintained.

2. If naturism admits that fetichism is a degeneration from some higher form of religion, may not naturism itself

also be the result of a *decline* from a purer stage of religious belief and practice? The frequency with which survivals of an older and purer form of religion appear in naturism, as well as in other lower types of religious belief, rather points to this conclusion. If this be admitted, naturism can scarcely make good its claim to be the primary form of religion, wherein men first came to the consciousness of the divine. The facts which bear this out are to be found in almost every form of religion extant among pagan peoples. The fact that there are such survivals is usually admitted by evolutionists. These survivals may be either relics of a lower form, or remnants of a higher phase of religion. In so far as they are the latter they testify to a prior and a purer type of religion than naturism expresses.

3. This theory assumes that, when it discovers the early men in various lands who began to look upon nature in a somewhat mythical way, it has before it the *earliest type* of the human race. The correctness of this assumption may be seriously questioned. History, tradition and archæology carry us back only so far. A long pre-historic period, in all probability, preceded the stage at which it is said that naturism appeared historically. During this period great changes may have taken place in matters of religion. There was time enough for men to have risen from fetichsm to naturism, or to have declined from a primitive monotheism to naturism. If a clear case cannot be made out for the former of these suppositions, the latter becomes the more reasonable hypothesis. And, as a matter of fact, the primitive man, of whom these naturistic theories all make so much, is largely a hypothetical personage, so that but little can be certainly known concerning him by purely scientific inquiry. In addition, much of the reasonings in favor of naturism implicitly assume that the religious phenomena of modern pagan peoples represent what religion really was among primitive men. The illegitimacy of this procedure is self-evident.

4. The *psychological difficulty* noted at the close of the last chapter reappears, and must be met by naturism. Even if we admit that naturism was the first outward definite form in which religion appeared among men, this would scarcely touch the problem of the origin of religious belief as its psychological side. This, after all, is the real question, for it may very properly be asked how it came to pass that men in early or later times were able to regard natural objects and activities as having certain divine qualities, and as worthy of religious homage? To conceive of nature as possessing certain vital energies, which are supposed to be in analogy with the activities of men, does not go to the root of the problem. The real question is as to how it came to pass that primitive men were able, almost unconsciously it may be, to regard the objects and processes of nature as divine. How were they able to construe nature under the category of divinity? The only rational reply is that there is in the very constitution of men an impulse which takes the initiative in bringing the consciousness of deity into their experience. Experience may be the occasion upon which it springs into consciousness, but the concept of the divine conditions the possibility of conceiving of nature as divine. The concept of nature, as actuated by certain forces, is one thing, and the idea of the divine is another. And the possibility of uniting these in human consciousness lies in the fact that the mind of man brings the idea of the divine to nature, and thus renders the mythical view of it which naturism expresses possible. This being the case, naturism does not fully account for the origin of religious and theistic belief.

IV. *Statement of Animism.* § 33.

1. Tylor, in his *Primitive Culture,* is the great representative of *animism.* His views are, in a general way, supported by Tiele and others. It is to be observed, however, that Tylor uses the term animism in a very wide

sense, and makes it include spiritism and ancestorism, and to a certain extent naturism and fetichism. Tiele scarcely gives animism such a wide meaning, though he does derive fetichism from animism, and argues that animism is at root a belief in spirits.

It may be better for practical purposes to give to animism a more definite meaning than Tylor and Tiele do; for if belief in souls and spiritual beings of some kind be regarded as the source of religion, then spiritism would be a better term to describe it than animism. If this were done, animism would stand beside spiritism as a theory to account for the beginnings of religion. Tylor, indeed, makes two main divisions of animism, and this leads him to give a special meaning to the term, for he describes animism in such a way as to denote the same idea as spiritualism. The one of these divisions relates to belief in human souls, and in their continued existence after death; the other includes the belief in spiritual beings, which are of higher rank than human souls, and may be regarded as deities that exercise some influence over the affairs of men. In our judgment, it is better to confine the term animism to the first of these forms of early belief, and to apply the term spiritism to the latter. This is the plan followed in this discussion.

2. Taking animism in the sense just defined, it finds the origin of religion in the belief in souls in general, or in the souls of men in particular. In various primitive experiences at the beginning of his career, man gradually came to have the belief that there was in his body some other form of being. He saw a dead human body, and concluded that something very real had gone away from it. The experience of dreams and certain abnormal affections confirmed this belief. In this way the belief in the living soul of man arose. As this belief became more firmly fixed in the mind of primitive man, he gradually came to have the persuasion that the soul continued to exist after death in a disembodied

state. And later on, as this conviction deepened, the idea of the immortality of the soul was reached.

These souls, thus conceived, were supposed to have the power to enter into various objects, animate and inanimate. In this way various birds and animals, and different sorts of trees and plants, were supposed to become the habitations of these souls. In this way, too, a kind of animated philosophy of nature was reached by primitive man. These souls in the several objects of nature were supposed to explain its varied and complex activities. And having reached the conception of nature as animated by these souls, which were, at one time at least, human, the notion of the divine was gradually associated with nature in general, and with these souls in particular. How the transition from soul to deity was effected is not made very plain by the advocates of this theory.

At this point one difference between *naturism* and *animism* appears. In naturism, the natural object or process is identified more or less fully with the agency associated with it, while in animism this agency is of the nature of soul, and capable of existing independently of any material object. In addition, it can be conceived as numerically distinct from the object it animates. It is from this animistic conception of nature, and from the belief in souls which it implies, that the origin of religion is to be found. From the belief in souls, men in early ages rose to that of spirits without bodies. Then they regarded these as deities, and in this way polytheism came into existence. Then out of polytheism, by a process of elimination, at last came monotheism. Thus animism accounts for religion.

V. *Examination of Animism.* § 34.

1. Some of the difficulties of fetichism, and not a few of the objections to naturism have force against animism as the philosophy of the origin of religion. Some additional

aspects of insufficiency may be mentioned. The fact that Tylor gives such a *wide meaning* to animism renders his reasonings more or less inconclusive when animism is taken in a strict sense. The admission of Tiele, that in all probability there existed prior to animism an earlier form of religion which has left but faint traces behind it, is fatal to the claim that animism has priority. It leaves the question of the conditions of its genesis practically untouched. The earnest contention of both Müller and Spencer against animism, as the alone source of religion, has considerable value. Then, all the historical uncertainty regarding the information which gives animism its support tends to weaken the theory. The light that shines on the distant past is dim, and its rays have been refracted through tradition, so that its historical value is not of the highest order. And if it be admitted that the principle of degeneration has been operative, it may be that animism can be best interpreted as a later decadent aspect of an earlier and higher form of religious belief. Every indication of an original monotheism confirms this view.

2. As our exposition proceeds, it becomes more and more evident that the effort to solve the problem of the origin of religious and theistic belief in a merely *naturalistic* way, and by means of purely historical or linguistic investigations concerning what was probably the first form in which that belief took definite shape is *futile*. Such investigations do not go to the root of the problem, so that it may be impossible, in this way, to discover certainly what was the primary form of religion. The analogy, upon which so much stress is sometimes laid, between the religions of modern savages and ancient men, does not justify any certain conclusion, for the reason, mainly, that great changes may have taken place during the period between the present and the distant past in the matter of religion. This consideration has special pertinence against evolutionists, who presuppose change and progress in this as in other spheres.

3. In order to make good the claims of animism, it must be shown that it was the *earliest* form in all lands. This is a difficult task, for historical and other investigations may reveal that in one land one form had historical priority, and in another land some other form was first. This being the case, it becomes practically impossible to explain the genesis and growth of religion as successive strata, lying historically one above the other in regular order, and with genetic relations to each other. That different forms of early religion may have been contemporaneous expressions of the religious aptitudes of men on the one hand, and of the self-revelation of God on the other hand, is at least a reasonable supposition, even at this stage of our inquiries. If this be true, the value of the psychological method of inquiry appears. The question of the way in which an enlightened mind in a Christian land, in the exercise of his varied powers, arrives at a well-founded theistic belief, may be at least as fruitful an inquiry as the attempt to discover with uncertain historical materials what was probably the beginnings of religion among men.

4. If this be the case, then the pressure of the *psychological* difficulty against any empirical scheme is sorely felt. In the case of animism, with its belief in souls as the genesis of religion, the question as to how the notion of soul came to be construed by primitive men under the category of deity cannot be properly answered. The only supposition under which the transition from soul to deity can be made, is that the mind that makes it has the two notions already in possession. In the fact of the transition, therefore, the genesis of neither can be discovered, for the reason that both are already in the possession of the mind. This being the case, the psychological aspects of the problem are of much more importance than those who lay stress on historical inquiry alone are ready to admit. In the light of this consideration, the question of the psychological validity of theistic and religious belief is quite as important as the

problem of its historical origin. We shall seek to give proper place to both aspects of the inquiry as we pursue our further investigations.

5. It may be proper to add here that the genesis of the notion of deity, and the origin of the idea of soul may each have its *own explanation,* and that neither is to be derived from the other. Many things are pointed out by Lang in his *The Making of Religion* which go to show that the notion of God does not grow out of the idea of soul, but that men come to believe in God and in soul along different lines and on independent evidence. Just in proportion as this is made out, does the claim that animism is the source of religious belief cease to have validity. If primitive men acquired the belief in the soul apart from the body in one way, and obtained the belief in God in another way, the transition from the former to the latter is an unnecessary assumption. This assumption the animistic theory of the origin of religious belief really makes.

CHAPTER V.

THE ORIGIN OF RELIGIOUS AND THEISTIC BELIEF. SPIRITISM AND ANCESTORISM.

Contents.

Spiritism and Ancestorism.—Spiritism Defined.—Its Origin Described.—Various Grades of Spirits.—Two Great Classes.—Polytheism and Polydæmonism.—Genesis of Religious Rites.—Naturistic Mythology.—Euhemerism.—Examination of Spiritism.—Spiritism Prior to Fetichism and Naturism.—It Fails to Explain Higher Spiritual Beings.—Fails to Show Clearly how Finite Spirits were Looked upon as Deities.—The Psychological Method Needed.—Ancestorism Defined.—Herbert Spencer.—Ancestorism is a Specific Phase of Animism or of Spiritism.—Starting Point is a Man's Double.—The Continued Existence of the Soul.—Homage to Ancestors and Rites at Graves.—Transition from Ancestorism to Religion.—Examination.—The Origin of Belief in Souls.—Spencer's Primitive Man.—Assumes Savagism.—Ancestorism not always First.—The Theory Breaks Down.

Literature.

Encyclopædia Articles on *Animism, Spiritism,* and *Ancestorism.*—Spencer's *Sociology,* Part I., Chaps. XXI., XXII.—Spencer's *Ecclesiastical Institutions,* Chaps. I.–VIII.—Fiske's *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy,* Part III., Chaps. II., III.—De Pressense's *Origins,* Book IV., Chap. III.—Pfleiderer's *Philosophy of Religion,* Vol. III., Chap. I.—Patton's *Syllabus on Theism.*—Fisher's *Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief,* Chap. I.—Knight's *Aspects of Theism,* Chap. II.—Kellogg's *Genesis and Growth of Religion,* Chap. III.—Müller's *Natural Religion,* Chap. XVI.—Lindsay's *Theistic Philosophy of Religion,* Chap. III.—De La Saussaye's *Science of Religion,* Chap. VI.—Menzie's *History of Religion,* Chap. III.—Lang's *The Making of Religion,* Chaps. IX.–XI.—Fairbairn's *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion,* Chap. I.

I. *Statement of Spiritism.* § 35.

TWO other related theories to account for the origin of religion are to be considered in this chapter. In dealing with them, we have still before us the ground embraced in Tylor's elaborate treatment of animism. The two aspects of this general scheme now to be noticed are *spiritism* and *ancestorism.* Spiritism in its more mature

forms, as the belief in spiritual beings, is really the highest of these types of view; for ancestorism relates itself mainly to some phase of animism, and finds its point of departure in the belief in human souls. Thus both spiritism and ancestorism have in a measure to be viewed in the light of previous discussions.

1. Spiritism maintains that men in very early times came to entertain the conviction that there existed invisible spiritual beings of various kinds. By degrees this conviction came to be a firmly fixed belief in the minds of primitive men, and in the course of time it became quite elaborate. At the outset, it is supposed by some that this belief was in the reality of human souls; and in this aspect of it spiritism is very much like animism. But by degrees the conception of the existence of human souls apart from the bodies of men became more definite, and in this way it is supposed that primitive men attained to a belief in the existence of separate spiritual beings without bodies.

This is the stage in this belief which the term *spiritism* properly denotes. It marks that aspect of the belief in spirits which regards them as having an independent spiritual mode of existence and activity, in which all necessary relations with a material body are severed. This view is not prepared to deny that these spiritual beings may not, at will, enter into and possess the bodies of men, or even take up their abode in certain objects in nature. In some cases this view suggests that the souls of certain men seem to have undergone a process of elevation above the human sphere, and to have had given to them a sort of superhuman, if not divine, character. In any case, the conviction of the separate existence of spiritual beings of some sort is supposed to have been the starting point of religious belief. These spirits, whether they entered into natural objects, or possessed human bodies, or existed in a separate state, were gradually regarded with awe and respect, which, in the course of time, became veneration. As the movement

advanced, these spiritual beings were elevated more and more in the reverent esteem and regard of men, until, finally, they came to be conceived of as real deities. In this way a certain type of polytheism arose.

2. Not only are these supposed spirits very numerous and of various *grades*, but they were gradually divided into two very diverse classes. This divison is supposed to have been made on moral grounds by primitve men in a somewhat unconscious way. The one class is holy, and ever ready to do good to men; while the other is wicked, and always seeking to do evil to them. The former are deities, properly so called, while the latter are rather demons. In this way it is supposed that polytheism and polydæmonism arose in very early times. Some writers are inclined to give the larger place to the former, while others lay great stress on the latter, in developing, if not in producing, religion at first. Schurman is inclined to regard polydæmonism as the first definite phase of religious belief; and there can be no doubt that primitive men seem very often to have been more anxious to appease the evil deities than to please the good.

In such general ways as these the belief in deities grew out of the belief in spirits which men in early times entertained. It was further felt by primitive men that these deities sustained certain relations with men, and that they had some influence on their welfare and destiny. Out of this fact religious ordinances arose, such as sacrifice, offerings and worship, and were intended to please or appease the deities. And as many of these deities were supposed to be ready to take offence and do harm to men, much of the religious service consisted in efforts to deceive, or to pacify these supposed divine spiritual beings. In this way the rites and ceremonies associated with polytheistic or polydæmonistic beliefs originated.

3. Associated with this scheme, a certain phase of *mythology* appears. As distinguished from the naturistic myth-

ology, described in the last chapter, the euhemeristic type of it now appears. It might be called animistic, spiritistic or anthropic mythology. According to this view of the origin of certain aspects of mythology, it began in the belief in the continued existence of certain heroic men after their death. Their spirits, at least, still existed after their earthly career ended, posterity regarded them with growing veneration, and at length they were clad with divine qualities and regarded as deities. Men became heroes, and these heroes became gods, and in this way one phase of mythology is accounted for.

II. *Examination of Spiritism.* § 36.

Only a few points of critical import need be noticed. So far as this theory connects itself with human spirits, viewed apart from their bodily habitation, the criticism of animism in the last chapter serves to refute this aspect of spiritism. So far as the belief in spiritual beings higher than human spirits, and having no relation with any kind of physical body, is concerned, a few points may be briefly noted.

1. The claim of spiritism to have *priority* over fetichism and naturism seems to be well founded. The condition under which it was possible for primitive man to construe nature as animate, or as possessing magical powers, is the supposition that primitive man already possessed the conception of a living soul. The conception of spirit is one thing, and that of the objects of nature is another, and these are essentially different. To be able to say that nature is in any sense inhabited by supposed spiritual beings, the mind must already have attained the idea of such beings. This consideration completely refutes the claims of fetichism and naturism to have priority. Hence, the reasonings for spiritism refute these theories to account for the beginnings of religion. And whatever is true in animism renders the same service.

2. The *adequacy* of the way in which, according to spiritism, the conception of higher spiritual beings is reached, may be seriously doubted. Even if it be admitted that the idea of the soul be reached in the way that animism describes, the question then arises as to how the transition was made from the conception of the human soul which consciousness announces, to the higher spiritual beings which are supposed to exist without bodies at all. This is the problem which needs some further elucidation than it has yet received at the hands of those who advocate the theory now under consideration.

3. Then, even if the belief in higher independent spiritual beings arose in the way spiritism claims, the theory would still have to show how these beings came to be regarded as *divine*. How came they to be construed under the category of divinity? The explanation often given by this theory consists in the application of the principles of euhemeristic mythology to the facts involved. Heroic men came to be reverenced as gods. But how came this to pass? How did primitive men come to attach the idea of deity to certain men, and then to do them homage as gods? Here we come again to the position that the notion of deity cannot be primarily drawn from nature; nor is it reached by elevating the human soul, as such, to the plane of deity; nor is it the result of endowing higher spiritual beings with the attributes of deity. It seems more reasonable to suppose that the varied powers of man's complex nature, as they came into exercise, by an impulse from within the soul, and were directed towards nature or to finite spirits in a reflective way, gave rise to the belief in the divine and to the idea of deity. On this supposition the mind of man is able to bring the idea of deity to the contemplation of natural objects, or spiritual beings, and to construe them in terms of the concept of divinity. This clearly gives prominence to the *psychological* method of inquiry in dealing with the problem of the genesis of religious and theistic belief. The

real question goes deeper than history or ethnography can take us. It leads us to ask how men in early or later times came to possess the idea of deity, and were thereby able to apply theistic predicates to objects in nature, to the souls of men, or to higher spiritual beings. This sets the real problem in such a way that no merely empirical explanation of it is adequate. Hence, we conclude that while historical investigation into the origin of religion may shed helpful light upon the problem, it cannot alone give the fundamental solution.

III. *Statement of Ancestorism.* § 37.

This is an elaborate explanation of the origin of religion of which Herbert Spencer is the leading exponent. He is the author of what he calls the synthetic philosophy, in which scientific materialism, naturalistic evolution and philosophical agnosticism are combined in the construction of an elaborate system. In the various parts of his system, Spencer seeks to construe all phenomena on the basis of a materialistic philosophy, and by means of the principle of continuity, and the hypothesis of evolution. Hence, material, vital, mental, moral and religious facts are interpreted in accordance with these principles. It is with Spencer's explanation of the genesis of religious and theistic belief and practice that we have now to do.

It is to be observed that Spencer does not seriously attempt to give a psychological explanation of the origin of religion, though in his *First Principles* he makes certain suggestions in this direction, which lead us to expect something more than he gives us. He might have started from the idea of the unknowable, or from the principle of causation in relation to nature, and have given a much more profound account of the origin of theistic belief than appears afterwards in his *Sociology*. Fiske, in his *Cosmic Philosophy,* has done better justice to this aspect of the problem

than Spencer, who really turned away from an open door of psychological explanation to a purely empirical theory of the origin of religion. This led him to elaborate that theory which is sometimes called the *ghost* theory, but which, for the present discussion, may more properly be termed *ancestorism.* In general, this scheme seeks to discover the origin of religion in that phase of belief in human souls which regards the souls of departed ancestors as still existing in some relation to their descendants, and as worthy of some sort of reverence and homage. It thus appears that Spencer's theory is little more than a specific phase of animism or spiritism, which does not take into account all souls or spirits, but regards only the souls of those who departed this life in those relations which enable subsequent generations to look upon them as ancestors.

A brief statement of Spencer's theory, as it is set forth in his *Sociology,* may be the best way to get a compact view of ancestorism. It is to be noted that Spencer argues strongly against the sufficiency of the fetichistic theory of the origin of religion; and he undertakes to show that fetichism can be best explained from ancestorism, with its implied belief in the reality of human souls existing after death. Spencer's scheme may be stated in four particulars, which represent the successive steps in the movement of the explanation.

1. The starting point of the theory is the notion of his *double,* or second self, which primitive man in very early times acquired. Spencer does not very clearly define what this second self really is, but he describes at length the way in which he supposes primitive man came to possess it. This man observed the shadow which his body cast on the ground, and concluded that this was another self. He beheld his form reflected in the clear water when he stooped down to drink, and the notion of a second self was deepened. The experiences of dreams led primitive man to think that he had a double which could go off on various excursions

during the hours of slumber, and return again before he awoke. The abnormal experiences of catalepsy are taken to further illustrate and confirm the process by which primitive man attained the notion of his double or second self. In this crude, blundering way, man, in the beginning of his career, obtained a vague belief in something like a soul.

2. Primitive man next acquired the conviction of the *continued existence* of the dead. As in the dream the second self went away from the body for a short time, so at death this self went away permanently. Hence, men were supposed to have continued existence after death. Especially was this held to be true of relatives or kinsmen. Their second self was believed to exist separately from the body which was laid in the grave. In this way the idea of spirit became more definite, and a vague belief in immortality gradually arose in the minds of primitive men. The second self, which had left the body at death, was believed to have continued existence somewhere as a disembodied spirit. This results in a modified spiritism.

3. Primitive man soon began to perform acts of *homage* at the graves of departed ancestors, and to entertain the supposition that the spirits of these ancestors were capable of taking up their temporary abode in various objects. In this way that stage in this scheme which is properly denoted ancestorism is reached. At this stage, also, this theory parts company, to a large extent, with animism and spiritism.

Primitive men, believing in the continued existence of departed ancestors, began to do certain acts of homage at the graves of these ancestors, and to express, in various simple ways, their veneration for them. Burial places were kept with care, and visits were made to them from time to time. By degrees these acts of reverence became more definite, and some simple rites and ceremonies began to be observed at the graves of ancestors. Certain offerings were brought to these burial places; and in the course of time the graves of departed ancestors were regarded as sacred

shrines, and acts of filial devotion were gradually transformed into religious worship. In this way, it is supposed by this theory, that the belief in deities, the practice of worship, and the offering of sacrifice had their origin among primitive men.

4. At this stage an explanation is given of the way in which ancestorism is actually transformed into religious belief and *worship*. Here lies the real difficulty of the theory, and at this stage Spencer seeks in various ways to carry his theory through this critical transmutation.

First of all, he supposes that the spirits of departed ancestors have the power of *entering* into various natural and artificial objects, and in this way fetichism is explained as an outgrowth of ancestorism. To some extent, naturism is accounted for in the same way.

Then, in seeking to span the chasm between veneration for ancestors and the worship of deities, Spencer adopts several expedients. These are mainly two: First, primitive man, having by means of the notion of his double attained to the idea of soul or spirit existing separately, passed on to suppose that these spirits could take up their abode, not only in natural and artificial objects which came to be called fetiches, but also in animals and in various forms of nature. Then, these spirits having veneration paid to them as ancestors, it gradually came to pass that this veneration was transferred to the object in which this ancestral spirit was supposed to dwell. In this way, further, the ruder forms of polytheism are explained.

Secondly, the *euhemeristic* theory of mythology is used to assist in making this transition. According to this theory, certain of the departed dead are looked upon as heroes, and then, by the play of the mythical principle, these heroes are gradually clothed with the qualities of deity and come to be regarded as gods. So departed ancestors, in their disembodied state, were gradually invested with increasing veneration till they assumed heroic proportions,

and as the process went on through successive generations these heroic ancestors were gradually elevated to the rank of deity, and worshipped accordingly. In this way certain higher forms of mythological polytheism are explained as the outcome of ancestorism.

Many other things are suggested by Spencer as assisting in the transition from ancestorism to religion among primitive men. The experience of catalepsy, the phenomena of intoxication, and certain phases of insanity are mentioned as having some part in this important transition. But space forbids further allusion to these things. Departed ancestors become deities, their graves are turned into places of worship, and the offerings brought to their tombs are transformed into rites of divine worship.

In this way ancestorism seeks to explain the genesis of religion among primitive men. And having accounted for the origin of religion, its growth onward, till monotheism is reached, is explained as a process of purification and elimination, which takes place according to the principles of natural evolution. Even Judaism and Christianity are made subject to this explanation of their origin and development.

IV. *Examination of Ancestorism.* § 38.

No criticism of the synthetic philosophy, as a whole, is necessary to expose the defects of its explanation of the origin of religion. Nor is it necessary to do more than mention the fact that Spencer, in his *First Principles* and in his *Sociology,* suggests two quite different explanations of the problem now under discussion. It is also sufficient to indicate that a purely empirical explanation of the origin of religion is all that Spencer's philosophy allows him to give, and that this explanation has really no more value than the philosophy upon which it is founded. Some particulars of criticism are now offered.

1. Spencer's explanation of the origin of the belief in

souls on the part of primitive men is *superficial.* To begin with, the conception of man's double, or second self, set forth by Spencer, is unnatural, and at the same time very indefinite. At first it seems to have been man's shadow, or an echo, or a dream. The difference between these things and the idea of a man's soul, or spirit, is very great, and Spencer gives no good reason for believing that primitive men blundered vaguely from the one to the other. Then, if any untutored man in the infancy of the race did chance to make this blunder, further experience of a very simple kind would enable him to correct his unreflecting mistake. The result of this would be to make it impossible for primitive man to attain to a belief in his soul, for he would come to see that his shadow was simply the reflection of his body. So evident is this that it is not easy to take Spencer seriously on this initial point of his theory. In the absence of valid proof for Spencer's explanation of the origin of belief in souls or spirits, by means of the notion of a man's double, it seems far more reasonable to conclude that the idea of soul or spirit grew out of the experiences of self-consciousness, and that no merely empirical explanation goes to the root of the problem on its psychological side. On this ground, also, the primitive belief in immortality has its reasonable explanation. So, also, those early beliefs touching the future life, as a continuation of the experiences and employments of this life can be accounted for on this supposition.

2. The supposed primitive man of Spencer's theory is largely *hypothetical.* He is too ancient to be interviewed, or even directly observed in these later days. To assume, as Spencer at times tacitly does, that modern savages accurately represent primitive men is illegitimate. The identity in their religious condition can never be proved, while there is strong probability that the condition of men has greatly changed through the passing centuries. Modern savage peoples may be higher or lower in the religious scale than

primitive men. From the many instances of degeneration which we see among the races of men in matters of religion, it seems reasonable to suppose that modern savages are the result of religious decline. If this be so, to judge of the religious condition of the first generations of men from what is now seen among modern savage peoples, is quite illegitimate. In addition, it should be kept in mind that the supposed primitive men of Spencer's reasonings may not after all really be the first men. Even theirs may have been a decline from a prior and a purer form of religious belief. Most of Spencer's materials of proof are drawn from pagan and savage peoples of comparatively recent times. His inferences from these facts to the condition and experiences of the first generations of the human race is about as far-fetched as anything could well be.

3. Spencer's theory assumes that man at first was in a rude *savage state*, little better than the brute beasts about him. This is to assume what needs to be proved. There are not a few indications that the first men were not untutored savages. Leaving out of account what the Bible implies on this subject, there are not wanting indications in the conclusions of modern ethnology that many peoples in very early ages were in a much higher moral and religious condition than modern savage races. And history reveals the fact that in very early days whole communities, like Egypt and Babylon, were far above the rude savage state. It may also be pointed out that while Spencer's criticism of fetichism, as the philosophy of the genesis of religion, has much force, yet his own evolutionary principles are rather inconsistent with this criticism. If evolution marks onward progress from the lower to the higher in the sphere of religion, then, since fetichism is a lower form of religious belief than ancestorism, it must have been prior to it. Or, on the other hand, if the priority of ancestorism be admitted, it may be proper to go a step further, and say that some phase of theistic belief lies before ancestorism.

4. To make good this theory, ancestorism must *antedate* and condition religion among all peoples. It must be shown that religion grew out of ancestorism in every country, or that all forms of religion have come by migration, or in some other way, from lands where ancestorism was primitive. To do this is difficult, if not impossible, for the reason that in many lands, and especially among some of those peoples where high civilization existed in very early ages, there is really no trace of ancestorism in the sense in which Spencer uses the term. In Egypt, Babylon and Greece, in the very earliest times, this is the case. This is a difficulty with which Spencer does not deal in any satisfactory way. The euhemeristic theory of mythology can scarcely be of much service in this connection, for it is now very generally discarded. And even if it were admitted, the very difficulties which press against ancestorism at this point would remain in full force. If it cannot be shown that ancestorism precedes and conditions religion everywhere, it can scarcely be maintained that ancestorism accounts for the beginnings of religion everywhere.

5. This theory *breaks down* at several important points. It overlooks the fact that veneration for departed ancestors is one thing, and worship of deities is another. It consequently fails to show how the transition is actually made from the one to the other. More thorough investigation might show that the transition is not possible in a natural way. At this point the theory must confess serious failure, for to explain religion from ancestorism is either to take religion for granted, or to explain it away. It may be that in order to give a valid basis for ancestor worship we must presuppose religion as already existent. In addition to all this, the searching question may properly be asked this theory, How could primitive man call his ancestors deities, and render to them a certain kind of worship, unless he already possessed the idea of deity, and understood, in some measure, what the instinct of worship really was? If this

be so, ancestorism cannot be the source of religious belief and practice, for the inquiry we are now pursuing relates to the origin of that very belief which is presupposed in ancestor worship. To crown all, this theory is not competent to account for the development of theistic belief, and the religion of the Bible, in accordance with its own terms.

CHAPTER VI.

THE ORIGIN OF RELIGIOUS AND THEISTIC BELIEF. HENOTHEISM.

Contents.

Müller's General Position.—His Definition of Religion.—A Growth, the Result of Criticism.—His Polemic against Fetichism.—This Quite Successful.—Statement of His Theory.—His Philosophy of the Infinite Underlies It.—The Infinite and the Indefinite.—The Theistic Significance of the Idea of the Infinite.—Materials Drawn from Literature of India.—Tangible, Semi-Tangible and Intangible Objects of Sense.—The Last Suggest the Infinite.—Henotheism Defined.—Henotheism the Source of Religion.—Criticism of the Theory.—The Philosophy of the Infinite Defective.—It is Historically Insecure.—It is Logically Contradictory.—It Has a Psychological Difficulty.—It Breaks Down in Passing from the Infinite to the Divine.

Literature.

Encyclopædia Articles on *Henotheism* and *Kathenotheism.*—Müller's *The Origin of Religion,* and His *Natural Religion.*—De Pressense's *Origins,* Book IV., Chap. III.—Edward Caird's *The Evolution of Religion,* Vol. I., Chap. IV.—Kellogg's *The Genesis and Growth of Religion,* Chap. IV.—Lindsay's *Theistic Philosophy of Religion,* Chap. III.—De La Saussaye's *Science of Religion,* Chap. VI.—Menzie's *History of Religion,* Chap. IV.—Fairbairn's *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion,* Chap. I.—Lang's *The Making of Religion,* Chap. XV.

I. *Müller's General Position.* § 39.

1. MAX MULLER'S unique theory to account for the origin of religious and theistic belief deserves some attention. He is an authority on philology in general, and on the literature of India in particular. He has also given great attention to the question of the nature and origin of religion, and he holds well-defined opinions upon the genesis of theistic belief. He has written extensively upon the subject, and his views have undergone certain changes from time to time. If we judged his opinions from his earlier writings, like his *Chips from a German*

Workshop, we would find admissions in regard to the native religious instinct of men, which are not so prominent in his later works, like *The Origin of Religion* and *Natural Religion.* In the latter his empiricism is more clearly announced, and the principle of natural evolution is given a larger place in the genesis of religion.

The origin of the belief in deity, according to Müller, is associated with the way in which men at first were led to a realization of the infinite, in its correlation with finite things in certain aspects. His theory has come to be known as *henotheism,* and some recent writers speak of this general theory as kathenotheism. He seeks to illustrate and confirm it from the contents of the literature of India which bear upon the question.

2. Müller is careful to *define* what he understands by religion. He follows Cicero in deriving it from *relegere,* to gather up, or carefully consider. He also states and criticises at length various proposed definitions of religion. In doing so he presents a valuable discussion of this subject. His own definition seems to have been a gradual growth in his hands. He first says, in his *Introduction to the Science of Religion,* that "religion is a mental faculty or disposition, which independently of, nay, in spite of, sense and reason, enables man to apprehend the infinite under different names and under varying disguises. Without this faculty, no religion, not even the lowest worship of idols and fetiches, would be possible." As the result of criticisms made upon this definition, he modified it in his *The Origin of Religion* so as to make religion consist in "the potential energy which enables man to apprehend the infinite." He thus substitutes potential energy for faculty, but says little or nothing about the objective side of religion. Under the influence of other criticisms, he still further modified his definition in his *Natural Religion,* so as to make it consist in "that faculty or potential energy in man by which the infinite is apprehended in such a way as to

affect his moral conduct." This may be regarded as Müller's most mature conception of religion. It is to be observed that it still gives prominence to the subjective side of religion, and relates it to the conception of the infinite. It is the origin of religion thus defined which he investigates.

3. Before he unfolds his own theory he enters on a vigorous *polemic* against the fetichistic theory advocated by positivists. His assault upon this theory is entirely successful, inasmuch as he shows very conclusively that religious belief and practices have not arisen as the result of homage paid to natural objects of any kind. This he does by adducing the testimony of *travellers* touching what they observed in various pagan lands, concerning the religious traditions, beliefs and practices of the people. He also draws at length upon the *history* of primitive religion, and makes out a strong case against fetichism as the first form of religion among men. He also presents a learned and elaborate review of the sacred *literature* of India in particular, and reaches the well-assured conclusion that the fetichistic explanation of the origin of religion is not supported by this literature. He further brings forward a fatal *psychological* objection to the fetichistic theory, to the effect that primitive peoples must have had some notion of the divine before they could regard a fetich as deity, or call it a god. This polemic part of Müller's work is excellent, and is really the best service he has rendered in this connection.

II. *Statement of Müller's Theory.* § 40.

1. Since Müller's theory of the origin of religion is associated with the idea of the *infinite,* it is natural to expect that he will set forth a philosophy of the infinite. This philosophy constitutes the basis of Müller's theory of primitive theistic belief. In unfolding it he proceeds in a somewhat empirical way.

Negatively, he argues that the idea of the infinite in the

human mind is not *evolved* by reason. It is not a rational intuition. Though he does not formally deny the *a priori* factor in human knowledge, yet he implicitly takes his stand on the ground of the empiricist in his theory of knowledge. He says that the infinite is a something which transcends both the senses and the reason, taking these terms in their ordinary meaning. In some places he seems to identify the *infinite* with the *indefinite,* the invisible, the supersensuous, and the supernatural, and is ready to admit that any of these terms might be used to denote what the term infinite means. He adds that the infinite is not merely a negative concept, nor is it abstracted from the finite. Yet the finite and infinite are correlatives.

Still, so far as the apprehension of the infinite is concerned, it is supplied to us in its original form by the senses. It seems strange to say this, after asserting that the infinite transcends both the senses and reason. Müller's words are: "Beyond, behind, beneath and within the finite, the infinite is always present to the senses. Its presence presses in on us in all our experiences of the finite. The finite by itself without the infinite is simply inconceivable; as also is the infinite without the finite." He thus makes the finite and the infinite relative terms, and finds the one implied in the other in cognition.

Müller, however, makes the unwilling confession that the infinite, thus apprehended, is after all only the *indefinite.* His words are, "The indefinite and the infinite are in reality two names for the same thing; the former expressing its phenomenal, and the latter its real character." And he adds that the history of religion is a history of all human efforts to render the infinite less and less indefinite, and that, in spite of all these efforts, the infinite must always remain to us the indefinite. This goes far to show that Müller's philosophy of the infinite is not adequate, and that it is justly exposed to the criticism made upon it by Edward Caird, in his *The Evolution of Religion,* to the effect that

the infinite should not be so much regarded as the correlative of the finite, as the principle of unity in the multiplicity of finite things.

2. After expounding the philosophy of the infinite, Müller proceeds to unfold its religious and *theistic* significance in an extended discussion. His main aim is to connect the idea of God with the notion of the infinite in the earliest stages of theistic belief. This leads him to seek to show how the vague sense of the invisible or infinite led out to the sense of the divine, and generated religious sentiments. He finds his materials for reasoning largely in the literature and religions of India.

In working out his theory, he undertakes to show that from the sacred literature of India, especially the Vedas, men were led in early times to an apprehension of the infinite over against certain forms of the finite which were present to the senses. Then he has further to explain how it came to pass that the infinite thus apprehended was construed under the category of deity. The objects of sense are divided into three classes for the purposes of complete discussion.

First, there are *tangible* objects, which can be touched and comprehended by the senses. Here certain objects, such as stones, bones, shells, flowers, berries, pieces of wood, water and animals, can be touched all round, as it were. By the senses these objects can be fully apprehended, so that the idea of the infinite is not realized in connection with these in the first instance. These objects, by the lower pagan religious systems, are regarded as *fetiches;* but this is not the primitive form of religious belief, since it is not in relation to them that men first began to suspect or realize the presence of the infinite in certain relations to them. This stage of religious belief is a degeneration, and is not the original stage of that belief.

Secondly, there are *semi-tangible* objects, which can be apprehended by the senses only in part, for to some extent

these objects lie beyond the reach of the senses, especially of that of touch. As examples of this class of natural objects may be mentioned trees, whose deepest roots are out of sight, and whose highest branches are out of reach. Mountains are another example, for we may tread about their base, but may not be able to scale their snow-clad summits, hidden beyond the clouds. And rivers are of the same nature, for we may see the portion of the stream visible as we stand on its banks, but its source among the mountains, and its mouth at the ocean, we cannot see. Here there is a dim hint of the infinite in the fact of the unseen and intangible features of these objects. The idea of a beyond the senses at least arises in the mind. To some degree the infinite is at hand, in connection with the partial apprehension of these objects by the senses; but the sense of the infinite is not yet vivid. This dim sense of the infinite passes over to the idea of the divine, somehow, and the result is the *semi-deities* of polytheistic paganism. Still, this is not the primary source of religious belief, for it is derived by degeneration from another earlier stage.

Thirdly, *intangible* objects form the third class, and they consist in those objects which cannot be touched at all by man. They may be apprehended by hearing or by sight, but not by touch. The azure sky, the passing cloud, the raging storm, the shining sun, the changing moon, the sparkling stars and the morning dawn, are examples of this class to which Müller makes frequent allusion. Here it is, as Müller understands the literature of India, that there were present to the senses of men certain objects in which the presence of the infinite was distinctly apprehended. He eloquently describes how the early Sanscrit Indians, on the tablelands of Hindustan, looking up into the Oriental skies, gradually reached the conception of the infinite, which they somehow or other transmuted into that of deity. Thus, the sky, and the cloud, and the dawn, were the vehicles which conveyed the impression of the infinite beyond, in

upon the minds of these primitive men. Thus, Dyaus and Varunna, Vishnu and Aditi, and many other deities, arose in connection with this apprehension of the infinite. Müller does not very clearly show how the transition from the *infinite* to the notion of *deity* is actually made, nor does he seem ready to admit that the notion of the infinite is in any proper sense *a priori*. The vague sense of the vast beyond suggested by these intangible objects is the germ out of which religion springs. Thus the conception of *deities* arose, and, in connection with this conception, certain religious rites were instituted.

III. *Henotheism Explained.* § 41.

1. The term henotheism, used to denote Müller's theory, must now be more definitely explained in contrast with polytheism and monotheism. Polytheism is the belief in and service of many gods. These may be regarded as a multitude of separate deities, or as classes of deities. Pagan fetichism represents the former, and the classic mythologies the latter. Of this polytheistic belief there are many forms. Monotheism is the belief in and worship of one infinite personal God. There is only one such being, and, from the nature of the case, there cannot be more than one. There are different types of this, also, represented by Mohammedanism, Judaism and Christianity. Certain types of speculative theism, which verge towards pantheism, are also to be thought of in this connection.

2. Now, *henotheism* is a curious intermediate doctrine, which is not easily stated. It denotes the belief in, and worship of, single deities, one at a time, which are represented by those natural intangible objects wherein men first began to suspect the presence of the infinite. These deities are regarded as single and independent of each other, to a large extent, so that only one among the many gods whose reality is admitted, for the time being, engages the attention

of the worshipper. These individual gods are not conceived as limited by the power of others, superior or inferior in rank. Each god is, to the mind of the suppliant, as good as all the gods. The reality of more than one god is admitted; but one is, for the time being, regarded as a real divinity, with its claim to homage. Müller thinks that this view of the subject is properly drawn from the literature and religion of India. But he also argues that there are traces of the same form of religious belief in Greece and Rome, and also in Germany. It marks in these lands that phase of religious belief which preceded that polytheism, where the gods were organized into a commonwealth, with one as supreme, like Zeus, Jupiter or Wodin.

3. The contention of Müller is that this henotheistic stage of religious belief is the *earliest* of all, and the source whence all others have come. A twofold development, he says, has taken place in the history of religion. The one is the *evolution* of henotheism into theism and monotheism. This has taken place by a process of elimination and elevation, according to which attention was fixed more and more on the single deity, till at length all thought of others faded out of the minds of men. In due time monotheism, as it appears in Judaism and Christianity, originated.

The other movement is by the operation of *degeneration,* whereby henotheism declines to pagan polytheism, and this polytheism, in turn, sinks still lower and becomes fetichism in its various forms. Fetichism, instead of being the primary source of religion, is a secondary product from henotheism, resulting from degeneration in religion. In this way Müller argues that all the phenomena of religion may be accounted for, from the assumption of henotheism as the fountain whence they all flow. Theism is the result of an advance on henotheism, and fetichism is the product of a decline from it. There is a good deal that is interesting and attractive about this whole scheme, so that it needs some careful scrutiny.

IV. *Criticism of Henotheism.* § 42.

1. The *philosophy* involved in Müller's theory is defective. He holds the empirical theory of knowledge, and presents a peculiar philosophy of the infinite. As a matter of fact, it is his empirical epistemology which leads to his philosophy of the infinite. It is with the latter that we have now chiefly to do, and some critical remarks may now be made upon it.

In denying that the notion of the infinite is a deliverance of reason, and in asserting that it is present in a phenomenal way to the senses is to *miss the mark* in both cases. The notion of the infinite is not apprehended by the senses, but is contributed by reason to certain aspects of cognition. He also confounds the infinite with the indefinite, and overlooks the fact that these are entirely diverse conceptions. The indefinite, no matter how vast, is still the finite. To speak of the infinite and the indefinite as the real and phenomenal aspects of the same thing is to introduce hopeless confusion into the discussion. Further, if we begin with the senses as our only source of knowledge, we can never reach the infinite. Empiricism will never lead to the goal of the infinite, for the infinite pertains to the reason as the faculty of supersensible principles.

Müller's fundamental error regarding the infinite is that he confounds the *mathematical* with the *metaphysical* infinite. The former is a quantitative conception, while the latter is qualitative. In the former case the finite stands related to the infinite as a mode; in the latter case it pertains to some form of being as a quality. The infinite, therefore, is not a substantive entity, supplying the stuff out of which the finite is made; it is rather a quality pertaining to the basal ground of the reality of all finite things. Nor, again, is the infinite the sum total of all finite things; it is rather the condition of the possibility of finite things

existing as a totality. Nor, again, is the infinite the highest or most general conception; it is rather an *a priori* principle of reason on its psychological side. This suffices to show how far short Müller's doctrine is of being an adequate philosophy of the infinite, either on its ontological or its psychological side.

2. Historically, Müller's theory is open to objections. Indeed, some of the reasonings which he uses against fetichism as the source of religious belief tell against his own theory. History shows that when religions are left to themselves they surely *degenerate,* and that the early forms of belief and the oldest traditions are the purest. Müller admits the operation of the principle of degeneration in deriving polytheism and fetichism from henotheism. But he gives no good reason for beginning with what he calls henotheism, which, at best, is a somewhat hypothetical stage. If he had fully traced out his views, he might have been led to a primitive monotheism, instead of to henotheism. For if henotheism be prior to fetichism, and the latter a degeneration from the former, may not monotheism be before either, and both be a degeneration from it? This consideration might be illustrated at length from the history of religion in Egypt, Babylon and India, did space permit.

3. Müller's effective polemic against the positivist account of the origin of religion is *inconsistent* with his own constructive exposition of the genesis of theistic belief. Against fetichism, he argues that it is a degeneration from henotheism; and against the view that religious belief originated in a primitive monotheism, he asserts the operation of an upward evolution from henotheism. And he does this without introducing any sufficient reason why the development should have taken one direction in the one case and another in the other. He refuses to allow the operation of any supernatural factor, and cannot consistently hold one principle to explain fetichism and another to account for

theism. Christianity, with its supernatural factor, can account for general decline in religion beyond the sphere of its influence, and for upward movement in religion where the supernatural factor is operative, as in Judaism and the Christian system. Müller's inconsistency is evident.

4. The same *psychological* difficulty arises here as in former naturalistic explanations of religion. When Müller properly enough says that savage men could not have called their rude fetiches, deities, unless they already had some conception of deity in their minds, he provides a weapon to strike his own theory a sore blow; for the question at once arises as to how the Sanscrit Indians could have called those intangible objects, in which they began to suspect the presence of the infinite, deities, unless they already had in their minds the concept of deity. It is quite clear that at this point Müller is little better off than the positivist, and that henotheism is scarcely more successful than fetichism in accounting for the genesis of theistic belief. The only supposition upon which Müller's theory can be made to work is that the human mind possesses, in its very nature, the principles of theistic belief. But if this assumption be made, Müller's theory is not needed to account for the origin of theistic belief. He cannot surmount this psychological difficulty.

5. In addition to all this, it must be pointed out that Müller tacitly *identifies* the infinite and the divine, without showing how primitive men made the passage from the one notion to the other. The notion of the infinite is one thing, and the idea of deity is another. The former is a metaphysical concept, the latter is a theistic notion. How are the two to be related, and how is the passage made from the one to the other on the basis of Müller's theory? Before the predicate of infinity can be rationally made of God, the mind must already have both concepts. It may be that neither is to be derived from the other, but that each has its own independent psychological origin. What is now

chiefly charged against Müller's theory is, that it does not show how the transition was made, or can be effected from the infinite, which he assumes to be first, to the concept of deity, which, he argues, is derived from the apprehension of the infinite over against the finite under certain conditions.

With the acknowledgment that Müller has rendered good service in this discussion, we are, nevertheless, compelled to pronounce his theory inadequate to account for the genesis and growth of religion.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ORIGIN OF RELIGIOUS AND THEISTIC BELIEF. THE FUNCTION OF REASONING OR INFERENCE.

Contents.

Preliminary.—Inference Theory.—General Statement.—Relation of Inference to Theistic Belief.—Confusion among Different Advocates.—Various Reasons for the Confusion.—Particular Statement of the Theory of Inference.—Two Types.—Theistic Belief Complex, Therefore not Intuitive.—Rather an Inference.—Confusion Again.—Theistic Belief an Unconscious Inference.—Not Intuitive, However.—Flint's View.—Cruder Forms.—Examination of the Theory.—Admissions Made.—The Usage of the Term Intuition Ambiguous.—Though now Complex, may Have an Intuitive Root.—Flint's Exposition Rather Ambiguous.—Confuses the Question of the Origin of the Idea of God with Proofs for His Existence.—Hence an Important Distinction Between the Genesis and Vindication of a Belief.—The Threefold Function of Logical Inference.—This View Confirmed.

Literature.

Flint's *Theism,* Chaps. I., II.—McCosh's *Intuitions.*—Harris' *Philosophical Basis of Theism,* Chap. XVI.—Cocker's *Christianity and Greek Philosophy,* Chap. II.—De Pressense's *Origins,* Book IV., Chap. III.—Principal Caird's *Philosophy of Religion,* Chap. VI.—Lindsay's *Theistic Philosophy of Religion,* Chap. III.—Schurman's *Belief in God,* Chap. II.—De La Saussaye's *Science of Religion,* Chap. VI.—Sabatier's *Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion,* Chap. I.

I. *Preliminary.* § 43.

SEVERAL naturalistic theories to account for the origin of religious and theistic belief have been considered. It has been found that they all presuppose more or less definitely a non-religious and non-theistic stage in the early history of the human race, and that they also attempt to explain, in some empirical way, the genesis of the religious consciousness and of theistic belief in man. It has also been discovered that each of these theories is marked by certain radical defects, and that some other solution of the problem must be sought.

1. We now proceed to the discussion of another theory which needs careful scrutiny, inasmuch as it is a defective, rather than an erroneous, solution of the problem. This theory discovers the origin of the belief in God, and hence of religion, in a *reasoning process* of some kind. According to this view, theistic belief originates in some sort of a logical inference. Much diversity of opinion exists as to the precise nature of the inference in question. It can scarcely be maintained that belief in God results from a strict logical demonstration, inasmuch as such demonstration only makes explicit what is already an implicit mental possession. To suppose, therefore, that men in very early times obtained the idea of God, and came to believe in his existence because they proved it, can hardly be a proper explanation of the origin of religious and theistic belief, for the reason, mainly, that men can only reason about that of which they already have some idea.

2. Most of the advocates of this theory are content to say that the origin of theistic belief is to be discovered, in a general way, in an *inference* of some sort touching the existence of God. At the same time no clear statement is given as to the precise logical form of this inference. It is not made plain whether it is the product of a mediate, an immediate or an inductive inference, nor is any definite view announced as to the non-theistic grounds upon which the inference rests which generates theistic belief.

It must not be supposed, however, that logical inference has no relation at all to theistic belief. It has, as we shall see, important bearings upon that belief, and it is of vital moment to ascertain its precise functions in relation to the belief in God. It must not be hastily concluded that logical inference has no bearing upon theistic belief, simply because that belief may not originate, in the first instance, in such an inference. It is precisely at this point that a good deal of confusion has arisen in the discussion of this topic. Very many things that those who hold this view say do not bear

upon the genesis of the idea of God in the human soul, but relate, rather, to the proofs for the existence of God. It is with the problem of the origin of the idea of God that the psychology of theism has to do, and this is the topic now in hand.

3. Further confusion arises in the discussion of this theory from the fact that different writers seem to have before their minds *diverse ideas* of God. One thinks of God mainly as the first cause, or creator of all things; and another regards him chiefly as one infinite personal God, the object of homage and service. One has before his mind the matured idea of God found in the Christian system, which is quite complex in its nature, while another turns his attention rather to the simpler forms of the idea of God found in cruder systems. It is easy to see that the function of reasoning in relation to these different ideas of God will necessarily be differently regarded by these several writers. In cases where the idea of God is complex, certain elements in it may be due to reflection and reasoning, although in no case can it be shown that the basal elements of the idea are generated by any reasoning process, because they must be presupposed in order to the possibility of the reasoning.

4. An additional element of *confusion* arises from the somewhat vague way in which the supporters of this theory regard the operation of the faculties of the human mind upon the manifold objects in nature. How far can the observation of, and reflection on, the glories of the heavens and the wonders of the earth, go to generate the idea of God in a mind presumably devoid of it? How much may this observation and reflection do to enlarge and enrich the idea of God in the minds of those who already possess it? These are two very different questions, and many of the advocates of the theory now under consideration do not make a proper distinction between them. They speak, in a general way, of reflection upon the starry heavens and the beautiful earth, and grow quite eloquent about how all this

leads out to God, and produces the idea of God in the mind of the reverent beholder. With much they say we heartily agree, if it be regarded as vindicating the objective validity of the belief in God, and as enlarging the idea already in the mind of the observer. But all this leaves untouched the basal inquiry as to the *origin* of the primary con-natural idea of, or belief in, God, which must be presupposed before reflection on, and inference from, the objects of nature can possess theistic quality. We seek to keep clearly before our minds the single inquiry into the origin of theistic belief.

II. *Statement of the Inference Theory.* § 44.

A brief statement of the theory which finds the origin of religious and theistic belief in some reasoning or inferential process may now be given. It is not easy to make such a statement, because able writers vary not a little in their mode of setting it forth. There are two main forms of stating it.

1. The first takes the somewhat mature notion of God found in the human mind, and discovers that it is quite *complex*. It then asserts that the belief in God which this notion implies cannot be an intuition, in the proper sense of the term. Hence, it is argued that the idea of God in the mind of man is not a simple and original idea or belief, but that it is complex and derived. Consequently it is not an ultimate idea, but capable of being reduced to lower terms, or of analysis into its component elements. According to this view, the term intuition is taken to denote a mental product, rather than the mental activity involved in originating that product. When this view of what an intuition consists in is applied to the idea of God, it follows that since intuitions are simple and original ideas, the idea of God, which is not simple and original, cannot be an intuition. And, touching the origin of the idea of God, it is further contended that it cannot arise in an intuitive

way. And it also follows, from the position just stated, that the genesis of the idea of God in the human mind must be sought in some other quarter. If it be not intuitive, it must be empirical in its origin. If it be not original, it must be derived from some other source. The supporters of the theory now under consideration usually fall back on the ground that the origin of the idea of God is the product of reflection on, or an *inference* from, certain aspects of the world about us. Reflective observation of the starry heavens, the fruitful earth, the changing seasons, the incidents of our lives, the events of history, and similar things, generates the idea of God in the minds of men, and leads them to believe in his existence.

There is evidently some confusion in this phase of the inference theory at this point. Those who argue in its favor do not distinguish clearly between the question of the *origin* of the idea of God and that of the reasons for believing in his *existence*. Much of what they say bears upon the latter question rather than upon the former, and it has much force when so regarded. But it does not follow that because we may be able to give good reasons for believing in the existence of God, these reasons generate the idea of God in the soul of man at first. More will be said upon this point later on in this chapter.

2. The other aspect of the inference theory prefers to say that the belief in God is the result of an *immediate inference* which men unconsciously make. Like the other phase of this theory, it denies that the belief in God is the product of immediate intuition, or that it originates in any kind of feeling. It is not always quite clear whether the adherents of this view are dealing with the genesis of the idea of God without reference to his existence, or whether they are really assuming the presence of that idea in the human mind, and then seeking to account for the validity of this belief in the existence of God. Flint, in the third chapter of his excellent treatise on *Theism*, in which he

deals with the nature, conditions and limits of the theistic proof, seems to stand on this general ground, as a few quotations may show. He says that "if not perfectly instantaneous, the theistic inference is so rapid and spontaneous as to have seemed to many intuitive. And, in a loose sense, perhaps, it may be considered so. Not, however, strictly and properly, since the idea of deity is no simple idea, but the most complex of ideas." Again, he says that "the contemplation of nature, and mind, and history, is an indispensable stage towards the knowledge of him. Physical and mental facts and laws are the materials or data of reason in its quest of religious truth." These passages, so far as they bear upon the origin of theistic belief, seem to indicate that this belief is not intuitive, but the result of the contemplation of nature.

Flint further says that "our knowledge of God is obtained as simply and naturally as our knowledge of our fellow-men. It is obtained, in fact, mainly in the same way. We have no direct or immediate knowledge, no intuitive or *a priori* knowledge, of our fellow-creatures any more than we have of the intelligence of our Creator. We grow up into knowledge of the mind of God, as we grow in acquaintance with the minds of men, through familiarity with their acts." In such passages as these it is not very clear what Flint means by the knowledge of God. It seems not easy to decide whether he intends this phrase to denote the idea of God in the human mind, or to describe the belief in the existence of God. One feels like asking whether he includes both of these aspects of theistic belief under the phrase, the knowledge of God? And one hesitates to admit the cogency of the analogy between the way we know our fellow-men and obtain our knowledge of God. Our relations with our fellow-men and with God are by no means the same. Our relation to God is one of origin and dependence, such as our relations with our fellow-men do not imply.

Flint adds that "the inferences which theistic belief in-

volves are, in fact, involuntary and unconscious." It is thus an immediate, involuntary, spontaneous and unconscious inference. "As a rule, the theistic process is as simple and easy an operation for the mind as digestion is for the body." Here, again, one is impelled to ask what kind of an inference a spontaneous, unconscious, involuntary inference really is. It looks almost as if there were an intuitive or con-natural factor in it. And the question still presses as to whether the result of this peculiar inference is the production of the idea or knowledge of God in the soul, where it did not already exist, or whether it relates to the apprehension of the reasons why we believe in the existence of God.

3. There are other and cruder forms in which the inference theory is presented, but it is scarcely necessary to explain them. They are generally quite *unreflecting,* and usually presuppose that the mind actually possesses the idea of God. What they say relates very largely to the elaboration of that idea, or to reasonings to vindicate the actual existence of God. But the real question now before us is as to the genesis of the idea of God in the human soul, and of the origin of what may be called the theistic and religious consciousness. The theory under notice claims that some reasoning process originates these experiences in the soul of man. The validity of this claim is now to be examined, and the function of reasoning in relation to theistic belief is to be indicated.

III. *Examination of the Inference Theory.* § 45.

As there are elements of truth in this theory, and at the same time not a little confusion in the statement of it, a somewhat careful examination is needed.

1. Concerning the inference theory, certain admissions should be freely made. It is frankly admitted that observation and reflection upon the manifold facts of nature, as

well as upon the events of human history, may serve to *enlarge* and elevate the idea of God. Various forms of inference or reasoning may do much to clarify theistic belief and give it definiteness and persistence.

And it should be just as readily conceded that reflection and reasoning may do much to *confirm* the belief in the existence of a supreme being. Logical inferences of various kinds may go far to establish the objective validity of the idea of God. The arguments for the existence of God are reasonings of different sorts which serve to provide a rational basis for this belief. This, indeed, is the main function of reasoning in relation to theistic belief.

Further, the function of reasoning is of great value in its inductive forms, since it enables us to *solve* the most profound problems of the universe by means of the theistic postulate. These problems are many and varied, and they pertain to the origin and continued existence of the universe. The human mind, having the idea of God in its possession, is able to bring it to the solution of these great problems. In doing so, it pursues a legitimate inductive process of reasoning, and announces a sound theistic philosophy of the universe. The result is a theistic cosmology.

But when all these admissions are made, the question as to the *origin* of the idea of God, or of theistic belief on its subjective side, still remains. The reflection which enlarges the idea of God, the reasoning which confirms belief in the existence of God, and the theistic inference which solves the world problems, rather presuppose than produce the idea of God in the first instance. The idea of God already in the mind logically conditions this reflection, reasoning or inference.

2. The usage of the term *intuition* in connection with the idea of God is not uniform, and consequently needs some elucidation. Indeed, in philosophy few terms are so ambiguous as intuition, and in the discussion of the psychology of theism it might be better to avoid it altogether.

It has, however, been used so much that it cannot easily be set aside.

Those who say that the idea of God is not intuitive because it is complex, scarcely go to the root of the question. They leave it uncertain whether they take the term intuition to denote a mental *product,* or the mental *process* therein involved. The advocates of the inference theory, already alluded to, make it refer mainly to the mental product. An intuition is a simple original belief, rather than the act of believing. It is a definite mental product expressive of a fundamental conviction of the mind. This view of intuition scarcely does justice to the activity of the mind which is spontaneous, and which conditions the intuition as a mental product. Now, it may be that the idea of God, as found in the human mind, is complex in its nature, and that there are factors in it which are the product of the native and spontaneous activity of the soul. In a word, though complex, there may be con-natural elements in the idea of God, and it may be found that those constitutional factors in theistic belief lie at the basis of the possibility of the realization of this idea. Hence, to deny altogether the intuitive factor in the origin of the idea of God may be going too far, even if we admit complexity in it as realized in experience. Let it be carefully observed, however, that the real question now before us is not as to how the idea became complex, but as to how man came to possess the idea of God at the very first. The real question is as to the origin of the theistic consciousness, not in reference to its development. And so we conclude that the ambiguity of the term intuition exhorts us to avoid its use as much as possible in the discussion of the psychology of theism. It may be better to use the term native, or con-natural, to denote the root of theistic belief as it springs up in the human soul.

3. The exposition of Flint, usually so clear, is a little *confused* at this point. He denies that theistic belief is intuitive, by saying that "the opinion that man has an

intuitive, or immediate perception of God, is untenable; and the opinion that he has an immediate feeling of God is absurd." The latter part of this statement has much force against the absolutists, like Schelling and Schleiermacher. The first part of the statement quoted shows that by an intuition Flint means an immediate perception of God, by gazing with the eye of the soul upon the very being of God. The force of Flint's remark may be admitted, if intuition be taken only in the sense in which he uses it. But it does not follow that there is not in the soul of man a native theistic capacity which is not produced by any inferential process of the mind itself. The ambiguity of the term intuition is again evident.

4. Flint's exposition seems *ambiguous* in another respect. He evidently identifies the *proofs* for the existence of God with the *grounds* for the belief in God. He says that "the proofs for the existence of God coincide with the grounds for the belief in God; they are simply the real grounds of the belief established and expounded in a scientific manner. If there were no such proofs there could be no such grounds." If Flint is here speaking of the theistic proofs, his statement is almost a truism, for the proofs are simply the grounds for believing in the existence of God, explicated in a more or less thorough manner. But if this statement has reference also to the origin of the belief in God, it implies that the explication of the proofs for believing in the existence of God generates the idea of God in the soul. If this is Flint's explanation of the genesis of the idea of God in the soul of man, we are constrained to take issue with it, for the reason, mainly, that the human soul must already possess some definite notion of God before it can lead out the proofs for his existence. This being the case, the proofs are not necessary to generate the belief which already exists.

The fact seems to be that Flint does not clearly conceive the question of the genesis of the idea of God. When he calls theistic belief an immediate unconscious belief, and

when he makes the proofs coincide with the grounds of that belief, he can scarcely mean anything else concerning the origin of the idea of God than what Luthardt and H. B. Smith mean when they say that belief in God is a native con-natural belief of the human soul, which springs up spontaneously on suitable occasion, and as the faculties of the soul come into exercise. This does not mean that the belief is not rational, or that it cannot be vindicated by reasonings which show the reality of its object. This position simply maintains that in the first instance the idea of God springs up within the soul, and is not brought into it by any process of inference or reasoning. Perhaps this is what Flint really means, so far as the origin of the idea of God which theistic belief implies is concerned. If so, it seems a pity that he should have denied the intuitional nature of this belief so decidedly as he has done. The truth may be, as we shall see later on, that there are both con-natural and empirical elements in theistic belief, as we find it fully matured in the human mind.

5. A very important *distinction* now emerges. This is the distinction between the *vindication* of a belief and the *genesis* of a belief. To account for the origin of a belief is one thing, and to establish its validity is another. To explain how an idea comes into the possession of the mind is one problem, to prove the reality of its object is quite another. Now, inference, reasoning or proof, has much force in justifying the rational nature of theistic belief, and in vindicating the real existence of the object to which that belief relates. It is in this sense that we prove the divine existence. But inquiry concerning the origin of the idea of God in the mind is a very different thing; and this must be settled before the proofs can be properly opened up. This is an inquiry in psychology, while the question of the theistic proofs is a matter of logic. Those who find the genesis of the idea of God in inference have the question of the proofs uppermost in their thought, while the problem now

before us is that of the origin of the idea. These two questions should be kept apart, and each ought to be considered in its proper place. The question of its origin now engages attention. We may be well able to give very good reasons for holding that there is a God, but it does not follow that the idea of God springs from these reasons. Hence, we conclude that this theory does not rightly regard the distinction between these two questions, and that it fails to show that man at first acquired the idea of God by any process of ratiocination from non-theistic premises.

6. Inquiry into the resources of *logical processes* will further show that theistic belief does not arise from any sort of logical inference. This is a point of vital importance in this discussion, and neglect of it has led to much confusion. There are three modes of logical inference of which the logicians speak, and these three exhaust the list.

There is *immediate inference,* first of all. By this mode of inference the conclusion is reached without the use of a third term for the purpose of comparison. By this kind of inference we merely elucidate in one form of expression what is contained in another. We really do not originate any new truth which is not implicitly in the first statement; we simply explicate the contents of the original assertion. Nor have we any right to put into the second statement anything which is not latent in the first. Hence, if the idea of God be not in some way implied in the original proposition, it can never justify for itself a place in the second, as the result of immediate inference. Then, if the idea of God be in the original statement, its origin cannot be accounted for as the product of an immediate inference from that statement, which already has a theistic quality about it. All that inference can do in such a case is to elaborate the idea and vindicate the reality of the existence of its object.

Then, there is *mediate inference.* Here a third term comes into service in reaching the conclusion. In this case, the form of reasoning is the syllogism, which consists of

two propositions, from which a conclusion is drawn. In this case, also, no new truth is obtained. We simply unfold, in the conclusion, what is implicitly in the premisses, and we can never have more, seldom as much, in the conclusion as in the premisses, without having a logical fallacy in our procedure. Hence, if the idea of God be not implicitly in the premisses, it can never get into the conclusion. We, therefore, have the idea of God before we make the inference, and hence we do not need the inference to generate that idea. In a word, we do not rightly explain the origin of the idea of God by means of a logical process, which presupposes its existence in the mind.

There remains a third mode of inference. This is known as the *inductive,* and it consists in the observation and classification of facts, with a view to discover the laws which govern the facts, and thereby solve the problems which the facts present. In a word, in inductive reasoning we bring some sort of postulate, which the mind already has in its possession, and we seek to solve the problems by means of it. Thus, we observe the manifold facts of order and design in nature, and we bring the theistic hypothesis which involves the idea of God to bear upon these facts, and therein we find their adequate solution. But it is to be observed that the mind already possesses the idea of God, otherwise it could not formulate and apply the theistic hypothesis; and hence, again, the idea of God cannot originate from an inductive inference which presupposes its existence already in the mind making the inference. Thus, it seems clear that it does not lie within the province of reasoning or inference to generate the idea of God in the human mind at first.

7. The general conclusion thus reached is confirmed by the fact that men generally have the idea of God, and even *believe in* his existence before they begin to reason about these questions. Now, if theistic belief arose from inference, only those who had gone through the reasoning

process involved in that inference would have that belief, and the idea of God involved therein. But, as a matter of fact, men seem to have the idea, or belief, first of all. Long before a child can conduct any sort of reasoning process, it may come to possess a pretty clear notion of God. In early times there seems to be little doubt that men had the theistic notion long before they reasoned about it, or concerning the existence of its object. Flint, of course, would say that the child or the primitive man makes the inference so quickly as not to be aware of it. But surely it seems better to say that theistic belief is the natural deliverance of the human mind, which is endowed with a con-natural theistic capacity. Before the mind can perform any act of conscious theistic inference, it must already possess the idea of God. An unconscious inference is practically an intuitive operation of the mind, determined by the nature of the mind itself, and springing up spontaneously therein. It is certainly *a priori* in its fundamental principles.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ORIGIN OF RELIGIOUS AND THEISTIC BELIEF. IDEALISTIC EVOLUTION.

Contents.

This Theory Important.—Vital Interests Involved.—The Hegelian Type of Thought.—Kant.—Fichte.—Schelling.—Hegel.—Spencer and Hegel.—Statement of the Theory.—Unconscious Reason the Basal Fact.—Hegel, Green, Caird.—In the Absolute an Inner Principle of Movement.—Produces Nature and Spirit.—The Origin of Religious Consciousness.—Man's Consciousness of God is God's Consciousness of Himself.—Examination of the Theory.—Certain Admissions.—Fundamental Conception Inadequate.—No Reason for the Direction of the Evolution.—No Teleology.—Explains the Higher from the Lower.—Destroys Man's Individuality.—Tends to Pantheism.—A Psychological Difficulty.

Literature.

Encyclopædia Article on *Idealism.*—Hegel's *Logic.*—Cocker's *Christianity and Greek Philosophy,* Chap. II.—Pfleiderer's *Philosophy of Religion,* Vol. II., Chap. VI.—Principal Caird's *Philosophy of Religion,* Chap. VIII.—Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics,* Book I., Chap. I.—Edward Caird's *The Evolution of Religion,* Chaps. VI., VII.—Watson's *Christianity and Idealism,* Chap. XI.—Lindsay's *Theistic Philosophy of Religion,* Chap. III.—Sabatier's *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion,* Chap. I.—Royce's *The World and the Individual,* Chaps. VIII., IX.—Bowne's *Philosophy of Theism,* Chaps. I.–III.

I. *Preliminary.* § 46.

1. WE now reach a profound and subtle theory, which in a measure deals with both the psychology and ontology of theism. It is based on certain aspects of the Hegelian philosophy, especially as modified by writers like Thomas H. Green and Edward Caird. It may be termed the theory of *idealistic evolution* or dialectic process. It must be kept clearly in mind that the evolutionary process involved in this theory is not mechanical nor physical, but rather logical and idealistic. According to this theory, the inner resources of absolute reason, developing in accordance

with their inherent conditions, produce the religious consciousness in the human soul which theistic belief implies.

As this theory touches vital questions in psychology, ontology and theology, it merits careful consideration. And the fact that the general type of thought with which it is associated commands the sympathetic attention of many thoughtful minds at the present day exhorts us to give it a respectful hearing. If there be in it elements of value, and if it shows a deep insight into the psychology of theism, we cannot afford to ignore it. And if it be marked by some serious and radical defects, these should be clearly indicated.

2. The Hegelian philosophy is the outcome of that remarkable *movement* of speculation in Germany which began with Kant, and continued through Fichte and Schelling, till it culminated in Hegel. So far as this type of speculation relates to the absolute reality of things, it deals with the problem of the dualism between mind and matter which Descartes set, and which Spinoza sought to solve by his thorough-going monistic system. Kant held that the absolute reality, as the thing in itself, is noumenal, and that cognition has to do with phenomena only. The absolute reality was merely assumed by Kant to provide, through sensuous intuition, the materials which the categories of the understanding are to organize into definite forms of cognition. Fichte discarded the absolute, as the thing in itself, lying beyond the conscious subject, and placed it within that subject as a kind of reaction against its own activity. Schelling conceived of the absolute, or thing in itself, as having two sides or poles. One of these is positive, ideal and spiritual, the other is negative, real and material. By this assumption it was supposed that the dualism between matter and spirit was solved in the inner unity of the absolute where they were really identical. The dualism, however, was solved by postulating a sort of dual identity in the absolute.

Hegel, in turn, identified the absolute reality with universal reason or thought, which is *impersonal and unconscious*. This absolute or universal reason, which is a rational unity, unfolds itself in the twofold forms of external *nature* and of human *spirit*. This supposition is taken to be an adequate solution of the problem of the dualism between matter and spirit, which had perplexed philosophers ever since the time of Descartes. These systems are all more or less idealistic. The kinship of these theories is evident. Kant's idealism is critical, Fichte's is subjective, Schelling's is objective, and Hegel's is absolute. The absolute reality with Kant is noumenal object, with Fichte it is universal subject, with Schelling universal reason, and with Hegel it is universal process.

3. The relations between the *idealism* of Hegel and the *materialism* of Spencer are worthy of passing notice. At first sight they seem entirely different, yet they have features of resemblance. Both are, in a sense, monistic, and both proceed to explain the world by an evolutionary principle. But Hegel starts from an ideal, and Spencer from a material, principle. Hegel begins with the absolute reason, Spencer with the atomic homogeneous. Hegel endows the absolute with thought which is unconscious; Spencer clothes it with power which is inscrutible. Hegel posits the idea, and by a logical process develops the universe; Spencer posits the atom, and by a mechanical process evolves the universe. These two modes of philosophizing are as ancient as the Greek philosophy. Plato is the forerunner of Hegel, and Democritus paves the way for Spencer. Perhaps the old Greeks have the best claim to originality.

II. *Statement of the Idealistic Theory.* § 47.

In the statement now to be made of the idealistic evolutionary theory of the genesis of theistic belief, we shall keep in view the general type of modern thought now

known as Hegelianism, and neo-Hegelianism. This type of thought has greatly modified both philosophy and theology in Germany. It has also been imported into English-speaking circles in Britain and America, through the writings of Green and Caird, Royce and Watson. In its imported form it has undergone considerable modifications, and it certainly strikes a profound note in philosophical speculation.

1. The fundamental fact in the system is the view taken of the absolute reality. The ground of all reality is *absolute reason* or pure thought, which is held to be alike unconscious and impersonal. What this reason or thought is in its essential nature does not very clearly appear in the system. Whether it is pure spirit, or highly refined matter, or the widest possible abstraction, is not easily determined. According to Hegel himself, it seems to be the impersonal spiritual ground of the reality of nature in the material universe, and of spirit in the realm of thought. But whether it is to be regarded as an entity of some kind, or simply as an empty abstraction, is a question in regard to which the interpreters of Hegel widely differ. Green maintains that the spiritual principle, which is assumed to exist alike in nature and spirit, is the ground of the reality of both. This spiritual principle unifies and explains the world of nature and the realm of mind. Caird lays much stress on the view that being and thought are really at root identical. But he does not very clearly show how they are to be identified, whether on the side of being or of thought. Hegel makes the absolute to be unconscious reason or thought, and regards it as the ground of the reality of both nature and spirit. Green looks upon the absolute as a spiritual principle, and as the element of reality common to both nature and spirit. Caird regards the absolute as a principle of rational unity, and describes it as the bond which binds nature and spirit into one rational system. Thus, in a threefold way, the type of thought now under

notice is described in its basal principle of reality in the absolute.

2. This theory presupposes an *inner principle* of movement in unconscious reason or pure thought. This internal principle of movement is a dialectic or thought process; its mode of operation is logical and rational. Its operation causes the absolute and unconscious reason to unfold itself in nature and finite spirit, by means of a progressive movement from the lower to the higher. This self-unfolding causes unconscious reason or absolute spirit to differentiate, and externalize itself first of all in nature, where it becomes other than itself. Then it returns to itself in finite spirit, and thus preserves its identity. In reaching this result there are at least three distinct stages. The first is in abstract *thought,* the second in outward *nature,* and the third in finite *spirit.* The first movement of absolute reason is from the most abstract of all conceptions, that of pure being, to the most concrete conception which still retains in it the unity of nature and finite spirit. This is the absolute idea. This absolute idea is that moment in the self-development of absolute reason which precedes the differentiation of it into nature and finite spirit. In the second stage, the absolute idea passes over into nature as other than itself, not by any creative process, but by a rational movement. In the third stage, the differentiation takes place into finite spirit, when consciousness arises, and wherein the absolute returns to itself, so that the cycle of logical movement is complete. Then, in the experience of finite spirit, the movement is through *subjective* spirit, on to *objective* spirit, and up to *absolute* spirit, which is God. This is a very brief outline of a great scheme, but it may pave the way for the statement of the next section.

3. The *origin* of the religious consciousness in man, according to this theory, must now be explained. This consciousness should be called God-consciousness, rather than theistic belief. This explanation is founded upon the

exposition made in the last section. The absolute reason, which is the basal fact in this theory, is at first regarded as unconscious and impersonal. It only attains consciousness in the process of development, as the absolute idea is differentiated into nature and spirit. As the absolute idea is realized in human spirit, by means of its own inner self-development, God, on the one hand, becomes conscious of himself, and man, on the other, rises to the consciousness of God. The consciousness of God which the human spirit comes to possess is but a moment in the logical process by which unconscious reason rises to consciousness. Thus it comes to pass, as Patton says, that man's thought of God becomes God's thought of himself. Or, to put it in another way, man comes to have a consciousness of God as God becomes conscious of himself. In this way the religious consciousness of man, and his belief in God, originates. It is the product of the self-evolution of the absolute in the consciousness of the human spirit.

The statement just made is essentially that of Hegel. Edward Caird, who maintains the identity at root of being and thought, states the theory in a different way. He says that it is necessary for the human spirit to *relate* itself to God. In explaining what he means by this, he seems to imply that belief in God, and the religious consciousness which goes with it, are to be regarded as the natural result of the relation of the absolute spirit to the finite spirit of man. God comes in some way into the activities of the human spirit, and thus the consciousness of God arises therein. Other adherents of the Hegelian mode of thinking give different explanations of the way in which the belief in God originates; but they all substantially agree in finding the genesis of the religious consciousness as a moment in the *process* of the inner self-development of absolute unconscious reason. Absolute spirit and finite spirit relate themselves to each other, and out of this relation the genesis of the religious and theistic consciousness naturally springs.

III. *Examination of this Theory.* § 48.

To examine this theory fully would require an investigation of the entire Hegelian system. This cannot now be done; nor, indeed, is it necessary to do so. Some general considerations are presented which may give a just estimate of the import of the theory which finds the explanation of the idea of God and of the religious consciousness in man in the necessary evolution or logical self-revelation of the absolute.

1. Certain important admissions are frankly made. It must be acknowledged that the view-point of the Hegelian system in regard to some of the deepest problems of existence and thought is *profound* and comprehensive. It is a highly speculative type of thought, and to discover what is called the *secret* of Hegel has greatly puzzled many of his interpreters. It may be further confessed that the Hegelian point of view gives glimpses, though perhaps in a one-sided way, of a profound philosophical *truth*. That truth consists in the fact that between subjective rationality in the fundamental laws of thought, and objective rationality in the basal conditions of existence, there is correspondence. In other words, in the cognition of the external world, the necessary forms of thought, and the underlying laws of nature, come into rational correlation. Human thought has its order and uniformity, and nature is a system of rationally related things. Between the two systems there is rational correspondence, and in true cognition there is rational correlation. This reveals the profoundly important position that the categories or necessary laws of thought have a fundamental relation of correspondence with the essential conditions under which the external world exists for rational apprehension. The questions of how this correspondence has been established, and whether the higher rational ground of their unity may not be in God, need now only be suggested. It will recur later on in these dis-

cussions. It is only just to acknowledge the good service which the Hegelian view-point has rendered in this connection.

2. The adequacy of the fundamental *assumption* of the Hegelian system may be seriously questioned. It assumes that the fundamental fact which is the ground of all reality is absolute, unconscious, impersonal reason, spirit or pure thought. It is difficult to determine whether it is a real form of existence or an abstraction. Hegel himself seemed to look upon the absolute as the highest possible abstraction. At the same time, being in the first instance impersonal, it is hard to see how it can be spiritual. Then, if it be an abstraction, the mode of its formation may be properly raised. If the absolute be not the supposition of a reality of some kind, the question at once arises as to whence it is derived. If it be an abstraction in the proper sense, it is doubtful if the notion of the highest abstraction can be formed, save as it may be drawn from materials already given in the world of nature and the realm of spirit, which exist as a closely-related dualism. Pure Hegelianism seems to be sporting with abstractions, rather than dealing with realities in its fundamental postulate. Neo-Hegelianism, if it admits the reality of a personal God, and the fact of creation, avoids some of these difficulties. The assumption of an unconscious reason, with an inner principle of development operating by necessity, is not vindicated by any good reasons. And, even when this postulate is made, it fails to explain all the problems of personality and freedom. And to make the process of evolution, by which all finite things have been produced, a merely logical, and not an ontological one, is either to identify thought and being, or to move in the regions of abstraction only. The postulate of one infinite personal God is a far more adequate assumption. And as some assumption has to be made, it is proper to make that assumption which best meets the conditions of the problem. If the choice be between the supposition of

absolute unconscious reason, and the postulate of an infinite personal God as the basal fact of reality, the latter surely seems the more rational of the two. Hence, we cannot but hesitate to accept the fundamental postulate of pure Hegelianism.

3. But even if this postulate were accepted as sufficient at the outset, and if it were admitted that absolute reason, in its logical yet unconscious evolution, did produce nature and finite spirit, no principle is provided which explains why the evolution should rationally move in *one direction* rather than in another. There is no free rational determination on the part of the absolute. Hegelianism simply presupposes an immanent principle of movement in the absolute, and seeks to construe this under the category of the rational and logical, though it be unconscious and impersonal. This virtually compels the conclusion that this principle of supposed rational activity is really bound by the law of necessity, so that idealistic evolution is not radically different from mechanical evolution in this respect. There is in it no basis for the formation of a plan which involves foresight and purpose. There is no free rational agency by which that plan is wrought out in the logical evolution of the absolute. In a word, the absolute, conceived of as impersonal spirit or unconscious reason, does not contain any principle which determines the nature and the direction of the evolution. There is no conscious realization of the plan, especially in its earlier stages there is no creation of anything by the free activity of the absolute. The evolution out of which all finite things spring is the necessary logical development of the absolute in accordance with its own inner nature. Above all, there can be no *teleology* in this process, save a kind of immanent teleology, which is no proper teleology at all. On this account, the Hegelian explanation of the origin of religious belief is not sufficient, for it makes the consciousness of God in the human soul merely a moment in a process, which, though

termed rational, is necessitarian. The reason in it, therefore, is non-free.

4. It is further to be observed that this theory has to explain the *higher* out of, and by means of, the *lower*. It begins with the lowest form of rationality in absolute unconscious reason. Indeed, it seems almost a misnomer to call the absolute, thus viewed, rational; and there is no transcendent rationality at all. It is merely immanent at best. It is claimed by this theory that somehow the inner self-movement of the absolute, which is yet unconscious, produces the consciousness which the human soul experiences. And this same movement rises even higher, and generates the God-consciousness which the soul of man is supposed to reach. This self-consciousness and this God-conscousness are the products, by a necessary movement in the absolute by which, in some mysterious way, the unconscious is transmuted into the conscious. In like manner the impersonal in some remarkable way becomes endowed with the dignity and glory of personality. The lower produces the higher without the aid of anything which lies outside of the lower. It gives an effect without a cause.

One naturally asks, Is this rationally possible? Can the unconscious produce, out of itself, the conscious? Can the impersonal beget the personal? Can the non-moral, by its own inner movement, generate the moral? Can the non-religious lift itself up to the religious? Can the non-free transmute itself into the free? To these questions the theory supplies no satisfactory answer. Indeed, the law of causation is transgressed at every upward movement of the theory, for there is a new factor in the higher moment whose causality does not lie in the lower. This is the insuperable difficulty which faces any self-contained evolutionary theory which admits no reason and efficiency outside the process of onward progress. And it is just as effective against idealistic evolution as against mechanical, when it

proposes to explain the higher from the lower, by means of an immanent reason and efficiency which is not also transcendent. We maintain that God is the only absolute form of being, from whom all other grades of being come. But we conceive of him as possessing rationality, conscious personality, self-determination, creative power and moral perfection. These characteristics of God, as the absolute, manifest themselves in, and account for, nature and human spirit. This is the correct theistic view.

5. It also follows that this theory destroys the proper *individual existence* of the human spirit. It also leaves no legitimate basis for man's moral freedom. Hence, it may be charged with cutting the roots of morality and religion. According to this theory, man is but a stage in the process of the self-development of the absolute, but a moment in the evolution of unconscious reason. He has no proper substantial, even though dependent, existence apart from his place in the evolution of which he is a moment. The conditions of the continuity of the existence of the individual human spirit are not made plain. The basis for moral responsibility is insecure, and the ground for a real immortality is wanting. If this be the case, there is no rational basis for either morality or religion. Any valid theory must preserve both the object and the subject in religion. God, as the infinite personal Spirit, is absolute. Man, as a rational, moral, though dependent, personality, has real existence. The theory under notice fails to do justice to either the object or the subject in religion.

6. It is evident, from what has been said, that the Hegelian type of thought tends to *pantheism*. Some of its later adherents have guarded against this charge, but it is true of Hegel himself. He may not inaptly be described as an idealistic pantheist; and he has some kinship with Spinoza. With Spinoza, the absolute is construed as substance, which has two attributes, according to which this substance unfolds itself for us. These are *extension* and

thought, and all finite things are merely modifications of these two attributes. Hegel regards the absolute as unconscious reason, which evolves itself, through the absolute idea, in the two forms of *nature* and human *spirit.* Spinoza's absolute is substance; Hegel's is reason. Spinoza's extension and thought are not unlike Hegel's nature and spirit. And both are essentially monistic systems, though Hegel's view is of a more elevated type than Spinoza's. Then the way in which Hegel, in a quite monistic manner, relates all finite forms of existence to absolute unconscious reason, gives a decidedly pantheistic color to his system. Ebrard, in his *Apologetics* (Vol. II., p. 204), says that in the controversy between Rosencrantz and Hoffmann, the latter proved conclusively against the former that Hegel was a pantheist, not a theist. If this be a just remark, then Hegelianism has no proper account to give for the origin of the religious consciousness, and of theistic belief, for the reason that it makes no real numerical difference between God and the human spirit. Man is but a moment in the evolution of the absolute; his consciousness of God is God's consciousness of himself, which comes very near to making the consciousness and personality of God depend on these features in man.

7. Finally, even if we admit the validity of the general Hegelian doctrine, and concede that the absolute, as unconscious, is capable to doing all that is claimed for it, there is still a very serious difficulty. How can the absolute be denominated God, unless the mind already possesses the idea of God. The *notion* of the absolute is one thing, and the *idea* of God is another. The question as to how they are to be related is not easily answered. Does the mind rise from the absolute, as an abstract conception, to God, as a concrete infinite being? Or does the mind, already possessing the idea of God, pass on to associate with it the notion of absolute existence? The latter is the more reasonable view. Hence, it follows that before we can apply

a theistic predicate to the absolute, we must already have the idea of God. And it is the origin of this idea for which we are now making search.

All who are in sympathy with the Hegelian type of thinking on this subject are in real danger here; so that while we admit that the view-point it gives us is profound, yet great care needs to be exercised in regard to it. Various writers in prose and poetry have exhibited it in attractive colors and in fine literary form. Others, like Green and Caird, have sought to give this type of thought greater philosophical precision, and to present an interpretation which is profoundly theistic. If we assume the fundamental reality to be an infinite personal God, who is the ground, reason and cause of all else, then there are features in the Hegelian way of thinking with which theism may have sympathy. But it is hardly an adequate theory, especially as presented by Hegel himself, to account for the *origin* of theistic belief. At the same time, we do not hesitate to believe that the Hegelian type of thought has great value against the current empiricism and superficial positivism of our own time.

CHAPTER IX.

THE ORIGIN OF RELIGIOUS AND THEISTIC BELIEF. THE FUNCTION OF REVELATION.

CONTENTS.

This Important.—Term, Revelation, Vague.—Three Senses.—Manifestation.—Communication.—Revelation.—Primitive Unrecorded Revelations now Mainly in View.—The Process of Revelation and its Record.—The Problem.—Statement of the Theory.—No Intuitive Religious Factors.—Watson.—Luthardt.—Man's Converse with God in Early Ages.—Admit it so Far.—But Redemptive Relation the Same.—Outlines of Redemption Due to Primitive Revelation.—Theory Explains General Religious Belief and Practice.—Examination of the Theory.—Certain Important Admissions.—But the Real Question Remains.—Elements of Confusion.—Origin of Religion and the Knowledge of Redemption.—The Origin of Religious Belief and its Perpetuation.—Danger of Atheistic Consciousness.—General Summary and Conclusion.

LITERATURE.

Encyclopædia Article on *Revelation.*—Watson's *Theological Institutes,* Vol. I., Part I., Chaps. I., II.—Howe's *Living Temple,* Vol. I., Chaps. I., II.—Luthardt's *The Fundamental Truths of Christianity,* Chap. VII.—De Pressense's *Origins,* Book IV., Chap. III.—Hodge's *Systematic Theology,* Vol. I., Chap. III.—Redford's *The Christian's Plea,* Chap. I.—Mead's *Supernatural Revelation,* Chap. III.—Beattie's *The Methods of Theism,* Part I., Chap. II.—Cocker's *Christianity and Greek Philosophy,* Chap. II.—Edward Caird's *The Evolution of Religion,* Vol. I., Chap. XIV.—Kellogg's *The Genesis and Growth of Religion,* Chaps. V.–VII.—Sabatier's *Outlines of the Philosophy of* Religion, Chap. II.—Kuyper's *Encyclopædia of Sacred Theology,* Div. III., Chap. II.—Martineau's *A Study of Religion,* Vol. I., Book II.—Menzie's *History of Religion,* Chap. II.—Iverach's *Theism,* Chap. VIII.—Bruce's *The Chief End of Revelation,* Chap. II.—Nitzsch's *System of Christian Doctrine,* Chap. I.

I. *Revelation Defined.* § 49.

TO determine the function of *revelation* in relation to the genesis of theistic belief is important, but by no means easy. Some go so far as to say that the origin of religious belief in general is due to some sort of outward revelation from God. Not a few theologians of a century

ago, who had not freed themselves entirely from the philosophy of deism, adopted this explanation of religious and theistic belief. Watson is an able exponent of this view. In his writings he maintains, in an earnest way, what, in a sense, is true of sinful man, that human reason cannot give him genuine religious knowledge, and that a revelation from God alone can do this.

As the term revelation is rather vague, and is used in different senses, it is necessary to define, as clearly as possible, what it really means. There are at least three distinct usages of the term.

1. The most general meaning of the term takes it to denote any *manifestation* which God makes of himself in any way whatever. These manifestations of God may appear in nature about us, in our own spirits, and in human history, as well as in his Word. In all of these ways, God is said to be revealing himself to men. The term revelation thus comes to mean the same thing as manifestation. This usage of the term really leaves no place for any distinction between the natural and supernatural forms of revelation, nor does it rightly distinguish between what may be called outward and inward revelation.

This wide sense of the term may denote much that is true, yet it is of little value in this discussion. It is doubtless true that men may learn much about God in all of these ways, but this fact throws little light upon the question of the origin of religious belief at first.

2. The term revelation is used in a narrower sense, to denote any direct *communications* which God may make to man. This excludes nature and history, and, in a sense, the witness of our own constitution, from the sphere of revelation. But it includes within its scope, not only the revelations recorded in the holy Scriptures, but also any other special or supernatural communications which God, in any age, may have made to men. Such communications may have been made in patriarchial times, in the Mosaic

era, and in the apostolic period. And if God has, since the canon of Scripture closed, given, by his Spirit, any special messages to men, these would also come under this meaning of the term. This sense of the Word includes all the special messages that God may have made known to men in a supernatural way, whether they have been recorded or not. From the Scripture itself there is good reason to believe that such messages were given, but not recorded in the canonical Scriptures. It is in this sense that we may very properly speak of primæval revelation. Of such a nature would be the unrecorded messages given to Adam, to Enoch or to Noah, to Abraham, to Moses or to Ezra, to John, to Peter or to Paul. And Jesus, no doubt, uttered many things not recorded in the Gospel narratives.

This sense of the term is much more definite, and has a very proper place in the discussion now in hand. The question of the influence of primitive external revelation in generating religious and theistic belief is the very inquiry which is now pursued. And the special problem now before us relates to the effect of any kind of outward supernatural revelation, whether primitive or biblical, in generating belief in God and originating religion.

3. But the term revelation is used in a still more definite sense. In this sense it relates only to that series of special divine communications which are on *record* in the canonical Scriptures. This is much narrower in its scope than the preceding view, for it includes only those divine messages which God, in his wisdom and goodness, deemed necessary to have put on permanent record for all ages. In this sense revelation is really equivalent to the holy Scriptures. Strictly speaking, this is the meaning of the term revelation with which the apologete has chiefly to do in vindicating supernatural revelation.

Now, in dealing with the question of the origin of religious belief, the question is as to which of these senses of the term revelation is to be taken. Some are inclined

to take the most general view, and argue that religion originates in some, or all, of the external manifestations which God makes of himself. This scarcely meets the case, for the reason that unless there be some capacity on the part of man to apprehend these manifestations, they would have no effect on him. But the very question in debate is the *origin* of this capacity. Few, if any, at the present day, take the third meaning of the term, and argue that the genesis of religious belief is to be found arising from the influence of the Bible. The Bible, rather, presupposes religion as already existent, and its great purpose is to perpetuate, purify and elevate religion by means of the redemption which is in Christ.

It is, therefore, the second meaning of the term which those who find the origin of religion in outward revelation usually adopt. In some form of *primitive revelation,* made in the earliest times, is the beginnings of religion to be discovered. Watson evidently takes this view when he says that the traditions of early revelations had much to do with producing religion, and in accounting for its general prevalence in the world. The question now to be considered is, How far is this view true? Has religious and theistic belief originated in any form of outward revelation in early times?

4. To determine the idea of revelation still more clearly, another distinction must be made. This relates to the contrast between the *process* of revelation and the *record* of it. The process pertains to the activity of God in making the messages known to men, while the record is the permanent form into which the messages have been reduced. The former had its main effect only on the few men who were chosen to be its subjects, while the latter remains in permanent form for men in all ages. So far as the divine activity is concerned, the effect of it would be practically the same upon all who were its subjects, no matter whether the revelation were recorded or not; but the result of each

on men in after ages would be very different. The unrecorded revelations would have but little influence, while the recorded would have very much.

This simple distinction has important bearing upon the question now before us. If by revelation we mean the influence of the divine activity in giving the message, then the question of this influence in generating religious belief would have to be considered. But if we mean rather the tradition, or the recorded account of this activity, the question will be quite different in its form. The latter form of the inquiry can scarcely bear upon the problem of the genesis of the belief in God, for the reason, mainly, that before the tradition, or the record of things revealed ages ago, would have any effect on men of later times, these men must already possess some religious sentiment or theistic capacity. It is the genesis of this which is our present problem. The real inquiry, therefore, must be concerning the effect of the divine activity on those men in early times who were the subjects of special outward revelations from God in originating religious and theistic belief and experience. In its lowest terms, the question is as to the effect of this activity on Adam and Eve, and as to whether they came to be possessed of their religious constitution and capacity by creation or by revelation, in the first instance. The related question of the influence of tradition and the record of the revelation in the development of theistic belief is one which is also of much importance, and must, at the same time, be carefully considered. To educe clearly the function of revelation in its relation to the con-natural constitution of man, and to elucidate its relation first to the *origin,* and then to the *growth* of theistic belief, is important.

II. *Statement of the Revelation Theory.* § 50.

The way in which outward revelation is taken to account for theistic belief may now be explained.

1. Those who hold this view assert that there is *no intuitive* knowledge of God in the human mind. They also maintain that the human reason by itself is not sufficient to lead men to true religious knowledge. Watson dwells on this point at great length. He seeks to show that the general religious condition of the peoples that are destitute of the light of revelation fully proves the necessity of that light to meet the religious need of mankind. It is evident that Watson is here speaking not so much of the primitive natural religious experiences of men, as of the true knowledge of God and of his will, which sinful men need in order to life and salvation. When so regarded, much that he says may be freely admitted.

He also traces whatever is pure in morals and true in religious knowledge among pagan peoples indirectly to revelation. He likewise finds the origin of the belief in immortality and future rewards and punishments, in the same outward divine source. The ordinance of sacrifice, and a knowledge of its meaning, are accounted for in the same way. In regard to the knowledge of God, he distinctly says that "the first man received the knowledge of God by sensible converse with him, and that the doctrines were transmitted, with the confirmation of successive manifestations, to the early ancestors of all nations." It is clear that Watson is here speaking chiefly of the purification and perpetuation of religious knowledge by revelation, and that a capacity at least to receive religious instruction by divine revelation must be presupposed in the first man.

In a somewhat similar way, Luthardt, who does not entirely deny the intuitive element in religion, sets forth the same general view. He says that "all religion rests ultimately upon a primitive revelation." It is to be observed that Luthardt does not make it clear what he means by primitive revelation. Since he admits the intuitive factor, it may mean either inward or outward revelation. The intuitive factor may be the inward revelation which needs

the outward revelation to bring it into distinct consciousness.

2. This general theory assumes that men in early times had more intimate *fellowship* with God than in later days. Those passages of Scripture which tell of God walking and talking with men in primitive days are so interpreted. Watson says that "the belief in God among the Jews was preserved by continual manifestations of the presence of Jehovah." He also goes on to say that as the knowledge of God and of religion became more generally fixed and developed, the converse God held with men became less intimate and personal, and men were led to depend more on the contents of the record of the revelation, and to expect less of the personal manifestations.

It may be admitted that in very early times God did hold intercourse in a more personal way with men, as the modes of revelation were then adapted to the conditions of the race. But it does not follow that the essential relations between man and God, on the basis of which revelations are made, have changed. The only radical change of relation was produced by the income of sin. Ever after man sinned and had hope of deliverance and restoration given him, the relation between God and man is a redemptive one. This relation remains unchanged, though the modes of communicating the knowledge of it, and of administering its benefits may be modified. It is to be observed all through that Watson has in view early unrecorded revelations, as well as those on record in the canonical Scriptures. Indeed, he lays special stress on these early revelations, made when man held intimate converse with God.

3. This view also maintains that these early unrecorded revelations contained the outlines of *redemption.* Hence, the origin of sacrifice, and of religious rites and duties, is explained in relation to these primitive revelations. There is much force in many things set forth in this connection by the advocates of this view. The germ of the hope and

knowledge of redemption was planted in the mind of the human race as our first parents left paradise, and this knowledge was made clearer and this hope brighter by advancing revelation as the ages moved on. But Adam and Eve had a knowledge of God, and religious experiences, prior to the invasion of sin. The question may still be raised as to the origin of this in them first of all. Thus, unless it is held that the fall reduced man to an entirely non-religious condition, revelation may not be needed to constitute him a religious being. In addition, it may be pointed out that redemption stands related to sin, and that sin is an abnormal fact, which presupposes some knowledge of God and his law. Hence, religion, at its root in the human race, can scarcely originate in those conditions of sin and redemption which presuppose its presence already in the race.

4. This theory seeks to find further support in the claim that it best accounts for the general *prevalence* of the belief in God among men, and the universal observance of religious rites everywhere. It argues that the history of the race shows that when men are left to themselves they gradually lose the knowledge of God, and that divine revelation has ever been their only safeguard. The survivals of the true religion now to be found in non-biblical religions have their explanation and source in original primitive revelation. They are dim reflections from the bright light of primæval revelations.

Watson and others lay much stress upon this point in the interests of revealed religion. Cocker, on the other hand, thinks that if there be no native theistic endowment in man's constitution, a primitive revelation alone would not be sufficient to explain the universality of religious belief and practice. Consequently, he suggests that the fundamental explanation of the prevalence of religion lies in the fact that men have a native theistic capacity, which they carry with them wherever they go. There is no doubt some force in both of these views. Man has a con-created theistic

capacity; otherwise he would not be a religious being at all. At the same time, there can be no doubt that not a few things found in the non-biblical religions are to be explained as survivals of primitive or biblical revelation.

III. *The Theory of Revelation Examined.* § 51.

In the examination of this theory much care is needed, for there are certain aspects of truth in it. There is, however, a good deal of confusion in the views of its advocates. The aim of this examination is to sift the truth from the error, and to eliminate, as far as possible, the confusion. The function of revelation in generating and developing religious belief will then appear.

1. Certain important *admissions* are to be made at the outset. It is admitted that the clear and complete knowledge of God and his will which prevail in Christian lands is due largely to the revelations found in the holy Scriptures. The knowledge of the nature and attributes of God, and of his tri-personality, comes largely from the Bible. Our lofty view of his transcendent majesty and moral perfection is chiefly drawn from the same source. The clear view we have of our relation to God, of his constant care over all his creatures, of his moral government over moral beings, and of our duties to him and to our fellow-men, is obtained from divine revelation. Above all, our knowledge of the world to come, our information regarding the nature and desert of sin, and our instruction in reference to the redemption which is in Jesus Christ, are drawn entirely from the sacred record of special revelation found in the Bible. In all these things it is ours to rejoice and give praise to God.

But, after all these admissions are made, the vital question still remains, How, in the very first instance in the earliest times, did any kind of religious belief and practice *originate?* Outward revelation has, no doubt, done much to purify and elevate religious belief, but it may be an open

question whether such revelation generated it at first. Dealing with the question of the genesis of religious and theistic belief, as we now are, we are persuaded that the con-natural theistic capacity must be presupposed in man in order to render him capable of receiving and understanding any objective revelation from God. This primitive theistic factor must antedate the reception of any outward revelation, and, in part at least, must logically condition it. This being granted, the revelation may come in to conserve and develop this con-natural factor of the religious consciousness. It may also be conceded that this revelation is really needed to preserve a well-defined monotheism, and thus prevent it from declining to pantheism, and then breaking up into polytheism.

2. In the advocacy of this theory there are certain elements of *confusion* which need to be removed.

Watson, and those who agree with him, are discussing what is necessary to give men who are in the darkness and deadness of sin a saving knowledge of God, and of the redemption which is in Christ. Much they say on this point is true and valuable. But this is not the question now in hand. The *real problem* relates to the origin of religious and theistic belief at the first. The inquiry relates to the genesis of religious experiences in the human race. To overlook this is to miss the mark and introduce confusion.

The advocates of this theory confuse two other questions. These are the *origin* and the *growth* of religion. The inquiry into the development of religious and theistic belief is a very important and interesting one, and much that the advocates of the theory now under consideration adduce bears directly upon this question. Outward revelation, in oral or in written form, may do much to preserve, perpetuate and purify theistic belief. Yet it may be helpless to originate this belief.

The real question with which the psychology of theism

deals relates to the initial appearance of theistic belief in the human race. It is not merely an investigation of the way in which men now come to believe in God and have religious experience, but of the manner in which any belief in God originated among men. Did man at first appear without any theistic factors in his nature, and had he to wait till these were produced by outward revelation? Or was he first possessed, in his very nature, of these factors? The debate lies between these contending views. The latter view has the better claim to our acceptance, mainly because it must be presupposed in order to give revelation access to the soul of man. The first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans confirms this view.

3. This theory is in danger of taking a *defective* view of man's original constitution and consciousness. It implicitly, at least, assumes that there is no theistic factor in human nature at first. At the present day, when naturalistic evolution so strongly asserts that man slowly rose up from a non-moral and non-religious state, it is perilous to deny of man, even in the interests of supernatural revelation, the native theistic factor. The position of Descartes, that the knowledge of God is necessary to give guarantee for the validity of our other knowledge, is important here. Even Luthardt, who favors, in a general way, the revelation theory, still says that "an intuitive conviction of the existence of God dwells within the human mind. We can by no means shake ourselves free from the notion of God. Consciousness of God is as essential an element of our own mind as consciousness of the world, or of self-consciousness." Schelling says that "the revelation theory implies an original atheism of consciousness." There is much force in these statements. If man's consciousness be at first *atheistic,* it is difficult to see how he would ever come to be a religious being, or be capable of receiving religious instruction, even by divine revelation. Nitzsch says that "if education be not already preceded by an innate con-

sciousness of God as an operative predisposition, there would be nothing for education and culture to act upon." Cocker puts the same view in another form when he says that "a merely verbal revelation cannot communicate the knowledge of God if man has not already the idea of God in his mind." With these views we, in the main, concur.

4. The conclusion in which we rest, therefore, is that primitive theistic belief in the human race has *not originated* in the first instance as the result of any outward revelation producing it where its constitutional factors did not exist. These factors must be presupposed, in order to give validity to outward revelation and render it intelligible. At the same time, revelation renders good service in preserving, perpetuating and purifying theistic belief. Without it, and by reason of sin, this belief would almost surely decline. Above all, revelation is indispensable to give important new elements of knowledge, regarding God and his will, man and his destiny, and the way of life and salvation through the Gospel, which was a mystery, hidden till revealed.

CHAPTER X.

THE ORIGIN OF RELIGIOUS AND THEISTIC BELIEF. THE ACCEPTED THEORY.

Contents.

The True Doctrine.—A Philosophical Conflict.—The Theist an Interested Spectator.—Some Partial Views.—Fichte and Shelling.—Cousin.—Jacobi and Schleiermacher.—Hamilton and Kant.—Calderwood.—Descartes and Anselm.—Statement of the Doctrine.—Intuitional, Rational or Inspirational.—Not Empirical.—Exposition of the Doctrine.—Source of Idea of God Within the Soul.—Yet not Innate in Strict Sense.—Not a General Conception.—Experience its Occasion of Coming into Consciousness.—Theistic Belief Needs Revelation and Education.—Confirmation of the Doctrine.—Hodge.—Flint.—H. B. Smith.—Luthardt.—Owen.—Calvin.—Ebrard.—Agrees with Theory of Knowledge.—Gives Basis for Ontological Proofs.—Gives Key to Causal Proofs.—In Harmony with the Way the Holy Spirit Works in the Human Soul.

Literature.

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I. *Preliminary.* § 52.

1. THREE defective and four erroneous explanations of the genesis of religious and theistic belief have been passed under review. Their discussion leads up to the

true doctrine to be unfolded in this chapter. This doctrine seeks to give a careful account of the origin of the religious consciousness in the human race. Its exposition raises profound questions, and brings us upon a great controversial battle-field, where many a hard-fought fight has taken place, and where the din of the conflict has not yet ceased. The lines of battle are drawn between the Intuitionalist and Empiricist in reference to the theory of knowledge. The form of battle and the weapons used may have changed from age to age, but the inner nature of the conflict has always remained the same. In ancient times Sophist and Socratist, Democritean and Eleatic, Epicurean and Platonist crossed swords on this field. In later times, Nominalist contended with Realist, Lockian with Cartesian, Sensationalist with Intuitionalist, in many an historic conflict. And on the same field, at the present day, Materialist and Idealist, Empiricist and Rationalist, Relativist and Realist, are fighting the same battles over again. The combatants may change, the plan of attack and defence may vary, but it is ever the same old controversy in regard to the problems of being and cognition.

2. The Christian theist cannot be an uninterested spectator of this age-long conflict. If empiricism wins the day on the field of philosophy, theism may have to capitulate in the sphere of religion, and leave agnosticism or skepticism in possession of the spoils. If we have no knowledge save that which comes by the senses, then the knowledge of God, as an infinite spiritual being, is ruled out. In the fourth chapter of the Introduction, the intuitional or rational theory of knowledge, in its general outlines, was accepted as correct. It is accepted, however, not in the sense of the historic innate ideas, but rather in the sense justified by the Kantian criticism. It is thereby admitted that experience may be the occasion when knowledge rises into consciousness; but it is also held that experience is not the sole source of knowledge. According to this view, the mind

itself, by the very laws of its own spontaneity, contributes certain rational elements to the fabric of knowledge. These *a priori* elements do not spring from experience, either individual or hereditary, but are the necessary rational conditions of the possibility of the experience itself.

This theory of knowledge is carried with us as we enter the realm of religious and theistic experience. We shall seek to thread our way with some care over very difficult and delicate ground. We may first seek to understand the significance of certain partial views, and then try to unfold the better doctrine.

II. *Some Partially Correct Views.* § 53.

Several phases of this theory, which, in a rather one-sided way, seek to account for the origin of theistic belief, are to be briefly noticed. These all agree in denying that primitive theistic belief is the product of any empirical process, or of any kind of logical inference, or even of an outward revelation. Though these operations may do much to develop the belief in various ways, yet they do not originate it at first. There are several types of this view; and it will be observed that the problem they deal with is the way in which a knowledge of God is obtained, rather than the question of the genesis of the belief in God in the human mind.

1. Fichte and Schelling, with the transcendentalists generally, represent one type. This is the *absolutist* type. God is identified with the absolute, and is immediately apprehended by an act of pure intellection. God is known face to face by an immediate intuition. There is a vision of the absolute in the human soul. In this vision subject and object are brought to a sort of rational identity. This vision is not of the nature of an ordinary consciousness; it is rather an intellectual intuition, which looks directly upon the reality of the absolute, which is God. By some it is

regarded as a transcendental gaze upon the very essence of deity by pure reason, as the faculty of the supersensible.

It need only be remarked that the transcendental philosophy upon which this view of intuition rests is not accepted. It, however, announces a great truth in an exaggerated way. That truth consists in the fact that the human spirit may sustain definite spiritual relations with God; but he is thereby apprehended as a living, loving, personal God, not merely gazed on intellectually as the absolute.

2. Cousin, the eclectic French philosopher, gives a slightly different turn to this general view. He argues that the absolute is of the nature of *reason,* and hence capable of being immediately cognized by human reason. He differs with the transcendentalists as to the mode in which the absolute is known. He holds that the absolute or infinite is immediately known in consciousness, rather than by pure intellection. He asserts that the absolute is both conceivable and cognizable, and that the conditions of consciousness, which are relation, plurality and difference, are applicable to the absolute. In particular, Cousin maintains that, over against the finite, the infinite is also present in consciousness. Hence, he contends that the infinite or absolute is known in consciousness, and thus the knowledge of God is realized.

The process by which Cousin explains the consciousness of the infinite is merely logical. We have the rational conviction of the reality of an infinite something over against finite things; but this can scarcely be called consciousness, unless we use that term in a very wide sense. Then the notion of the infinite, as Cousin conceives of it, is scarcely the same as the idea of an infinite personal God.

3. Jacobi and Schleiermacher, though differing in various respects, may be grouped together as another type of this general view. The conviction or apprehension of God is of the nature of *faith* or feeling. Jacobi lays stress on faith, and Schleiermacher on feeling. We have belief in, and

sense of dependence on, some higher power. God is believed in rather than known; he is felt rather than cognized. This faith and feeling are simple, spontaneous and immediate activities of the soul, and they relate the soul to God in what may be called a God-consciousness. Schleiermacher made this feeling of dependence the essence of religion. God was immediately felt.

There is an element of truth in this view. God is believed in, from one point of view, and the sense of dependence is a factor in religious experience. But these views scarcely do justice to the intellectual factor in the religious consciousness, and hence they tend to some form of mysticism. The theistic intuition, rightly understood, is more than feeling, and it involves more even than a spontaneous act of faith.

4. Hamilton and Kant, though representing different types of philosophy, are in substantial agreement touching the question now under discussion. Hamilton holds that the *unconditioned,* which includes both the infinite and the absolute, is both incognoscible and inconceivable. It is the negative of the conditioned, and it is the conditioned alone that can be known and conceived. The unconditioned cannot be cognized, and hence God, as the unconditioned, lies beyond rational cognition. It does not follow, however, that Hamilton was an agnostic; for though he holds that God is not the object of intellectual cognition, his real existence is a *fixed conviction* of man's moral nature.

Kant held that God cannot be the object of cognition by the human understanding, which deals only with phenomena in the sphere of experience. According to Kant, the idea of God is merely a *regulative principle* of pure reason itself, by which it is to be guided in unifying its cognitions. Hence, Kant held that the proofs for the existence of God are invalid, since they do not deal with realities, but with phenomena. As the door for the intellectual cognition of God is thus closed by Kant, it looks as if he must be an

agnostic. But he is not; for he holds that what pure reason or intellect cannot do, practical reason or conscience can. Pure reason has God as merely a regulative idea, while practical reason makes God its *fundamental postulate.* Thus, both Hamilton and Kant find the knowledge of God to be a product of man's moral experiences; and hence it is a matter of faith, rather than of cognition.

There is, no doubt, much force in what both of these writers say in regard to the theistic import of man's moral nature, and they both render good service in giving faith a large place in theistic belief. Still, both of them have done harm, alike to speculative and theistic philosophy, in denying the validity of the intellect in relation to the knowledge of God. Herbert Spencer has ingeniously used both of these names in support of agnosticism, in a way never intended by them. But the door was opened for him to do so, and the efforts of Mansel were not entirely successful to close it. The sound doctrine here is that both intellectual cognition and moral conviction relate us to God. If he be the postulate of practical reason, he is the same also for pure reason. God, as truth, is the object of the intellect; and God, as right, is the object of the conscience. If the cognition of God be banished from pure reason, it is hard to see how it can be retained in the sphere of practical reason. But all this, it will be observed, pertains as much to the existence of God as to the origin of the idea of God in the mind.

5. Calderwood may be taken as an example of another type of view. He makes the knowledge of God to be *intuitive,* but this intuition is not so much an immediate perception of God, as a necessary judgment affirming the existence of an infinite personal God. Some who take this general view describe the intuition of God as a necessary belief which the mind possesses. This judgment is not at first in itself theistic, for it arises from what is really a non-theistic aspect of the soul. The religious conscious-

ness arises from the exercise of the belief in the existence of God, rather than conditions it, according to this view.

Calderwood, and those who think with him, have, perhaps, been too much influenced by Kant's criticism of the theistic proofs, and hence have been led to rest mainly on intuition to justify belief in the existence of God. Hence, they minimize the value of the proofs for the existence of God, as they magnify the import of the theistic intuition, as a necessary judgment or belief asserting the divine existence. If Kant goes to one extreme in making little of the theistic proofs, we have to be careful not to put too much stress on the intuition. It is precisely this mistake that Calderwood and others are in danger of making. It may be going too far to say that the intuition of God is a necessary judgment affirming the existence of one infinite God. For even if we admit, as we do, that there are con-natural factors in the idea of, or belief in, God, it may still be true that revelation and reflection have done much to enlarge the idea and enrich the belief. It may also be true that the reasonings which vindicate the rational nature of the belief in the existence of God are of much value. And it must ever be kept in mind that the question of the origin of theistic belief is one thing, and that the problem of the proofs for the existence of God is another.

6. The last partial type of view now to be noted is that represented by Descartes and Anselm. This view emerges in connection with the elaboration of the ontological proofs for the existence of God. Anselm seems to have simply assumed that the human mind is *in possession* of the idea of "a being than whom a greater cannot be thought"; and from this idea he proceeds to vindicate the existence of the being to whom it relates. Descartes, in one of his arguments for the existence of God, drawn from the idea of "an all-perfect being," which the mind necessarily possesses, gives no account of how the mind arrives at this idea.

When, however, Descartes opens up another of his theistic proofs, he says that the only adequate explanation of the idea of God in the mind is the fact of the existence of God. Were Anselm or Descartes asked, whence the idea of God came, he would likely say that the human mind, in its very nature as created by God, possessed it. Most of those who give value to the ontological proofs agree in holding that the idea of God is innate, or con-natural, in some sense. The idea is in the mind, not so much as an intuition, which the mind itself arrives at, as a product of which God, in the last analysis, is the author.

In this position there is something profoundly true, but that truth does not bear directly upon the question of the psychological origin of theistic belief. It is not really intended to be a philosophy of the genesis of that belief. It assumes man's theistic constitution, and proceeds to justify belief in the existence of God from the contents of that constitution. The discussion will recur to this position again in the ontology of theism.

These six types of view are all on the true ground, in the main; but they do not distinguish between the *psychology* and the *ontology* of theism, and in some instances they bear chiefly upon its ontology. But the *origin* of theistic belief in the human mind is the question now under careful consideration.

III. *Statement of the Correct Doctrine.* § 54.

1. It now remains to give a statement of the doctrine which we are led to adopt in regard to the genesis of theistic belief and the religious consciousness. This is one of the deepest problems in psychology which can engage our attention. It relates, not so much to the way in which we now come to obtain a knowledge of God, as to how the religious consciousness in the human race at first had its

origin. How has it come to pass that man possesses the con-natural theistic capacity which expresses itself in religious belief and practice everywhere among men?

2. The true doctrine may be called the intuitional, if we take the term intuition in the sense of *con-natural,* constitutional or *a priori.* It may be termed the *rational* theory, which implies that human reason, or spirit, in its very constitution, has a theistic factor. Some would call it the inspirational theory, indicating thereby that God himself has produced that idea in the mind which theistic belief implies. The second of these terms, perhaps, best describes the true doctrine. It is necessary to keep in mind the analysis made of man's religious consciousness in the second chapter of this division of the discussion. It is the origin of this that we are now dealing with.

3. In general, this view holds that the basal factors in religious consciousness and theistic belief are *not empirical* in their origin. They do not arise from natural evolution, external revelation or logical inference. Nor are they the result of the necessary evolution of absolute unconscious reason. On the other hand, while it is admitted that in mature theistic belief there are empirical elements which spring from these various sources just named, yet it is firmly maintained that the human spirit itself, in its very constitution, possesses certain primitive con-natural factors, which antedate all distinct conscious religious and theistic experience, and which, indeed, condition that experience and render it possible. These primitive factors constitute the intuitional or *rational basis* of theistic belief, and the genesis of this belief must have relation to these native factors. In this sense, theistic belief is intuitive or *a priori.* This belief is not a translation from something in the soul which is not theistic, for the original itself is already theistic. This belief is what it is in religious consciousness, because it is, on the occasion of experience, the spontaneous outcome of the native theistic factors in the constitution of man. On

this basis education and revelation may have much influence in developing the belief.

Such is a general outline of the doctrine held. The belief in God is not intuitive, in the sense that we have, at first, the immediate perception of God, or that we make a necessary judgment asserting the existence of one infinite God. This belief at first implies that man, having the theistic constitution, naturally attains, by an impulse from within, rather than by influences from without, to that belief in God which religious experience implies. The influences acting from without may be the *occasion* of the rise of this belief into distinct consciousness, but the impulse of the con-natural theistic endowment of man, working from within, conditions and shapes that consciousness. This, in the last analysis, is the *source* of theistic belief.

IV. *Exposition of this Doctrine.* § 55.

That the doctrine thus stated may be more thoroughly understood, some further exposition of it may be of value.

1. The genesis of theistic belief must, in the end, be discovered *within* the human spirit, rather than in any circumstances operating on it outwardly. This is a simple statement, but full of significance. It means that the human mind rises to the belief in God, not merely as the result of certain external experiences, such as may be exerted by nature, or outward revelation, or education and reflection. It means that the soul at first is not like a blank, unruled sheet of paper, but that, in its very nature, it is endowed with a native, theistic appetency, or aptitude. In this nature the germ of theistic belief lies, here it is quickened into life, and here it plants its roots as it grows up into a mature religious experience. Deep down in the very nature of the soul the sources of theistic belief lie.

2. This doctrine does not imply that the idea of God which theistic belief involves is *innate,* in the sense in which

the term "innate ideas" has often been used. This phrase, coming to us from Plato through the scholastic philosophy, has caused much confusion, and introduced some error into both philosophy and theology. The doctrine of the origin of theistic belief just stated does not imply that the idea of God is stored away in the mind, as a fully formed idea of one infinite God, ready to be brought forth into experience at any time. By intuitive or *a priori* we do not mean the same thing as the scholastic term innate usually denotes. The idea of God, in its maturity, does not lie in the human soul; but its germ, which is already theistic in its nature, is there.

3. Nor does this doctrine imply that the idea of God is of the nature of a *general conception* framed by the mind. A general concept, which is expressed in a general term, is a mental product, and is the result of abstraction and generalization. When it is said, therefore, that belief in God has its genesis in the soul, it is not to be supposed that the soul has formed it there, in the same way that a general conception is framed. Were this the case, no legitimate inference could be made from the idea of God to his actual existence, for the reason that general conceptions have no real objects actually existing, other than the qualities constituting these conceptions, as they are found in individual objects. Much of the criticism of some of the proofs for the existence of God has proceeded on the ground that the idea of God is a general conception framed by the mind, instead of an idea formed in it. All such criticisms are disarmed when it is seen that the idea of God is con-natural, and that it conditions theistic experience.

4. This doctrine further implies that theistic belief comes into distinct *consciousness* as the powers of the soul, developing from within, find themselves in relation with those conditions which constitute the occasion of this consciousness taking definite form. All growth is the result of the life-germ in the seed, and of the suitable conditions to render

it vitally active. This is true in the vegetable and animal kingdoms. The source and cause of the growth and development are within the germ, but the occasion of the activity coming into play are certain external conditions. So in regard to the genesis and growth of theistic belief. Its germinal elements are con-natural, as a constitutional endowment of our nature; and, as the intellectual, emotional and moral life of the soul opens up, theistic belief comes into ever clearer consciousness. The initial movement is from *within* the soul, and not from *without*.

5. The true doctrine, finally, maintains that the con-natural factor in theistic belief needs *expansion* before it reaches its maturity. Here it is that reasoning, reflection and revelation render valuable service in leading the theistic belief out to its maturity. By this means a purified, elevated, rational theism, such as Christianity presupposes, is realized. Some intuitionalists put too much into the intuition of God, and do not allow enough for the influence of reasoning, revelation and religious education. The basal factors of theistic belief are *a priori* or con-natural; but reasoned, mature theism has in it many empirical elements. Here, as in other aspects of the theory of knowledge, the *a priori* and the *a posteriori,* are both necessary to the matured product of cognition.

V. *Some Confirmation of the Doctrine.* § 56.

1. The views of eminent *scholars* greatly confirm this doctrine. Charles Hodge (*Sys. Th.,* Vol. I., Ch. I.) holds that the idea of God is intuitive, and at the same time he properly recognizes the use and force of the theistic proofs. Flint (*Theism,* Lect. III., § 2), when he speaks of theistic belief being an immediate unconscious inference, can scarcely mean anything different from this doctrine. H. B. Smith (*Introd. to Christian Theology,* p. 90) says that "such is the human constitution that under appropriate

circumstances it always recognizes the existence of God as a fact." He calls this aspect of the knowledge of God "connatural." Owen (quoted in Haliburton's *Rational Inquiry,* Ch. III.) says that "men are born with a capacity of knowing him (God), and they do not so naturally know as they feel this implanted capacity of knowing God." Calvin (*Institutes,* Book I., Ch. III.) says that "all men have by nature an innate persuasion of the divine existence, a persuasion inseparable from their very constitution." Luthardt (*Fundamental Truths,* Lect. II., pp. 43, 44) says that "an intuitive conviction of the existence of God dwells within the human mind. We can by no means free ourselves from the notion of God. It is a question of the whole man, of his whole mental and moral life. And if it be a question of the whole man, its answer must come from the whole man." Ebrard (*Apologetics,* Vol. I., § 100) says, with deep insight, that "both the premises which lead to the cognition of God, *i. e.,* the knowledge of the external world, and the knowledge of self, are in every human consciousness immediately given, even in that of the simplest child, and operate directly as an urgent feeling which presses on to the knowledge." Again, Luthardt (*Fundamental Truths,* Ch. VII.) adds that "we have within us a consciousness of his (God's) existence, a natural knowledge of God, which is further developed by his testimony of himself in creation and providence." The consensus of opinion thus adduced could be greatly expanded by reference to other writers like Augustine, Howe, Christlieb, Thornwell, Diman and Patton.

2. Some *general* considerations also establish the doctrine. A few of these are merely mentioned.

First, it is in harmony with the sound, rational *epistemology.* According to this theory, the mind itself always makes some contribution to the fabric of knowledge, and hence all knowledge has in it an *a priori* factor. Theistic belief is in harmony with this theory of knowledge.

Secondly, it lays a basis and paves the way for the ontological and psychological *proofs* for the existence of God. The con-natural factor becomes a witness to the reality of its object. The *a priori* endowment constitutes the premises from which the existence of God may be argued. The intuitive reality of the idea of God pledges its objective validity in the existence of God. This is the starting point of some subtle and forcible proofs.

Thirdly, it provides the ground for the *inductive* proofs for the existence of God, drawn from the order and design seen in nature. If man had no theistic capacity, he could never frame the theistic hypothesis of the universe. But he can do so, and thus bring the theistic postulate to solve the problems of the cosmos. This constitutes the essence of several potent proofs for the existence of God.

Fourthly, this doctrine is in harmony with the way in which the human spirit comes to know more and more of God under the operation of the Holy Spirit in it. If there were no natural kinship between God and the human spirit, *religious experience,* as the result of the indwelling Spirit of God, would have no foundation in its psychical side. But if we regard the intuitive factors of theistic belief as in a sense a natural revelation of God in the soul, then we have a secure natural basis on which the Holy Spirit operates in his supernatural activities in the human soul. Thus, the natural spiritual relation between God and man provides the ground in man's soul's upon which the supernatural spiritual relation of the regenerate life is constituted. These four reasons greatly confirm the doctrine.

"To be a settled Christian, it is necessary, first of all, to be a good theist."—SHAFTESBURY.

"If nature does not belong to God, we also cannot belong to him."—SCHELLING.

"No one can be called a theist who does not believe in a Personal God, whatever difficulty there may be in defining the word 'Personal.'"—NEWMAN.

"By the name of God, I understand a substance, infinite, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by which I myself, and every other creature that exists, if there be any such, were created."—DESCARTES.

"Theism assumes a living relation of God to his creatures, but does not define it. One may be a theist and not be a Christian, but he cannot be a Christian and not be a theist."—CENTURY DICTIONARY.

"The primitive revelation, which was a fact, was necessarily addressed to a precedent religious nature, without which it could not have been received; it was important in developing the idea of God, but did not at first produce it."—WARFIELD.

THE SECOND DIVISION.

THE ONTOLOGY OF THEISM.

THE FIRST SECTION.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY TOPICS.

CONTENTS.

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LITERATURE.

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I. *Preliminary.* § 57.

1. THE discussion of theism has thus far been concerned with its *psychology*. The nature and origin of religious and theistic belief have been considered. A careful analysis of the religious consciousness and of theistic belief has been made. The question of the genesis of this belief has been discussed at length. Various theories to account for its origin in human experience have been passed under critical review, and the true doctrine has been educed. This doctrine announces that there is a con-natural, intuitive or *a priori* factor in theistic belief, which pertains to the very constitution of the human soul, and is not the product, in the first instance, of natural evolution, logical inference, nor external revelation. But this doctrine also maintains that this native theistic aptitude or capacity of man's constitution requires certain external circumstances, such as revelation, education and reflection, to preserve, purify and perpetuate it in such maturity as to constitute the proper rational basis for Christianity. In mature monotheistic belief, therefore, there are two related elements. The one is the primitive or con-natural factor, which is the antecedent condition of the subsequent theistic experience; and the other consists in all those elements which are incorporated into that experience by means of revelation, reflection and education.

2. We now pass on to the second main division of theistic discussion on its positive side. This may be termed the *ontology* of theism. This leads to the study of the intricate problem of the ontological validity of theistic belief, and of the idea of God therein involved. The question now is: Is there actually existing a real object upon which theistic belief legitimately rests? Is there really existent in the objective sphere a personal being in rational correspondence with the idea of such a being in the human mind? Given

the belief in God which is native to the human soul, what is its ontological significance? Has subjective theistic belief objective validity?

The problem thus raised is a profound one, and its proper solution is of the deepest import. It raises the whole debate concerning the theistic proofs, or the arguments for the existence of God. The field of discussion is wide, its materials are vast, and the treatment is difficult. The treatises dealing with this subject would form a large library. Every system of philosophy has to face the problem of the existence of God. Modern science often leads up to the same problem. Theology has to deal with it also, as one of its fundamental facts. Even poets often find the same mysterious inquiry before them as they wander in the sunlit and flowery fields of imagination. This problem of the ages meets us everywhere. Ancient Greek in shady grove, mediæval monk in lonely cell, modern philosopher in quiet study, present-day scientist in the laboratory, the poet in every age, as well as the theologian, are alike concerned to know what answer should be given to the inquiry concerning the objective validity of theistic belief.

Before proceeding to the formal exposition of the theistic proofs, there are several preliminary topics to be considered, so that the way may be made plain for an intelligent discussion of these proofs. This is very important, in order to avoid confusion in the whole theistic discussion. This chapter will deal with these preliminary topics.

II. *The Precise Task Undertaken.* § 58.

1. First of all the *results* reached in the psychology of theism are assumed, and carried forward to the discussion of its ontology. This affords the starting-point of the reasonings which justify belief in the existence of God; and it at the same time supplies, in part at least, some of the materials for the proofs for the reality of the object of

theistic belief. It is held that this belief has its roots deeply fixed in the very nature of man, and that it is an essential element in his constitution. From this secure subjective fact the reasonings for the existence of God proceed; and never, in the exposition of the theistic proofs, should the con-natural or intuitive nature of the belief in God be lost sight of.

2. It should also be kept in mind that we do not undertake to prove the existence of God after the manner of a strict *demonstration*. The method of mathematics is not the one now to be followed. The method must rather be that of rational vindication, and the result will be moral probability. This is perhaps the only method possible in dealing with this problem, for it is doubtful if real existence in any sphere can be proved by strict deductive or demonstrative reasonings. Hence, we undertake to show that theistic belief, which involves the actual existence of God, is a rational belief, capable of abundant vindication. We shall also be prepared to make it plain that the denial of the divine existence is irrational and unnatural, and that theistic belief, in predicating the actual existence of its object, is reasonable and natural. In a word, we undertake to make good the claim that theistic belief is reasonable, and that atheism is irrational.

3. This position further implies that theistic belief is not a mental fancy or a subjective dream, but an *a priori* belief, which *asserts* the existence of its object. The exposition of the theistic proofs will mainly consist in the rational vindication of the objective validity of this native belief. This belief will be regarded as a valid witness, and the significance of its testimony will be interpreted.

Hence, we do not begin to prove the existence of a God of whom we are entirely ignorant, or concerning whom we have no idea. To take this position would be to make reasonings in regard to the existence of God impossible. But we begin with the primitive theistic belief, whose sub-

jective and con-natural reality has been established in the psychology of theism, and then proceed to *vindicate* the ontological reality of this belief in the existence of God. This initial position for the ontology of theism is well brought out by Luthardt (*Fundamental Truths,* p. 48), when he says that "the theistic arguments are not intended to prove to us that which we are not already acquainted with, but to justify our intuitive conviction to our reasoning faculties, by directing us to the traces, scattered on all sides, of that God, whom we already perceive and know in our hearts." Thus we undertake to vindicate the native spontaneous conviction of the heart before the bar of reason, and so to set sail for the long voyage across the wide sea of the theistic discussion.

4. The import of the difference between *proving* and *solving* should also be kept in mind as it here emerges. This may seem but a verbal distinction; yet it is necessary to make it in order to understand the function of the arguments for the existence of God. To prove is one thing, and to solve is another. The former is of the nature of demonstration, the latter of explanation. Proving, as demonstration, relates to a theorem; solving, as explanation, pertains to a problem. We prove a theorem, and solve a problem. The method in the former case is mainly deductive, and in the latter chiefly inductive.

In unfolding the theistic proofs this distinction must be constantly kept in view. To undertake to demonstrate the existence of God is one thing, and to offer the theistic hypothesis as the solution of the problems of the universe is another. In the former case we undertake to prove the existence of God, without direct reference to the native belief in him, and in the latter we proceed to vindicate this native belief, as a valid witness to the existence of God. In the ontological proofs we may seem to be often following the method of proving or demonstration. Still, in this case, even after we have reached the idea of an infinite, an all-

perfect, or a necessary being, we must presuppose the theistic concept as already in mental possession before theistic predicates can be applied to this object. Thus it appears that even in this case we do not really demonstrate the existence of a God of whom we have no antecedent notion or belief. But in presenting the theistic proofs we shall be mainly engaged in showing that belief in the existence and activity of God is a reasonable and rationally necessary belief, inasmuch as it supplies the most adequate solution of the varied problems presented by man and the universe. If theistic belief, which postulates the existence of God, thereby fully solves all these problems, we are justified in concluding that the divine existence is a fact which is rational and well grounded.

This gives the task we now undertake a somewhat different form from that which it had in the hands of the older natural theology. That theology proceeded to unfold the arguments for the divine existence, and thereby sought to put the human mind into possession of the idea of, or belief in, God. The method now suggested assumes the reality of the subjective and con-natural nature of the belief in God, and from this it proceeds to vindicate the reality of the existence of God. In the former case, the reality of the existence of God was vindicated as the ground of the subjective belief; in the latter, the reality of the subjective belief is vindicated as the rational ground for believing in the existence of God. The results of the psychology of theism justify this conclusion.

III. *The Relations of the Theistic Proofs.* § 59.

1. In entering upon the exposition of the theistic proofs, it is necessary to come to some understanding in regard to the *relation* of the various proofs to each other. There are many lines of reasoning by which the belief in the existence of God is vindicated, and these differ in their method and

materials. The relation of these to each other is an important question. What is the relation of the so called *a priori* and *a posteriori* proofs? How do the deductive and inductive modes of reasoning stand related in the theistic argument? How should the ontological, cosmological, teleological and moral proofs be construed in their mutual bearing upon each other? To understand these questions is necessary to clearness of exposition, and may pave the way for such a presentation of the theistic proofs as shall go far to meet certain objections to them.

2. First of all, these proofs are to be regarded as *cumulative* in their nature. This means that the many lines of reasoning are to be taken, not singly, but in their combined logical force. The theistic proofs are like the *strands* of a cable, rather than the *links* of a chain. If they be regarded merely as links in a chain, the strength of the whole is measured by the strength of the weakest link; but if they be considered to be strands of a cable, their argumentative force is equal to the strength of all the strands when compacted into the cable. One strand may be strong and another weak, yet each adds its quota of logical value to the force of the whole. One strand may even be quite defective, yet the theistic argument, as a whole, may stand quite secure, because other strands are sound and strong. This is what is meant by the cumulative nature of the argument for the existence of God. Hence, after we have expounded each separate proof, and shown its peculiar value, we shall be careful to bind them all together in a legitimate logical synthesis, and thus exhibit their combined and convincing force. Thus we are justified in speaking of the theistic proofs collectively, and in calling them the theistic argument. The proofs are many, but the argument is one.

3. Each proof should be carefully estimated in accordance with its peculiar *logical form*. In doing this, it is important to understand clearly what the logical form of

any particular argument is, and not to expect any conclusion from it which it is not fitted to supply. We should carefully observe whether any argument is deductive or inductive, *a priori* or *a posteriori*. We should understand clearly the principle of each form of reasoning, whether it be ontological, cosmological or teleological. We should observe whether we start from the idea of a necessary being, from the notion of the infinite, or from the principle of causation. We should consider whether we are seeking for a first cause, or trying to account for order and design in the universe. Above all, care should be taken to comprehend the method of immediate inference which the moral argument exhibits. Much confusion will be avoided, and the relation of the several theistic proofs will be better understood if this point be kept constantly in view.

4. In like manner, the *subject-matter* of each proof should be diligently considered. The subject-matter of the various proofs is as different as their logical methods are diverse. In this respect the ontological, cosmological, teleological and moral proofs widely differ. Diligent observation is needed to discover whether the materials of any given proof are drawn from the contents of human reason and its modes of cognition, from the varied facts of nature about us, or from man's moral nature and the conditions of moral order under which he finds himself placed. It will be a serious mistake to derive from the materials of one line of proof what can only be deduced from another. To expect the teleological argument to give what only the ontological can would be a serious mistake.

And in this connection it is necessary to distinguish between the native, con-natural factors, and the empirical elements in theistic belief, in order to clearly comprehend the significance of the materials of the several proofs. The material of some of the proofs is more directly related to the con-natural aspects of theistic belief, and in others to its empirical factors. To keep this in mind is necessary

in order to make a legitimate use of the subject-matter of the varied lines of reasoning for the divine existence.

5. It must be further borne in mind that some of the proofs bear directly upon the *being* of God, and others upon his *attributes* mainly. The being of God denotes his real essential nature as God; the attributes of God are those qualities which belong to his essence, or are exhibited by his manifold activities. Certain proofs, such as the argument for a necessary being, or that for a first cause, relate mainly to the essential nature, the very being of God. Others, like the arguments from order and design, relate directly to the attributes of knowledge, wisdom and power. And still others, such as the varied phases of the moral argument, bear upon the moral attributes of righteousness and justice. Then, having reached these attributes by varied lines of inference, we postulate the reality of the being to whom these attributes necessarily belong. It will thus appear that certain proofs establish the reality of the divine existence in its essential nature, and that others clothe that being with certain natural and moral attributes. In the former case the divine existence is vindicated, in the latter we enlarge our idea of God. In the one case we are assured that God is, and in the other we learn something of what God is. Thus, by reasoning, the primitive knowledge of God is greatly enlarged and enriched. The relation of the several proofs in this respect should be faithfully regarded.

IV. *The Order of the Theistic Proofs.* § 60.

1. Opinions differ widely as to the best *order* in which to exhibit the different theistic proofs. Some think one order, and some another, the more effective. Shall we begin with the ontological, the cosmological or the teleological proof? Shall we begin with the *a priori*, and pass on to the *a posteriori* modes of reasoning, or shall we invert this order? Shall we begin with the contents of the human

mind, or shall we take our point of departure from external nature? And how shall we relate the moral proofs to the other lines of reasoning? Some eminent writers pursue one order, and some another. Flint begins with certain phases of the cosmological argument, passes on to the design and moral proofs, and finally reaches the ontological. This was the natural order for Flint to pursue, inasmuch as he allows no proper place for the con-natural factor in theistic belief. This required his point of departure to be empirical in his presentation of the theistic proofs. Writers of the Cartesian and intuitive schools usually pursue the opposite course, and begin with some aspects of the psychical or ontological proofs, and then pass on to the cosmological, teleological and moral modes of reasoning. When high authorities thus differ, it is not easy to decide which order is the better one to adopt. Yet it is of some importance to come to an understanding as to the order of presenting the proofs, so that their exposition may be made in a simple and natural way.

2. The positions taken, and the conclusions reached in the psychology of theism, naturally suggest that the exposition of the proofs should connect itself closely with these conclusions. In dealing with the nature and origin of theistic belief, the reality of the con-natural or *a priori* factor in that belief was vindicated. In taking up the ontology of theism, and in seeking to make good the existence of God, it is natural to seek, first of all, to interpret the *objective validity* of the subjective belief in God. Consequently, we are led to begin with the psychical proofs, whose material is found in the mind itself, and then to proceed to deal with those proofs whose material is found in various aspects of the universe. For a natural method of exposition, therefore, we begin where the discussion of the psychology of theism left us, and proceed to establish the objective validity of the native belief in God. We begin, consequently, with the *a priori* aspects of the proof, and

pass on to the *a posteriori*. The ontological proofs will thus be considered before the teleological. This order may be the best for another reason. In all the proofs there is, as we shall see, an *a priori* as well as an *a posteriori* factor. This being the case, it may be an advantage to have the import of this factor clearly brought out first of all. Those who fail to do justice to the native or con-natural factor in theistic belief cannot so consistently follow this course. We shall begin by seeking to interpret the meaning of the native theistic belief. We shall regard this con-natural appetency to believe in God as a witness to his actual existence. We shall inspect its credentials and weigh its testimony.

V. *The Classification of the Proofs.* § 61.

1. This is also a question concerning which the authorities differ. What divisions of the proofs shall be made? How shall the various branches of the theistic argument be *classified?* Having settled the order of their treatment in the previous section, we are now to see how the proofs can be best marshalled according to this order. What principle of classification should be adopted, and what titles shall be applied to the various strands in the cable of proof? The literature of the theistic discussion does not afford much help on this point. One author adopts one classification, a second follows another, and a third may give the question of classification but little consideration. The old division into *a priori* and *a posteriori* does not aid us much, because most of the proofs have both of these factors in their make-up. The division into deductive and inductive is much the same in principle, and is open to the same objection. The scholastic classification into ontological, cosmological and teleological is defective, inasmuch as they imply each other, and the two latter are really founded alike upon the principle of causation or sufficient reason. This fact gives

some plausibility for the merciless assault on the rational proofs which Kant made. A classification and an exposition of these proofs which turns, in some degree, the edge of this criticism, is desirable. Moreover, this threefold division gives no proper place for the moral proof, upon which Kant and many others have laid such stress, and which in itself has such cogency and power. A classification which overlooks the moral arguments is surely defective, and a criticism which fails to do the rational proofs justice is equally at fault. Both classes of proofs are valid. If God be the postulate of conscience, he is also the postulate of reason. Any adequate classification must recognize this fact.

2. It may also be well to avoid the use of the *terms* ontological, cosmological and teleological, as far as possible. Recent critical theistic discussions justify a more careful use of titles than these historic terms supply. The various aspects of the ontological proof merit recognition; the cosmological has been shown to be ambiguous, since it sometimes means the argument for a first cause, and sometimes the proof from order. Then, too, the arguments from order and design have in our own day been clearly discriminated from each other. And the several aspects of the moral or anthropological proof have also been elucidated in recent years. All of these considerations should have proper recognition in an adequate classification of the theistic proofs.

3. The following classification is suggested: The various proofs are divided into three main classes. The first may be termed the *psychical* or psychological. Here the materials of exposition and proof are found in the contents of the human mind, and in the conditions of its cognition. The second we designate the *cosmical* or cosmological. The principle involved in these proofs is that of causation, and the materials are found in various aspects of the universe of nature all about us. The third class is denoted the *moral* or anthropological. Here the starting point and the mate-

rials of the reasonings are found in man's moral nature, and the conditions of moral government under which he finds himself situated. In brief, the three main divisions of the theistic proofs are the psychical, the cosmical and the moral. The materials of the first lie mainly in the human mind, of the second in the external world, and of the third in the sphere of man's moral experiences. As the exposition proceeds, various subdivisions of these three main classes of *proofs* will be opened up. Then, when this is done, they will all be bound together logically, to supply one irrefutable *argument,* which abundantly vindicates the objective validity of theistic belief in the fact of the existence of God.

CHAPTER II.

THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS: PROOF FROM THE AUTOPISTIC NATURE OF THEISTIC BELIEF.

Contents.

Theistic Proofs. — Starting Point. — Psychical Proofs. — Several Forms.—Theistic Belief Autopistic.—Two Presuppositions.—Transition from Psychology to Ontology of Theism.—Statement of This Proof.—The Connatural Nature of the Belief in God.—Gives Presumption of His Existence.—Luthardt and Others Confirm.—Exposition of This Proof.—Does not Strictly Prove nor Really Form its Object.—Theistic Belief is a Messenger and a Witness to the Existence of God.—It is God's Testimony in the Human Soul to His own Real Existence.—It is Self-evidencing.—Vindication of This Proof.—Important to Make it Good.—The Universality of Religion Supports it.—Pagan Peoples Instinctively Believe in the Reality of Their Gods.—Philosophical Speculation Confirms it.—So does the Tendency of the Soul of Man Towards a Unity.—The Method and Conditions of Special Revelation also Vindicate this Proof.

Literature.

Luthardt's *Fundamental Truths,* Chap. III.—Dabney's *Theology,* Chap. II.—Hodge's *Systematic Theology,* Vol. I., Part I., Chap. I.—Shedd's *Dogmatic Theology,* Vol. I., Div. III., Chap. II.—Strong's *Systematic Theology,* Part II., Chaps. I., II.—Orr's *Christian View of God and the World,* Chap. III., Appendix.—Lindsay's *Recent Advances in the Theistic Philosophy of Religion,* Chap. V.—Mead's *Supernatural Revelation,* Chap. II.—Ebrard's *Apologetics,* Vol. I., Part I., Book I., Sec. I., Chap. III.—Fisher's *Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief,* Chap. II.—Fiske's *Cosmic Philosophy,* Vol. II., Part I., Chap. II.—Knight's *Aspects of Theism,* Chap. VIII.—Thomson's *Christian Theism,* Book II., Chap. VIII.—Dale's *Christian Doctrine,* Chaps. I., II.—Clarke's *Outline of Christian Theology,* Part I., Chap. II., 2.—H. B. Smith's *Introduction to Theology,* Part II., Chap. III., 3.—Fraser's *Philosophy of Theism,* Vol. I., Chap. II.—Harris' *Philosophical Basis of Theism,* Chap. V.—Calvin's *Institutes,* Book I., Chaps. I.–III.—Illingworth's *Divine Immanence,* Chap. IV.—Descartes' *Method and Meditations.*—Augustine's *The Trinity,* Chap. VII.—Frank's *System of Christian Certainty,* Sec. II., Chap. I.

I. *General Statement.* § 62.

1. IN this chapter the formal exposition of the theistic proofs is begun. According to the classification of those proofs suggested in the last chapter, the *psychical* or

psychological proofs are to be first unfolded. These proofs take their point of departure from certain rational contents of the human mind, and find their materials in the fundamental conditions of cognition. Beginning with the psychical proofs, we are able to bring the *ontology* of theism into close relation with its *psychology*. If we were to raise the metaphysical question of the ground of the con-natural theistic aptitude or instinct of the human soul, we might find the best answer to be that it was due to God making his presence known in the human soul. Theistic belief, in the last analysis, would then be grounded on the testimony of God in the soul of man, to his own existence. This view is not pressed just now, but it is merely suggested to show how the subjective and objective aspects of theistic belief are related.

The psychical proofs assume several quite distinct forms. First, the *autopistic* or self-evidencing nature of theistic belief; secondly, the proof from the idea of a *necessary being;* thirdly, the proof growing out of the idea of the *infinite;* and fourthly, the inference from the rational principle of *intelligence* itself, have to be unfolded. In this chapter attention will be devoted to the first of these. This leads to a careful interpretation of the *autopistic* nature of the belief in God.

2. This initial theistic proof presupposes two important positions already made good in these discussions. One is the rational theory of knowledge. This theory insists on the reality of the *a priori* laws of thought, and asserts that in cognition these laws come into rational correspondence with the real conditions of objective existence. The other is the con-natural or instinctive nature of theistic belief. This implies that this belief in its deepest roots is *a priori* or native to the human constitution. With the rational theory of knowledge as our guide, and the instinctive nature of theistic belief as our starting-point, we now proceed to investigate the ontological character of this belief.

3. By this means we may hope to be able to make the *passage* from the psychology to the ontology of theism in an entirely rational way. If this passage can thus be made, the objective validity of theistic belief will be securely established. It is evident that this is a matter of the utmost importance. How is the passage to be effected in an entirely rational way from the subjective belief in God, which is an undoubted psychical fact, to the objective existence of God as an undoubted reality? To show that this can be done in various ways is to go far to vindicate theistic belief as a warrant for belief in the existence of its object. In some respects the autopistic nature of this belief is the key to the situation. This may be termed the *esotheistic* proof, and we now enter on its exposition.

II. *Statement of this Proof.* § 63.

1. The starting point of this proof is the *nature* of theistic belief as inherently con-natural or intuitive. By intuitive, we do not now mean a direct gaze upon the very being of God. It is rather taken to denote that native theistic endowment, or inborn tendency to believe in God, which the human soul possesses. It is now assumed that the soul of man has this constitutional capacity in its very make-up. This intuitive factor must indeed be presupposed in order to the possibility of any definite theistic experience. Otherwise this experience would have to be explained on purely empirical grounds, and from materials at first non-theistic in their nature. But it has already been shown that this intuitive factor antedates and conditions the empirical elements which enter into this belief. Now, if it can be shown that this intuitive or con-natural factor in theistic belief is in rational correspondence, and cognitive relation with its object in the existence of God, a very important step will be taken towards laying the foundations for belief in the divine existence.

2. In proceeding to show this, it is necessary to keep in mind the fact that the intuitive factor in theistic belief is like the same factor in other aspects of human cognition. They all, as by an instinctive conviction, *postulate* their external counterparts, as actually existing in the objective realm. On this general and somewhat abstract ground, we reach the presumption that the theistic intuition has objective validity. In this connection, it must be remembered that theistic belief is not of the nature of a general conception, but rather a native endowment of the human soul, which has an *a priori* quality about it. Such being the case, it is not framed by the mind in the experiences of abstraction and generalization; it is rather possessed by the mind and given to that experience which is theistic. This wards off the objection that the idea of God has not any necessary objective validity, since the human mind can construct various general notions which have no real existence at all, as, for example, a mermaid or a centaur. But if the true intuitive or *a priori* factor be rightly regarded, it conditions, rather than springs from, experience; and it thereby pledges the reality of the object to which it rationally stands related. This, then, is an initial presumption in favor of the objective validity of theistic belief.

3. This presumption enables us to assume, tentatively at least, that the theistic intuition, with its *a priori* quality, may be justly regarded as an abiding *witness* in the human soul to the reality of the existence of God. The con-natural theistic factor in the constitution of man thus becomes God's testimony therein to his own actual existence; and it also lays the foundation for the *autopistic* nature of theistic belief. As rational intuition, in its very nature, relates the human mind to objective reality of some kind, so the theistic intuition of the human soul may relate it to God as an actually existing object. In such a case the object is not formed by the mind, but rather given to it. This being so, the very existence and character of this subjective factor

postulates its object as really existent. From another point of view, the theistic intuition may be regarded as a revelation of God in the soul. The con-natural theistic factor is the ear of the soul to hear the voice of God; it is his conscious presence in the audience chamber of the soul. Such revelation certainly presupposes the existence of the being who makes it. Hence, man's instinctive belief in God is a valid testimony to the existence of God.

Luthardt expresses almost the same view when he says that "to think of God is to be certain of his existence." This simply means that in the thought of God his existence is implied; or that the existence of God is necessary to account for man's native belief in him. Certain aspects of the Cartesian view suggest the same conclusion. When Descartes argues that the only proper way to account for the presence in the human soul of the idea of an infinite self-existent being, is to presuppose the existence of such a being, he makes this suggestion. Thus, the existence of God becomes the guarantee for the validity of human knowledge. Malebranche is not far from the same position when he says that we perceive all things in God when we perceive them accurately. Green, Caird, Royce and Watson certainly suggest the same view when they assume that God is the highest goal to which human intelligence can attain. And we may not be going too far when we suggest that the witness of the Holy Spirit in Christian experience implies the underlying natural relation of the infinite Spirit with the soul of man. If God, by his Spirit, sustains this inward relation to the believer's experience, may we not suppose that the foundation of this *gracious* relation is the *natural* relation, on the ground of which the theistic intuition is regarded as the testimony of God in the human soul, giving assurance that he is, and that we are under his authority? Even though sin may have marred this relation, and perverted this testimony, still it is not utterly destroyed; for if it were, man would no longer be a religious being

at all. At root this may be called the religious proof for the existence of God, wherein man's religious nature as self-evidencing testifies to the existence of God. In other words, the theistic intuition is native and autopistic.

III. *Exposition of this Proof.* § 64.

Some further exposition may more fully elucidate this proof, and indicate more clearly the precise results which it attains.

1. The theistic intuition as autopistic does not *prove* the existence of God in the sense of a strict logical demonstration. This con-natural theistic factor does not do the work of formal logic. It does not proceed deductively to reach by logical processes the conclusion that God exists. It operates instinctively, and spontaneously suggests the reasonableness of the existence of God. What was said in the preceding chapter, in regard to the function of proof in relation to the divine existence need only be now recalled, in support of what has just been stated. We do not seek to prove the existence of a God of whom we have no knowledge, but we rather undertake to interpret our instinctive conviction in regard to the existence of such a being.

2. Nor is it admitted that the theistic intuition *forms* the object to which it relates. If it did, God would have only a conceptual existence. But it has already been insisted that primitive theistic belief is not of the nature of a general notion framed in the mind by abstraction. If it were, the mind would be the virtual creator of God, and his existence would be purely ideal. The theistic intuition rather finds its object already existing. It is not, therefore, a mechanic, but rather a discoverer; it *finds,* rather than *makes,* its object. In the light of this view, the contention of Kant, that the idea of God is merely a regulative principle of human reason, according to which it proceeds in dealing

with the totality of phenomena in the cosmos, is entirely untenable. The position of Kant upon this point has been hurtful to both philosophy and theology. But if it be firmly held that theistic belief, which involves the idea of God, should be regarded as a rational intuition, much will be gained. The idea of God will then be regarded, not merely as a regulative principle, having only subjective validity, but it will be looked on as an instinctive and constitutive belief, carrying in its very nature the promise and pledge of its objective validity.

3. The theistic intuition rather *reveals* its object as existing. That object thus revealed is God. Hence, man's instinctive belief in God becomes a *messenger* in the human soul, revealing the existence of God. As in nature we say that God reveals himself, and thus the heavens declare his glory, so in the human soul God may, in like manner, be said to reveal himself, and therein declare his presence. In both cases the revelation is possible only on the supposition that God actually exists. The con-natural or intuitive belief in God is the fundamental fact, for unless we have the conviction concerning God which this belief implies, we could never see the glory of God in the starry heavens, nor find all nature vocal with his praise. Thus the intuitive factor rather reveals than forms or proves its object. It is needful to add that the revelation here implied is not external, but internal. It is not an outward special revelation, but an inward manifestation of God to the soul.

4. The theistic intuition further *attests* the reality of its object. It is an abiding attestation in the soul itself, testifying to the real existence of God. The native theistic endowment of the human soul is a *witness,* not a mechanic. It testifies to the reality of its object, which consequently it does not construct. Thus, as it is a messenger to the soul, revealing God therein; it is also a witness, testifying from within the soul to the reality of the existence of God. In this way the self-evidencing nature of theistic belief is

vindicated, and its objective validity securely established. This belief is not at first fully matured. It is at root con-natural, but needs revelation and education to lead it out to maturity.

Thus the native theistic belief of the soul neither proves nor forms its object. It rather reveals and attests the existence of that object. It is neither a logician nor a mechanic. It is simply a messenger and a witness. It is autopistic.

IV. *Vindication of this Proof.* § 65.

As the conclusion just stated is of much significance in itself, and in relation to the further exposition of the theistic proofs, it may be well to give some further reasons in its support.

1. The autopistic nature of theistic belief is supported by the *facts of religion* among men generally. If the con-natural nature of that belief be denied, it is not easy to see how a satisfactory explanation of the universal prevalence of religious ideas and practices can be given. If the phenomena of religion depend on primitive revelation, and subsequent education, there is reason to believe that religion would die out altogether in certain cases. If any people should entirely lose the memory of the revelation, or be deprived of the necessary religious education, the probability is that the knowledge of God would fade away from them entirely. But the fact is that there are no tribes of men, no matter how rude, but retain some acquaintance with deity. It may often be sadly perverted, but its essential principle is present. The best explanation of the persistency of religion among men is found in the con-natural nature of theistic belief. This implies that this belief is an essential element in the very nature of man, just as truly as conscience is, so that wherever man goes he carries it with him. This fact, coupled with the influence of revelation, fully accounts for the universality of religion. That it does so

in turn confirms the self-evidencing nature of the belief in God.

2. In this connection, it is worth while noting the fact that the religious belief of the different pagan systems is a belief in the actual *existence* of their deities. Their gods are not to them imaginary, but real beings. This persuasion prevails so widely among pagan peoples that it cannot be called in question. If these peoples thus assume the real existence of their deities, there is reason to conclude that their belief in them is self-evidencing in its nature. The native belief in the gods, though defective and perverted, is acted on in a somewhat unconscious way by untutored peoples, as if it were a testimony to the actual existence of their deities. Even though it be admitted that they are in error as to the precise form and number of their gods, yet their belief in them is a testimony to the objective validity of the native theistic endowment of mankind.

3. The conditions of philosophical *speculation* further confirm the doctrine announced in this chapter. It is interesting to observe how intimately theistic and philosophical speculation have always been related. The best types of ancient Greek philosophy give prominence to the theistic element. This is true of Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. In patristic and scholastic ages philosophy and theology were closely allied. In modern times almost every notable philosopher gives prominence to the theistic view of the universe. Descartes, and after him Spinoza in a quite different way, combined aspects of theism with their philosophy. Leibnitz and Kant wrestled with the problem of the divine existence and government. Hamilton and Hegel speculated profoundly upon the nature of the infinite and absolute. Ethical monism and definite theism have a large place in the philosophy of our own day. Even those whose philosophy is anti-theistic have to face the very problems of which theism provides the best solution.

Whence arises this persistent impulse in philosophical speculation to move on and up to the theistic goal? If the native and autopistic nature of theistic belief be admitted, this impulse can be understood. If the theistic intuition be regarded as an abiding attestation in the human soul to the existence of God, then it is easy to see how the belief in God comes to be used as the solution of the problems of the universe in the hands of philosophy. Thus the connatural and self-evidencing nature of theistic belief explains the prevalence of the theistic element in philosophy. In turn, the prevalence of this element in human thought goes far to confirm the autopistic nature of the belief in God when it affirms the existence of the object of this belief.

4. The fact that all the powers of the human soul find *unity* for their activities in God, further confirms the doctrine of this chapter. Thus it comes to pass that cognition, faith, feeling, moral experiences and religious instinct, all find the goal of their noblest exercise in the postulate of God. The highest thinking, the most exalted faith, the most elevated emotion, the deepest moral experiences, and the loftiest religious aspirations of the human soul, reach to, and rest in, God. These all lead out and up to God, and when they rest in him they find unity and satisfaction. As Augustine has said, "the soul is restless till it rests in God." Thus, God, is the true home of the soul, and all its activities find their highest forms of exercise in relation to him. This, again, is in harmony with the doctrine that theistic belief is autopistic in its nature.

The dire effects of *sin* have, of course, to be taken into account in these reasonings. The intellect has been darkened, the eye of faith has been blinded, the feelings have been perverted, conscience has been dulled, and the religious sentiments have been turned into wrong channels. But this does not destroy the force of the contention here made, because the Gospel comes, with its remedy for the evils of sin in all these elements of man's nature, so that they may

be brought into harmonious action again. The return to God is associated with the restoration of this harmony, and, indeed, conditions it. In redeemed men the self-evidencing nature of theistic belief is clearly seen, for in them the native *testimony* of God to his own existence becomes the *witness* of the Spirit that he is, and that they are his children.

5. The doctrine of this chapter is further confirmed by the way in which the Scriptures, as a *divine revelation,* come to men, and are received by them. There must be a channel of communication between God and man, and there must be a door of access in the soul of man for outward revelation, in order to the possibility of revelation addressing itself to him at all. Unless man has a spirtual nature, and a con-natural theistic endowment, he cannot sustain spiritual relation with the infinite Spirit, nor receive any special communications from him. In other words, the condition of the possibility of any kind of outward special revelation from God to men, lies in the fact that God is still in contact with men in the inner chambers of their souls. This implies, not only that men are made in the image of God, but also that men "are not far from him," and that he "hath not left himself without witness." Even "that which may be known of God is manifest in them, for God hath showed it unto them."

That God has made outward revelations, such as are recorded in the Scriptures, is assured historical fact; and that men may understand and receive this revelation is also undoubted experimental fact. This plainly implies that in the very constitution of man there is a native theistic factor, by which man is related to God. It also justifies the conclusion that this factor may rightly be regarded as a divine messenger in the human soul, and as a testimony, in the audience chamber of the spirit of man, to the objective existence of God. This further confirms the doctrine of this chapter, and vindicates the self-evidencing nature of theistic belief.

In this way the transition is securely made from the psychology to the ontology of theism. Given the *idea* of God as a fact in the human soul, the presumption is that he actually exists. Given the con-natural quality of theistic belief, the reality of the object of this belief is at least suggested. This is what is meant by the autopistic nature of theistic belief. With this presumption, and this suggestion, we seek further confirmation of it in the proofs that are to follow.

By some it may be thought that if primitive theistic belief is autopistic, the presentation of further proofs is not necessary, so that the discussion might be ended at this stage. But if we keep in mind the true nature and relation of the theistic proofs, it will be evident that this would be a mistake. These proofs are cumulative, and each gives its share of logical result. The autopistic nature of theistic belief is the first contribution to that result, and we proceed to confirm and expand the suggestion of this proof by unfolding others.

CHAPTER III.

THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS: PROOF FROM THE IDEA OF A NECESSARY BEING.

CONTENTS.

Titles of this Proof.—Kant's Relation to it.—Reaction.—Better Understanding of it.—Various Types of it.—Cartesian Type.—Descartes' Philosophy Theistic. — Three Proofs. — One Ontological.—Careful Statement of it.—Illustration.—General Estimate of its Force and Value.—Anselmian Type.—Anselm's Position.—Statement of his Proof.—Indirect Proof of it.—Its Exposition.—Three Interpretations.—The Correct One carefully stated.—Objections Answered.—Further Confirmation.—General Estimate of Anselm's Argument.—Summary of the Ontological Reasoning for the Existence of God.—Kant and Scholasticism extremes.—Truth between them.—Its Permanency in Human Thought.—Its underlying Principle sound.

LITERATURE.

Augustine's *City of God,* Chap. XII.—Anselm's *Proslogium* and his *Apology.*—Aquinas' *Summa,* Chap. I.—Descartes' *Method,* Chap. IV., and his *Meditations,* Chap. III.—Leibnitz's *The Cartesian Demonstration.*—Howe's *Living Temple,* Chap. II.—Clarke's *Demonstration.*—Gillespie's *The Necessary Existence of God.*—Edwards' *The Will,* Part II., Chap. III.—Patton's *Syllabus on Theism.*—Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason,* Transcendental Dialectic, Book I., Chap. III., 3.—Pfleiderer's *Philosophy of Religion,* Vol. III., Sec. II., Chap. I.—Shedd's *Dogmatic Theology,* Vol. I., Div. III., Chap. III.—Flint's *Theism,* Chap. IX.—Fisher's *Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief,* Chap. II.—Dabney's *Theology,* Chap. I. — Hodge's *Systematic Theology,* Vol. I., Part I., Chap. II.—Strong's *Systematic Theology,* Part II., Chap. II., 4.—Foster's *Systematic Theology,* Part II., Chap. I.—Miley's *Systematic Theology,* Vol. I., Part I., Chap. II.—Boyce's *Abstract,* Chap. II.—Lindsay's *Recent Advances in the Theistic Philosophy of Religion,* Chap. VIII.—Orr's *Christian View of God and the World,* Chap. III., 2.—Bowne's *Philosophy of Theism,* Chap. II.—Conder's *Basis of Faith,* Chap. III.—Fraser's *Philosophy of Theism,* Vol. II., Chap. IV.—Stirling's *Philosophy and Theology,* Chap. X.—Thomson's *Christian Theism,* Book I., Chap. I. and Chap. V.—Ueberweg's *History of Philosophy,* Vol. I. on Anselm, and Vol. II. on Kant.

I. *Preliminary.* § 66.

1. THIS chapter deals with the second aspect of the psychical proofs. In general, it may be described as

the proof from the idea of a *necessary* being as it is found in the human mind. It is often called the *a priori* proof for the existence of God, and it is sometimes known as the deductive argument for the divine existence. These two terms are now seen to be rather too general to denote quite clearly this aspect of the psychical argument. Strictly speaking, it is the *ontological* proof in its historic and classic form that we are now to consider. And even this term has to be taken in the sense which recent criticism has elucidated and made definite.

The literature of this proof would fill many a library shelf, so that no outline of it can be given here. At times Aristotle and Plato are almost on this ground, though they often mingle cosmological elements with their ontological reasonings. Some of the early Christian Fathers, like Tertullian and Augustine, lay the foundations for this argument; and many of the Scholastics, like Anselm and Aquinas, elaborate it with much acuteness. Indeed, it took its definite form in their hands. Bœthius was the forerunner of Anselm, and Anselm is the typical exponent of this proof among the Scholastics. Descartes, in his philosophy, gave great prominence to the *a priori* proofs for the divine existence, and in one of his proofs he follows very closely the lines marked out by Anselm. Clarke presents the deductive proof for the existence of God in a very elaborate way. In its preliminary steps, his argument is chiefly *a priori,* but in its later stages *a posteriori* factors are introduced into it. This illustrates the fact that the *a priori* and *a posteriori* proofs cannot be entirely separated from each other; and it suggests the additional fact that in the cosmological proof there is an ontological element. Gillespie, and many other writers up to our own day, have expounded and criticised this proof in various ways.

2. In recent times Kant's trenchant *criticism* of the rational proofs for the existence of God was directed very specially against the logical validity of the ontological argu-

ment. He also sought to reduce the other rational proofs to the principle of the ontological mode of reasoning, with a view to expose the dialectic inadequacy of them all. Ever since Kant's day, and as the result of his criticism, the ontological argument has fallen more or less into disrepute. Hamilton's doctrine of the unconditioned betrays signs of the influence of this criticism. Both Mansel and Calderwood, in dealing with the philosophy of the Infinite, show quite plainly the same influence. And Spencer assumes the validity of this criticism, and proceeds to enlist the services of Kant and Hamilton in favor of agnosticism in a one-sided way.

In our own day a reaction is setting in. Thinkers are getting over the first shock of the Kantian criticism. Thus, we find that writers like Flint, Caird and Pfleiderer, from different view-points and with much caution, are seeking to restore this classic argument to its proper place and rightful authority. In not a few cases an attempt is made to give a somewhat different form to the argument, so that it may be more effective. No writer in America has done more than Shedd, in the early chapters of his *Dogmatic Theology,* to vindicate this argument and to indicate its true nature and value.

Kant's criticism has not been an unmixed evil. It has compelled a closer scrutiny of this classic argument. It has marked out its scope more clearly, it has revealed its limitations, and it has removed from it certain illegitimate elements. At the same time, the principle of this argument, as it is implied in the idea of a necessarily existing being of some sort, is not destroyed, though the form of its statement may be modified. We are inclined to think that at the present day we have a clearer view and a firmer grasp of the real rational objective validity of the argument for the existence of God, which arises from the very idea we have of him, than ever.

3. It is evident that we have not space here to sketch the

various *forms* of this proof, nor can we undertake to trace out the *history* of this type of theistic speculation. Certain selections, therefore, must be made. It will be proper to choose for exposition the clearest types of this proof, and then unfold its real principle. The core of this proof lies in the fact that the existence of God is properly inferred from the very idea we have of him. Given the idea of God, his existence is assured.

The idea of God is differently described by various exponents of this argument. Some say that it is the idea of a necessarily existing being, others that of an all-perfect being, and still others that of a being than whom a greater cannot be thought. It is assumed that the human mind does possess such an idea, and it is from this psychical content that the ontotheistic proof proceeds. If this description of the idea of God implied in this proof be kept in mind, several forms of *a priori* and deductive reasonings will appear to be not strictly ontological in their nature. The ontological proof has an *a priori* factor, but the two are not to be entirely identified. Other proofs have also an *a priori* element in them. The proof from the universe as contingently existing to God as necessarily existent; the inference from the finite to the infinite, or from the dependent to the independent, though they be deductive and possess an *a priori* element, are not strictly ontological. This proof proceeds to infer the existence of God from the very idea of him which is native to the human mind. The two names which best represent this pure form of the proof are Anselm and Descartes. With these we now deal, taking Descartes first.

II. *The Cartesian Form of the Proof.* § 67.

1. The Cartesian philosophy is essentially theistic. It postulates the existence of God as the condition and guarantee of the trustworthiness of all human knowledge. In a word, its epistemology is founded on its theism. Descartes

begins with doubt, by which he means that all prepossessions must be laid aside. He first finds that he thinks, and this even when he doubts. From the fact of thought he infers his own existence, which means that in the fact of his thinking his existence is involved. He next proceeds to establish the existence of God, so as thereby to provide the assurance that the human faculties are reliable, and give us certain knowledge. If there be a God, and if he has made us, then, being such a God as he is assumed to be, he cannot have made us to be the victims of faculties which are constantly deceiving us. Thus the reality of the divine existence is a fundamental fact in the Cartesian philosophy.

2. Descartes employs three distinct modes of reasoning in establishing the reality of the divine existence. Only one of them is ontological, and presents itself for study in this chapter.

First, he argues that the *idea* of God in the human mind requires the *postulate* of the existence of God to account for it. That idea is of an infinite or all-perfect being. This idea cannot arise from myself, or any other finite cause; hence it must be due to God alone, who, therefore, must exist. The principle of causation underlies this proof.

Secondly, he reasons for the existence of God from the fact that contingent forms of being require us to assume a *necessary* being, which means that forms of being which may or may not be, do not possess in themselves the reasons for their being, but require the hypothesis of a being who must be, and who has the ground of his own existence, and of the existence of all other things in himself. This requires a first cause.

Thirdly, he infers that the existence of God is implied in the *very idea* the human mind has of him. This is the Cartesian ontological argument. Given the idea, and it posits the existence of God.

3. The third of these proofs is now to be briefly considered. Descartes held that the idea of God is *innate* in

much the same sense as the idea of our own existence. We cannot help having it. The precise doctrine of innate ideas, which Descartes held, is not easily understood, for he has stated it in several ways, and it has been variously interpreted. It may suffice to say that he held that the mind possesses, in its very nature, certain subjective principles or primary convictions, which are con-natural, and not derived from experience. In this sense the idea of God is innate. Descartes does not always make it plain whether this innate idea is the fully developed notion of God, or whether experience may be necessary to give it its maturity. His views have generally been taken to favor the former idea.

The idea of God with which Descartes sets out is that of "an all-perfect being." God is the infinite, independent, self-existent substance. Such a being possesses all possible perfections. In many respects this conception resembles that of Anselm's "being than whom a greater cannot be thought." The inference made from the idea of such a being is that he must be thought to exist. The very idea of God involves the reality of its object. The being which corresponds to this idea, and to which it relates, must exist. His existence is not contingent, but necessary. For if we were to think of such a being existing only contingently we would be thinking of it minus one element of its perfection, and that is its *necessary* existence, or its actual reality of being. It would then no longer be the idea of the all-perfect being with which we set out at first. Necessary objective existence is an essential element in the very idea of an all-perfect being, and hence the being to which this idea relates must really exist.

4. This inference is *subtile,* has often been misunderstood, and has suffered severe criticism. It has been charged that a mere notion in the mind never justifies belief in the existence of the object of it, that existence is in no proper sense a quality of any object, and that Descartes' doctrine of

innate ideas is untenable. We do not undertake to answer these and other objections to this argument at length. We are content to point out that the idea of God is not a general conception at all, but a con-natural conviction of the mind in regard to the existence of God. The idea of God involves a necessity of thought, which requires us to think God as necessarily existent. In relation to an all-perfect being such necessity is operative. Hence, the object of this idea exists.

Descartes was, perhaps, a little unfortunate in the illustration he used, though it might be shown that his critics have been even more unfortunate in their attack upon his argument. He used the illustration of a *triangle,* saying that the idea of the equality of the angles of a triangle to two right angles is involved in the very notion of a triangle. Given a triangle, the equality of its angles to two right angles necessarily follows. So he argued in regard to the existence of God. Given the idea of such a being as he is, his existence is wrapped up in that very idea in such a way that it cannot be rationally denied.

This illustration has been criticised on the ground that it does not prove anything in regard to the actual existence of a triangle; and, hence, the argument for the existence of God from the very idea of him proves nothing as to his existence. It is doubtful if Descartes intended by his illustration to prove the existence of a triangle, or to make the fact of existence the feature common to the two cases. It is more reasonable to suppose that he simply intended to say, that just as the quality of having its angles equal to two right angles is involved in the very notion of a triangle, so the quality of necessary existence pertains to the very idea of God. Thus understood, the illustration has a degree of pertinency not to be ignored.

It was this form of the argument that Kant assailed. Against the illustration especially he made his assault. As Kant's criticism has generally been regarded as fatal to all ontological reasoning, it may be well to discover its precise

force. The criticism runs as follows: If a triangle exists, its angles, of course, are equal to two right angles; but the existence of the triangle must be first assumed. So he says that if God exists he is an all-perfect being; but his existence must be assumed, and cannot be proved.

5. In the light of the real meaning of the illustration used, this criticism may not be entirely fatal to this argument. The real point in the illustration is that any quality which is necessary to the completeness of the idea must be supposed to have reality. Having the two angles equal to two right angles, and necessary existence, are features necessary to the completeness of their respective ideas. The fact of existence or non-existence is not the feature in which the illustration and the thing illustrated agree. In addition, to say that there may be no existing triangle, that is, to annul the predicate in the proposition, "a triangle exists," still leaves the idea of a triangle in the possession of the mind. So, to annul the predicate in the proposition, "God exists," still leaves unaffected the fact that the mind possesses the idea of an all-perfect being, in which idea existence is taken to be a component part. Hence, whether we assert or deny the existence of God, the idea remains in the mind. So long as this is left intact, the Cartesian proof is protected from the Kantian criticism, unless it can be shown that existence is an incident, and not an essential element in, the idea of God. The real force of this argument lies in the fact that the con-natural nature of the idea of God renders it ineradicable in the nature of man; and being so, it finds its objective validity in the existence of God.

III. *The Anselmian Form of the Proof.* § 68.

1. Anselm of Canterbury presents the ontological argument in its typical form. Many since his day have stated and restated it, yet its essential principle has never been

more clearly exhibited than by Anselm. In his *Proslogium,* especially, he states the proof, and in his *Apology* he defends it. In his *Monologium* he also alludes to this proof, but there dwells chiefly on others aspects of the theistic argument.

It is not easy to give a concise statement of Anselm's reasoning, though the argument itself is very compact. He professedly undertakes to prove the existence of God from the *very idea* we have of him. He sets out with the idea of God as of *a being than whom a greater cannot be thought.* This is really the idea of a being who possesses all possible perfections. This idea must be supposed to be in the mind alike of the theist, who asserts the existence of God, and of the atheist, who denies that existence. Then Anselm argues that the being, whose idea is of a being than whom a greater cannot be thought, must exist in reality as well as in thought. Hence, a being than whom a greater cannot be thought, must exist *in re,* that is, objectively, as well as *in intellectu,* that is, subjectively. This simply means that the existence of God must be postulated, as the object to which the idea of him necessarily relates itself.

2. Anselm seeks to confirm this inference by *indirect* proof. He says that if we suppose that the being than whom a greater cannot be thought, does not exist *in re,* that is, actually, we could still think of him as so existing. This would then be the thought of a greater being than the one from which we set out, and yet we set out from the idea of a being than whom a greater cannot be thought. This would give the idea of a being than whom a greater cannot be thought, and also the idea of a still greater being, which is absurd. Hence, it must be concluded that the being than whom a greater cannot be thought does actually exist; and that his existence is necessary, not merely contingent. In this way Anselm deduces the existence of God from the very idea the human mind has of him. As that idea requires

the quality of the existence of its object to make it complete, so it at the same time postulates the actual existence of God as its object.

3. This proof has been interpreted in so many ways, and criticised from so many points of view, that some further exposition of it is necessary to unfold its true significance. First of all, the terms used by Anselm should be carefully noted. He uses the word *cogitare,* not *concipere.* Hence, we translate *think,* rather than *conceive.* This indicates that Anselm is not thnking of a general conception which the mind forms, when he describes the idea of God, as that of a being than whom a greater cannot be *thought.* The view he evidently has is that the idea of God is a product of rational thought, not a mere concept of the understanding.

With this verbal explanation to guide us, we now seek to ascertain the real significance of the proof. And in doing so we are greatly aided by the acute hints given by Patton, in his *Syllabus of Theism.* The starting point of the proof is, that the actual existence of God is somehow implied in the native idea of him in the human mind. The force of the inference involved in the proof lies in the statement, that what exists *in re* is greater than what exists *in intellectu,* which means that the idea of a being which is necessarily thought to exist, is a richer or more complete idea than is the idea of a being which is not thought to so exist. Then, since we have the idea of a being than whom a greater cannot be thought, such a being is the most complete of all beings; and, as necessary existence is essential to that completeness, the being to whom the idea in question relates cannot but exist. This being is God, whose existence, therefore, is necessary. The core of the inference is that necessity in thought and necessity in existence are somehow bound up with each other. The ground of the proof is that whatever is necessarily thought to exist objectively does so exist. But even on this point different expounders

and critics of Anselm give various interpretations of his proof.

4. First, some explain it in a superficial way. What exists in thought also exists in fact. But a being than whom a greater cannot be thought exists in thought. Therefore such a being exists in fact. Only superficial critics state the proof in this form. They think that they have refuted the proof when they show that many things may exist in the mind, as general conceptions, which have no existence in fact at all. This is evidently the view Gaunilo took in his criticism of Anselm's reasoning. Gaunilo says that he can imagine an island, and so the island exists in thought. But he says that this is no proof that an island exists in fact. Anselm naturally replied that the idea of God is not like other mental concepts. It is unique, as the idea of a being than whom a greater cannot be thought. So he added that whenever Gaunilo presented an island than which a greater cannot be thought, his objection would have weight. If Anselm had indicated more clearly that the idea of God is not a generalization, gathered from reflection upon a number of gods, as the concept of an island is a generalization, made from the observation of a number of islands, his answer would have been still more complete to this objection.

5. Secondly, others give another turn to the proof. That which necessarily exists in thought exists in fact. A being than whom a greater cannot be thought necessarily exists in thought. Therefore such a being does exist in fact. Some critics assail the proof as thus stated. This interpretation lays stress upon the fact of necessity, as connected with the idea of God. That idea is regarded as one which the mind necessarily possesses, and from the idea thus regarded the existence of the object is inferred. This interpretation shows a truer appreciation of the proof than the foregoing one, and the inference from an idea which the mind, by virtue of its inherent nature, necessarily possesses

to the actual existence of its object may be legitimate. Still the chasm between necessity in thought and actuality in existence is not very easily bridged over by this interpretation of Anselm's argument, so we hesitate to accept it.

6. Thirdly, this may be a truer construction of the proof Anselm propounds. That which is necessarily thought to exist in fact does so exist. A being than whom a greater cannot be thought is *necessarily thought to exist* in fact. Therefore, such a being does so exist. This, as Patton shows, may be accepted as the correct interpretation of the Anselmian proof. Anselm himself may not always have held closely to this meaning of his proof, yet we are persuaded that this is what underlies the type of reasoning which he initiated. The gist of the inference is that what is necessarily thought to exist in fact, does actually exist. This means that in any idea wherein necessity of existence is an essential factor, the object to which that idea relates does exist in fact. Such an object is not only a necessity of thought, but is also thought to have necessary existence.

When thus stated, this proof has rational force. It would be interesting to follow this profound type of theistic speculation as it appears in subsequent writers. The fact that it has always attracted the earnest attention of minds of a high order, argues that it cannot be entirely without logical and rational value. One can scarcely suppose that a mode of reasoning that was entirely illogical and irrational would be treated with so much respect by human reason as this has been.

7. Many and varied are the objections made against it. Some say that the fallacy of four terms, or of reasoning in a circle, lurks somewhere in this proof. Others say that it is useless to try to prove the existence of God syllogistically; and still others allege that this proof simply assumes the existence of God, and then seeks to justify it to human reason. But it has never been shown what the four terms are, or how the reasoning in a circle takes place.

Then, strictly speaking, it does not profess to prove the existence of God syllogistically, nor can it be truly said that it assumes the existence of God. It simply argues that since the idea of God in the mind implies the existence of its object, the existence of God may be legitimately inferred from the very idea we have of him.

The main objection which can be made against this general proof lies in the statement that to exist in fact is greater than to exist in thought only. The real questions here raised are: Whether existence is a quality or attribute of any object, and whether the fact of existence adds anything to the idea of the thing. While we might hesitate to say that existence is a quality in the strict sense, yet most minds instinctively feel that the idea of an existing object is a richer notion than the idea of a non-existing object. There is a factor in the one that is not in the other. This factor is the predicate of existence. No doubt this is what Anselm had chiefly in view when he said that the idea of God is unique, in that the fact of the existence of God is involved in the very idea of him which the mind possesses. It is of the very nature of God to have real existence, and the idea of him in the human mind so regards him.

8. Taking it all in all, Anselm's exposition of the ontological proof is the *purest* and most effective form in which it has ever been presented. As we have seen, the Cartesian form is not so effective. And other forms of this proof, such as that presented by Clarke and Gillespie, though *a priori,* are not strictly ontological, and must be treated in another place later on in our discussion. While we may hesitate to admit the complete logical validity of the ontotheistic proof, we may equally hesitate to concede that it has, when clearly stated, ever been successfully refuted. Its real value consists in the fact that it shows that in the *a priori* factors of the human mind we have the premises of what may be called a transcendental logic which ration-

ally justifies the inference that the objects to which these factors relate exist; in a word, that the *a priori* factors have objective validity.

IV. *General Estimate of this Proof.* § 69.

1. It is not easy, in a few concluding sentences, to give an *estimate* of the real cogency and value of this proof. It naturally has more weight with some minds than others. Minds of a speculative turn may recognize its full force, while those of a more practical temper may think it of little value. The scholastics of the middle ages no doubt laid too much stress upon it, while the criticism of Kant, a century ago, certainly led to an undue depreciation of it. At the present day, theistic speculation is slowly restoring this mode of reasoning to its proper place, and presenting a more just and balanced view concerning it. The precise nature and scope of its inference is more clearly understood, and modes of reasoning not strictly ontotheistic are set in another place. Hence, we are enabled to rest in a middle view between Kant and the scholasticism he criticised. While this historic proof may not be regarded as a strict demonstration by means of the processes of formal logic, it may still be held to be a rational inference in accordance with transcendental logic which presupposes a ground of unity for thought and reality. This simply means that, from certain fundamental factors in the human mind and its modes of cognition, we may justly conclude that their counterparts have objective reality.

2. The *permanent* place which the ontotheistic mode of reasoning for the existence of God has ever had in the activity of human reason, certainly suggests that it must have some true rationality about it. It appears in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle among the Greeks. It is discovered in the theology of Tertullian and Augustine among the patristic writers. Among the scholastics, where

philosophy and theology are blended, it reaches its high-water mark. The great theologians of the Reformation, though they parted with the scholastics in many things, often rely on the ontotheistic form of reasoning in regard to the existence of God. And at the present day it is slowly recovering from the effects of the Kantian criticism, and both philosophy and theology are aiding in this recovery. This reaction may be very properly regarded as an evidence of the rational right of this proof to have a permanent place in human thought. The duty of the philosopher and theologian alike is to try to interpret the real significance of this mode of reasoning. With the advent, in our own day, of a sounder epistemology than either empiricism or idealism can supply, the psychical basis for this proof is made more evident. It is now more and more clearly seen that a sound interpretation of the principles of human reason goes in the direction of sustaining the validity of the ontological proof for the divine existence.

3. Hence, without pronouncing upon the logical soundness of all the forms in which this proof has been stated, we are inclined to think that there is a *valid principle* of inference underlying them. This principle is that there is a rational unity lying at the very root of both human thought and objective existence. This does not mean that thought and being are in any sense to be identified, nor does it suggest the view that matter and spirit do not belong to different categories of existence. It rather suggests that human reason, in its fundamental principles or *a priori* elements, relates itself rationally in a real cognitive manner to forms of existence which are objective to it. On this basis the knowledge of the external world is real and rational, and on the same basis the existence of God is guaranteed as real and our knowledge of him rational. And, as we shall see in another form of the psychical proofs, it shall appear that the postulate of God is the ground of rational unity for human reason and the external world.

Descartes stated this in another way when he made the important assertion that the existence of God as an all-perfect being is the pledge of the validity of human cognition. And, in more modern phrase, this implies that the *a priori* or necessary elements in the human mind rationally postulate the real existence of their objects; and, further, that in both the mind and the world there is an element of rationality which forms the basis of their union in cognition. This is the very important doctrine which the Common Sense philosophy grasped, but did not fully interpret. The belief in God, containing the *a priori* element of necessary existence which cannot be cast out of it, justifies the inference that he actually exists. This we take to be the profound truth in the ontological argument.

CHAPTER IV.

THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS: PROOF FROM THE IDEA OF INFINITY.

CONTENTS.

The Infinite and the All-perfect Compared.—The Infinite and Absolute in Philosophy.—The Human Mind has these Ideas.—They are Native or *a priori*.—The Unconditioned, the Infinite and the Absolute.—The Idea of the Infinite defined.—Not the Sum Total of Finite Things.—Not the most Abstract Conception.—Not the Concept of Pure Being.—Other Views defective also.—True Doctrine.—The Terms Adjectives, not Substantives.—They are not Empirical.—The Mathematical Infinite.—The Metaphysical.—And the Dynamical.—Must include all.—Includes the Absolute.—Theistic Import of the Idea.—The Idea of the Infinite, being *a priori*, has Objective Validity.—It is Congruous with the Idea of God.—Illustrated by Clarke's Reasoning.—Confirmed by that of Descartes.—The Qualitative and Quantitative Aspects enlarge the Idea.—The Personality of the Infinite as related to God.

LITERATURE.

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I. *Preliminary.* § 70.

1. IN this chapter an attempt is made to give an interpretation of the theistic significance of the ideas of the *infinite* and the absolute. In some respects the proof

for the existence of God based on these ideas resembles the ontological mode of reasoning, and they are often discussed as if they were identical. Thus, the idea of an all-perfect being, such as Descartes and others describe, is sometimes identified with the idea of the infinite. Many criticisms of the ontotheistic proof assume this identity. But the abstract notion of the infinite or of the absolute ought not to be identified, at once and entirely, with that of God, as an all-perfect being, and this for two reasons. First, the idea of God is of a real personal being, while the abstract idea of the infinite is not. Secondly, the notion of infinity, in some sense, is applicable to other things than God, such as space and time, knowledge and power. Hence, the idea of the infinite, and its related notion of the absolute, require a separate interpretation in order to discover their theistic significance. If the ontotheistic proof rightly infers the existence of God, as a necessarily existent and real being, from the contents of the idea of him, then the proof from the notions of the infinite and absolute may enable us to endow this being, already viewed as really existing, with the characteristics of infinity and absoluteness.

2. Reflection concerning the *infinite* and *absolute* has had a large place in speculation in all ages. The *απειρον* of Anaximander, 600 B. C., seems to have been a hint, at least, of the infinite. In the Eleatic philosophy, the *one* and the *all* had the quality of infinity. In the atomic Materialism of Democritus and Epicurus, the atoms were infinite in number, and the vacuum was infinite in extent. And Plato and Aristotle were not strangers to these notions. In modern times these ideas run all through the philosophy of Descartes, and they are one of the essential features of the pantheism of Spinoza. Kant and later Germans, on to Hegel, gave much prominence to the notion of the absolute. Hamilton's philosophy of the unconditioned deals almost entirely with these notions, and Mansel and Calderwood gave much attention to the same speculations. J. S. Mill,

and, later on, Spencer, criticised, from different view-points, the philosophy of Hamilton; while Müller, Caird and Green have all wrestled earnestly with the problems of the infinite and the absolute in our own day.

3. That the mind of man *possesses* these ideas or convictions is generally admitted. There is, however, much difference of opinion as to how the mind obtains them, and as to what their essential nature really is. The sound rational psychology usually maintains the *a priori* character of these notions or persuasions of the human mind. And the usage of terms to denote these notions is not always consistent. English writers generally use the term, infinite, while the Germans seem to prefer the title, absolute. Hamilton has sought to use these words in a well-defined sense. The unconditioned is his general term; and under it he includes both the infinite and absolute. The infinite is that which has no limits, and the absolute is the independent. The former is mainly a quantitative, and the latter a qualitative, notion. The infinite, then, is that which is conceived as incapable of ever being completed by any finite additions; and the absolute is that which is regarded as unrelated to anything else and complete in itself. The former is unconditionally unlimited, and the latter is unconditionally limited.

This is perhaps making a rather rigid distinction between these two ideas. They can scarcely be regarded as two things, for they are not really entities at all. They seem rather to denote two ways of regarding certain things. The infinite regards its object as over against finite things, and as without limits of any sort; while the absolute looks upon its object as independent and self-sufficient. The term *ideal,* now coming into use in certain quarters, seems a better term than the unconditioned to embrace both of these ideas. It is with the idea of the infinite that we are to be mainly occupied in this chapter.

II. *The Idea of the Infinite Defined.* § 71.

In seeking to discover the theistic import of the idea of the infinite, it is very necessary to define, as clearly as possible, what that idea really is. Several inadequate views must be understood and set aside, and the distinction between the *mathematical* or quantitative, and the *metaphysical* or qualitative infinite, must be made definite and plain. Nor must the *dynamical* aspect of it be overlooked.

1. Some have made the infinite consist in the *sum total* of all finite things. According to this view, the notion of the infinite is reached by adding together the totality of all existing finite things. The vast variety of existing things in the heavens and on the earth, of every grade and order, viewed as a great whole, constitutes the infinite. These finite things are simply parts or parcels of the infinite. The same sort of substantial reality pertains to both, and they do not belong to different categories of being.

This is in principle a monistic view, and makes the infinite purely quantitative. It is the fundamental error in Spinoza's pantheism. In a somewhat different way, it is the mistake of those who identify the infinite with the *ens realissimum*. And even the idea of an all-perfect being, as criticised by Kant, was conceived of as mathematical and quantitative, rather than dynamical and qualitative.

The infinite is not the sum total of all existing finite things, for by no possible addition of finite things can the infinite ever be reached. At best, we can only reach the indefinite, or a very great finite, by this pathway of reflection. Some phase of monism, with materialistic tendencies, must be the logical result of this view of the infinite; and it surely leads to pantheism rather than to theism.

2. Others take the infinite to be the most *general conception*. A general conception is the product of the discursive powers of the human mind. By means of these

powers in the operations of abstraction and generalization, general notions are formed, and these are expressed by general terms. This process begins with individual things wherein there are resemblances; these resemblances are abstracted, and then all the individuals having these resemblances are formed into a class, and a class name is given to it. Then, from these general notions, by the same process of abstraction and generalization, the mental activity is carried on, till the very highest possible notion is reached. This leads to the most general conception, and this is taken to be the infinite.

This is an entirely inadequate conception, alike of the nature of the infinite and of the way in which the idea of it is realized. The infinite is not the most general conception to which the understanding may attain in a purely empirical way. It is an *a priori* idea of the reason, and its object is the condition of the possibility of finite things existing as a totality. This idea is given to the mind, not framed by it. Moreover, if the notion of the infinite were a general concept of the understanding, it would have a purely conceptual existence, and its objective validity could not be vindicated at all.

3. Still others have sought to identify the infinite with the notion of *pure being*. Concrete existing things are manifold, and qualitatively distinct from each other. In this way, iron, stone, wood, water and other material things are distinct from each other. There are also various grades of existing things, such as the material and spiritual, the inorganic and organic, the vegetable and animal. Now, by thinking away all qualitative distinctions that differentiate things from each other, there remains only the bare and empty fact of existence. This is said to be pure being, which can scarcely be regarded as an entity of any kind. It is at most the empty abstract conception of mere existence.

Nor is this a proper exposition of the infinite. At best,

this view makes the infinite consist in the mere fact of existence, which is common to all forms of being that have reality. So far as its entity is concerned, it is pure nothing. It is as empty of real content as the most general notion of the preceding view is, if, indeed, it is not really the same thing regarded in a somewhat different way. The highest possible abstraction of being in general, which can be nothing more than the simple fact of existence, is a totally inadequate view of the infinite. The infinite is a positive idea, and not entirely devoid of content. In certain respects it is a richer idea than that of the finite.

4. Other opinions concerning the infinite can only be mentioned. Kant and his school were inclined to regard it as "the thing in itself," and to conceive of it as the absolute. The Hegelian absolute was the culmination of this general view. Müller and Cousin regard it as merely the correlative of the finite, but do not define very clearly what it really is. Spencer identifies it with the inscrutable or unknowable which underlies phenomena. Those who take an empirical view of the way in which the mind acquires the idea of the infinite can only regard it as the indefinite. Müller is a good example of this statement.

5. In seeking to unfold the true idea of the infinite we have a difficult task, and the utmost care must be taken to guard against serious error.

a. First of all, a *verbal* remark must be made. The terms infinite and absolute are to be regarded as *adjectives* rather than substantives. This may seem to be a superficial remark, yet it is of much importance. If we regard these terms as substantives, we are in danger of being compelled to regard them as real existent forms of being. If we take them to be adjectives, we can then look upon them as attributes, or as the conditions, of the existence of certain things. The infinite is not an existing entity, having a real being of its own apart from all other things. Nor is the absolute to be thought of as an actually existing thing

in itself. If, therefore, we regard these terms as adjectives, then they properly qualify some forms of being or activity. Thus we may rightly speak of infinite space and time, of infinite wisdom and power, and of a being which is both infinite and absolute. This remark, if kept in mind, will ward off many errors.

b. As to the nature of the idea itself, and the mode by which it is acquired, it need only be stated that empiricism cannot supply the explanation. The idea has an *a priori* quality about it, so that neither individual experience, nor association, nor even the accumulated hereditary experience of the human race can account for it. Hence, no experience of finite things, no process of abstraction, or negation, or analysis, can in any empirical way lead us into the heart of the idea of the infinite. This idea is *native* to the mind, and it conditions all our thought of the finite in a rational way. It is intuitive, and cannot be reached by any empirical process, nor is its complete significance exhausted in the experience of finite things. Instead of being the idea of the totality of finite things, it is rather *the rational condition of the possibility of thinking of finite things as a totality*. Instead, therefore, of being an empty or negative idea, it is positive and rich in its contents.

c. The whole significance of the idea of the infinite is not exhausted in the *mathematical* infinite. This aspect of the idea is quantitative, and consists in the process of adding finite parts indefinitely, with the possibility of finding something ever beyond our greatest endeavors. The fact that the mind can entertain the convictions of a something beyond the greatest possible addition of finite parts, is a hint, at least, that the idea of the infinite has something about it which is not empirical. This is the meaning of the term infinite which is most frequently associated with its usage. In mathematics this meaning prevails, and this is the main thing implied when space is said to be infinite in extent and time infinite in continuance. The scientific

conception of all infinite regression of causes and effects illustrates the same usage.

d. The other and deeper aspect of the infinite is the *metaphysical* and qualitative. This, in many respects, is a different idea than the mathematical. It is qualitative instead of quantitative. Instead of asking, How much? it asks, What kind? is the object of the idea denoted by the term infinite. This is, perhaps, the truest conception of the infinite. It raises the question of the real nature of any object to which the term infinite is properly applicable. And if this aspect of the infinite be given its proper place, it really embraces what is denoted by the term absolute as well. Thus, any form of being or mode of activity which is described by the term infinite, in this metaphysical and qualitative sense, is also properly regarded as absolute or independent in its mode of existence. As to its nature, such a form of being, and such an activity, are without limits, and are independent. Thus the infinite, as *qualitative,* denotes certain characteristics which pertain to that which is called infinite.

e. Perhaps it would not be amiss to connect the *dynamical* idea with the metaphysical aspect of the infinite, in order to make the explanation of it complete. This expresses the idea of agency and activity, wherein power and resourcefulness are implied. That which is infinite and absolute is not to be thought of as boundless extension merely, or as only abstract endlessness. It is more, even, than the rational unity which lies at the root of all finite things. It is also the dynamical agency which is involved in all the finite changes and onward progress which are seen in the universe of thought and of things. This aspect of the infinite, which suggests *causality* as well as rationality, is exceedingly important, for a causality that is rational and not merely mechanical implies self-determination. And this brings us within sight of will and personality in connection with the infinite.

Hence, to get a complete view of the infinite, we need to take the mathematical, the metaphysical, and the dynamical aspects of it. Quantity, quality and causality are all implied in it, and any object which is termed infinite and absolute exhibits these three related qualities. This is true, whether that object be a form of being or a mode of activity. If the infinite be the ground of *unity,* it is also the ground of *change* in the world. If it be independent in itself, it must be the basis for all that is dependent. If it be self-sufficient, it must be the source of the sufficiency of all else save itself. This view we carry with us.

III. *The Theistic Import of the Infinite.* § 72.

1. The careful exposition of the idea of the Infinite given in the last section, paves the way for an *interpretation* of its theistic significance in this. The metaphysical and the dynamical, as well as the mathematical, aspects of the infinite are still to be kept clearly in mind. At the very outset, care must be exercised not to identify, in an immediate way, the infinite and absolute with God. The infinite relates to a quality or condition of certain existing things, while God is a well-defined existent being. To vindicate the true doctrine of the infinite is not to prove the existence of God. Nor should we forget that the term infinite, in the mathematical sense, applies to other things than God. But having arrived at the existence of God on other grounds, we have in that fact a form of being and modes of activity with which the ideas of infinity and absoluteness do properly claim kinship. Our main task now is to so connect infinity with God as thereby to give the theistic interpretation of the infinite, and at the same time confirm our belief in the existence of God. In doing so, it will clearly appear that the metaphysical and dynamical aspects of the infinite, though they supply the ground and provide the interpreta-

tion of finite forms of existence, yet do not find their full significance in relation to those forms of being which, in their very nature, are limited and dependent. This leads naturally to the supposition that the full significance of these aspects of the infinite is to be discovered in the necessarily existent and independent being, whose reality was established in the last chapter. The result of the reasonings now entered on will be, not so much to prove the existence of God, as to invest him with the attributes of infinity and absoluteness, which are congruous with no being except God. We shall not prove the existence of God from the idea of the infinite; nor shall we vindicate the reality of the infinite from the existence of God. But having both the idea of God and of the infinite in mental possession, we shall show their *rational kinship,* and in this way confirm the reality of both. In view of this position, it seems clear that some of the older theologians undertook to do too much in seeking to prove the existence of God from the idea of the infinite. As a matter of fact, it is not possible to apply theistic predicates to the infinite, unless the idea of God be already in the mind. All that can be done, therefore, in the present reasonings, is to show how the two ideas are to be rationally correlated.

2. The first step in the theistic interpretation of the idea of the infinite is to understand its real *psychological* nature. It is not the product of experience in relation to finite things, though experience may be the occasion when it is realized as a native mental law. Nor is it the result of mental abstraction in any way, so that it has more than a conceptual reality. It is *a priori* in its nature, and hence given by the mind itself to certain of its experiences. In a word, it conditions the activity of the mind in relation to finite things.

The idea of the infinite, being *a priori,* leads to the inference that it has objective validity, and that it postulates a reality of some kind, other than the mind which is its

source, and other than finite things which are the occasion of its realization. The idea of the infinite, being neither empirical nor conceptual, is rather rational, and, as such, it has objective validity. It, therefore, postulates an object to which it properly belongs. That object cannot be finite things, either in part or in their totality. It may be the ground of the possibility of finite things existing as a totality, and of their being so apprehended by reason.

This is illustrated by one stage in Clarke's *Demonstration.* He finds space and time to be facts for the human mind. Reflection upon them shows that they are neither substances nor agents; so he concludes that they must be attributes of some substance or subject which possesses the quality of infinity that space and time exhibit. He concludes that such a being is God. While we may hesitate to agree with Clarke that space and time are attributes of some substance, and while we do not now argue whether they are merely subjective conditions of certain forms of human cognition, yet it may be doubted if the quality of infinity, which Clarke here presents, is wholly exhausted, when viewed only subjectively. In other words, the purely empirical explanation of it is not sufficient.

This is further confirmed by reflecting, after the manner of Descartes, upon the causal origin of the idea of the infinite in the human mind. That cause, or, more properly, ground, cannot be myself, nor things about me; for I am finite, and so are they. Hence, its ground must be beyond me, and other than finite things. It must, therefore, be connected with some proper objective reality which constitutes at once its ground in relation to reason, and the ground for finite things existing as a totality for cognition. In this way the objective reality of the idea of the infinite as *a priori* may be vindicated.

3. Then, when the *qualitative* aspects of the infinite are considered, we get a still deeper view, and are able to

rationally relate the idea of the infinite with God. These aspects of it lead us to lay aside all quantitative notions of the infinite. In doing so, we get rid of some of the difficulties of the subject which grow out of the idea of the infinite, as extensive boundlessness. We think of it now in terms of quality, and have regard to its *intensive* aspects. The inner reality and resources of the infinite, rather than its boundlessness, are now considered. The intensive unity, the self-sufficiency, and the complete rationality of the infinite are what we now consider. These, without any limitation pertaining to them, give the infinite under our present vision of it. This idea, as infinite, having objective validity, very naturally connects itself with God, as a necessarily existent being. This enables us also to regard God as the ground of unity and system in finite things, and to clothe God with the qualities of independency and self-sufficiency. In this way the theistic significance of the intensive infinite appears.

4. This interpretation becomes richer still when we take into account the *dynamical* aspects of the infinite. This view of the infinite associates the quality of *activity* and efficiency with it. In addition to the intensive, we have now the causal aspect of the infinite before us. We observe constant change taking place within and without us. We instinctively postulate a causality for these changes. We at the same time instinctively conclude that the resources of causality operative in the universe are not exhausted in all the finite changes which take place in it. We think of the wealth of this causality as without limit. This is the idea of infinite power or efficiency, and it presents an aspect of the infinite which is dynamical. Here, again, the *a priori* nature of the idea of the infinite enables us to postulate a proper object for this idea. The natural association of this idea with the necessarily existent being, God, is readily effected. Here, in its deepest aspects, the idea of the infinite receives its theistic interpretation, and the necessarily ex-

istent God is thereby shown to be the source of infinite causality in the cosmos.

5. The *personality* of the infinite remains for brief discussion. This is confessedly a difficult question. Its difficulty arises largely from the fact that the infinite has been regarded chiefly in its quantitative aspects. To connect personality with the merely boundless is by no means easy. And the difficulty has not been lessened by regarding as merely an abstract quality, for it is virtually impossible to associate personality with an abstraction of any sort. But, if we regard the infinite as a quality or condition of the existence of some form of being, it may be comparatively easy to assert personality of these forms of being to which the quality of infinite is properly applicable. Let this be made plain.

If we give the metaphysical and dynamical aspects of the idea of the infinite their proper place, we shall find little difficulty in binding infinity and personality together in a rational way. We have already found the being called God to be the proper object of the *a priori* aspects of the idea of the infinite. If we regard this infinite being as the rational ground of the totality of finite things, infinity and rationality are associated in this being. And if we regard this infinite being as the ground of the causality that is implied in the changing of finite things, we further associate infinity and causality together in this infinite being. Then, if this infinite causality be also rational, we have the main factors of personality provided. These are *causality* or efficiency, and *rationality* or intelligence. These provide what may be regarded as the rational self-determination which personality demands. The qualitative aspect of the infinite supplies the factor of rationality, the dynamical aspect of it provides the element of agency or power. Both of these, associated with the form of being that the term God denotes, gives an infinite being who is also personal. In this way it is made plain that the infinite and personality

do not exclude each other. And the conclusion may be confidently rested in, that the infinite, as qualitative and dynamical, in connection with God, provides the richest form of personality, with limitless rational self-determination, as its inherent endowment and crowning glory.

This is a conclusion of much importance in itself, and in the controversy with pantheism. Pantheism always denies personality to the ground of all things. It insists that the absolute form of being must be undifferentiated and impersonal. The main error here is in construing the infinite and absolute under the concept of quantity almost entirely. But if the qualitative and causal aspects of the infinite and absolute ground of all finite things be kept in view, the difficulty vanishes. Hence infinite power and absolute reason are not only consistent with personality, but really supply its highest form.

CHAPTER V.

THE PSYCHICAL PROOFS: PROOF FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF INTELLIGENCE.

CONTENTS.

The Theistic Significance of Intelligence.—Set out from the Rational Epistemology.—Sketch of the History of this Type of Thought.—Socrates.— Plato.— Aristotle.— Augustine.— Cudworth.— Descartes.—Malebranche.— Leibnitz.— Kant.— Hegel.— Many Moderns.— Theistic Interpretation.—The real Problem.—Empiricism inadequate.—Rational Theory of Knowledge accepted.—The Laws of Thought.—Rules of Mental Spontaneity.—The Spiritual Principle in Man.—The Unity of Self-consciousness.—Nature a System of Related Things for Cognition.—The Laws and Unities of Nature.—Modern Scientific View.—The Laws of Nature Rational at Root.—Hence Intelligible.—How are the Laws of Thought and Laws of Nature related in Cognition?—Exposition of their Relations.—The Theistic Interpretation.—Personality and Intelligence.

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I. *Preliminary.* § 73.

THE fourth phase of the psychical proofs remains for exposition. The first sought to interpret the autopistic nature of theistic belief, and found thereby a

presumption for the existence of God. The second made an inference concerning the existence of God from the very idea of him which the human mind possesses. The third tried to discover the theistic import of the idea of the infinite and absolute.

1. In this chapter an attempt will be made to ascertain whether the principle of human *intelligence* itself has any theistic significance. This leads to an inquiry in regard to the essential nature and fundamental activities of human reason. The main question thus raised is as to whether any theistic inference may be properly made from the principle of human intelligence and its rational activities. We are now to interrogate that principle in order to find out whether it supplies a valid ground for asserting the existence of God. If it shall turn out that the deepest interpretation of human intelligence implies the reality of a supreme intelligence, much will be done to vindicate the existence of God.

2. The point of *departure* for the reasoning now to be entered on is the rational epistemology, or theory of knowledge, expounded in the fourth chapter of the Introduction. This theory holds that while experience may be the occasion, the human mind itself is the source of rational knowledge, inasmuch as it supplies the rules according to which the manifold units of experience are bound together. This means that there are *a priori* or pre-empirical factors in all true knowledge. These factors, viewed generally, are those *necessary laws* of thought which condition the possibility, and determine the form of our cognition. These factors the mind always contributes to experience. They presuppose certain mental rules, according to which the rational activity of the principle of intelligence takes place.

This theory of knowledge also maintains that in cognition the laws of thought find themselves rationally *correlated* with certain abiding laws in the things which become the objects of cognition. These laws are regarded as the rational conditions under which the universe exists for

human cognition. This implies that the world is a system of related things, and that in cognition the laws of intelligence and the laws of nature are correlated in a truly rational way. We are now to inquire what theistic implications, if any, are involved in this view of human intelligence and of its activity in rational cognition. Is human reason, as its root, theistic or atheistic?

II. *This Inquiry in the History of Speculation.* § 74.

1. This type of speculation has had a prominent and permanent place in the *history* of the activity of human reason. It appears in ancient Greek philosophy. Its keynote was sounded by Socrates, who, against the Sophists of his day, asserted the eternal and immutable reality of the principles of truth and right. This truth and right are not individual and subjective, but universal and objective. As such, they determine true knowledge and right action. Plato, in his lofty idealism, put the Socratic doctrine into more definite form, and thereby gave permanency to a type of thought which has produced much that is best in philosophy. The universal principles of Socrates were transmuted into the ideas of Plato. These ideas are the eternal rational unities, according to which things are made, and by means of which the mind arrives at a knowledge of things. Viewed subjectively, these ideas become the *a priori* principles of knowledge which determine cognition. Viewed objectively, they are the fundamental conditions of the reality of things. The world of things is framed according to these ideas, and this world becomes an object of knowledge by means of the same ideas. These ideas are of different grades, and they appear as determining various forms of being. The highest idea is that of the good, which is the complete, or the perfect. This is usually identified with God, and it virtually includes all the other ideas. Hence, the ideas all pertain to God, and in a sense they

are all in him. With him they are the archetypes according to which things are framed as unities out of matter, which is also held to be eternal. These ideas thus become the unchanging realities in things, and the fixed elements in human knowledge. They, in turn, are all unified in God, whose existence, therefore, is the goal of all Platonic speculation.

Though there is much in Platonic idealism that must now be discarded, yet its central principle, that the rational is the abiding and real both in thought and in things, must be regarded as of great value in all sound philosophy. And it may be pointed out that, though Aristotle differed widely from Plato in his philosophy, yet his doctrine of the eternal forms, according to which the world-former framed the world out of eternal matter, is a testimony to the persistence of that type of thought, which asserts the reality of the permanent amid the changing, and of the one and the abiding among the many and the fleeting. Aristotle conceived of these unchanging unities as mechanical rather than rational, while Plato regarded them as mainly rational. As against the materialists and empiricists, the sophists and sceptics of ancient and modern times, this general type of philosophy is of the utmost value.

2. In the noblest aspects of philosophy during the Christian era this type of thought frequently appears. Augustine reasons from the fact of truth to the existence of God. Cudworth, the great English Platonist, reproduced the idealism of the Greek philosophy in his elaborate system. Descartes, in all of his speculation, gives a foremost place to the rational, and announces the important position that the postulate of the existence of God is the necessary guarantee for the validity of human knowledge. Malebranche's supposition that we see all things in God, is neither so superficial nor so mystical as it is sometimes supposed to be, if viewed in the light of the general type of thought we are now considering. It simply means that both thought

and things have their source and their solution in relation to God. The monadology of Leibnitz, according to which all things are looked on as active and possessing ideas, has its real meaning given to it in the light of Plato's idealism. The monads are of varying grades, but each has an element of rationality at its core; and God is the highest monad, having perfect rationality, and giving rational reality to all the other monads.

3. In more recent times the wonderful movement of idealistic speculation which appears in the transition from Kant, through Fichte and Schelling, to Hegel, exhibits the same type of thought on a large scale. Plato and Hegel have many points in common, and in some respects the idealism of the former is less abstract than that of the latter. In spite of all its defects, it may be safely admitted that the idealism of Hegel has been fruitful in giving a vantage ground for philosophy which makes materialism rationally impossible.

In other systems of philosophy distinct traces of the Platonic unities appear. As against Locke's moderate empiricism, Berkeley in one way, and the Scottish school in another, sought to preserve the rational element in human knowledge, the former by a one-sided idealism, and the latter by a rather rigid dualism between mind and matter. Then, writers like Green and Caird, Watson and Royce, have done not a little to avoid the errors of Hegel, and to present an idealism which professes to do justice to the reality of both thought and things. And many others, like Cocker and Harris, Bowne and Strong, Ferrier and Seth, Flint and Fischer, Baader and Krause, have done good service on this ground, some critically and others constructively. It is evident that many of the leading workers in the field of philosophy at the present day are in sympathy with some phase of modified idealism. It may be yet too soon to pronounce a final judgment on its claims to be the true philosophy. Still one of the cheering and attractive

features of this type of speculation is that it seeks to construe the universe, finally, in terms of spirit and thought, rather than of atoms and force. In this way the rational, rather than the mechanical, is made fundamental in the universe, and a spiritual principle is assumed to lie at the very heart of things. As against pure empiricism, and absolute dualism between mind and matter, many of the foremost thinkers of our day are inclined to hold that a modified idealism, which places a rational and spiritual principle at the core of things, and which, at the same time, gives to finite things in the universe their proper dependent reality, is on the path which leads to a sound philosophy. There is great difficulty in framing any theory which binds thought and things together in the unity of a single system. It seems clear that many earnest minds are ready to conclude that the difficulties of a modified idealism are less formidable than those which lie against any other system. They think that it opens the way to construe the universe with reference to a spiritual principle, and then to interpret that principle, in turn, by the theistic postulate.

III. *The Theistic Significance of the Principle of Intelligence.* § 75.

1. If there be a spiritual principle at the heart of things, and if human *intelligence* be rational in its nature, the inquiry naturally arises whether any theistic inference can be properly made from this principle of intelligence? Does this principle, rightly interpreted, justify the theistic postulate? If so, the fourth aspect of the psychical proof for the existence of God is vindicated.

In the last section the tendency in human thought towards a rational and spiritual, rather than an empirical and mechanical, explanation of the universe was pointed out. The inadequacy of the materialistic philosophy, with its empirical psychology, has been repeatedly revealed by these

more spiritual types of speculation. The soundness of that philosophy which, in varying modes, asserts that a spiritual principle lies at the basis of all things, and that our knowledge is not only sensuous, but also rational, has been made very plain. To make inquiry whether this better philosophy gives good reason to postulate God, as the final ground of the spiritual principle in the universe, and as the basis of the rational factor in human intelligence, is our present task.

2. In opening up this inquiry, the *implications* of the human mind and its cognitive activity must first be ascertained. In the light of previous discussions, we feel justified in setting aside the empirical theory of cognition, alike in its cruder sensational forms and in its more refined associationalist types. In like manner, we feel justified in accepting the rational epistemology in its general outlines. For our present purposes, an exposition of the rational, intuitional or *a priori* factor in human knowledge is our point of departure. Speaking generally, this factor is what the mind itself contributes to the fabric of cognition. Such cognition is itself possible only because the *a priori* factor, as a rational rule or law of the mind's activity, is given to experience by human reason. Mere isolated facts of experience are not knowledge, for they become knowledge only when the mind binds them together according to certain *rules* which it itself supplies. No collection of sense impressions, after the manner of Hume, nor any grouping of mental facts, in the way Mill suggests, can ever become a rational unity in cognition, unless there be first presupposed a principle of unity in human reason, and definite laws of intelligence according to which the unity itself is effected. This spiritual principle, and these *a priori* rules are necessary to the possibility of true knowledge. Kant and his school, with their doctrines of the unity of self-consciousness in the *ego,* and of the *a priori* factor in human cognition, are, in principle, right, as against Hume and the Sceptics; and the Common Sense philosophy, with its

fundamental laws of thought, is on safe ground, as against empiricism generally. Hence, the real source of cognition is the inherent power of the mind by which it spontaneously unifies the scattered items of experience according to a rule which the mind itself supplies. No analysis of consciousness which does not reach this result goes to the root of the problem. These *a priori* rules must be presupposed in order to the possibility of knowledge.

The *laws of thought* thus come into view. These are rational subjective rules which inhere in the very constitution of the human mind. They underlie and give direction to all the activities of the spiritual principle in man. They are involved alike in the activities of sense-perception, in the operations of the understanding, and in the exercises of the reason. In the activity of the spiritual principle in man in all these spheres, there are certain rules or unities, according to which that activity is determined.

We may call these rules the *laws* of thought, or the first *principles* of knowledge, or the *a priori conditions* of cognition, or the rational *unities* for experience, as we please. Their main feature is that they belong to the spontaneity of the mind itself, and are necessary to cognition. They really lie deeper than consciousness, and give form to experience, making it this or that, as the case may be. Without them human knowledge would be isolated, chaotic and unstable. By means of them that knowledge becomes real, stable and rational. They cannot arise out of experience, since they antedate and condition it. The supposition of Herbert Spencer, and the evolutionists generally, that heredity has contributed that stable element which we call the *a priori* factor in human knowledge, does not meet the case, for the reason, mainly, that unless we assume the validity of certain rules which determine the experience there could not arise any permanent factor to be transmitted by heredity.

In addition, the supposition of a basis of unity other than

the manifold of experience must also be made. The elements of experience are many, and yet they are found to be bound together in a rational way. We have already seen how the *a priori* rules of the spiritual principle in man explain the order and unity of experience. We now further find that all these experiences, together with the rules that condition them, are to be unified in relation to a principle which lies at the basis of all cognition. This is to be regarded as the spiritual principle in man, which is the seat of the inner unity of *self-consciousness*. The seat of this unity cannot be any one of the *a priori* rules, nor even the sum total of them. Still less can it be one of the elemental factors in experience, nor all of them combined. In a word, from the very nature of the case, the seat of the unity of self-consciousness must be a unitary spiritual principle. Hence, our knowledge becomes a rational unity on the basis of a spiritual principle, and according to certain *a priori* rules which are involved in the spontaneous activity of that principle. This is the initial stage in the theistic interpretation of the principle of intelligence in man.

3. The second stage turns our attention to the *world* of external realities in nature, as an object of cognition. What is this external world with which the mind comes into cognitive relation? What is the nature of the *non-ego* which stands related to the *ego* in cognition? As it is cognized, is it a collocation of unrelated things without any order or connection? Or is it a system of related things having a rational unity? Or must we go further, and say that nature is constituted a system by the mind itself through the act of cognition? Does the understanding make nature, as Kant suggests, or does the mind discover that nature is already a definite system for cognition?

All we need now say is that in cognition we find nature a system of related things. For thought it is a *cosmos*, not a chaos. Therein we discover certain laws or unities. These constitute the laws or uniformities of nature. It is

only on this supposition that a scientific knowledge of nature is possible. If there be no order or unity in nature, it would not be intelligible. But if it be regarded as a system of related things, it becomes an intelligible object for intelligence, and a science of nature is possible.

It would be interesting, did space permit, to show that scientific inquiry consists largely in a search for these laws or unities in nature. The facts lie open before us for observation. At first they seem to be isolated, but search is instituted for the unities or laws, by means of which nature may be construed in a rational way. Hence, the laws of motion, the principle of gravitation, the modes of chemical combination, and the laws of organic being, are discovered. By this means modern scientific reflection has opened up a splendid vision of the rational unity of nature. Nature becomes a real system of related things for cognition. This gives a deeper meaning and a more rational interpretation to the laws of nature than empiricism can possibly supply.

The question at once arises as to the significance of this view of nature as a system of related things. Are these laws to be regarded as merely physical and mechanical in their nature, or do they really imply a rational factor? Is there a spiritual principle associated with nature, whose rational activity is the true philosophy of the laws of nature? It can scarcely be supposed that the laws which bind nature into an intelligible system are in, and of, the things themselves. Then, if this bond be other than the things themselves, the question at once arises as to whether it is mechanical or rational in its nature. The intelligibility of nature suggests that it has at least a rational factor about it. Then, if it be rational in some sense, we may justly presuppose a spiritual principle to be associated with nature as a system of related things. There is evidently force in the reasoning of Green in his *Prolegomena to Ethics,* as he proceeds to show that a spiritual principle must be associated

with nature as the basis of the unity and intelligibility which human intelligence discovers therein.

4. This leads to the third stage in this exposition. What *interpretation* must now be given of the relation between the laws of thought and the laws of things, as they are bound together in cognition? Are they connected in a merely external way? Or is one set of laws to be subordinated to the other? If so, then are we to conclude that the laws of thought produce the laws of nature, and commit ourselves fully to idealism? Or are we to hold that the laws of nature produce the laws of thought, and capitulate to empiricism? Or shall we say that there is no rational relation at all between them, and rest in an irreconcilable dualism? Or shall we assume that the two sets of laws are to be unified on the supposition of an impersonal ground that really contains both, and thus make a treaty with pantheism? What shall we say? If the laws of thought do not produce the laws of nature, and if the laws of nature do not produce the laws of thought, how shall we regard these two sets of laws in their relation in cognition?

If we say that the laws of thought and the laws of nature are rationally correlated in cognition, we may be not far from the truth. According to this view, neither set of laws produces the other, but in cognition the two sets of laws come into rational relation with each other. Hence, we find two sets of laws which are ontologically independent of each other, yet they are related by a rational bond in cognition. This, then, is their relation.

5. The final stage of exposition remains. This is the definite theistic inquiry as to whether these two sets of laws may not be taken to *postulate* a higher spiritual and rational unity which is their common source. If neither set of laws is to be subordinated to the other, they may both be subordinated to a higher rationality, from which they both spring. If the laws of thought have been set by a higher intelligence, and if the laws of nature have been organized

by the same intelligence, then that intelligence may be regarded as the *basis of unity* for both sets of laws. This would be the postulate of intelligence and a spiritual principle in its highest form. This would be the highest aspect of rationality of which we can think.

By this means we are able to endow the infinite and necessarily existent being with the qualities of spirituality and rationality. This, then, is the theistic inference we make from the spiritual principle in man. Given this principle as the seat of intelligence, with its *a priori* rules in cognitive relation with nature as a system of related things, we may justly infer a higher intelligence which constitutes the ground of unity for both.

6. The fact of personality is also suggested by the inference just made. The reality of self-consciousness which is involved in the spiritual principle in man implies personality. And the principle of intelligence is not to be regarded as merely passive and unconscious. It is rather found to be endowed with spontaneity and consciousness, and this further implies personality. An impersonal spirit is a contradiction, and an unconscious intelligence is impossible. The rational unities in the human mind and in nature postulate a higher unity, which is properly identified with the divine being, the reality of whose existence has been established by former proofs.

CHAPTER VI.

THE COSMICAL PROOFS: CAUSATION, AND THE PROOF FROM COSMIC ORIGIN.

CONTENTS.

The Principle of Causation.—The Basis of Theistic Proofs.—Defective Theories.—Not merely Invariable Succession.—Nor all Concomitant Antecedent Circumstances.—Nor merely the Mental Law of the Conditioned.—Nor only a Category of the Understanding.—Nor simply Inscrutable Force.—Nor Volitional Agency alone.—True Doctrine.—An *a priori* Rule of the Mind.—Connection between Cause and Effect necessary.—Includes Efficiency.—Also sufficient Reason.—Rests on an Uncaused Cause.—Four Phases of Causal Proof.—That for a First Cause.—Aitiological Proof.—The Problem.—The entire Universe in its Totality.—Solved by the Principle of Causality.—The Universe not necessarily Infinite and Eternal.—Hence may be Finite and Contingent.—Infinite Regress untenable.—Reasons.—The Theistic Postulate needed.—God the Uncaused Cause.—And the Abiding Ground.

LITERATURE.

Flint's *Theism,* Chap. IV.—Watts' *Reign of Causality.*—Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason:* Transcendental Dialectic, Book II., Chap. II.—Diman's *The Theistic Argument,* Chap. III.—Dabney's *Theology,* Chap. II.—Hodge's *Systematic Theology,* Vol. I., Part I., Chap. II.—Thornwell's *Collected Writings,* Vol. I., Chap. II.—Shedd's *Dogmatic Theology,* Vol. I., Div. III., Chap. III.—Foster's *Systematic Theology,* Part II., Chap. I., 2.—Miley's *Systematic Theology,* Part I., Chap. II., 2.—Fisher's *Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief,* Chap. II.—Martineau's *A Study of Religion,* Vol. I., Book II., Chap. I.—Pressense's *Origins,* Book II., Chap. I.—Lindsay's *Recent Advances in the Theistic Philosophy of Religion,* Chap. VI.—Orr's *Christian View of God and the World,* Chap. III., 2.—Fraser's *Philosophy of Theism,* Vol. II., Chap. III.—Stirling's *Philosophy and Theology,* Chaps. VII., VIII.—Conder's *Basis of Faith,* Chap. II.—Schurman's *Belief in God,* Chap. IV.—Fiske's *Cosmic Philosophy,* Vol. II., Part III., Chap. III.—Knight's *Aspects of Theism,* Chap. VII.—Ebrard's *Apologetics,* Vol. I., Chap. II., Sec. 96.—Hamilton's *Metaphysics,* Chap. XXX.—Mill's *System of Logic,* Book III., Chaps. V., VI.—Spencer's *First Principles.*—Kaftan's *The Truth of the Christian Religion,* Vol. II., Chap. I.

FOUR chapters have been devoted to as many branches of the psychical proofs for the existence of God. In all aspects of these proofs the materials of reasoning lie in

the constitution of the human mind. The self-evidencing nature of the belief in God, the inference from the idea of a necessarily existent being, the import of the notion of the infinite, and the significance of the principle of human intelligence itself, have yielded certain important theistic results which we now carry forward with us, as we take up the second main class of proofs for the reality of the divine existence. The proofs now to be considered are all based on the principle of causation broadly viewed and rightly interpreted in relation to the cosmos, and it is in this class that some of the most cogent theistic proofs are to be found.

I. *Defective Views of the Principle of Causation.* § 76.

1. As the principle of *causation* underlies, in some way, all forms of the proofs now to be expounded, a clear understanding of this important principle is necessary at the outset. How far the theistic inference depends upon any particular doctrine of causation, or whether that inference is really independent of any definite view of the causal relation, are questions of some importance in theistic discussion. While we may not go so far as to say that the validity of the theistic inference is conditioned upon a sound metaphysic of causality, we may be sure that a correct doctrine of causation makes the basis of the inference more secure. Hence, some exposition of causation must first be made, and certain defective views of the causal relation must be set aside by a brief critical statement.

Few questions in philosophy have given rise to more debate than that of causality. It has been discussed at great length alike in its psychological and ontological aspects. The question as to whether we arrive at the idea by an *a priori* method, or by an *a posteriori* process, has been earnestly debated, and the problem of the real connection between things which stand in the causal relation has been much

discussed. As a matter of fact, the doctrine of causation held will largely give color to the type of philosophy adopted.

2. The cruder types of empiricism make causation consist merely in the uniform *succession* of physical phenomena. The invariable antecedent is the cause, and the invariable consequent is the effect, in the order of changes which take place. The *a priori* factor is denied to the idea, and the feature of necessary connection is not admitted to have a place in the causal relation. The sphere of causation is the mere sequence of physical phenomena, and the idea of causality is obtained in a purely empirical way.

This theory has had its advocates in all ages. The Greek sensationalists and sceptics first sounded its note. Materialists cannot consistently hold any other view, nor can they admit any other efficiency than that of mechanical energy. Hume regards the idea of cause as the result of custom, or association of things together in frequent succession. Brown, in nearly the same way, looks upon causation as the product of habit, or of an induction from experience on the basis of association. And empiricists generally must discover the origin of the idea of causation in experience, and they cannot consistently assert that there is any necessary relation between cause and effect.

This explanation of the causal relation is far from *adequate*. The idea of causation involves a great deal more than mere observed succession, for we often observe invariable succession when we never think of predicating causation. We do not think of saying that day is the cause of night, or that night is the cause of day, though they succeed each other with incessant regularity. But we almost instinctively say that a spark applied to gunpowder produces an explosion, or that a blow on the head causes death, when we observe only single cases of this nature. Observed succession does not account for the idea of causation, nor is it a proper explanation of the real connection between cause and effect.

Not only is the fact of the necessary connection between cause and effect not accounted for by this theory, but the quality of *efficiency* associated with the fact of causation is not properly explained. This quality is of the very essence of causation, and the mere sequence of events, no matter how invariable, cannot alone supply it. Yet consciousness instinctively discovers the quality of power or efficiency in the very conception of causation. In a word, the dynamical aspects of causality must be taken into account, and this involves more than sequence, no matter how invariable that may be. That this is the case is really confessed by Locke, who is usually regarded as an empiricist. He says, in effect, that the senses do not make known to us the features of necessity and efficiency, yet we must suppose that these features do pertain to events that stand in the causal relation to each other. Now, this supposition, which Locke says the mind must make, is not the result of habit or association, but the offspring of the mind itself. And Spencer, in his attempt to account for the factor of necessity by the law of heredity, and the fact of efficiency by the hypothesis of an inscrutable force, also makes an incidental confession of the insufficiency of this theory. It may, therefore, be rejected.

3. A second theory of causation is connected with the name of John Stuart Mill. Mill's doctrine is an enlarged edition of the empirical theory. He denies the *a priori* factor in causation, and falls back on experience for the origin of the idea of cause and effect. But Mill does not regard any single immediate antecedent of an event as its cause. His conception of cause includes all the *antecedent concomitant circumstances* that are related to the event. All that goes before, and has anything to do with the production of any event, is the cause of that event. Mill holds that this is true alike of physical and mental sequences; and his theory thus becomes mechanism in the former, and determinism in the latter, sphere. The whole problem of

cause and effect is solved only when we consider the complex antecedent circumstances of any event, so that any attempt to reason to a first cause is needless, if not invalid. Then the features of necessity and efficiency, according to Mill, are explained on the usual ground of repetition, habit and association. Wundt practically agrees with Mill in this explanation.

Interesting as this explanation is, it can hardly be held to be *adequate*. On the psychological side it does not do justice to the *a priori* nature of the idea of causation. Then, it makes it practically impossible to obtain a clear and complete view of the cause of anything, for it would require virtual omniscience to ascertain all the concomitant circumstances which make up the cause of any event. In addition, its explanation of *necessity* and *efficiency* as associated with causation is entirely defective, since it is made on an empirical basis. We insist that any doctrine of causation which is adequate must do full justice to these two essential features of causality.

4. A third explanation of the causal relation, which views it mainly on its psychological side, is that of Hamilton. In some respects, Hamilton's doctrine is like that of Mill, and yet there are features in which they widely differ. In many ways Hamilton's doctrine is unique, and merits separate consideration. His somewhat peculiar theory of the idea of cause and effect is the outcome of his philosophy of the conditioned and unconditioned. The unconditioned is that which is entirely independent of anything else for its existence and continuance. As such, when viewed in relation to human cognition, it is alike inconceivable and incognoscible. The infinite and absolute are two aspects of the unconditioned. The infinite is the unconditionally unlimited, and the absolute is the unconditionally limited. Both are in contrast with the conditioned, and both are to be regarded as the negative of the limited or conditioned, which is both conceivable and knowable.

The doctrine of causation arises in this connection. Hamilton says that we cannot conceive of an absolute commencement or of an absolute non-commencement, such as change, succession and causality imply. Some explanation of the causal relation in harmony with this philosophy of the unconditioned must be given. This explanation is to be found only in the sphere of the conditioned, and in the mean between extremes which are mutually exclusive. This implies that neither an absolute commencement nor an absolute non-commencement is conceivable; yet one of them, on the principles of contradiction and excluded middle, must be admitted to be necessary. Applying this general teaching to the doctrine of causation, it implies that we cannot conceive of an absolute beginning, or an absolute non-beginning of anything in the sphere of the unconditioned. Thus the idea of cause, which is entirely negative, arises. Its application is confined to the realm of the conditioned which is conceivable and cognizable. Causation thus, in a somewhat negative way, becomes the *mental law of the conditioned* wherever change takes place.

This doctrine is not unlike that of Kant. Hamilton himself acknowledges this in a measure. On the subjective side, Kant makes causation one of the categories of the understanding. As such it is a *regulative principle,* according to which the manifold phenomena of sense perception are unified in cognition. The kinship of Kant and Hamilton thus appears. Hamilton's unconditioned is like Kant's thing in itself, and Hamilton's conditioned resembles Kant's phenomena. The sphere of the conditioned, according to Hamilton, and the realm of phenomena, according to Kant, is the area of experience. And to this region causation belongs. Hamilton makes it the mental *law* of the conditioned, Kant makes it a *category* of the understanding in relation to phenomena. In both cases its *a priori* nature is maintained, but in neither case has the law of causation

any valid application beyond the conditioned and the phenomenal.

Both phases of this doctrine are much better than those empirical theories which deny the *a priori* factor in causation. Yet they are both *defective*. Hamilton's distinction between the conditioned and the unconditioned, and Kant's separation between noumena and phenomena are both too rigid. Both are in error in placing the world of realities beyond the scope of the principle of causation. Both virtually close the door against the postulate of a cause which lies outside the line of phenomenal or conditioned sequences, and this comes perilously near casting us adrift on the shoreless ocean of the infinite regress of cause and effect. Hamilton errs in supposng that the causal judgment arises from the impotency of the mind in relation to apparent contradictories. Kant also errs in confining the principle of causation so rigidly to the realm of phenomena.

5. A fourth type of causation brings Spencer into view. Speaking generally, Spencer is an empiricist in his psychology, yet in his ontology he makes a great deal of force and its persistence. On this ground he has a place for an efficiency, which, however, is mechanical; but out of the fact of force, Spencer's doctrine of causation arises. According to his view, all phenomenal changes are the product of a power which is infinite and inscrutable, and by means of this postulate he proposes to harmonize science and religion. As to this inscrutable and infinite energy which lies behind phenomena, we only know that it is, but not what it is. This, again, is almost like Hamilton's unconditioned, and Kant's thing in itself. This *inscrutable energy* is the ground for all change in the universe, and it supplies the root of the notion of cause. But when Spencer expounds the principle of causation, he moves almost exclusively in the pathway of empiricism.

This is not a sufficient account of causation. Spencer confesses that there is an infinite energy which is the ground

of all phenomenal change in the universe. But this non-phenomenal ground is not in the sequence of the phenomenal, and this is really inconsistent with Spencer's empiricism. Then, at most, the energy in Spencer's doctrine is physical and mechanical, and it gives no proper place for dependent second causes with finite efficiency. There is only one cause, and that is mechanical, and the observed sequences of phenomena are devoid of any dependent efficiency. Spencer's system, therefore, is *mechanical monism,* which makes a true doctrine of causation really impossible. Then, Spencer's attempts to explain the feature of necessity in the causal relation are unsatisfactory. He makes it arise from the results of habit and association, working through long ages, and handed down by heredity from one generation to another. As heredity can originate nothing, the difficulty of producing the factor of necessity by habit or custom is very great. Spencer's theory is insufficient, and has in it a strong tendency towards materialism, mechanism and monism.

6. A fifth theory of causation is quite different from those already noted. It has an able advocate in Maine De Biran. This theory deals almost exclusively with the psychological aspects of the problem. According to this view, the genesis of the idea of causation is found in man's conscious *volitional agency.* Will is the only efficient cause. In our conscious free agency we realize the fact of efficiency in certain changes in our experience. Then, we instinctively postulate efficiency when we observe change in the world about us. Will thus becomes the type of causation.

So far as the psychical explanation of the idea of efficiency is concerned, there is much that is true in this theory. Still, even here we must be careful not to give the law of causality an entirely experimental origin, for we must not forget that the mind itself, even in such cases, provides the *a priori* rule, according to which events that sustain the causal

relation in our experience are held together. But this theory deals only with the *subjective* aspects of causation. The question still remains as to how things in the objective sphere which are construed under the causal relation are really connected with each other. While it may be perfectly true that we get our first impression of efficiency from our own volitional agency, we may yet have to inquire concerning the way in which things in the outward world, which we call cause and effect, are related. This inquiry is necessary to unfold clearly to us what the principle of causality really is, and to make it plain that we are justified in applying the causal judgment to anything beyond the sequences of psychical phenomena. It is doubtful if any merely subjective explanation of causation, or even of the element of efficiency in it, is sufficient to justify an inference from the order of sequences in the cosmos to a cause of these sequences which lies outside the cosmos of experience. And while Biran's theory shows that the physical sequences may be effected by a spiritual cause, in the influence of will on members of the body, it may be questioned whether a deeper philosophy of causality is not needed to provide a valid objective ground for Flint's forceful reasoning that the universe is an effect whose cause is God. In a word, the principle of causality requires an *objective* as well as a *subjective* exposition, for it has its ontology as well as its psychology.

II. *The True Doctrine of Causation.* § 77.

The exposition of defective views in the foregoing section makes it now possible to state the *true* doctrine of causation quite briefly in this section. In making this statement, care must be taken to give it its proper scope, and to include all its constituent elements. Five important particulars complete the analysis.

1. As in the mind, the principle of causation is *a priori*

in its nature. On its subjective side, causality is a fundamental *law of thought*. This means that it does not arise in the mind from experience, but is given by the mind itself to experience. On the psychological side, therefore, empiricism does not go to the root of the problem of causation; for while experience may be the occasion upon which this fundamental law of thought is elicited into consciousness, yet it is not the source whence it springs. Hence, neither in its psychological nature or origin is the principle of causation empirical. Its true rational and *a priori* nature must not be forgotten. It is at root one of those *a priori* rules of the spontaneity of the human mind, according to which the experience in question is regulated.

2. As between things, the causal bond is *necessary,* not contingent. On its objective side, causality finds the events which are construed under the causal relation bound together by an inward bond. This means that mere succession, no matter how invariable, is not the deepest reality in causation; but that wherever we construe events in the causal relation, we presuppose an inner objective tie between them. This feature of necessity belongs inherently to the principle of causation, for we instinctively associate it with the causal judgment, whenever that judgment is made. Certain events may be observed in frequent succession, and yet the fact of necessity may not be connected with their sequence; but whenever they are construed under the principle of causality, the feature of necessity is implied in that very construction. The causal relation, therefore, has objective reality.

3. As in the mind, and as between things, the principle of causality implies power or *efficiency*. Both objectively and subjectively, efficiency is an essential factor in causation. Biran, in his idea of the efficiency of the will, gives the hint of this on the subjective side; and on the objective side, we instinctively assume that there is some power in that which is a cause, such as is not asserted of what may

be merely antecedent. Even Locke, who is so much of an empiricist, associates the ideas of power and of cause very intimately. And both technical and applied science proceed upon the assumption of real efficiency in the causal relation. It is thus evident that succession is not all there is in that relation. Power, agency or efficiency is the very essence of causality. If that be removed, causality is destroyed.

4. As in the mind and as between things, causation implies the fact of *sufficient reason* or adequate ground. This is a very important aspect of causation in itself, and especially in the theistic discussion. Leibnitz was the first to give this principle definite form, though the germs of it are in the Greek philosophy. By some it is separated from causation almost entirely, and treated as a separate principle. We incline to the opinion that it is best to discuss the fact of sufficient reason in close connection with the principle of causation. This would make sufficient reason a quality of the principle of causality, just as necessity and efficiency are.

This feature of the causal relation implies that there is something in every cause which makes the effect which follows it what it is and not otherwise. There is some kinship, therefore, between cause and effect. The cause always contains a factor which determines what the effect will be. This means, not merely that there is power or efficiency in the cause to produce the effect, but that there is also an impulse which gives form and direction to the effect. In other words, there is in the cause the reason which adequately accounts for the effect being just what it is. Thus, there is something in the spark which produces the explosion of the gunpowder rather than its fusion. This is an aspect of the principle of causation of great value in the exposition of some of the theistic proofs.

5. In addition to all this, the principle of causation leads us to posit a cause which is not also an effect. In the last analysis, causality postulates an *uncaused* cause. This is

a feature of causation sometimes overlooked. Some expositors of the philosophy of causation are content to think only of sequence or regress. But causation is more than sequence, or regress of cause and effect. Even an infinite regress does not satisfy the principle of causation. That principle forbids such a regress and demands a resting-place. Causation thus requires a cause which is not also an effect of an antecedent cause. Only by this supposition is the logical demand of causation finally satisfied.

6. In addition, causation, rightly understood, requires us to postulate a ground *outside* the series of events which stand in the causal relation, in order to its complete interpretation. Any one event in the series does not in itself contain all that the principle of causation implies. That which effects the passage from one event in the series to another must be taken into account. A ground to effect the change from one stage to another in the series must be provided. Change implies a great deal more than sequence. It implies an efficiency, and a sufficient reason to effect it, and to give it its particular form. This ground for change, this agency which effects the passage from one event to another in the series, must lie outside the series itself. Aristotle's hypothesis of a first mover, who himself is unmoved, illustrates this position, which we take to be of vital importance in the doctrine of causation. Therefore, we conclude that, in the last analysis, the basis of the principle of causality is an uncaused cause, which has its ground outside the causal series.

III. *Proof from a First Cause: The Problem.* § 78.

1. The principle of causation just expounded forms the basis of four phases of theistic proof. The first is the proof based on the logical demand for a *first cause* of the universe; the second consists in the reasonings which grew out of certain *specific facts* in the cosmos; the third is derived

from the marks of *order* to be seen everywhere in the universe; and the fourth is the inference which is justified by the evidences of *design* which abound in the world. In the older natural theology, three of these were included under the cosmological proof for the existence of God. But now more careful distinctions are made among these four phases of the causal proofs. The first may be called the *aitiological* proof, the second the *cosmological,* the third the *eutaxiological,* and the fourth the *teleological.* They all involve certain applications of the principle of causality to various problems which the universe presents for rational solution. In this chapter the proof for the reality of the divine existence founded on the reasonings for a *first* cause of the universe of existing things is discussed.

2. The *problem* presented is a vast one, yet it can be stated in a few sentences. That problem is the existing universe regarded in its totality. This includes the sum total of all finite things in the cosmos. This totality of finite things is viewed as existing not necessarily, but contingently. The materials of reasoning from which this proof proceeds consists in the sum of dependent existing things regarded as contingent. This includes the whole vast frame of the material universe, in all its complexity and immensity. It embraces suns and planets, moons and stars, in all their magnitude and grandeur, and viewed in their totality as a mighty system. In addition, the system of natural laws involved in the universe, viewed in all their complex totality, has also to be taken into account in making up the problem. And, further, all the complex forces and agencies operative throughout the vast universe constitute an additional element in the problem. And we must not omit to take into account all the various grades of being in the universe, from the material and inorganic up to the sentient and spiritual. Even men and angels, regarded as part of finite existing things, are a part of the problem presented by the universe in its totality. This vast complex

of existing things, in its aggregate, is the problem which presents itself for solution.

With this vast problem before us, we have now to make an application of the principle of causation to it in its totality. That something has always existed must be assumed. If the universe exists contingently, we may think of it as not always existing. And if the universe be finite, no matter how vast, it is not necessarily self-existent. We do not need to settle the question of the original condition of the universe just when it began to be. It is simply the fact of its beginning that has to be considered. If it had a beginning, how came it to be? It could not have originated itself. What was its first cause? What was its uncaused cause? Then, what is the ground of all the changes which take place in it? Is this ground within or without the series of changes?

3. This proof is sometimes called the cosmological argument, but it is better to term it the *aitiological*. Many writers have presented it in varying forms. Aristotle and Cicero both have it. The former argues from the fact of motion in the universe. Motion is a fact, and it presupposes, in the last analysis, a first mover, who himself is unmoved, though the cause of all motion. One of the Cartesian proofs reasons from the universe as contingently existing, to God as necessarily existent as its first cause. In Clarke's celebrated argument certain aspects of this proof appear. Some writers confuse this proof with that from order, and expound it under the title of the cosmological proof. It is better to confine it strictly to the one fact of an uncaused cause of the universe as a whole. This is the aitiological proof in its simplest terms. Based on the logical demand of causation for a cause which is not also an effect, it postulates God, for the solution of the origin of the universe as contingently existing. Flint gives fine scope to this proof when he speaks of the universe being an effect of which God is the cause. The universe of contingently

existing finite things, taken in their complete totality, is the problem to be solved. How is its origin to be accounted for?

IV. *The Proof from a First Cause: The Solution.* § 79.

There are really only two possible solutions of the problem. One is to suppose that the universe is *eternal* and self-contained; the other is that it had a *beginning* and is dependent. In the former case, the present condition of the universe is due to an infinite regression of causes and effects moving ceaselessly on. In the latter, the universe has its origin in a first cause, and its present state is grounded upon this cause as its abiding basis. These two alternatives must be briefly considered in their contrasts.

1. The theory of the eternity of the universe, and of the *infinite regress* of causes and effects in it, must be first examined. This theory, in assuming the eternity of the universe in some form, takes for granted the very question in debate. Is the universe eternal? Does it exist necessarily?

As to the ceaseless changes which are constantly taking place in the universe, it is evident that they are not eternal, but *originated* by some cause. Then, the various orderly combinations of things in the universe are also temporal, and require a cause to account for their origin. This leaves the material basis of the universe as the only apparently eternal factor in it. But is matter eternal? The first thing to do, in answering this question, is to decide what matter is. What is the atom of matter? Is matter only the permanent possibility of sensations, as Mill says? Is the atom simply a point or centre of energy, as Faraday suggested? Is matter non-corporeal, as the idealists assert? Is the atom, after all, a manufactured article, as Herschel intimated? Does the atom bear the marks of supernatural agency, as Clerk Maxwell thinks?

In general, it may safely be said that the tendency of many physicists is towards the conclusion that matter, in its constitution, does not possess those elements of permanency which the hypothesis of its eternity implies. Lord Kelvin's vortex-atom theory of matter requires a cause to account for the rotatory motion which it implies; and his hypothesis of the gradual dissipation of heat in the universe, implies that it is not in a condition of permanency such as its eternity would require. Hence, just in proportion as the *permanency* of the universe, or of the material basis of it, may be doubted, so its eternity may be called in question.

The same conclusion may be deduced from the nature of the case. Unless the universe be infinite in *extent,* it is not necessarily eternal as to *time;* for if it be finite in one respect, it is likely finite in the other. We are inclined to think that its infinity as to space can never be proved. Then, if it be neither infinite in regard to space, nor infinite in relation to time, it is not likely necessarily existent. And unless it can be shown that the universe has in it the elements of permanency and self-sufficiency, it can hardly be said to have self-existence and eternity. Its finitude and consequent contingency seem the more reasonable contentions. This leaves the universe open for the application of the principle of causality to it, in the form of an inquiry for its first cause and abiding ground.

2. The hypothesis of all infinite regress of events in the universe causally related, is the more popular form in which the theory of the universe which rejects a first cause is usually presented. The universe, as it exists in its totality now, is the effect of the universe as it was the *preceding moment;* and the universe in that moment is the effect of it as it existed in a still earlier moment, and so on infinitely. In the regression of the causal series there is no halting place, and the universe at any given time is adequately explained when its successive changes are construed in

accordance with the principle of this infinite causal regress. Usually this regression is applied mainly to physical sequences; but to be complete, it must include all forms of sequence, physical, vital, mental and moral, in the cosmos. A few critical remarks may show the insufficiency of this endless-chain scheme.

First, it does not *satisfy* the logical demand of the principle of causation for a ground of the causal series. That demand calls for an uncaused cause, and it is not satisfied with the offer of an infinite regress, no matter how long continued that may be. Causation means more than that every change must have a proper cause. It also requires that a ground which is unchanging must be provided for the fact of change. After the regression has been pursued a million stages backward, the demand of causation for an uncaused cause, and an unchanging ground, is still unsatisfied and as loud as ever.

Secondly, the hypothesis of infinite regress gives no account of the *beginning* of the series of changes. It rather assumes that it had no beginning. It gives no ground for believing that this series exists contingently. It rather assumes that it exists necessarily. The hypothesis in question gives no place for a beginning of the causal series. But if the universe exists contingently because finite, and if it be not necessarily eternal, as we have already seen, the causal series is not necessarily eternal. This means that it, in all probability, had a beginning. This is the very thing which the hypothesis of infinite regress persistently denies.

Thirdly, even if we admit that the theory of infinite regress has some plausibility in regard to purely physical sequences, it would still have great difficulty to account for the *sequences* which appear in the vital, mental and moral spheres. Can an infinite regress explain these sequences? Do we not come to a time when the sequences end? Was there not a time when life and mind did not exist on this

earth? If we say that the regress passes over into the physical, then we are on the ground of the materialist, and must prove that the vital came from the non-vital. In this way the theory of an infinite regress *breaks down* entirely, if an attempt is made to apply it in a definite way to every phase of the series of causes and effects.

Fourthly, this theory at best could only place a cause at the *beginning* of the causal series. The first cause would then be merely the first in the series whose sequences continue afterwards. It would not lay any ground for the changes involved in the series, nor provide any reason for the movement of the series in any given direction. In a word, the hypothesis of an infinite regress, even if a certain sort of beginning in the series were allowed, does not provide an uncaused cause, which is also the abiding ground of the whole series. From this it is evident that we would be compelled to give the universe a deistic construction on this hypothesis.

3. The *true* doctrine can now be stated in very brief and simple terms. The only adequate explanation of the universe existing contingently in its totality is the *theistic postulate*. This means that the infinite and necessarily existent being, of whose reality we have already been assured by previous reasonings, is the adequate first cause and abiding ground of the universe, with all its complex changes and sequences. This provides an uncaused cause of the universe, and thus fully accounts for its beginning. It also provides an unchanging ground for all its changes, and thus accounts for its continuance. This is the theistic postulate as the solution of the problem of the commencement of the universe. It also constitutes the principle of the aitiological proof for the existence of God.

4. This postulate fully satisfies the logical demands of the principle of causation. The logical faculty rests content with an uncaused cause. And the hypothesis of an *absolute cause* outside the series of sequences in the universe supplies

the element of permanency which further satisfies reason. That it is not one of the series of causal sequences is implied in the supposition of an uncaused cause, for every event in this series may be, in turn, both cause and effect. If, therefore, a cause which is not also an effect is assumed, we have a cause which is outside the series, and independent of it, though related to it. On this cause the series is dependent for its origin and continuance. It is, consequently, fully adequate to account for all the sequences of physical, vital, mental and moral events which come to pass in the universe viewed in its totality.

5. It is important to observe that it also provides for the profound doctrine that this uncaused cause is related not only to the origin of the series, but also to each factor in the series. God, therefore, is not only the eternal first cause of the universe in its totality, but he is also its *changeless ground,* so that he is in intimate relation with the universe in its totality from moment to moment. As such changeless ground, he is in contact with each factor in every causal series in all the complex activity of the universe, and he is as near to it now as when he first brought it into existence, as its uncaused cause. This is the true theistic doctrine. It lays the ground for the divine transcendence, as against pantheism, for God is outside the causal series. It also provides the basis for the divine immanence, as against deism, for God is in relation with each stage in the causal series of changes through which the universe passes. This is the result to which the aitiological proof surely brings us. God is the uncaused *cause,* and ever-present *ground* of the universe, alike as to its origin and continued existence.

CHAPTER VII.

THE COSMICAL PROOFS: THE PROOF FROM COSMIC PROGRESS.

Contents.

Relation to the Previous Proof.—The Cosmological Proof.—Its Relation to other Causal Proofs.—The Principle of the Proof.—Sufficient Reason.—Relations of Cause and Effect.—Kinship, but not necessarily Identity.—This Problem in Philosophy.—Descartes.—Guelinx.—Leibnitz.—Spinoza.—Coleridge quoted.—The Problem of the Proof.—The Universe in its Cosmic History and Progress.—Stages in its History.—The Inorganic Stage primal.—The Organic.—The Sentient.—The Intelligent. — Self-consciousness. — Moral and Religious. — At each stage certain Specific Facts.—The Problem consists in these.—The Solution of the Problem.—Two Proposed Solutions.—First by the Principle of Continuity and Evolution.—But this transgresses the Principle of Causation. —The true Solution is by Efficiency and Sufficient Reason.—This results in the Theistic Postulate.—Adequate Solution.

Literature.

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I. *The Principle of this Proof.* § 80.

1. THE line of reasoning now to be followed out is closely related to that of the foregoing chapter. There the universe was viewed in its totality, now certain specific features in it are to be interpreted. There it was

the *origin,* now it is the *progress* of the universe which has to be considered. The specific facts now to be interpreted are found in the universe, viewed as a cosmos of organically related things marked by progress. The theistic proof which thus emerges may be properly termed the cosmological, since it deals with certain inherent features of the cosmos. This gives a much more definite meaning to the scope of this term than it usually has. But in the more thorough theistic discussions of the present day this limitation is just and necessary. It gives the four causal proofs their well-defined spheres, and greatly increases the logical value of these proofs. The *aitiological* proof vindicates an uncaused cause and abiding ground for the universe as a whole. The *cosmological* seeks a cause and sufficient reason for certain facts in the cosmos as progressive. The *eutaxiological* proof reasons towards God from the phenomena of law and order in the universe; and the *teleological* proof argues towards the same conclusion from the features of design which the world exhibits. This classification of the causal proofs gives harmony and completeness of view. Each branch of proof has its aspect of causation and its proper subject-matter. The cosmological aspect of the causal proofs seeks to interpret, by the principle of sufficient reason, certain aspects of the universe as an organized cosmos.

2. At the very outset a clear grasp of the *principle* of this proof is needed. This principle, in general, is that of causation, but the aspect of this principle which is prominent is that of *sufficient reason* or adequate ground. This feature of causation was briefly explained in the previous chapter, but this explanation needs a little more illumination in connection with the proof now under consideration. According to Leibnitz, as quoted by Thomson in his *Outlines of the Laws of Thought,* the principle of sufficient reason means that "whatever exists, or is true, must have a sufficient reason why the thing or proposition should be as it is and

not otherwise." In its logical meaning, this signifies that any inference or conclusion in reasoning must rest on adequate grounds. There must be good evidence for any inference which is made. The premises of any conclusion must be reliable and assured. Then, in its ontological significance, the principle of sufficient reason implies that there must be in the cause of anything something by reason of which it is what it is, and not otherwise. This is the feature of causality now mainly in view. It means that there is something pertaining to every cause by virtue of which the effect assumes its well-defined character. It is thus a definite aspect of the principle of causation, and it may be called sufficient reason or adequate ground. It is this which constitutes the nerve of the cosmological proof.

3. An important and very difficult *problem* meets us on the threshold of this exposition. As this problem emerges again later on in these discussions, it may be well to give attention to it at this stage. As has been pointed out, the principle of causality involves the two features of efficiency and sufficient reason. In every cause there is that which effects the change implied in the causal relation; and there is also that which makes the effect just what it is and not something else. The question which arises in this connection relates to the *identity* in nature between cause and effect. How far must cause and effect be like each other? May they be quite diverse in their essential nature? Can things affect each other causally only when they are alike? Is the feature of sufficient reason especially conditioned upon some sort of identity between the cause and effect? These seem simple inquiries, yet in some of their applications they are of the deepest import. Mind and matter, for example, are different substances, yet the soul and body seem to interact on each other. The volitions of the soul, at least, affect the movements of the body. How is this effected? Must we say that, at root, body and soul are the same, and hence must be reduced to unity on the basis

either of materialism or idealism? This must not be done, so that some other construction must be given to their relation. That the soul and body do act on each other is an undoubted fact. It seems clear, therefore, that in some way mind can act on matter so as to produce changes which are of the nature of effects in the material sphere. So in regard to the relation of God to the universe the same problem arises. Must God and the universe be of the same essential nature, in order to the exercise of divine activity in the cosmos? If so, then some type of monism is the only philosophy. In order to think of God as the first cause of the universe, must we postulate identity of essence between the universe, as an effect, and God its cause? If so, that one essence must be either material or ideal, and the abyss of *monism* opens wide before us. Such examples show how serious a problem this is, and exhorts us to discover a secure basis whereon the kinship of cause and effect may be held, and the possibility of spiritual forms of being producing changes in material modes of existence may be vindicated.

4. Still another turn must be given to this problem. Does it follow, from what has just been suggested, that there must always be *as much* of reality, if not more, in the cause as there is in the effect? It has just been suggested that the effect may not be essentially the same in nature as the cause, which leaves the way open for the view that a physical sequence may be produced by a spiritual cause. Now, does it follow that there must be as much of real content in the cause as appears in the effect? Does it come to pass that if we find certain qualities in the effect, that these, in at least corresponding degree, must be found in the cause? Thus, if life or thought be present in the effect, must these qualities be asserted of the cause producing them? In a word, can the non-vital produce the vital; can the non-intelligent cause the intelligent to arise; can water rise higher than its level? Must there be, in short, a *sufficient*

reason in the cause of anything, which determines what the character and contents of the effect shall be? Are we justified, when we find that certain features are in an effect, in concluding that these features must find their counterpart in its cause? It seems reasonable to maintain, in the light of the efficiency and sufficient reason implied in the principle of causality, that there must be at least as much richness of content in the cause as appears in the effect, even though their strict identity may not be asserted. If there be not efficiency enough in the cause, the effect would never arise; and if there be no sufficient reason, everything would be entirely contingent, and we could never know that any particular cause would produce any given effect. Hence, we may safely conclude that there must be at least as much in the cause as in the effect, and that there must be a degree of *kinship,* though not necessarily *identity,* between them. In no case is it to be supposed that the cause is exhausted in the effect, or that in essential nature they are to be identified. There is likeness without identity, efficiency without exhaustion, and sufficient reason without contingency in the causal relation, as now viewed. This is the principle of the cosmological proof.

5. This problem of unlikeness between cause and effect has given color to many things in philosophy. It was implied in the crude Greek materialism and sensationalism, in which the conclusion was drawn that the soul must be material in order to be the subject of sensations produced by impressions from material objects. In the Cartesian philosophy, the view held of the essential difference between mind and matter had much influence upon that philosophy itself, and upon subsequent speculation. Out of this sprang the occasionalism of Guelinx, the preëstablished harmony of Leibnitz, and the pantheism of Spinoza. They all wrestled with the causal relation between soul and body in man. Guelinx supposed that on the occasion of an affection in the body, a corresponding affection arose in the

mind. Leibnitz assumed that there was a harmony established from all eternity between the sequences in the body and those in the mind. And Spinoza held that the two series of sequences had a common ground, in a unitary basis which he denoted eternal substance and identified with God. And the empiricism and idealism of our own day have both felt the effects of this speculation, which entirely separates soul and body, and is in danger of divorcing God from the universe. In both cases the relations are apt to be construed in a forced and mechanical way, which leads to the theories just mentioned, touching the relation between the soul and body in man, and to deistic and mechanical views in regard to the relation of God to the universe. The utmost care is needed here to avoid materialism, idealism, pantheism and deism upon this point. They may be avoided if we hold to *kinship without identity* in regard to the causal relation.

6. When Coleridge says that "the law of causality only holds between things that have some common property, and that it cannot be extended from one world to another," he implies the problem we have been discussing. In his statement there is real *truth* and serious *error*. The truth is that there must be some kinship, or common property, between cause and effect. His error is in suggesting that in no case can the causal relation be extended from the spiritual to the material world. For this is true neither of the connection between the soul and the body in man, nor of the relation which God sustains to the universe. To agree with Coleridge is to present an insuperable barrier between mind and body, and between God and the world. As both mind and matter have in them rational factors, and both are to be construed, finally, in relation to God as infinite rationality, they need not be absolutely separated from each other. They are not so much two worlds, as two sections of one universe of finite things. We do not require, therefore, to hold the absolute identity of cause and effect, nor that the cause is

either exhausted in, or transmuted into, the effect. All we need to maintain is that there is a something in the cause which gives to the effect its well-marked character, and that there must be at least as much of resource or content in the cause as appears in the effect. This is the vital aspect of the principal of causality which underlies the theistic proof now in hand.

II. *The Problem of this Proof.* § 81.

1. In general, this *problem* consists in certain aspects of the universe, viewed as an organized graded cosmos. In this cosmos there are certain well-defined phenomena, and these constitute the materials of the proof. The cosmos is regarded now, not in its totality, but rather in its *course* and constitution. The problem relates to the view which is to be taken of the cosmos in this aspect of it. The whole cosmic history of the universe opens up before us, in all its boundless duration, magnitude and complexity. Its cosmic history and *progress* are to be considered in the light of the causal principle, especially in its aspect of sufficient reason. The higher stages of the cosmos are to be interpreted in relation to the lower, and the problem of the way by which the passage from the lower to the higher was effected has to be solved.

Whatever view may be adopted of the continuity of the universe, or of the inner principle of that continuity, it is clear that there has been progressive development in the organization of the cosmic whole. The question at once arises as to whether the principle of causality in the form of sufficient reason is properly applicable to the cosmos thus regarded. And if it be applicable, does it justify the theistic postulate as its necessary explanation? We have space to mark out only the great stages which the progress of the universe exhibits.

2. First, the universe, so far as the best light which

modern science sheds upon it shows, was in an unorganized inorganic condition when it began its career. There was a time when our earth at least, and probably the other planets, and possibly the stellar systems also, existed in their simplest material and mechanical elements. And, if we indulge in scientific speculation, we may even go further back, and think of the star dust, or of the luminiferous ether, or of the homogeneous of the nebular hypothesis, where we find the universe in its simplest terms. Just what that condition may have been, or how long it lasted, we cannot now tell. Nor is it necessary to do so. All we need now assert is the fact that, in its early stages, so far at least as our earth is concerned, atomic *matter* and mechanical *energy* alone existed.

3. Secondly, we may think of the time when *organic* forms of being arose. Here we observe that the transition was somehow made from the non-vital to the vital. The living was superimposed upon the non-living by some agency within or without the cosmos. The atom gave way to the cell, and the crystalloid to the colloid, in certain forms of being, and mechanical energy became by some means vital energy. At the same time, the chemistry of inorganic modes of existence became the chemistry of the organic, or entirely new forms of chemical action were introduced into the cosmos. Hence, arose various organic processes, known as assimilation, nutrition, growth and reproduction, in incessant succession. In addition, various grades of organic beings have come into existence, with ever-increasing complexity of structure, till the highest was reached. The problem is as to how all these facts are to be explained.

4. The third stage to be noted here is the *sentient*. This is a new form of being, and constitutes a set of specific facts. It came, no doubt, after the organic in its non-sentient forms. This includes all forms of being capable of distinct sensations of pleasure or pain. In this there is something not in the merely vital, nor in the inorganic in

any degree. Here, too, may be observed various grades of sentient being, from those wherein it is scarcely perceptible up to those where it is most acute. Here, too, we may take into account the remarkable facts of animal instinct, which are both like and unlike intelligence. The facts here are very many and very varied, and the complexity of the problem to be solved is greater than at any previous stage. How has the passage from unconscious to conscious forms of being been effected, and how has even the organic passed on from non-sentient to sentient stages?

5. A fourth well-marked stage in the progress of the cosmos is that of *intelligence* and reflection. Here all distinctly spiritual forms of finite being arise. This is the sphere of man, at least so far as this earth is concerned. The realm of finite spirit as distinct from that of matter now clearly emerges. The phenomena of self-conscious knowing beings, capable of reflection, are before us at this stage of the cosmos. Memory, imagination, abstraction, reflection, and all other mental activities make up the problem. Above all, the facts of self-consciousness come distinctly into view. The problem here again is, How did these specific facts come to be? Did they arise by the law of continuity and progress from the lower stage of merely sentient being, or have we here a new effect, which, according to the principle of causation, must be accounted for by a new cause?

6. A final stage need only be mentioned. This is the stage wherein *moral* and *religious* facts emerge. Here we have important facts before us. Judgments of duty, the sense of obligation, the feeling of moral approbation, and all that arises in a moral experience, have to be here considered. Then, too, the elevated instinct of worship, the sense of the supernatural world, and the feeling after God, are great facts which await interpretation in this discussion. What must that interpretation be, and what is its key? Are these facts self-explanatory, or can they be explained by

simply referring them to the lower antecedent stage of being?

Such, then, is the *problem*. It lies in the course and constitution of the cosmos. That cosmos exhibits all these distinct grades of being, and evident marks of *progress*. What is the philosophy of that progress? What is the sufficient reason for these specific facts?

III. *The Solution of the Problem of this Proof.* § 82.

Two radically different solutions of this problem of the cosmological proof claim attention. The one is based entirely on the principle of *continuity* and the law of natural evolution. The other rests on the principle of *causation* and sufficient reason. Each must now be considered.

1. The explanation which is based on the principle of continuity and *evolution* argues that the specific facts of the cosmos which constitute the problem of this proof are sufficiently explained when a natural history of them is given, in accordance with their order and succession. The moral facts succeed the intellectual, the intellectual the sentient, the sentient the vital, and the vital the non-vital; and when their continuity is traced out, their explanation is fully made. No inference towards any cause or sufficient reason outside of the facts is needed, and hence none should be made.

2. It will be observed that this is a scheme of ontological evolution. Its inner principles are material and mechanical, and the law of continuity runs throughout. *Matter* and *force* must account for all the facts, and for the progress in complexity which they exhibit. There is no other causality, and there can scarcely be any sufficient reason at all.

It is evident that this scheme is entirely inconsistent with the principle of *causality*, as already so fully explained. There must be at least as much in the cause as appears in

the effect. But in the case before us, each new stage in the progress of organization in the cosmos presents new factors, which were not in the previous stages. Of these new facts no adequate cause is provided by simply referring them to the preceding stages in a purely descriptive way. Nor does this theory do justice to sufficient reason. There is nothing necessarily in the preceding stages which adequately accounts for the succeeding stages being just what they are. This proposed solution, therefore, is entirely insufficient. At every step in the stages of the cosmos already described, where there is advance in complexity of organization, the principle of causation, both as to its efficiency and sufficient reason, is utterly ignored, or boldly transgressed. Neither an agency nor a reason is given for the new factors which appear in the more complex stages.

Even if the validity of the hypothesis of *evolution* be admitted, as a description of the process in itself considered, the principle of causation would still be needed to effect the passage from one stage to another, and to account for the distinctly new factors which appear in the more complex stages. Thus it at once appears that so long as evolution be made identical with progress, as it should only be, the theistic postulate is still needed to explain the progress of the cosmos on its pathway of continuity. Evolution in this strict sense does not destroy theism; it rather demands it.

3. The other explanation is found in the *theistic postulate*. It is based on the principle of causation, in its application to the cosmic problem of progressive organization in the universe. This postulate fully meets the case. In God, the self-existent and intelligent causality which we have in former reasonings seen him to be, we have an efficiency and a sufficient reason, which fully meet the demands of the problem. He exists necessarily, not contingently; he is unchanging, amid all the changes of the cosmos; and he has infinite resources and causality. The postulate of his

existence and activity, in causal relation with the cosmos, fully accounts for the problem in hand. He possesses every quality in abundant measure that appears in the universe, and in him there is provided a cause that is not merely in the cosmos, but also without it, as the ground of its change and progress.

Many isolated proofs for the existence of God are all gathered up under this head. The proof from biogenesis in biology, of a living source of life; the argument of Locke that the existence of knowing beings, like men, argues an intelligent first cause, which is God, and the inference from the idea of God in the human soul to the existence of God as its only adequate cause, as presented by Descartes, all illustrate this cosmological proof, as we conceive it. They all imply that from certain features in various facts, which are viewed as effects, that the counterparts of these features must be found in their cause. This is simply an application of the principle of sufficient reason to these specific facts.

4. In the light of modern *scientific* and semi-philosophical views of the cosmos in its progress, this proof has very much value. Rightly understood, it makes any merely materialistic and mechanical explanation of the universe not rationally possible. Moreover, it enables us to clothe God with certain attributes, in analogy with the qualities which we discover in the facts, for which he supplies the sufficient reason. And while this argument may not of itself justify the inference to an infinite creator; still, having this aspect of God supplied by other proofs, we vindicate the force of these proofs by this one, and at the same time endow God with certain obvious qualities or attributes, which make him much more rationally real to the human understanding. In these simple terms, we venture to give a somewhat new version of the cosmological proof for the divine existence.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE COSMICAL PROOFS: PROOF FROM COSMIC ORDER.

Contents.

The four Causal Proofs distinguished.—The Principle of this Proof.—An Aspect of Causality.—Various Views.—McCosh.—Flint.—Hicks.—Eutaxiological Proof.—Sufficient Reason for Unities and Laws in the Cosmos.—Speculation.—Efficiency and Invariableness.—The Problem of this Proof.—The entire Sphere of Cosmic Order.—Instances in Astronomy.—In Physics.—In Chemistry.—In Crystallography.—In Optics.—In Acoustics.—In Thermodynamics.—In Electrodynamics.—In Biology.—In Psychology.—In Morals.—Solution of the Problem.—Three possible Solutions.—Chance and Fate inadequate.—Immanent Order subtile, but insufficient.—The Theistic Postulate meets the case.—An Extramundance Intelligence in God.—Limits of this Proof.

Literature.

McCosh's *Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation,* Part I.—Hicks' *Critique of Design Arguments,* Introduction.—Diman's *The Theistic Argument,* Chap. IV.—Flint's *Theism,* Chap. IV.—*The Bridgewater Treatises.*—Chalmer's *Astronomical Discourses.*—H. B. Smith's *Apologetics,* Chap. IV.—Ebrard's *Apologetics,* Vol. I., Part I., Book II., Sec. 1.—Fisher's *Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief,* Chap. II.—Lindsay's *Recent Advances,* Chap. XIV.—Hodge's *Systematic Theology,* Vol. I., Part I., Chap. II.—Shedd's *Dogmatic Theology,* Vol. I., Div. III., Chap. III.—Strong's *Systematic Theology,* Part II., Chap. II., 1.—Thornwell's *Collected Writings,* Chap. II.—Miley's *Systematic Theology,* Part I., Chap. II., 2.—Boyce's *Abstract of Systematic Theology,* Chap. II.—Fraser's *Philosophy of Theism,* Vol. II., Chap. III.—Stirling's *Philosophy and Theology,* Chap. VII.—Kaftan's *The Truth of the Christian Religion,* Vol. II., Chap. IV.—Paley's *Natural Theology.*—McCosh's *Divine Government,* Book II., Chap. I.—Stearns' *The Evidence of Christian Experience,* Chap. II.

WE now reach a very important branch of the causal argument. It is concerned with the facts of *order* as they appear in the cosmos, and seeks to discover their theistic significance. Some writers make this proof the main feature of the cosmological argument, while others construe the facts of order under the teleological mode of reasoning. McCosh represents the former, and Flint the

latter type of view. H. B. Smith, with much breadth of vision, inclines to give this proof a very wide scope, and to thereby include the facts of order found in nature, mind and morals under it. Hicks, on the other hand, gives it a much more definite application, and thus limits it almost exclusively to the cosmic order of material things. In our own day the sphere of this pertinent proof has been pretty clearly marked out, and it has been differentiated from the proof founded on the marks of design in the world. *Order* and *design* are now properly distinguished from each other.

I. *The Principle of this Proof.* § 83.

1. The principle of the proof lies in the causal relation, and its process consists in an application of the law of causation to the phenomena of order in the universe, with a view to their adequate rational interpretation. At this stage the relations of the four cosmical proofs must be clearly apprehended. The aitiological seeks the first cause and ground of the universe as a whole. The cosmological proposes a sufficient reason for the cosmic progress observed in the universe. The eutaxiological inquires for an adequate cause of the law and order seen in the cosmos; and the teleological does the same thing in regard to the marks of design exhibited in the world. The universe, in its cosmic *origin,* in its cosmic *progress,* in its cosmic *order,* and in its cosmic *design,* is the subject of interpretation under these cosmical proofs. With the third of these we are to be engaged in this chapter.

2. It is important to observe the precise aspects of causality which are involved in each of these proofs. In particular, it is very necessary to understand the difference between the facts of *order* and of *design,* that we may construct aright the argument based upon each of these sets of facts. McCosh, with much insight, makes the distinction between typical *forms* and special *ends* in creation; and by

this distinction he suggests the difference between order in general and design in particular. Some writers, in a rather clumsy way, term the one set of facts general order, and the other special order. But the words order and design more accurately describe these facts. In the former case, we have before us the facts of law and order, of unity and system, of sequence and coexistence, such as may be construed under mathematical relations. In the latter we have in view the features of purpose and design, of adaptation and adjustment, of means and ends as seen in the universe of related things. In the one case we have regard merely to the relations of the factors which constitute the cosmos as it now exists; and in the other we are to consider the ends which certain factors in the cosmos serve in relation to other factors. The one is the proof from order; the other that from design.

Flint, in his excellent discussion, does not quite clearly make this distinction, and on this account somewhat weakens the logical force of his reasoning. But Diman, who is a follower of Flint at many points, opens up this distinction in a lucid way, and carries it with him into his discussion. Hicks, also, very strongly emphasizes the essential distinction between these two forms of proof, but his polemical attitude towards the teleological proof somewhat mars an otherwise informing exposition. We regard the distinction between order and design to be a valid one; and we believe that the facts involved in each supply the materials for a sound theistic inference. We would, therefore, distinguish more clearly than Flint does between *laws* and *ends* in the cosmos. But we are very far from agreeing with Hicks that there is more logical value in the eutaxiological than in the teleological proof. We believe that while order and design provide different forms of the cosmical proof, yet each yields a valid theistic inference.

3. But the *principle* of the eutaxiological proof must now be more clearly exhibited. In doing this, we have to show

what aspect of causation comes into view in it. Order and sequence are seen everywhere in the cosmos. It appears on the earth and we behold it in the heavens. It holds universal sway in the universe. The question at once arises as to the relation between this order and sequence, this law and harmony, and the principle of causation. Is the law of causality in some form involved in the cosmos, viewed as an orderly and harmonious system? And is it efficiency, or adequate ground, or sufficient reason, which is prominent in this proof?

A general inspection of the cosmos as a system of related things shows two aspects of it. There are comprehensive *unities* and pervasive *laws* in it. Under the former of these aspects we observe groups of kindred things organized together in nature. These constitute the great natural types of things in the universe. The homologies of comparative anatomy illustrate these unities or types in one sphere. Then the definite groups of living things, known as biological species in the vegetable and animal kingdoms, afford further examples of these groups in nature. So, too, those resemblances which render the morphological classification of any forms of being possible give additional instances of these unities in nature. Now, an adequate ground or sufficient reason for these features of the cosmos must be found, and to provide this the principle of causation is required. In the application of this principle to these unities the principle of this proof is implied.

The other aspect of order which is observed in the cosmos consists in the *laws* and uniformities of nature. These laws in manifold forms express the order and sequences which appear in the cosmos. These laws are simply expressions of the *uniformities* of nature. In themselves they have no inherent efficiency, nor do they in their own resources contain the reason for the uniformities which they express. These laws of nature are simply formulæ which denote certain sequences and coexistences in the cosmos. They do

not produce the facts whose sequences they express, nor do they cause those coexistences which they denote. In a word, they have no causal agency. This being the case, they invite and require an application of the principle of causation in order to account for them. The implication is that the sequences in nature which these laws express are grounded in agencies which act uniformly. These agencies involve the principle of causation. It is evident, therefore, that the principle of causation comes properly into view in relation to these laws and uniformities in the cosmos. In this fact is found, again, the principle of the proof for the existence of God based on order in the universe. The features of efficiency, adequate ground and sufficient reason are all, in some degree, brought into play as the principle of causation is applied to the facts of *order* in the cosmos.

4. Philosophical speculation has been quite busy with this problem, and opinions differ as to the precise view to be taken of the relation of causation to the facts of order. Hume and Reid, who differ very greatly as to the exact nature of the causal relation, agree in resting the theistic proof from order on the principle of causation. McCosh, and many more recent writers, hold the same view. Flint is substantially on the same ground, though he uses the term cause in a somewhat general sense. Kant's criticism of the cosmological argument, as the proof from the facts of order, assumes that the inference in it is grounded on the causal relation. And many recent writers who are under the influence of the evolutionary philosophy, though they may admit the causal relation in the sequences of the cosmos, are unwilling to allow the validity of any inference from these to an extra-cosmic ground or cause. The reasonings of ontological evolution at this point are very subtile, and need to be carefully considered in the interests of this theistic proof.

5. Another point emerges here. There has been debate as to whether the theistic inference based on the facts of

order requires *efficiency* in the principle of causation involved in the inference, or whether that inference is valid on the basis of invariable *succession* in that principle. We incline to the view that, so far as the doctrine of causation is concerned, the feature of efficiency is an essential factor in it, so that wherever the causal relation exists, there efficiency is present. Hence, if causation underlies the argument from order, efficiency, and sufficient reason, too, are involved in it. If this be maintained, the ground of the causality may also be outside the mere facts of order. At the same time, we are inclined to believe that the facts of invariable sequence supply a sufficient basis for the theistic inference. We have, even on this view, certain *unities* and *sequences,* which, apart from all reference to their efficient causation, require to be explained, by means of that aspect of causality which we have called sufficient reason. Hence, the fact of invariable sequence has to be accounted for, even though efficiency be denied; so that, while the feature of efficiency is essential to causation rightly understood, yet it is not necessary to the validity of the theistic inference from the phenomena of order. This, then, is the principle of this proof. It consists in an application of the principle of causation to the unities and laws of the cosmos.

II. *The Problem of this Proof.* § 84.

1. In unfolding the principle of this proof its *problem* has been partly indicated. The problem consists in the phenomena of cosmic order in all their boundless scope and endless multiplicity. Its materials are found in the instances of unity, system, law, sequence and uniformity observable everywhere in the heavens above and in the earth beneath. To give even the barest outline of these facts would require a survey of the broad fields of all the sciences, and would lead us to transcribe many a page from treatises on natural theology. As we look out upon the varied face of nature

in any sphere, we observe, amid ceaseless change and endless variety, order, system and harmony everywhere. Scientific research is constantly enlarging the range of our vision over these splendid and inviting fields. Philosophers and poets alike have been sensible of this all-pervading *cosmic order,* and the painter has been moved to represent it in his works of art. Only a few general instances of the problem of order whose varied facts constitute the materials of the theistic proof now under consideration can be given. The student can easily increase and amplify the hints we now give by his own reflection or by consulting accessible treatises on natural theology.

2. The following instances may suffice to illustrate, if nothing more, the problem of cosmic order. The almost boundless uniformities of which the law of *gravitation* is the expression, and according to which the heavenly bodies hold their relations and conduct their movements, at once come into view. Here the music of the spheres is tuned to the key of the theistic inference. Then, all the additional facts of order, which may be construed under Newton's laws of *motion,* as illustrated in the parallelogram of forces, and in all the wonders of statics and dynamics, form part of the vast problem. So, too, the wonderful and mysterious *unities* which emerge in chemistry, under the operation of chemical affinity, and which can be expressed in mathematical formulæ, together with the subtile and still more mysterious activities of electricity, further illustrate the problem. And, in a very definite way, the wonderful geometrical relations of the sides and angles of *crystalline* substances, to which trigonometry can be applied, reveal unities which make a striking part of the problem. In addition, the wonderful phenomena of *light,* as revealed in the science of optics, and as made radiant in the colors of the rainbow, the striking facts which *heat* exhibits as unfolded in the science of thermodynamics, and the transporting results of *sound* as set forth in the science of acoustics or exhibited

in the grand oratorio, have all to be included in the problem of cosmic order. Nor is this all. The regular recurrence of the *seasons,* with the complex uniformities therein involved; the ceaseless succession of day and night, with the changing moment of sunrise and sunset, as it is set down beforehand in the almanac; the orderly succession of vegetable and animal life, with the laws of nutrition, growth and reproduction which they exhibit; and the great unities of species and type in the realm of organic things as shown in the science of *biology,* are a further part of our present problem. Nor must we exclude from view the uniformities which appear in the *operations* of the human mind, as expressed in the principles of reasoning and the laws of thought with which logic and psychology are concerned. And we may even take into account the great uniformities which appear in the moral world, and in all the relations which men sustain as expounded in ethics and sociology, as part of this immense problem.

These are but a few general illustrations of the problem of the eutaxiological proof for the existence of God. They may serve to illustrate the nature of the problem, and to show its boundless magnitude. The aggregate of these and similar instances provide the *problem* of the proof from order. These remarkable facts, which have been the theme of the poet and the philosopher, of the naturalist and the theologian, in all ages, form the basis of the theistic inference, which we are now unfolding. Never before has the vision of philosophical observation been able to reach as far as now, nor has the inspection of science ever been able to look so deeply into this great problem as at the present day. Order, harmony, law and uniformity stretch far and wide on every hand. Theism and Christianity have nothing to fear, but much to gain, from the enlarged vision. We may welcome and ever use the telescope and the microscope, the observatory and the laboratory, in getting a clear vision of this wonderful problem.

III. *The Solution of the Problem of this Proof.* § 85.

This solution leads us to inquire concerning the best *explanation* of the facts of order in the cosmos. There are at least three possible solutions, each of which has its advocates. The first is the theory of chance, with which the theory of fate may be connected. The second is the supposition of germinal order inherent in the universe itself. And the third is supplied by the theistic postulate. The first and second will be criticised with a view to the confirmation of the third.

1. The theory of *chance* and that of fate may be taken together, for though they are apparently very different, they are not really so in principle. Both deny the need of intelligence to explain order. Both are purely mechanical; the one mechanical contingency, and the other mechanical necessity. What happens by chance cannot be otherwise than it is, which means that it is necessary. And what happens by fate just happens so, without any reason for it.

This theory, whose principle is mechanical contingency, undertakes to explain all the facts of order in the universe by supposing that a succession of fortunate chances brought it all into existence. Through infinite time this process of contingency had gone on by slow degrees, and, without any guiding wisdom, things began to fall into unity, order and harmony, till in the course of time the orderly universe now existing came to be what it is.

This scheme seems scarcely worthy of serious consideration, and yet it has a considerable place in human speculation. It was the fortuitous concourse of atoms with Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius among the ancients. In modern times it is represented by the cruder current materialism of our own day. According to the ancients and moderns alike, all the wonderful facts of law, system, order and harmony observable in the cosmos are the result

of an endless number of *happy hits* which have been taking place during countless ages. By this method, cosmos came out of chaos by chance or fate.

2. A little reflection surely shows that chance cannot really account causally for anything. In its very idea it is *inadequate*. Chance is simply a process, and requires a causality. Hence, in and of itself it can really explain nothing. A process cannot account for itself, unless we hold to empiricism and phenomenalism, where description takes the place of philosophy. Chance is only the mode in which certain events come to pass, oftentimes with a confession of ignorance as to the causality which brings them to pass. To say that events happen by chance, or according to fate, is simply to say nothing at all in the way of explanation. To assert that order was produced by chance, or that law arose from fate, is to darken counsel by words without any real meaning.

A single *example* may expose the absurdity of this theory. Suppose a man had all the letters of the great poem, *Paradise Lost,* printed singly on little bits of paper. Then suppose that he put them all into a bag, and then went with them to the brow of a high hill overlooking a level valley. And then, suppose that he scattered them out on the wings of the wind, to be swept over the valley, that they might all rest on the green grass somewhere. How often would he have to repeat the process before he would find them fall by chance into the very order they have in Milton's great poem? Humanly speaking, it could never be done. Now, this is a simple problem compared with that which the system and order of the universe presents. Without further discussion, therefore, this theory may be set aside as irrational and absurd.

3. The second theory is much more subtile, and of greater danger to the theistic inference from the facts of order. It is based on certain dynamical and ontological evolutionary views of the cosmos. It admits that the principle of order

is *inherent* in the cosmos, and that chance alone does not solve the problem. But it holds that this principle is simply within the universe, and that it neither needs nor justifies the inference to any extra-mundane causality or intelligence. According to the dynamical view of matter which this theory holds, there is supposed to be latent in matter certain potencies which provide the agency by which the facts of order are wrought out. It also holds that there is an evolutionary endowment in matter, according to which these potencies operate in producing the facts of order everywhere. This general theory assumes many special forms, and appears alike in ancient and modern times. The old Stoic doctrine of the world as a great living thing, animated by a soul or life, and the later Platonic conception of a plastic principle in the cosmos, moulding it into order, represent this theory. All modern hylozooistic views of the nature of matter, and the refined materialism of our own day, that professes to discover "the promise and potency" of all things in matter, are also exponents of this theory. Systems which, like that of Spencer, hold to the eternity of matter, the persistence of force, the continuity of motion, and the reality of the evolutionary principle, are necessarily on this ground, especially if agnosticism, as is usually the case, be coupled with them. All the phenomena of order which the universe reveals are explained from within rather than from without it. The principle of order is *immanent* in the cosmos, and as it emerges in the universe it is self-produced. Hence, there is no rational ground to infer an extra-cosmic intelligence, nor is there any need for the theistic postulate.

A more refined type of this theory admits that divine wisdom and power were involved in the *origin* of those potencies and uniformities which are inherent in nature, and that exhibit themselves in the manifold facts of order in the universe. But it denies that these facts as they now are need any explanation, save their deistic origin just indicated. But this practically concedes the point, and puts

the fact of intelligence only a step further back. It thus confesses that something extra-mundane must be admitted somewhere to account for the genesis of order, if not for its present reality. The argument for the first cause, at least, is legitimate, even if we admit the force of this theory.

4. But, concerning all these aspects of this general theory, it need only be pointed out that they either *assume* the reality of intelligence to account for order, or they *contravene* the principle of causation, which is implied in the proof now under discussion. If they admit that intelligence originated germs of order in the cosmos, the inference to intelligence from order holds good. It is practically assumed. If this inference be denied, both the efficiency and sufficient reason of causality are ignored. As the facts of order arise, a causal agency of some sort must be assumed to account for them. And a sufficient reason must also be adduced to explain the precise nature of the law and order which arise. Unless, therefore, the inference from order to intelligence is invalid and needless, the theistic postulate from the facts of order is both sound and necessary to account for them.

5. This leads to the third theory, which holds that the *theistic postulate* is the necessary and adequate explanation of the problem of order in the cosmos. The order in the cosmos implies intelligence, and intelligence is provided by this hypothesis. The analogy between this order and that of human mechanism affords a pertinent illustration of this inference. In any piece of complicated machinery, where all the parts are carefully fitted together and move smoothly, we instinctively suppose that intelligence had something to do with it. So, when we see order and harmony on a far larger scale in the cosmos, we naturally infer an intelligence which operated on the cosmos, as well as in it, to make it what it is. This reasoning, when thus applied to the cosmos, justifies the inference of an extra-mundane intelligence which shall afford an adequate reason for the facts of order

in the universe. This fully meets the demand of causation, for it provides an uncaused cause, and a sufficient reason for certain phenomena in the cosmos. The validity of this inference turns on the legitimacy of the inference of intelligence from order. Are we justified in making this inference? We justly make it in regard to problems of order which human mechanism presents. Are we justified in making a similar inference in regard to the evident and extensive order exhibited in what may be called the mechanism of nature? We are inclined to believe that such an inference is legitimate, if no other hypothesis meets the case. It has already been shown that neither chance, nor fate, nor immanent order affords a rational explanation, so that we are urged on by the rational demand for a sufficient reason and adequate ground, to adopt the theistic postulate as the only rational solution of the problem. In this we securely rest.

It is proper to add that this proof has its *limits,* and it has to be construed along with those already expounded. It does not prove a *creator* of the universe, nor does it justify the conclusion that the intelligence which it postulates is *infinite.* It simply announces that an intelligence adequate to explain all the facts must be assumed. Then other proofs already opened up having given us the presumption of a being corresponding to the idea we have of him, and that such a being is necessarily existing and infinite, we find in this notion of God the theistic postulate, which we use, in harmony with the principle of causation, to give a truly rational solution of the problem of order in the cosmos.

CHAPTER IX.

THE COSMICAL PROOFS: PROOF FROM COSMIC DESIGN.

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Janet's *Final Causes.*—McCosh's *Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation,* Part II.—Flint's *Theism,* Chaps. V., VI.—Diman's *The Theistic Argument,* Chaps. IV.–VII.—Patton's *Syllabus of Theism.*—Fisher's *Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief,* Chap. II.—Paley's *Natural Theology.*—Hicks' *Critique of Design Arguments,* Chaps. I.–XVIII.—*The Bridgewater Treatises.*—Lindsay's *Recent Advances,* Chap. VII.—Bowne's *Studies in Theism,* Chap. IV.—Orr's *Christian View of God and the World,* Chap. III., 3.—Rishell's *The Foundations of the Christian Faith,* Div. VII., Chap. II.—Dabney's *Theology,* Chaps. I., II.—Hodge's *Systematic Theology,* Vol. I., Part I., Chap. II.—Foster's *Systematic Theology,* Part II., Chap. I., 3.—Shedd's *Dogmatic Theology,* Vol. I., Div. III., Chap. III.—Strong's *Systematic Theology,* Part II., Chap. II., 2.—Thornwell's *Collected Writings,* Vol. I., Chap. II.—Miley's *Systematic Theology,* Part I., Chap. II., 3.—Conder's *Basis of Faith,* Chap. IV.—Fraser's *Philosophy of Theism,* Vol. II., Chap. III.—Mill's *Three Essays on Religion,* Part I.—Stirling's *Philosophy and Theology,* Chaps. IV.–VI.—Ebrard's *Apologetics,* Vol. I., Part I., Book I., Sec. I., 85, and Book II., Secs. I. II.—Stokes' *Natural Theology,* Chaps. I., II.—Beattie's *Methods of Theism,* Part II., Chap. V.—Thomson's *Christian Theism,* Book II., Chap. VI., 1.

I. *Preliminary.* § 86.

1. THE fourth phase of the cosmical argument remains for exposition in this chapter. We are now to enter the wide domain of what older writers called natural theology. We are to consider the proof for the existence of God based on the traces of *design* which appear in the universe. It is often designated the argument from *final causes.* In some respects this is one of the most venerable of all the theistic proofs, and its directness and force have been very generally recognized. On this account it has a very large place in the writings upon this subject. It is the only proof which has a definite place in the Scriptures, where it is found especially in the Book of Job. Its influence on ordinary minds is evidently greater than that of any of the proofs, except perhaps the moral argument. Kant frankly acknowledges its force and effectiveness; for when he is whetting the sword of his destructive criticism against it, he admits that it is an old argument worthy of much respect. And modern mechanical and evolutionary theories of the universe are expending much effort in our own day to explain away design or finality, and to account for the facts in nature which these terms denote without assuming intelligence. This proof, therefore, is of crucial importance to the theistic view of the universe.

2. The *history* of this proof is full of interest. It is as old as Socrates at least, though the doctrine of νους, suggested by Anaxagoras to account for certain features in the cosmos, seems to have been an anticipation of the teleology of Socrates. Plato, with great beauty, unfolds the same proof in the *Timæus,* and Aristotle, who lays so much stress on the proof for a first cause, is not without allusions to the proof from design also. In the middle ages, Sebonde reasoned in a teleological way at a time when the schoolmen were chiefly occupied with ontological

speculations. In modern times, Niewentyt in Holland appears as the forerunner of Paley in England. And Paley, in turn, is usually regarded as the founder of that teleological method of natural theology which appears in the *Bridgewater Treatises,* and in many other writings, wherein this proof is elaborated in various forms, and illuminated by numerous instances of design in nature. For a time after Paley, and especially among English apologists, this proof had a very wide scope given to it, and it was relied on very generally to vindicate the reality of the divine existence. In our own day, it is very much more clearly defined, and has its proper place given to it beside the other lines of proof.

3. Hosts of *critics,* especially in recent times, have risen up in arms against the argument from design. It is very evident that the opponents of theism recognize this proof for the exstence of God to be one of the strongholds of theism. The result is that the principle of final cause, and the theistic inference based upon it, have been subjected to the severest scrutiny. But at the present day, those who support the validity of the theistic argument have every reason to be satisfied with the results of this criticism, for much good has come out of it. The admission is freely made that many writers on natural theology half a century ago were more eloquent than logical, and sometimes mistook illustration for proof. Yet it does not follow that the principle which underlies their reasonings is not sound. Even if we grant that the early writers on natural theology put more theistic content into the conclusion than the premises warranted, when they inferred an infinite creator from the facts of design, still it can be successfully maintained that they did splendid service against atheism and deism. The criticism to which this proof has been subjected has exhibited its central principle more clearly, and has confined its inference more strictly to the facts of the problem it solves. On this account the argument from design has been

made more effective than ever. Janet, in his great treatise on *Final Causes,* amply justifies this statement. The presence of teleology, as inherent in the universe, is now more fully assured than ever, and the necessity for a proper explanation of it is even more urgent than a generation ago. It is also worth while noting the fact that modern evolutionary doctrines, which profess to supersede teleology altogether, can scarcely express themselves without using the language of design, adaptation, or adjustment. Teleology, therefore, cannot be discarded, but must be properly explained.

II. *The Principle of this Proof.* § 87.

1. By some writers this *principle* is called that of special order. McCosh applies the term special ends to it, as distinguished from typical forms. As the latter is the proof from order, so the former is the argument from design. But this is only a general statement, and we must endeavor to show more clearly the principle involved in design, or adaptation of means to ends, as it appears in nature. That principle may be called *teleology* or *finality,* for these terms mean the same thing. Perhaps the best term to denote the principle of this proof is that of *final cause.* This title has the advantage of signalizing the idea of *ends* in nature, and of associating this argument with the principle of causation.

2. To bring out clearly the aspect of causation involved in the principle of this proof, Aristotle's fourfold view of causation may be noted. According to the Greek polymath, the cause of anything may be viewed as formal, material, efficient or final cause. Its *formal* cause is the scheme or plan according to which it is framed; its *material* cause is the material out of which it is constructed; its *efficient* cause is the agency involved in its production; and its *final* cause is the purpose for which it is brought into existence. In

the case of a house, for example, the plan of the architect is its formal cause, the materials of which it is built make its material cause, the workmen who build it are its efficient cause, and the purpose for which it is intended is its final cause. It is evident that the last aspect of causality has some relation to all the others; for the purpose we have in view determines the plan of the house, and the plan affects the materials, and the materials modify the agency of the builders. So, in nature, the principle of finality, if its presence be admitted, has a wide sweep.

Without admitting the value of all that is implied in Aristotle's doctrine, it is evident that it serves to bring out the real distinction between the *efficient* and the *final* aspects of causality. The former denotes the agency which effects any change; the latter suggests the purpose for which the change is brought about. In the one case, the power producing an event, and in the other the reason for it, is expressed. The first is mainly a dynamical and the latter chiefly a rational conception. In this way *agency* and *end* are distinguished. It is further evident that the aspect of causation which is prominent in the principle of this proof is that of sufficient reason. On this account final cause and sufficient reason are closely related. If there be design, or adaptation, or final cause in nature, a sufficient reason for it must be provided. If there be teleology in the world, it must be rationally accounted for. If there be finality in things, an adequate explanation of this fact must be given. All of which shows that final cause and sufficient reason imply each other.

3. But the principle of this proof, thus suggested in a general way, has had various *interpretations* given to it. Some say that it bids us argue *to* design, and others contend that it leads to an inference *from* design. In the former case, we have mainly to vindicate the fact that design or finality pertains to nature, and in the latter we undertake to infer an extra-cosmic intelligence from design or finality.

It may be nearer the truth to maintain that the principle of the proof now under discussion embraces both of these views. We may be said to reason *to* design when we show that finality or teleology is a fact inherent in nature, and we argue *from* design when we proceed to infer intelligence from this finality. Some writers, like Hicks, contend that we cannot state the teleological proof without taking for granted the very intelligence we are seeking to prove. But this is a mistake from which we may be saved if we keep the distinction just noted in mind. So far as finality is concerned, it simply means that in nature things seem to be fitted for each other, and that certain ends are related to certain means. At this stage we need not decide whether the means determine the ends, or the ends bring the means into play. The simple fact that they are linked together in nature is what design, or finality, expresses. At this stage, it cannot be said that intelligence is simply assumed in finality. But when the fact of finality in nature has been established, a sufficient reason for this feature of the cosmos must be discovered. The postulate of an extra-cosmic intelligence supplies it for this proof, just as it affords the sufficient reason for the facts of order in nature according to the eutaxiological proof. In a word, we *find* finality in nature, and *infer* intelligence from finality.

4. But what is this design or adaptation? What particular feature of the cosmos does teleology or finality denote? The proper answer to these queries gives the *principle* of this proof. In general, it may be said that design or teleology implies an end, a plan or an ideal which is forecast and realized in nature. This general statement implies two related things. First, we observe in nature what looks like *ends* towards which its activities are directed. An ideal future result seems to be forecast, and in nature there appears a tendency towards its realization. It might almost be called nature's prediction and fulfilment. This is what Ebrard fittingly calls *design-setting* in nature. This

simply means that somehow nature seems to have what looks like purpose and forethought. Secondly, we also observe in nature that certain *means* come into play, and are made effective towards securing the forecast ends. By virtue of these means the plan is matured, and the ideal realized. In some remarkable way the means and the end, the tendency and the ideal, the resources and the plan, seem to be linked together in such a manner that the end is attained, the ideal is realized, and the plan is completed. This is what nature exhibits to observation.

These, then, are the two main features of design or finality. A design seems to be set for nature, and conditions arise which bring it into effect. Certain ends seem to be projected, and agencies operate to effect those ends. The analogy between this aspect of nature and human activity is often used to illustrate this principle and its application. While analogy is useful for purposes of illustration, care must be taken not to look upon the proof from design as merely an analogical mode of reasoning.

5. The precise *relation* of design or *finality* to *causality* has been much discussed and variously understood. Some writers look upon them as entirely distinct principles; others construe one in relation to the other. Some hold that both finality and causality are *a priori* in their nature; while others deny the *a priori* nature of one or both of these facts. Reid, Porter, and intuitionalists generally, regard the principle of design as *a priori,* or intuitive, while Mill and Janet, in quite different senses, look upon finality as inductive or analogical. What, then, is the relation of finality to causation? In our classification of the theistic proofs, we construed the proof from design under the principle of causality. This implies a close relation between these two facts. The fact that we classify the proof from design under causation implies a certain *a priori* character about it, for causation has this character. The elements of causation which enter into final cause are efficiency and sufficient

reason. The fact of efficiency is involved in the efficacy of means to attain the projected ends, for thereby the ideal or design-setting is realized. To effect the changes involved in this process certain agencies are needed. These are provided by the fact of efficiency implied in causation. But this is not the main aspect of causality involved in finality. This efficiency takes a given direction as the means realize the end. This implies that there is something in the means which makes the end just what it is and not otherwise. This is the principle of sufficient reason, and it implies some sort of kinship between the means and the end. Hence, finality is causation looking towards and realizing an end, and the principle of the teleological proof consists in an application of the principle of causality to the facts in nature which the term finality denotes. This we take to be a simpler and clearer view than to make finality and causality entirely distinct principles.

6. The relation of the principle of this proof to analogy needs to be clearly understood. What is the relation of *finality* to *analogy?* Is the theistic inference from design merely an argument from analogy? Analogy, it may be first explained, consists in the resemblance of relations between things that have something in common. Thus the foot of a chair is analogous to the foot of a horse, because the object denoted by the term *foot* sustains a like relation to the chair that it does to the horse. Though the objects themselves are very different, their relations are similar. Those who make the theistic proof from design turn on analogy argue from certain features in works of man's agency and skill to the adaptations of means to ends in nature. The inference is thereby made that since it is very evident that intelligence is involved in works of human skill, so also may similar intelligence be implied in the marks of design observed in nature. This use of analogy is prominent in Paley; and Janet, in the first part of his treatise, with acute discrimination, gives analogy a place in con-

nection with finality. Kant's criticism of the teleological proof assumes that analogy has much to do with the theistic inference it makes.

Careful *discrimination* is needed here. It is freely admitted that analogy may be of service in illustrating this argument, and in answering objections to it. At the same time, we incline to the opinion that mere analogy is not the real principle of the teleological proof. In that proof there are two stages. The first is the vindication of finality as inherent in nature, and the other is the theistic inference from that finality. In making good the former, analogy has much value. Here the analogy between what Janet calls "the industry of men" and "the industry of nature" is valid and of force. If in the former case we see that means are used to effect certain projected ends, so in the latter we may rightly conclude that a similar adaptation exists. But in both cases we simply establish finality in the two spheres in question, and the facts in the human sphere illustrate, by analogy, the facts in the sphere of nature. But the question still arises as to the cause or sufficient reason of finality in both cases. Here we pass, in both cases, from analogy to causation, when we make the inference from finality to intelligence. Causal efficiency is involved in the agency which renders the means effective for the ends in view, alike in the case of man's agency and skill, and in that of nature. And the feature of sufficient reason must also be assumed to account for the precise nature of the ends in view, and to exhibit the relation between the means and the ends where finality is present. Instead, therefore, of reasoning by analogy from human to divine intelligence, we rather infer, by virtue of causation, that the postulate of intelligence is needed to provide a sufficient reason for marks of design in both spheres. Hence, the form of logical inference from a watch, and from the eye, with their respective marks of finality, to an adequate intelligence, is precisely the same in both cases.

The fact that the agency and intelligence are more evident in the one case than in the other does not affect the principle of this proof. This principle, therefore, is not mere analogy. Analogy may vindicate and illustrate finality in nature, but causation is necessary to make the theistic inference from finality in nature. That this is true is evident from the fact that even after finality is shown to be inherent in nature, the question still remains as to whether this finality implies mechanism or intelligence to account for it. And if intelligence is necessary to explain finality in a rational way, the further question at once arises as to whether this intelligence is intra-cosmic or extra-cosmic. To answer these questions, the principle of causation is required, as will be more fully shown in the last section of this chapter.

It is very important to keep this *distinction* in mind. It protects the teleological argument from certain objections which are based on the assumption that it is merely analogical. It also shows that the theistic inference of this proof rests on the principle of causation, and that it is a legitimate application of that principle. Hence, we conclude that the theistc inference of the teleo-theistic proof is neither inductive nor analogical, but *causal*. Induction and analogy may establish and illustrate finality as a feature of nature, but the theistic inference here made consists in an application of the principle of causality to the facts of design, that is, finality, in nature.

III. *The Problem of this Proof.* § 88.

1. This *problem* is of vast extent and great variety. It includes all the marks of *design,* all the instances of the *adaptation* of means to *ends,* observed in nature. It embraces all those combinations in nature where *finality,* as distinguished from mere *order,* appears. These features of the cosmos constitute the materials of the proof, and present

the problem now to be solved. Two things have to be done in exhibiting the problem in a definite way. The facts have to be sketched in outline, and the reality of the design or finality therein implied has to be vindicated. In the older natural theology the first of these things was the main factor in this problem; but in our own day, owing largely to the influence of the hypothesis of evolution, the second has come to be a matter of vital importance in connection with this proof. In regard to the first, only the hem of nature's garment can be touched in setting forth the facts which constitute the problem. Limitations of space compel great condensation, and cause us to direct the reader's attention to current treatises on natural theology, and in respect to the second phase of the problem not much need be said here, inasmuch as the bearing of evolution on finality will be considered more fully in the third main division of this treatise. It is the less necessary to set forth a vast array of the facts, since the force of the inference made from them does not depend so much on the number of the facts as upon their nature and meaning. A few well assured instances of design, or cases of finality, really constitute the problem, and justify the theistic inference. Nor is there urgent need to follow out at any length the mechanistic explanation which modern evolution gives of these facts, since that very evolution can neither state its case nor make its assault upon the teleology of nature without using terms, such as end, adaptation, and adjustment, which carry with them a teleological meaning, in spite of all the protestations of naturalistic evolution to the contrary.

2. In setting forth certain of the facts which constitute the problem of this proof some of the *larger instances* of finality in nature may first be mentioned. Here we come within sight of the facts of order in the cosmos; for in many cases the law and harmony therein seems to have an end or purpose in view. In such cases order and design are both present, and it is the latter with which we are now

concerned. All that is involved in the fact of gravitation, in the way of effecting the end of a stable universe, is part of the problem. The position and power of the sun in relation to the planets of our solar system to the end that it is the centre of regular motion, the fountain of light, and the source of heat, so that the solar system may be preserved, and the life upon this earth be perpetuated, supply many instances of finality. The procession of the equinoxes, and the revolution of our earth upon its axis, to the end that there may be successive seasons, and recurring day and night, are pertinent cases of adaptation of means to ends. The qualities of the ether in relation to light, and the atmosphere with reference to sound, supply many striking instances of design. The phenomena of evaporation, condensation and precipitation, to the end that the waters of the sea may be carried to the fields and forests of the dry land, so as to keep it fertile and render it fruitful, are striking instances of the facts of this problem. The relation of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, in the matter of the interchange of oxygen and carbon, and the various recuperative resources of nature, reveal instances of finality.

3. The observation of *organisms* in the animal kingdom shows that in particular *organs* there are many striking instances of finality, wherein the adaptation of the various parts of the organ realizes an end whose purpose can hardly be mistaken. The eye, with its varied, complex and delicate organization, and the remarkable combination of its entire structure to the end that vision may be realized, is the classic instance of finality in single organs. Then the human hand, with its palm, and fingers, and thumb, and joints, and the evident combination of all of these to certain well-defined ends; the wings of the bird, combining strength, rapid motion and little weight in a very high degree, to the end that flight may be realized; the webbed feet in water-fowl, the fins of fishes, the ear in various animals, and ten thousand instances of which full descriptions may be found

in books on natural theology, present another group of the facts composing this problem.

4. The organic kingdom exhibits many instances of the *correlation* of organs with each other for certain evident purposes. Here the adjustments are often very marked. The relation of the heart to the lungs for the purification of the blood is a pertinent case of finality. As the blood is forced into the lungs it comes into contact with the fresh air which respiration brings into their cells, and there, by a curious chemical process, the excess of carbon is given off, and certain elements of oxygen taken in, so that the blood is sent on its way through the body purified. The teeth and the digestive organs of various animals are fitted for each other in a most undoubted way. In carnivorous, herbivorous and omnivorous animals, respectively, the teeth and digestive apparatus are so adjusted to each other that the one could scarcely subsist on the food of the other. Even the appropriation of food would be difficult, save in harmony with this adjustment. The short neck and long trunk of the elephant, the long legs and long neck of the crane, the thumb in relation to the fingers of the hand, and the eye-brows with reference to the eyes, are familiar instances of this group of facts exhibiting finality.

5. Then the adaptation of organs to certain *functions* is equally evident, and introduces some new factors into the problem. Here organs are not so much coördinated with each other, as associated with some function which they are suited to serve, for the welfare of the organism. The feet of man, or beast, or bird, seem to have been constructed for the purpose of walking, and this, in each case, according to its own definite type. The case of the wings of birds is very remarkable, as may be seen in the humming-bird or the eagle. Here the industry of nature far surpasses the industry of man, for man has never yet made a really successful flying-machine. The same is true of the fins of fishes for swimming, the eyes of animals for seeing, the

ears for hearing, the heart for the circulation of the blood, the hands for grasping, the nose for smelling, and numberless other cases, are all instances of adaptation which belong to this problem.

The objection which organic evolution makes to these facts, to the effect that the *function* produced the *organ,* need only be mentioned here, and dismissed with the single remark that function, at first, according to the evolutionist, could only mean sense of need; and that sense of need has never yet been clearly proved competent to produce an entirely new organ. It may be admitted that organ and function are closely related, and that function may modify organ to some extent, yet it must be held, in the light of all the facts, that, from the nature of the case, organ logically conditions function and makes it possible.

6. The adaptation of organs to *environment* gives another group of instances of finality. Here we find organs adjusted in various ways to the medium wherein their destiny is to be worked out. The lungs to the air, the eye to light, the ear to the atmosphere, fins to the water, oil for the feathers of water-fowl, warm fur for animals in cold countries, the summer and winter plumage of birds in certain climates, the feature of mimicry in certain insects and animals, whereby the color of their bodies comes to resemble their immediate environment, the formation of organs in young mammals for a prospective environment very different from that of their embryonic state, and scores of similar cases, illustrate this group of the facts where finality is to be observed. The objection here made by organic evolution, that environment may have produced the organ and the function, need only be noted here, and set aside with the remark that, while environment may modify existing organs, it has never been known to produce entirely new organs. Much less can it account for organs originating in one environment, with the end in view of discharging functions in an entirely different environment, as, for ex-

ample, the eyes and ears of a young mammal. This must suffice as a brief survey of the facts where the problem of finality lies. What looks like means and ends is in nature.

7. Before we pass to the solution of the problem, the *reality* of design, as inherent in the facts of this problem as briefly recited, must be assured, for if there be no finality there might be no real problem, and consequently no basis for the theistic inference.

Three remarks may serve, first of all, to limit our view of the problem to its proper materials. First, we do not feel called upon to show that *everything* in nature must have some final cause in order to make good the reality of the problem of finality. Some of the older writers on natural theology perhaps erred in this respect, in seeking to find finality in everything. It may not be possible to do this, and it certainly is not necessary to the reality of the problem. Secondly, we shall be careful not to postulate *finality* where it does not really exist in the combinations of nature. To say that noses were made to wear spectacles, that trees were made for squirrels to climb, or that the tide rises for sea-bathing purposes, illustrates this limitation. These and many similar cases are no part of the problem of finality. And, thirdly, instances where nature's combinations produce *pain* are not necessary parts of finality, unless it can be shown that the production of pain is the end nature has in view by the combination in question. The nerve of the tooth is not for the purpose of producing toothache, arsenic does not exist in order to cause death, nor does the appendix form part of the human system with a view to the production of disease. If due consideration be given to this point, the objection to teleology in nature, based on the fact of pain, will be greatly minimized. These three observations lead us to confine the materials of the problem strictly to cases wherein *finality* is an assured fact. The combinations in nature must clearly have in view the securing of some definite end before design or finality can

be asserted of any combinations. This limits the problem to its legitimate sphere.

8. But even in this sphere, is design a fact, is finality really present, is teleology inherent in cases in nature where means and ends seem to be rationally related? Those who give a purely mechanical interpretation of nature, and those who hold a definite monistic theory of real existence, are ready to deny that there is any finality which requires an *extra-cosmic* explanation. As this point comes up still more definitely in the next section of this chapter, all we need now say is that the common instinctive judgments of men are in favor of the postulate of finality in nature. Many of the mythological interpretations of nature imply this; and much of the scientific and economic uses to which the resources of nature are put in our own day involve finality. And the evolutionary hypothesis, neither in its Darwinian, Spencerian nor Weissmanian form, has been able to exorcise teleology from nature. We are pretty safe in assuming that in nature there is *design* as well as order, *finality* as well as law, and *teleology* as well as agency.

IV. *The Solution of the Problem.* § 89.

That design or finality is inherent in nature is now taken for granted. That certain things in the cosmos are connected in a teleological way may be assumed. This being the case, we have a problem to *solve*. The various theories presented for its solution must be passed under review. In particular, we must see whether the theistic inference is needed for its adequate solution.

1. From the nature of the case *materialists* must hold that there is no finality in nature, and that what appears to be design is simply mechanism. This, of course, leaves no basis for intelligence or the theistic inference. According to this general view, the facts of design must be explained as matters of chance or necessity. Things just

happen so, or they must be so. There is in nature no such adaptation of means to ends as to imply purpose and intelligence. There is really no spiritual principle in the cosmos, and all the facts of supposed finality must be construed in terms of matter and force. Then, since matter is dead and force blind, mechanical contingency or necessity must account for those features in nature which look like design. Nature, by a series of *happy hits* through long ages, finally succeeded in producing the phenomena of finality. In a word, this theory puts chance in the place of design. There is no finality and no theistic inference.

The only remark we need now make concerning this theory is that if *chance* cannot account for the *order* of the cosmos, much less can it explain *design*. We saw in the foregoing chapter that neither chance nor fate can account for law and order in the universe; and now we may say that much less can it supply a rational explanation of the finality which constitutes the problem of this proof. If the fact of finality be admitted, then chance cannot explain it; and if finality be denied, then everything in nature is mechanism without rationality. Then difficulties arise. How many happy hits would it take to produce an eye, or to construct the organs of digestion? Reason practically refuses to believe that it could ever be done. Indeed, we might go further, and say that if finality be excluded from nature, *science* would be impossible. There can be no science of absolute chaos, or of things that are entirely contingent. In a word, teleology and science are not only consistent, but they imply each other. And, in addition to all these considerations, the theory of chance to account for finality is open to all the objections which lie against materialism.

2. A second theory is advanced by those who are under the influence of various types of *idealism* or phenomenalism. They deny that finality has any objective reality at all. Design is merely *subjective,* and is thought into things.

This general theory may grow out of Kant's phenomenalism or Mill's empiricism, though it is usually connected with the former. According to this view, finality, like causality, is simply a *rule* of the understanding, which is valid for phenomena alone. In the region of noumena there is no adaptation of means to ends. We construe nature under certain subjective laws, whereby it assumes the appearance of finality. Finality is a law of *thought*, but not a law of *things*. In this way finality is excluded from nature, unless we hold that the only nature there is consists in that which the understanding itself constructs, and into which the mind projects its own finality.

This theory is marked by all the *defects* of empiricism and subjective idealism. The wide separation between phenomena and noumena made by Kant is unreal, and his contention that the human mind does not come into rational relation with reality, is dangerous to a sound epistemology. If nature be held to be a system of related things, then subjective finality is an inadequate theory, for the reason, mainly, that finality is both a law of *thought* and a law of *things*. Hence, we do not so much think finality into nature as find it already there. Its presence in nature has to be accounted for; and the denial of its presence is no explanation of its nature.

3. A third attempt to avoid the theistic inference as the solution of design in nature is what Janet calls *immanent finality*. The fact that means are adapted to ends in nature is admitted. There is finality in nature, there is teleology in the cosmos. Nature does seem to set ends or make plans for herself, and then she appears to proceed to work them out. But the whole process is confined to nature, and does not justify any inference to an extra-cosmic ground. If the process postulates intelligence, this intelligence is still within the cosmos, and consequently there is no ground upon which to make the theistic inference. This is based on certain aspects of the Hegelian philosophy, according

to which, in a monistic way, an inner principle of logical development in the cosmos produces the features of finality which it exhibits. This principle, in some sense, is rational, yet it is little more than a blind and unconscious tendency that brings forth results which look like purpose and design. But it is all within the cosmos, which is taken to be self-contained and self-explanatory. The *anima mundi* of the old Stoics, the *plastic nature* of the later Platonists, and the *unconscious rationality* of recent Hegelians illustrate the views of nature with which this theory to explain finality is associated. The finality is immanent in nature, and requires no extra-cosmic explanation. The theistic inference, therefore, is not needed.

This theory is not adequate, mainly because the philosophy which underlies it is *one-sided* and incompetent. The idea of unconscious finality is almost a contradiction in terms. We must at last construe the facts of design under either mechanism or intelligence. If we do the former, we are on the ground of the theory of chance; if the latter, we open up the way for an extra-cosmic intelligence, and the theistic inference. Hence, if the fact of finality in nature be admitted, as it is by this theory, then the law of causality, which, as sufficient reason, is the principle of this proof, demands the postulate of an intelligent ground, which, as an uncaused cause, transcends the cosmos wherein the facts lie.

4. A fourth theory arises from an application of the hypothesis of *evolution* to the facts of design in nature. It usually presupposes the deistic view of the relation of God to the world, and holds that the world now, under the operation of natural laws, is working out its own destiny. The method of this working is evolution. We do not now require to discuss the scientific validity of the evolutionary hypothesis, but rather to consider its bearing upon the teleological proof. Does evolution eliminate finality from nature, and so destroy the basis of the theistic inference

founded thereon? Various types of evolution, of course, emerge here. We have that of Lamarck, Wallace and Darwin, which confines the hypothesis of transformism to the organic sphere, and that of Comte, Spencer and Hæckel, which gives it universal application.

The Darwinian type of this theory deals with the facts of biology, where many instances of design are supposed to lie. Darwinism supersedes finality by *natural selection,* and puts the survival of the fittest in the place of teleology. In this way nature's adaptations are all to be explained, and no theistic interpretation of the facts is required. The Spencerian type of evolution is much more pretentious. It claims to be a philosophy of all existence. At root it is *materialistic monism,* wherein the principle of mechanical evolution becomes at once the architect and the builder of the cosmos. It takes the atomic homogeneous, and differentiates it into heterogeneous forms of being, having even life and consciousness. It professes, by the method of natural history, to give an explanation of all the features of design in the universe, without any intelligent extra-cosmic key. Matter, force and motion account for everything under the magic operation of ontological evolution. In a word, cosmic evolution *dispenses* with finality altogether.

Not much need now be said to show that this theory is insufficient. Darwinism, while professing to supersede design by natural selection, and teleology by survival, constantly falls back on design and adaptation as a feature of nature. It constantly uses the terms "designed," "adaptation," "adjustment," "fitness," terms which very clearly imply finality in nature. Then, if unlimited variation happening by chance be the starting point of the theory, it is virtually on the ground of the theory of *chance,* and exposed to the objections already stated. If purpose or design be admitted anywhere in the working of the hypothesis of evolution, then finality, in nature at least, is conceded. Then

the process involved in its working needs an efficient cause, and the direction of the process towards a certain goal requires a sufficient reason. This again leads to the postulate of an uncaused cause. And Spencer's scheme is open to the same objections. A ground, a cause and a reason for the evolutionary process is needed, even if we admit the validity of the process itself. A purely mechanical interpretation of the cosmic finality, which makes our present problem, is inherently inadequate. At best, evolution is but a *process* and a *method;* the process needs a cause, and the method a reason. The theistic postulate supplies both.

5. The conclusion to which we are thus surely led is that neither mechanical chance, nor subjective finality, nor immanent teleology, nor cosmic evolution, solves our problem. We are, therefore, shut up to the only remaining postulate, and that is the supposition of a purposive intelligence, which holds an immanent and transcendent relation to the cosmic finality to be explained. This gives a sufficient reason for the facts of design. Then, in accordance with the principle of causation, this intelligence must be extra-cosmic. And this intelligence demands a spiritual reality in which it rests and of which it is an expression. Hence, the explanation of cosmic teleology is an extra-cosmic intelligence, and this extra-cosmic intelligence requires a spiritual being as its ground. This being is found in the infinite, necessary and rational being of whose real existence other theistic proofs have assured us. This is the *theistic inference* to solve the problem of finality in the universe.

Like the argument from order, this proof has its logical *limitations*. It does not prove a *creator*, nor does it lead to an *infinite* intelligence. Strictly speaking, it does not *prove* the existence of God. It rather takes the theistic postulate which the human mind can frame, and finds in this the *solution* of a well-defined cosmic problem. This in turn greatly confirms belief in the existence of God. This proof further enables us to clothe God with certain attributes.

Knowledge, foresight, wisdom, skill, power and goodness can now be rationally associated with the infinite and necessary being, whose existence, as a real being, was established in the psychical proofs.

This concludes the exposition of the cosmical proofs, and brings us well on our way. The principle of causation is the key of inference in each case. The universe in its cosmic *origin,* its cosmic *progress,* its cosmic *order,* and its cosmic *design,* has been studied. In each case an extra-cosmic agent and a supra-cosmic intelligence was required. This was discovered in the *theistic postulate,* whose rational validity is thereby greatly confirmed.

CHAPTER X.

THE MORAL PROOFS: MORAL THEORY: PROOF FROM THE IDEA OF RIGHT.

CONTENTS.

The Moral Argument.—Cogent and Effective.—Yet not alone to be relied on.—Rests on facts of Man's Moral Nature and Moral Government.—Moral Theory and Theistic Inference related.—Yet Theistic Inference not dependent on Moral Theory.—Types of Ethical Theory.—Four Classes.—Morality founded on Legal Restraint.—Morality based on Pleasure or Utility.—Morality the outcome of Evolution.—These defective.—Correct Doctrine.—Conscience original.—Right and Obligation ultimate.—Morality has universal Validity.—The problem of this Proof.—The Moral Faculty.—The idea of Right.—The fact of Moral Law.—These facts are not self-explanatory.—They need a ground.—This is found in God as Moral Ruler.—Moral Law in Man.—Moral Order over him.—Neither Produces the Other.—Both unified in God.

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I. *Preliminary.* § 90.

1. THE third class of theistic proofs is now reached. This consists in the different phases of the moral proof for the existence of God. This is one of the most cogent and effective of all the theistic proofs, and it is

perhaps less open to assault than any of them. Some writers are inclined to rely on it almost exclusively to establish the fact of the divine existence. Such writers sometimes go so far as to say that the moral faculty in man is the religious organ of the soul, and that the dictates of conscience are the voice of God in the human spirit. By means of this faculty, some contend that man has an immediate intuition of deity. The Kantian criticism is no doubt chiefly responsible for this emphasis on the moral side of the theistic proof, for after the great critical idealist had shown, as he thought, that all the intellectual proofs were inconclusive or contradictory, he fell back with a great deal of confidence on the moral proof for the existence of God. He discovers in the moral law, with its categorical imperative uttered in man's nature, a sure ground for believing in God, freedom and immortality. Hamilton takes nearly the same view when he says that for the belief in immortality and in the existence of God we must rest on the ground of man's moral nature. It may be now safely said that Kant and Hamilton separated the intellectual and the moral basis of the theistic inference too widely. That inference is valid in both spheres. God is the postulate equally of the *intellect* and the *conscience,* for he is absolute *truth* as well as absolute *right.* Flint is much nearer the sound position than Hamilton, and Luthardt than Kant.

2. In unfolding the moral proofs, we must keep in mind the fact that the theistic argument is *complex* and *cumulative.* The moral proof, in its several forms, is not the only valid reasoning for the existence of God. It is one of the many converging lines of proof, and has great logical force. But it is a mistake to rely on it alone to establish the reality of the divine existence. Other valuable theistic allies should also be called into service. In this way the psychical, the cosmical and the moral proofs are all to have their proper place, and they are all to be

bound together in a cumulative way, in what may be termed the theistic argument. The moral proofs have a very important place in this argument, but we are not compelled to rest upon them alone. This is now generally recognized.

3. The moral proofs rest, in general, upon the facts of man's moral nature, and upon the conditions of moral government under which he is placed. This being the case, it is evident that *moral theory* and *theistic proof* are very closely related. Writers differ as to the nature of this relation. Some think that the validity of the theistic inference does not depend upon any particular theory as to the nature of moral distinctions, and of the origin of the moral faculty. Others incline to the view that the force of this inference is dependent upon a sound moral theory. We are inclined to agree with Flint, who takes a middle view. His position, in substance, is that if we take the facts of man's moral nature as we find them, and seek to interpret the ideas of rightness and oughtness as they are in moral experience, we are justified in making the theistic inference therefrom, irrespective of any particular theory as to their real nature and origin. At the same time, we are persuaded that while this position is substantially sound, it may also be true that, if we hold an empirical theory of morals, and make morality derivative, the theistic basis of inference is not so secure as if we adopt some form of the rational or intuitive theory, and regard moral distinctions as ultimate, and the moral faculty as original in man's nature. If, therefore, the cogency and force of the theistic proof is affected by the type of moral theory adopted, theism cannot afford to be entirely indifferent to the theory of morals on which its inference rests. This being the case, a brief sketch of moral theories, and a careful statement of the sound doctrine, should be made at the outset.

II. *Types of Ethical Theory.* § 91.

In a somewhat general way, all types of ethical theory may be classified under four main heads, each of which has a distinct principle underlying it. Three of these deny that the moral faculty in man is an original factor in his constitution, or that the ideas of rightness and oughtness are ultimate and irreducible in their nature, while the fourth asserts that they are so.

1. To the first class of theories belong all those that discover the origin of moral distinctions and of obligation in some form of *outward law* or external authority. Hobbes and Bain, in different ways, represent this type of moral theory. Hobbes held a bald empirical theory. He asserted that the original of all the thoughts of man is to be found in the senses, and that there is no conception in man's mind which has not first, in whole or in all its parts, come from the organs of sense. In morals personal happiness plays a large part, and no common rule of good and evil is to be found in the nature of things. Where there is no civil authority, every man must be his own arbiter of what is good, and thus might makes right. Where civil authority is set up among men, that authority is the absolute judge of what is good and evil, and his sentence is the rule of right and wrong. In this way the law of the land becomes the ground of morality. According to Bain, conscience has an empirical origin, and moral distinctions are the product of external restraints, in which parental authority plays a large part. The first lesson the child learns is obedience, and with this is often associated pain or penalty for disobedience. Out of this experience the distinction between good and evil grows, and in later life social and civil restraints mature the moral experience.

According to this theory, *law* conditions *right,* and moral distinctions are originated out of the relation to external

restraint, and the pain which conflict with this restraint may produce. The sense of obligation, in the first instance at least, is nothing more than fear of pain, which springs from a violation of external restraint of some sort. It is clear that all such theories either presuppose the idea of right in the fact of law and restraint, or they place moral distinctions on an entirely arbitrary basis. In such case there can be no fixed standard of right, and no absolute basis for obligation. If law be not founded on right, it is only arbitrary command, and the unethical position is reached that will and *might make right* and duty. In a word, it professes to perform the impossible task of bringing an ethical experience out of a non-ethical state.

2. In a second class may be placed all those ethical systems which find the source of morality and the basis of obligation in some form of *self-love,* pleasure or utility. This general theory assumes various forms, and has had many advocates in ancient and modern times. Here we have hedonism, and egoism, and altruism, and many types of each; but they all agree in denying that conscience is an original faculty, or that moral distinctions are simple and ultimate. The moral good is identified with *pleasure,* and moral evil with *pain.* The right is that which is useful to me or to men generally; the wrong is that which is devoid of egoistic or altruistic utility. The basis of obligation lies in the fact that I should follow the dictates of the pleasant and the useful. My own welfare, or the general good, marks out the path of duty for me.

It is evident that hedonists and utilitarians do not show how facts in human experience which are first expressed in terms of pleasure, happiness or utility, come to be stated in terms of right, duty and obligation. They do not clearly show how the notions of *rightness* and *oughtness,* which may be called ethical *atoms,* are to be reduced to lower terms. Above all, we are convinced that none of these hedonistic or utilitarian schemes can fully explain the fact

of *obligation.* They may postulate it and lay stress upon it, but they can give no proper philosophy of it. They can never show how the pleasurable or the useful, which is merely *optional,* can ever, on their principles, be transformed into the dutiful, which is *obligatory.* Nor can they make it plain how the self-interestedness, from which they set out, can ever be transmuted into the disinterestedness which appears in human conduct, without violating the principles of their own theory. We may very freely admit that in the long run the useful and the right, utility and obligation, will agree; but we must refuse to concede that the basis of morality is utility. In a word, the right conditions the useful, not the useful the right.

3. A third class of moral theories includes those modern schemes which connect morality with the modern *hypothesis of evolution.* These theories are of quite recent origin. They all agree in denying the ultimate nature of moral distinctions, and they refuse to conscience any *a priori* quality. According to these theories, all the contents of the moral experiences of the individual and the race are to be accounted for by the principles of the doctrine of evolution. Spencer gives this scheme definite form in his *Data of Ethics,* and many writers have followed in his steps. In general, this theory contends that man, whether he came from the brute or no, was at first in a non-moral state. By slow degrees, as men mingled together in the exercise of simple social instincts, the idea of right and a sense of duty gradually dawned within them. The laws of natural selection, of competition, and of environment, had their influence in bringing this about, and the principle of heredity handed down the gain of one generation as an ethical inheritance to another. In this way, by slow degrees through countless ages, the notion of right became clearly defined, and the basis of obligation was securely laid. It may be observed that some of the features of the utilitarian theory pertain to this scheme, because the operation of the

laws of the evolutionary process are supposed to be working for the highest good of the whole.

The only remark we make upon this general theory is, that thorough-going evolutionists have never yet presented an adequate *philosophy* of moral facts. An absolute standard of right, and an obligatory basis of duty, are not yet provided by this scheme, and it is doubtful if it ever can be. Some advocates of evolutionary ethics come very near to the denial of an immutable right and an absolute basis of obligation. Spencer's attempt to show how the conduct of the dog at his master's feet has been transmuted, during long ages, into the ethical conduct of the man, cannot be regarded as satisfactory. And while we may admit that the advocates of this theory have done good service in certain respects, in giving a natural history of moral experience, yet it must be confessed that they give no adequate philosophy of the facts of that experience. The natural history they give has value only on the supposition that right, duty and obligation are simple, ultimate and irreducible factors in human nature and experience.

4. In a fourth class there may be placed those theories which hold, in one way or another, that conscience is an *original faculty* of human nature, that moral distinctions are *immutable* and ultimate, and that obligation is *absolute* in moral experience. This gives the true philosophy of moral facts. Right and ought are ethical *atoms,* and cannot be transmuted or reduced to lower terms. They are ethical ultimates. Socrates against the Sophists, and intuitionalists against the empiricists, are on the ground of a sound moral philosophy. Three simple statements make this philosophy plain.

First, it is held that conscience or practical reason is an *original factor* in the constitution of man. It is not the product of any sort of moral experience or education, but it is necessary to that experience and education. It matters not whether we call it the moral sense, or the ethical faculty,

or conscience, or the power of making moral judgments, this sense, faculty or power is a connatural factor in the nature of man. Here the old distinction between the rational and empirical theories of human knowledge appears in the sphere of morals.

Secondly, the distinction between good and evil, right and wrong, is an eternal and *immutable distinction.* The idea of rightness and the fact of oughtness are simple and ultimate. They cannot be reduced to lower terms, because they are not derived from any other facts or ideas. It matters not how men may differ in the application of moral distinctions, the fact remains that they make the distinction, and this fact lies at the foundation of a moral experience. The right gives an ultimate standard, and the ought supplies an absolute authority for a moral life.

Thirdly, moral distinctions have *universal validity.* By this is meant that right and wrong are not individual or relative notions. They have universal application and authority. The right is not merely for me, or for a few, but for all moral agents. If there be an eternal and immutable right, then man is not the measure of all things in the region of morals. What is right here is right everywhere; what is right on earth is right in heaven. These eternal principles of rectitude are revealed in and through the moral nature, and they supply the norm for the moral life. It is evident, therefore, that I do not construct them, but that they instruct me, and bind me in matters of my moral experience.

III. *The Proof from the Right: Its Problem.* § 92.

1. Having set forth in three particulars the elements of a correct ethical theory, the foundation is laid to unfold the *theistic proofs* which rest securely upon it. That conscience is an original faculty, that moral distinctions are

ultimate, and that moral law has universal validity, is now assumed as the basis of certain theistic inferences. Several lines of reasoning open up. The idea of moral *law,* the fact of moral *obligation,* the notion of a moral *good,* and the phenomena of a moral *history,* suggest these lines. The first of these now engages attention, and in this section a statement of its problem is to be made.

2. Conscience, or the moral faculty, perceives the distinction between things right and things wrong. This distinction implies a standard or rule which we call moral law. The idea of a morally right implies moral law, and if that right is an ultimate idea the fact of moral law is a fixed fact. This further implies a moral order, in which the factors in a moral life constitute a system of related things just as surely as nature is a system of related things under natural law. Moral law is not merely a subjective rule, but it is also an objective fact having universal validity. Moral law is objective, therefore, and hence emerges what may be called a moral government, under which man finds himself placed. This constitutes the *problem* of this proof.

3. It must be borne in mind that while the sound theory of morality gives this problem its most definite form, and provides the most secure basis for the theistic inference, yet the problem remains on any ethical theory that admits the reality of the fact of a moral experience. If men are found making the distinction between right and wrong with reference to some standard, and if they are conscious of a moral experience as a matter of fact, the problem still exists. There is here, in a certain sense, a moral order under which I find myself, and of this some proper explanation must be given. Here is the basis of an inference, and the materials of a line of reasoning which seeks a solution of the problem presented by the notion of right and moral law. Conscience must be accounted for, the moral distinctions of which it makes us aware are to be properly

explained, and the moral order which it shows that we are under has to be interpreted. This is the problem which here awaits solution.

IV. *The Proof from the Right: Its Solution.* § 93.

1. The inquiry now to be made is as to the *theistic* significance of the idea of right and wrong, and of the fact of moral law and government. This is simply a phase of the old question as to the foundation of virtue. Is conscience an entirely self-contained fact? Is the idea of right self-explanatory? Is the fact of moral law and order self-interpreting? Are the conditions of a moral experience the product of man himself, or does he find himself in that experience related to a moral order and government? Does this moral order require a ground beyond itself as its adequate explanation?

2. The reply which we make to these inquiries is that the theistic postulate is needed to explain the facts. Conscience is not self-explanatory. The distinction between right and wrong does not account for itself. And the fact of moral law and moral order is not self-interpreting, but the postulate of the existence of God and of his relation to man by means of moral government is needed. The metaphysics of ethics leads to theism. Man's moral nature finds its secure ground in God. Moral law and order would have no reality apart from God. Moral government would be without foundation if there were no moral governor. Conscience needs an author, moral law a lawgiver, and moral government a moral governor.

3. The *theistic postulate* fully solves the problem, and that postulate is needed to solve it. Having the fact of the existence of God fully confirmed by the proofs already unfolded, we are in a position to present this fact for the solution of the problem now under consideration. That necessary infinite being who is the uncaused cause and

abiding ground of the cosmic order and process may be presented as the *solution* of the moral order and process. In this way God is the postulate of moral law and order as he is of natural law and order. He is the ground of the right as well as of the true, the presupposition of the practical as well as of the pure reason.

Empiricists of both agnostic and positivist types deny the validity of this inference. They tell us that in moral science we are to deal only with the psychology and natural history of moral facts. In this way we construct what is a moral science rather than a moral philosophy. Then they insist that we should go no further, and that we have no right to make any philosophical deduction or theistic inference from the facts of our moral life. It is easy to see that empiricism is logically driven to this untenable position by the necessities of its own theory. If we are to deal only with facts in their coexistences and sequences, and never raise inquiry as to causes or grounds, we are shut up to a self-contained explanation of the facts of our moral life, and are debarred from making any philosophical or theistic inference. But we reject empiricism, and refuse to allow its claim against the validity of the theistic inference we are now making. Moral facts call not only for *scientific* treatment and classification, but also for *philosophical* treatment and interpretation. That interpretation is supplied by the theistic postulate which asserts that the nature of God is the foundation of morality, and the solution of the problem of a moral life. In this way the moral rule of God affords the key which rightly interprets that moral order under which man is placed, and of which he finds himself a part. Thus my moral life, through moral law and order, discovers a moral governor, who himself is not a moral subject.

4. This phase of the moral argument may have another turn given to it. This arises from the analogy between this proof and that form of the psychical argument which

is derived from the principle of intelligence in man. In that proof the laws of nature and the laws of thought were correlated in cognition in such a way that neither produced the other, but that both pointed to and found unity in God, who, as supreme intelligence, is the author and ground of both sets of laws. So we may argue in the sphere of our moral life. Moral law revealed in man's moral nature is correlated in his moral experience with the moral order under which, as a matter of fact, he finds himself placed. This subjective law and this moral order do not produce each other, yet they are *correlated* in man's moral life. Hence, the moral law revealed in conscience does not constitute the moral order to which man is related, nor does that moral order generate the law of right revealed in conscience. Yet they are not to be regarded as in irreconcilable dualism, for they are correlated in moral experience, and bound together in moral life and progress. How, then, is the problem of their correlation to be solved? If we say that the subjective rule produced the objective order, we have idealism in ethics. If we argue that the objective moral order produced the subjective moral rule, we have ethical empiricism. How can we avoid these alternatives? We reply that the *theistic postulate* provides the ground of *unity* for both. If we hold that both the objective and subjective law and moral order are unified in God, who is at once the author and ground of both aspects of moral law and order, we may be near the truth. This gives a turn to this proof which brings it abreast of the best in recent ethical speculation, and provides a secure basis for the theistic inference in the moral sphere. It shows that God has instituted a *moral order* and government in the universe, which is other than, though related to, the *natural order* therein. He has placed man under this government, made him a part of this moral order, and has given him a nature suitable to this relation. God then reveals his moral law and order in man's moral life, and man discovers this

law in his moral experience. In this way the problem of a moral life and experience from one point of view is solved by the theistic postulate. Moreover, this, in turn, confirms our belief in the reality of the divine existence, and enables us to clothe the first cause and ground of the universe with *moral attributes*. And subsequent moral proofs will further enlarge our vision upon this point.

This turn given to the moral proofs reveals the important fact that the natural and moral orders are not entirely unrelated to each other. If the spiritual principle which is immanent in nature constitutes the ground of intelligibility in nature, that same principle immanent in the moral order may be the ground of morality. Hence both the natural and moral orders find their principle of unity in this spiritual principle, which in turn relates itself to God by the theistic postulate.

CHAPTER XI.

THE MORAL PROOFS: PROOF FROM THE FACT OF OBLIGATION AND THE IDEA OF THE GOOD.

Contents.

The Fact of Obligation defined.—Goes with Right and Moral Law. — Relation of Rightness and Oughtness. — Obligation a fact of Consciousness.—Socrates, Butler, Kant, Green and Sidgwick.—Conscience has Authority whose Imperative is lifted up in a Moral Life.—Solution of the Problem.—The Theistic Import of Obligation.—Ground of Obligation is not found in any one Power of the Soul.—Nor in all the Faculties combined.—Nor even in the Moral Nature itself.—The Ground transcendent.—The Theistic Postulate gives it.—The Ground is in God.—The Highest Good.—The relation of the Right to the Good.—The Good defined.—Not Happiness merely.—Nor Knowledge only.—Nor Righteousness alone.—The goal or end towards which all the Powers coöperate in seeking True Self-realization.—It ever has a Moral Quality.—Plato and Green.—The Solution of the Problem.—Man sets a *summum bonum* before him.—Strives to attain it.—Does not rise from any one Faculty.—Nor from all.—Its Ground and Motive found in God.

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I. *The Proof from Obligation: Its Problem.* § 94.

1. THE theistic significance of the fact of *obligation* is now to be studied. The inquiry thus entered on is closely connected with that of the preceding chapter, and the results of the exposition of moral theories then made are to be still kept in view. Then the nature of conscience was explained; now its authority is to be considered. Then the notion of rightness was interpreted; now the meaning of the fact of obligation is to be sought. Then the significance of moral law engaged attention; now the binding nature of that law is to be investigated. Then the contents of a moral life were surveyed; now the imperative nature of that life is to be considered. Then the wide scope of moral order was scanned; now the sanctions involved in that order are to be understood. Then *rightness,* now *oughtness,* is the starting-point of the proof. If the former might be called the ortho-theistic proof, the latter may be termed the deonto-theistic.

2. The fact of obligation does not need much exposition after what has already been said about moral theory. It is simply a matter of consciousness in moral experience. It is the invariable *concomitant* of the recognition of moral law, and the perception of moral distinctions. Moral obligation as realized in consciousness speaks with no uncertain sound. It utters its voice not in terms of a persuading *may,* which would render obedience merely optional; nor does it command us with an arbitrary *must,* which would make obedience mechanical. It rather addresses us with an emphatic *ought,* which renders obedience imperative. It is an inward, unavoidable exhortation to duty. It implies the burden of moral responsibility. Hence, obligation as it rises in consciousness is neither a sense of what is *optional,* nor a feeling of *arbitrary* compulsion, but the conviction of a moral *imperative* in the soul. It is a call to duty, and

its nature is such that it may not be disregarded. Oughtness is perhaps the best single, though rather clumsy, word to denote the fact of obligation.

3. The relation of *oughtness* to *rightness* is intimate. The notion of right, which some prefer to call the moral good, is the foundation fact. If there be no absolute right as an ultimate fact, there can be no imperative obligation as an authority from which there is no appeal. An absolute moral imperative depends on an ultimate right. This right expresses itself through conscience as moral law in a moral life. This law is at once the expression of the right, and the norm by which the moral life is to be regulated. This moral law is not a positive enactment, but a moral principle which pertains to the ultimate conditions of a moral life. This law, thus viewed, implies a moral order of which my moral life forms a part; and my moral life is a part of this moral order not by my own choice. I have not constituted this order, for I find myself placed under it by the very fact that I have a moral nature, and am capable of a moral life. It is out of these inherent conditions that the fact of obligation arises. I find myself the subject of a moral life, which can only be regarded as part of a moral order whose principles appear in that life as an imperative. Hence, whenever the right is recognized, my actions must be construed in relation to the law which reveals the right, and duty as obligatory opens its path before me. Rightness becomes oughtness, law prescribes duty, morality announces obligation, and obedience is revealed as an imperative.

4. Obligation, therefore, is a *fixed fact* in consciousness. Nothing can dislodge the imperative of oughtness from the consciousness of a moral life. It matters not what view we take of the metaphysics of this moral life, the fact of obligation remains, to some degree at least, in force. If we hold an inductive or derivative theory of morals, the fact of obligation has to be reckoned with. And such

theories always seek to show how that which is at first merely optional is transmuted into the obligatory in a moral life. Thus the authority of conscience, whatever may be its origin, is recognized. The fact of the imperative in a moral life, no matter what the principles of that life may be, cannot be ignored. The regnant power of moral law, as an element of consciousness, is simply an undeniable fact. This, then, constitutes the *problem* of this theistic proof. How are the imperative of conscience and the regnant power of moral law, as experienced in a moral life, to be rationally explained?

The real nature of this problem is made very plain by writers on ethics. Socrates clearly announces it. Butler expresses it when he says of conscience and moral law, that "if they had might as they have right, they would rule the world." Kant's striking phrase, "the categorical imperative," of practical reason, represents it in a very forcible way. Those who represent the good as the fundamental fact in a moral life, whether this be regarded as distinctly ethical, as Green argues, or as somewhat utilitarian, as Sidgwick reasons, all agree in asserting that the pursuit of this good, as the end of human activity, is imperative. It is not conditional and optional; it is categorical and imperative. It addresses the moral life in the imperative, not in the optative mood. Thus, again, the problem emerges.

5. The fact that there is a moral imperative in our moral life, and that conscience has unquestioned authority therein, is confirmed by the further consideration that when this imperative is not heeded, it lifts up its voice, and pronounces us *guilty*. Thus, it comes to pass that when we disobey moral law, as expressed through conscience, we find that a feeling of self-condemnation rises up in the moral life. This sense of guilt, this feeling of moral disapprobation, testifies to the reality and authority of the moral imperative which has been ignored or transgressed.

If obedience to moral law, if the pursuit of the higher ends rather than the lower were merely optional, moral approbation and disapprobation would not so surely and so keenly arise. The fact that it does so arise testifies to the reality of the authority of conscience, and the imperative which is invariably associated with moral law. This, once more, is the *problem* of this theistic proof. How are we to account for the categorical imperative which lifts up its voice in a moral life? How is the *absolutism* of conscience to be explained? How are we to interpret the *de jure* authority of moral law? How is moral responsibility to be interpreted? Does the problem justify the theistic inference?

II. *The Proof from Obligation: Its Solution.* § 95.

1. The theistic import of the authority of conscience, as expressed in the fact of obligation, awaits consideration. The question now raised is one of the central aspects of the moral argument, and at the same time one of its most forceful. Does the fact of moral obligation, with its accompanying sense of responsibility, require a ground which lies outside of man's moral nature, and beyond the experiences of his moral life? Can all the elements of that life, which stand related to the imperative of duty in the human soul, be explained out of the resources of that life? Is the authority of the moral order, of which man is a part, immanent in that order, or is it also transcendent?

2. To open up the way for a satisfactory *solution* of this problem, the relation of the authority of conscience to the activity of the other faculties of man's nature must in some measure be understood. A little reflection shows that the authority of conscience, and the imperative of moral law, are not derived from the other faculties of the human constitution. The intellect cannot supply this authority and imperative, because the intellect is not primarily moral at all; and then, so far as its judgments enter the region of

a moral life, they are determined by moral law. The sensibility cannot provide the requisite ground, for the reason that the feelings, so far as they have moral quality, are conditioned upon the exercise of conscience in the moral life. And the will is not adequate to give the basis of the imperative which is involved in moral obligation, for the reason that the will is the servant of conscience, and is under orders from moral law. The will is not the basis of the authority of conscience, but rather the instrument of its expression, and hence subservient to it.

It is thus evident that conscience, with the moral law which it expresses, is *supreme* over all the other faculties of man's nature. They all render allegiance to it, and acknowledge its authority. This being the case, the authority of conscience is not derived from any other faculty; nor can it be said that all the other faculties, in their combined exercise, provide the basis of that imperative which appears in a moral life.

3. The question next arises as to the sufficiency of conscience and moral law itself to supply an adequate ground for the fact of obligation. Is conscience self-explanatory in the matter of moral obligation? Is a merely subjective or immanent explanation of obligation sufficient? A little reflection serves to justify the conclusion that it can scarcely be so. The spontaneous conviction of the moral life is in the direction of supposing a moral ruler, whose will, as expressed in moral law, is the foundation of the obligation which announces itself in that life. Responsibility, in the last analysis, relates itself to a moral governor, and obligation under moral law finally rests in a moral lawgiver.

And this is greatly confirmed by the very nature of moral obligation. The moral imperative it announces is a bond from which, by our own powers, we cannot set ourselves free. We find ourselves under the dominion of responsibility, with no door of escape from its authority open. Now, if we had *tied* ourselves up under moral law by our

own volition, then, presumably, we could in like manner *untie* ourselves whenever we chose. If we ourselves had issued the imperative which declares its authority in our moral life, then surely we could recall it whenever we pleased. But consciousness testifies that we are unable to recall this imperative, or to untie the bonds of obligation which we find upon us. It seems pretty clear, therefore, that we are consciously under an authority which is neither self-explanatory nor self-imposed. This implies that moral law and life does not in itself contain the foundation of its own authority, as expressed in the fact of obligation.

4. This leads to the last step in the inference. The ground of moral obligation, though expressed in the experiences of a moral life, must lie beyond that life. There must be a *transcendent* basis for that sense of responsibility which moral law imposes on us. If this ground be not in the other faculties of man's nature, and if it be not in the moral life itself, but is rather expressed therein, it must lie beyond all these facts. If the moral order, of which man is a part, does not explain its own imperative; if moral law, which expresses itself in a moral experience, does not contain in itself the ground of its absolute authority; if conscience, as the organ which gives the sense of responsibility, is not itself the final basis of moral obligation; and if that obligation, which is realized in a moral life, is not self-explanatory, then we must go beyond all of these, and discover somewhere a *transcendent ground* for these aspects of moral order, law and life.

The question as to where this ground lies is now easily answered. In previous theistic proofs we have found that a necessary, infinite and intelligent being has real existence; and that this being is the efficient cause of the universe in its cosmic origin, and the sufficient reason of its cosmic progress, order and design. This being, whose existence, natural attributes and immanent relation to the universe, have been already vindicated, may now be postulated as

the adequate transcendent ground of the fact of obligation, and of the imperative which it asserts in the moral life. This being, we have already seen, is the *ground* of the idea of right and of the fact of moral law. He now appears as the *basis* of obligation. If his nature as moral is expressed in moral law, then this law, as expressed in a moral life, provides the authority which appears in that life. The theistic postulate thus supplies the transcendent ground for the fact of moral obligation, and this fact, in turn, requires this postulate. This is the solution of the problem.

It will be observed that this inference does not directly *prove* the existence of God. The postulate of his existence is presented as the transcendent ground for the fact of obligation, and as the necessary basis of the moral imperative announced in a moral life. All of which, in turn, confirms the reality of the existence of God, and the validity of the theistic view of the universe. This solves the problem of moral obligation. I am responsible, not merely to law, but to a law-giver. I am under obligation, not merely to conscience, but to the moral ruler whose authority is expressed in conscience. This being is God, as moral ruler.

In this way it is made plain that the necessarily existent being, who is the first cause and ground of the universe, is also moral in his nature. It also clearly appears that moral attributes, as well as natural, pertain to him; and that he is the *moral*, as well as the *natural*, ruler of the universe.

III. *The Proof from the Good: Its Problem.* § 96.

1. This branch of the theistic proof finds its point of departure in the idea of the *highest good*. Its exposition raises the inquiry of the ages in regard to the *summum bonum* and its theistic import. If the history of human

speculation means anything, it is that men have ever been setting before them an ideal of what is for them their chief good, and that they have earnestly striven to attain it. No matter how widely men may have differed in regard to the precise nature of their chief good, the fact remains that they set it up, and bend their energies towards its realization. This fact is the starting point of the proof now under notice.

2. At the very outset the relation of the right, as already expounded, and of the good, now under consideration, emerges. That there is a very intimate relation between them is generally admitted, but there is wide diversity of opinion as to how that relation should really be construed. Some make the notion of the right fundamental, and construe the good under it. Others invert this order, and give the idea of the good the ruling place. Still others are content to correlate them, and make no attempt to construe the one in terms of the other. No complete discussion of this *problem* is now required. It will suffice to adjust the problem in a general way, and to bring out clearly the concept of the good.

The term *good* is quite ambiguous. Indeed, there are a great many *goods,* some higher, others lower. A thing may be called good when it serves its end. There are physical, metaphysical and moral aspects of the good. What is now in view is the highest good. This means the good which serves man's best welfare in the long run and in the widest sense. It is a good, also, to which all other forms of the good must be subordinated.

3. In both ancient and modern times opinions have differed widely in regard to what really constitutes the highest good for man. Some found it on the *sensibility,* and make it consist in some form of happiness or pleasure. This is represented by the Cyrenaics and Epicureans among the Greeks, and by the Hedonists and Utilitarians of our own day. This may be egoistic and individual, or altruistic and

universal, but in all its types the good is conditioned upon some modification of the sensibility. A second opinion founds the *summum bonum* on the *reason,* and makes it consist in a form of knowledge or right judgment. The Cynics and Stoics of ancient times, and modern rationalistic ethics, as represented by Kant, are types of this general opinion. Knowledge or right reason is the goal where man's highest good lies, and to live according to the nature of things rightly understood is the *summun bonum* for man. A third view of the chief good for man associates it with man's *moral* nature, and makes it a matter of the conscience. This view regards it as righteousness rather than knowledge or happiness, because it springs from the moral nature, rather than from the intellectual or the sensuous. Socrates, and Plato in a sense, and Aristotle more definitely, represent this opinion in the olden time, and those intuitional moralists of our own day, who make conscience an original power of our nature, are its exponents. A fourth opinion deserves to be mentioned, though it in a sense combines elements of the other three. This view discovers the highest good in the *unity* of the exercise of all the powers of man. It is founded on the whole personality of man, rather than on any one element in his nature. That end which best conduces to man's welfare as a whole, is his highest good. Plato's ideal theory on its ethical side, and some of the better Stoics, were almost on this ground, among the Greeks. Hegel and Green and Seth, though they differ much in the particulars of their systems, practically agree in finding the basis of the highest good in the unity of the human personality, as it strives towards self-realization.

This fourth view has much to commend it so long as the ethical element is given its proper place in the scheme. In the long run the right and the good will agree and be found in harmony, for the reason that they are joined in a still deeper unity. Indeed, the *good,* the *true,* and the *right*

find their ground of unity and harmony in *personality*. That which contributes to the noblest exercise of all the activities of man's personality is his highest good. This highest good, as the noblest end of human activity, has its pathway marked out, and its goal set by the right, and it is only when walking in that path, and striving towards that goal, that the harmony of all the powers of man's personality can be secured, that the perfection of character can be attained, and that happiness in holiness can be experienced. The chief end of man is happiness in holiness for the glory of God. Plato's highest idea as the good, and Green's ideal end for human conduct, suggest the correct doctrine upon this point. The fact that man finds such a good, or sets such an ideal before him, and finds himself striving towards it, is the core of the *problem* now to be solved. Has it any theistic significance?

IV. *The Proof from the Good: Its Solution.* § 97.

1. The fact that men do set before them certain ends which they deem desirable to be attained must be conceded. These desirable ends constitute what men regard as the things that are good for them. As we have seen, men differ widely as to what the highest good is. Still, the fact remains that they set something before them and strive to attain unto it. Hence, men do conceive of some good which they set before them as desirable, and they instinctively put forth effort to come into possession of it. And this instinct is not only an inherent tendency in human nature, but it is also the condition, when rightly directed, of all true human progress. It seems to rise out of a sense of defect, a feeling of imperfection, or a conviction of moral incompleteness. In its essential nature, it is a striving for the complete, a longing for the perfect, or a struggle for moral excellency.

2. This highest good towards which men thus strive

has a moral quality pertaining to it. To it, thus regarded, both the sensuous and the rational nature of man must be subordinated. The highest good, therefore, is not happiness nor knowledge, but *virtue*. This is the moral ideal which constitutes the highest good for man, and conditions all other goods which may make their appeal to him. It is the proper goal of all human effort after better things. Its perfection consists in the harmonious exercise of all powers of man directed towards some definite goal. It thus appears that there is erected or revealed in man's personality an ideal good, which ever beckons him on and up towards its realization. The question at once arises as to the philosophy of this fact in human experience. Is it capable of explanation from the resources of man's nature alone? Must its final explanation lie beyond man? In a word, has it any theistic significance?

3. That the genesis of the idea of the highest good, and of the impulse in man to attain it, can be *explained* from man's various powers alone, is more than doubtful. It cannot arise from the sensibility alone, for the sensibility in itself is non-moral, and its feelings are conditioned upon, rather than produce the moral ideal. It can scarcely be the product of the intellect, for the reason that the intellect apprehends rather than originates it. And it can scarcely be said that conscience originates it, for it seems that conscience simply finds it as a possession and prompting in man's moral nature. As an ideal for man's highest moral good, and as a longing of the human personality for complete realization, it brings into play all the powers of man in their highest harmonious exercise. Now, the question is, whether all this requires an objective ground of some sort. Can any one of the powers, or all of them combined, provide an adequate ground for this ideal and striving? To this we return a negative answer.

4. It, therefore, follows that the only supposition which fully meets the case is the *theistic postulate*. In the fact

of the existence of God already made good, there is found an adequate objective basis for the good as already set forth in the problem of this proof. God becomes the goal of the highest good for man, and he is the explanation of man's striving after the highest good. It appears, in this connection, that there is profound insight in Plato's hint that the highest reach of his ideal theory is the idea of *the good,* and that this good may be identified with God. If God be the highest good for man, then likeness to God in moral excellency is the *summum bonum* for man, and the proper goal of all his striving. Thus the theistic postulate presents an objective ground for the moral ideal which is expressed in man's nature, and out of the relation of the nature of man to that ground springs the longing of the human soul to transcend itself, and the striving to attain unto its ideal.

As in the case of the other moral proofs, it must be remembered that this inference does not directly *prove* the existence of God. It simply takes the fact of his existence, as already vindicated, for granted, and finds in this the *solution* of the problem of the proof now under discussion. If God be immanent in some sense in man, and is revealing himself in the human personality, then man's response to God reveals the ideal which the moral good expresses, and produces that irrepressible striving towards that ideal which man finds in his experience. In this simple yet profound way the theistic postulate solves the problem of this proof. God is the goal and the ground of this striving towards complete self-realization on the part of man. In this way the reality of the divine existence is confirmed, and it is shown that God possesses moral attributes. He who is the first cause and abiding ground of the universe is now seen to be the moral ideal, as well as the ground of right and the basis of obligation. The *right,* the *ought* and the *good* all centre in him.

5. Here, again, the fact of *moral evil* must be taken into

account. By reason of this fact men set before them lower ends, and strive after what is an inferior good. But, after all allowance is made for this terrible fact, the principle of this proof remains secure and its inference is entirely sound. Men do set before them a supposed good as a desirable end, and the striving to attain it is a fact in their experience. In addition, it must be carefully observed that in true self-realization, when all the powers of man's nature are working harmoniously, there is a distinct tendency to eliminate moral evil. This fact goes far to confirm the validity of this proof, since it shows that the real goal of true self-realization is the moral good. It at the same time exhibits the truly ethical character of the highest good, as grounded in God. Hence, we conclude that the theistic postulate is the valid solution for the problem of this proof. Man is so constituted that in his moral experience he can set before him a moral goal in the highest good, and that he is conscious of a striving to attain it. This striving, when it is moving aright, travels along the path of righteousness, and is satisfied only when *self-realization* in the ethical life finds the character becoming more and more like God. These things are not self-explanatory, but constitute an unfailing witness to an objective ground in God, who is the highest good for man, and the goal of that ceaseless striving in him which seeks ever to transcend its limitations and reach complete self-realization. And all of this, in the sphere of natural theology, lays the sure ground for the deeper experiences of a genuine spiritual life, where the goal and the striving appear in another and different form.

Here, too, we come within sight of the redemptive revelation which is the heart of Christianity, and of the spiritual dynamic which is resident in the glorious gospel of the blessed God.

CHAPTER XII.

THE MORAL PROOFS: PROOF FROM HISTORY.

Contents.

Scope of this Proof.—Two related Aspects of it.—The Historico-religious and the Historico-moral.—The former.—The *consensus gentium*.—Belief in God Universal and Permanent.—The Evidence of this.—The Reality of the Existence of God best Explanation of the Facts.—All other Explanations insufficient.—The Historico-theistic Proof.—The Material Consists in Universal History.—Positivist Explanations.—The Statistical Interpretation.—The Theistic Explanation alone Sufficient.—A Rational End and a Moral Purpose in History.—Its Statics and Dynamics.—The Theistic Hypothesis fully Explains all the Facts.—Illustrations at length not given.—Theism, not Atheism, has the Key of Human History.—Higher Inference Suggested.—Christ and Christianity Solves all.

Literature.

Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Book XI., Chap. VIII.—Cicero's *Laws*, Part I., Chap. VIII.—Augustine's *City of God*.—Howe's *Living Temple*, Part I.—Flint's *Theism*, Chap. VII.—Diman's *The Theistic Argument*, Chap. IX.—Grotius' *The Christian Religion*, Part I., Chap. XII.—Redford's *The Christian Plea*, Part II., Chap. II., 3.—Brace's *Gesta Christi*.—Storrs' *The Supernatural Origin of Christianity*.—Johnston's *Outline of Systematic Theology*, Part II., Sec. XI., Chap. VI.—Lindsay's *Recent Advances*, Chap. XVI.—Bruce's *The Providential Order of the World*, Chap. VIII.—Kidd's *Social Evolution*, Chaps. IV.–VII.—Mair's *Studies in the Christian Evidences*, Chap. XI.—Uhlhorn's *The Conflict of Christianity*, Book II., Chap. I., and Book III., Chaps. I., II.—Luthardt's *Fundamental Truths*, Chap. IX.—Flint's *Antitheistic Theories*, Chap. I.

I. *Preliminary.* § 98.

1. THIS is the concluding branch of the moral proof for the existence of God. The theistic inferences based on the notion of the right, the fact of obligation, and the idea of the good have been elucidated. The inference which *history* justifies remains for exposition. This opens up a vast and varied field. It leads to the consideration of man, not as an individual, nor merely as the personal subject of moral government, but as a social and religious

organism, and as a current of successive historic activities. This leads to a study of the social fabric in its totality at any given time in part, but mainly to a careful interpretation of its historic moral and religious progress. Hence, social *statics* and *dynamics* are both involved in this comprehensive proof.

2. There are two related aspects of this proof. The one consists in an inference from the fact that the belief in some sort of deity is practically *universal* among men. This, by some, is called the anthropological argument, and by others it is termed the religious proof for the existence of God. Either of these titles fairly well denotes this general proof. In any case, it may not be improper to regard it as a certain phase of the historical argument, for the reason, mainly, that history is largely the source of our information for the materials of this inference. Strictly speaking, it is the *historico-religious* proof, and as such it will be treated in this connection.

The other and main branch of this proof grows out of the moral order and purpose which are to be observed in the *history* of the human race. Here is a multitude of facts which call for an explanation. The moral order and movement exhibited by the progress of the race, viewed as a social organism, in its broad and comprehensive outlines, are to be investigated, in order to discover whether they justify the theistic inference. Each of these somewhat diverse branches of the historical argument will be briefly outlined.

II. *The Historico-Religious Proof.* § 99.

1. The *problem* now presented is the widespread and permanent belief in some form of deity which the history of the human race presents. Connected with this belief is the universal prevalence of some sort of religious rites among men. This general religious *cultus* also forms part of the

present problem. The solution of this problem provides what is sometimes called the argument for the existence of God from the *consensus gentium.* The world-wide and age-long belief in deity thus argues his existence. A brief exposition of it must suffice.

The universality of the belief in some sort of a god or gods is now seldom questioned. The alleged tribes of atheists spoken of by Lubbock and others, turn out to be quite mythical in the light of the mass of testimony which is now available from every age and every land. Flint, in his *Antitheistic Theories,* shows conclusively against Lubbock, Feuerbach, and others, that there are no tribes of people on the earth devoid of the belief in some kind of supreme being or supernatural powers.

Plato says that the belief in the gods is a natural and universal instinct. Aristotle bears similar testimony and expresses the same opinion. Calvin and Grotius adduce abundant evidence to justify the same conclusion.

In our own day we have materials coming from two important sources, which do much to establish the *consensus gentium* in regard to belief in deity. First, we have a vast mass of *facts* gathered from many a field by those who are seeking to explain the phenomena of religion according to naturalistic methods and in accordance with the principles of natural evolution. These investigators have done much to show that religious belief and worship are found everywhere among men. They have searched far and wide among all races and tribes of men, and have brought to light much that is of interest and value for the argument now in hand. This material we willingly utilize in laying the foundations of the theistic inference which is now under discussion.

Secondly, the study of *Comparative Religion,* by those who pursue it for legitimate apologetical purposes, renders a similar service. The beliefs and practices of all peoples in matters of religion, as set forth in their traditions, in

their literatures, or in their religious rituals, are carefully studied, and a vast mass of materials is thereby placed at our disposal. We gladly use all that is suitable and serviceable of this material in the present discussion, for it is much easier to make bricks when both the clay and the straw are gathered.

2. In seeking to discover the *solution* of the problem thus formulated, we have simply to inquire what inference we can properly make from the facts of the universal and permanent belief in deity, and from the practice of various religious rites and ceremonies among men.

The purely naturalistic explanations scarcely suffice to account for the facts, for while these explanations may give a complete natural *history* of the facts, they do not provide any complete *philosophy* of them. Indeed, these facts are not self-explanatory. The fact of a universal belief in deity argues for the reality of the object of that deity in some proper form. Even though the idea of the object be sadly perverted in many cases, yet the fact of the belief suggests the reality of its object, unless this universal instinct of the human race be false at its very root. But we must assume the veracity of that religious instinct, and hence find the *solution* of the problem of universal belief in deity in the theistic hypothesis. Even if we admit that in many pagan systems there is much of superstition, this conclusion is valid, for superstition, as a counterfeit of religion, is a witness to the genuine. Hence, we find that the solution of the problem now in hand is found in the conclusion that God really exists. To deny this would be to do injustice to the very deepest convictions and the most permanent practices among men everywhere.

III. *The Historico-Theistic Proof.* § 100.

1. This is the main branch of the fourth line of the moral proofs. We have now to consider the facts of *history* in

their inner relations and search for their true philosophy. This is a cogent proof.

The *material* of this proof is vast and varied. It embraces all the events that have transpired in the great drama of man's historic activity in all the ages of the world. Many of these events have never been recorded on the pages of history; but on the historic page we find sufficient to justify the inference of this proof. Everything that relates to men as individuals, as nations, and as a race of moral beings, rises up for review.

To sketch all the facts here would be to write a comprehensive universal history. It would require us to find out all we could about the men who lived before the deluge; it would call for a detailed account of all the movements of ancient nations; it would further insist on a connected account of the rise and fall of the nations of the Christian era. It would also ask that we should ascertain, as far as possible, the underlying motives which prompted men to act their parts on the stage of history; and it would raise the question of the moral bearing of these facts upon each other, and upon the progress of the race as a whole. But for the details of the materials thus hinted at we must refer the reader to the best current works on general history.

2. In seeking now to *solve* this tremendous problem, we have to ask the question, What is the true key to interpret the manifold facts of the history of the human race? What is the philosophy of human history? Can it be explained on merely natural social ground, or must moral factors be given a place?

Various principles of *explanation* have been proposed. Comte, and positivists generally, seek to explain history in accordance with the principles of naturalistic evolution. All such attempts must be considered failures, inasmuch as they merely state the problem by giving a natural history of the facts, but provide no philosophy of the facts, no solution of the problem presented. Herder, Vico, Buckle,

and others of similar views, propose to explain history in a purely social and statistical way. All such attempts leave largely out of account the fact of human freedom, and they ignore entirely the permanent moral factors in the historic activity of mankind.

Edwards and Bossuet, and a host of others since their day, give the true theistic and religious explanation of the facts, with the agency of God and the fact of redemption underlying them. This is no doubt the correct principle of interpretation for the phenomena of history. We observe a moral *purpose* running all through history. There seems to be a rational plan working out in it all. Events do not transpire on the stage of history by chance nor as the result of fate. They are marked by freedom, intelligence and morality. Plan, purpose and design seem to run all through history as the centuries roll on, and as empires rise and fall. There seems to be a moral *teleology* in this age-long stream of historic events. As the individual is consciously under moral government, so the race, as a whole, as an organism, is under the same government. Hence, a moral purpose runs all through the course of history. This is its moral teleology. There is also seen to be a power which makes for righteousness which impels and overrules the destinies of the race. This is the moral *dynamic* of history.

Hence, whether we view the human race in its social statical state, or in its dynamic historical movement, we observe a moral order. As in nature there is a *natural* order with natural law, so in social statics we see a *moral* order with moral law. And as we see in the universe cosmic progress in harmony with certain great cosmic principles, so in the movements of human history we see progress in accordance with recognized moral forces. This, then, is the *problem* to be solved.

3. The *solution* of this problem, in the light of previous proofs for the existence of God, is almost self-evident. It

consists in a simple theistic inference from the facts of human history to be seen on every hand, and running on through all the ages. That inference is secured by an application of the theistic hypothesis to the facts in question. No other explanation of the facts is adequate. We can give unity and rationality to the facts of history only on the supposition that there is an intelligent, powerful and *moral ruler* over men in their moral relations and history. The life and activity of the human race does not consist in a series of detached and arbitrary details, entirely devoid of any moral quality. The sum total of human history is not a vast mass of unrelated and unmeaning facts; but it is an orderly whole, which finds the philosophy of its order in the hypothesis of a power over it, and working through it, which is intelligent and moral.

To give extended illustrations of this inference is entirely out of the question here. We can only give a hint or two in regard to the *key* for the interpretation of history which the theistic hypothesis supplies. Many able and popular treatises supply abundant illustration of the way history should be regarded in the light of its theistic interpretation. To such treatises, some of which are named at the beginning of this chapter, we must refer the reader. History, from this view-point, becomes a description of God's dealings with men. Even unconsciously on their part, it may come to pass that men and nations fulfil the great ends of the moral government of God. By this means the presence and power of God as moral ruler is made manifest, and the fact of his existence assured.

It is in this way, rather than by detailed illustration, that we emphasize the conclusion that we find in the theistic postulate, when applied to the facts of the human race and its history, a rational explanation of the history and destiny of humanity. No other view of history gives such an adequate explanation. The theist alone holds in his hands the key of human history. The atheist or agnostic may

describe the facts with the utmost care, but both are alike helpless to explain them. Hence, both the moral teleology of the social fabric among men, and the moral dynamic seen in the historic movements of the race, fully justify the conclusion that there is a moral divine ruler.

4. It would be easy, and perfectly legitimate, to rise a step higher than the philosophical theism just stated, and to find in human history the *confirmation* of the reality and divinity of Christianity. It would then appear that the history and destiny of the human race can be best understood in its deepest significance only in the light of Jesus Christ and the redeeming activity of God in the world by him. From Bethlehem and Nazareth, from Jerusalem, Calvary and Olivet, rather than from palaces and fortresses and battle-fields, is the true divine keynote of history to be heard. God's spiritual kingdom in the world is the scene of his empire on this earth. The laws of that kingdom are moral and spiritual, and are for the government of men. Sin has come in to mar the order of that government as at first instituted. Redemption comes in to restore the harmony which sin had broken. Jesus Christ is the central figure of history, because he is the head of this spiritual kingdom. By him, through the Spirit, the redeeming activity of God is exercised among men in the world. The history of the race at large can only be understood in its relation to Christ and his kingdom. Indeed, all history, directly or indirectly, is but an expression of the *redeeming* operation of God among men according to his purpose. If we stand at Calvary, and look back, we see all history converging to its fulness of time in Jesus Christ; and if we look back from the same vantage ground, we see all history pressing forward towards its consummation in the culmination of his spiritual kingdom.

This being the case, the theistic inference which the facts of history justify is of the very highest order. By means of it we stand at the threshold of Christianity, ready

to pass in by the gateway of *revelation* to learn the secrets of the spiritual kingdom itself. With the hand upon the lifted latch, reason leaves us standing on that threshold. Only when by faith we enter in, do we behold its beauty and its glory.

5. This completes the outline of the theistic proofs. The psychical and cosmical have been already summarized. In a sentence or two the force of the moral proof, in its four lines, may be gathered up. The *ortho-theistic* proof argued from the idea of moral right and law to God as its proper ground. The *deonto-theistic* proof reasoned from the fact of the binding nature of moral obligation to the will and authority of God as its basis. The *agatho-theistic* proof found that the striving of man for his true highest good reached its proper goal in God. And the *historico-theistic* proof discovered in the fact of the existence of God as the moral ruler of the nations the true key to interpret human history. These four true strands, bound together, form the moral proof for the existence of God. Binding the psychical, the cosmical and the moral proofs together, we form the strong cable of the *theistic argument.*

CHAPTER XIII.

THE KANTIAN CRITICISM, AND A SUMMARY OF THEISM.

CONTENTS.

Kant's Influence on Philosophy and Theology.—His Criticism of the Theistic Proofs.—Not so Destructive as at one Time Supposed.—His Classification of the Proofs.—The Arguments in Order.—Charged with Logical Contradiction.—The Ontological Proof not Invalid.—Cosmological Proof Criticised under a False View of Causation.—Noumena and Phenomena too Widely Separated.—Teleological Proof Commended and Limited.—Yet Criticised as Defective.—Kant's Criticism Reduces all Proofs to the Principle of the Ontological.—Overlooks *a posteriori* Factors.—Stress laid on Moral Proofs.—Yet if Valid, so is the Theoretic.—Summary of Psychology and Ontology of Theism.—Conclusions. —Man a Religious Being.—Idea of God not Produced by Theistic Proofs. —Proofs not Strict Deduction.—Revelation Needed.—Divine Attributes.—Theistic Cosmology.

LITERATURE.

Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason.*—Transcendental Dialectic, Book II., Chap. III.—Pfleiderer's *Philosophy of Religion,* Vol. I., Chap. VI.—Stirling's *Philosophy and Theology,* Chaps. XV., XVI.—Ueberweg's *History of Philosophy,* Vol. II., Div. III.—Shedd's *Dogmatic Theology,* Vol. I., Chap. III.—Fisher's *Grounds of Theistic Belief,* Chap. II.—Martineau's *Studies in Religion,* Vol. I., Book II., Chap. I.—Caird's *Philosophy of Religion,* Chap. V.—Fairbairn's *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion,* Chap. II.—Balfour's *Foundations of Belief,* Part II., Chap. II. —Pressense's *Study of Origins,* Chap. III.—Orr's *The Ritschlian Theology,* Chap. II.—Fraser's *Philosophy of Theism,* Vol. II., Chap. II.—Schurman's *Belief in God,* Chaps. IV., V.—Cocker's *Christianity and Greek Philosophy,* Chap. V.—Tigert's *Theism,* Chap. III.—Patton's *Syllabus on Theism.*

I. *The Kantian Criticism of the Theistic Proofs.* § 101.

1. THE influence of Emmanuel Kant on both philosophy and theology has been very great. Even if it be not fully admitted that the change he effected in philosophy was quite as radical as that brought about by Copernicus and Galileo in the science of astronomy, yet the deep and abiding influence of this great thinker on

subsequent philosophy cannot be denied. Perhaps no part of Kant's critical work demands more careful attention than his destructive criticism of the general rational proofs for the existence of God. So trenchant was that criticism that many writers since Kant's day have regarded all theistic inferences in the sphere of pure reason as necessarily inconclusive, and have fallen back entirely upon the moral argument as the only ground upon which belief in the existence of God can be vindicated. Others, influenced equally by this criticism, have taken refuge either in the contents of divine revelation or in the intuition of an infinite personal God as the only safety from atheism or agnosticism.

It is, therefore, a very important matter to ascertain how far we should in our day be influenced by this bold criticism, and to understand what the proper *limits* of theistic proof really are. It is mainly to this inquiry that this chapter is devoted. In general, it may be stated at the outset that our conviction is that many writers have given too much weight to Kant's criticism, and consequently have allowed themselves to be too easily driven off the field of rational theistic proof. It may be freely conceded that Kant has rendered good service in pointing out the proper limits of the rational proofs, and that he deserves all praise for the forceful way in which he has presented the argument based on the categorical imperative of our moral nature. At the same time, we should *hesitate* before we admit that Kant has shown that all the rational proofs are fallacious. Indeed, one of the wholesome signs in recent theistic speculation is the fact that the rational proofs for the divine existence are coming to be regarded with increasing favor. The modes in which they are now presented may be somewhat changed, but their rational force is at the same time confidently admitted. We rejoice in this tendency of our own time, and a few remarks may serve to show that it is well-founded.

In the examination of Kant's criticism now to be made, a general knowledge of the Kantian philosophy on the part of the reader must be assumed, for space quite forbids even a general sketch of it. The examination itself may be divided into two distinct branches. In the first branch, inquiry will be made as to whether Kant's criticism justifies the *rejection* of the ordinary theistic proofs. In the second, an attempt will be made to discover whether Kant is *consistent* in relying on the moral proofs while he rejects the rational.

2. Kant divided the ordinary rational proofs current in his day into three classes. The ontological proof reasoned from the idea of a necessary being; the cosmological argued from the universe existing contingently to its first cause, existing necessarily; and the teleological makes the theistic inference from various marks of design exhibited by the universe.

The *imperfection* of this classification might be pointed out. At the outset, he treats these arguments as if they were entirely distinct, whereas we have already pointed out the fact, in unfolding the causal proofs, that the cosmological and teleological both rest on the principle of causality. Then, in the course of his criticism, he attempts to reduce them all to the terms of the ontological. This does serious injustice to the *a posteriori* factors in the cosmological and teleological proofs, and overlooks the fact that all the proofs are strands in a cable, not links in a chain. While, in a sense, the proofs are to be logically distinguished from each other for purposes of exposition, yet in their argumentative force they are *cumulative* and mutually confirmatory of each other. It cannot be admitted that the fundamental principle of these three proofs is the same, or that they can all be reduced to any one of them.

3. Kant next takes up the three arguments in order, and seeks to show that they all lead to logical *fallacies* or land in rational contradictions. In the discussion of the psychical

proofs, we have alluded to this part of Kant's criticism, but now additional details may be given. Concerning the *ontological* proof, Kant argues that the judgment which affirms the existence of a necessary being is analytical, not synthetical. To understand the force of the criticism here made, the contrast between analytic and synthetic judgments must be perceived. The *analytic* judgment merely unfolds the contents of the propositions in the argument, and adds nothing to their material. The *synthetic* enables us to go beyond the scope of the propositions in the proof, and embrace really new material with which the judgment may be concerned. Kant asserts that the judgment affirming the existence of God as a necessary being is simply an analytical judgment. Hence, it either assumes the existence of God in its statement or identifies the idea of God with the object of that idea. In the former case the existence of God must be assumed, not proved, otherwise it could never be asserted. In the latter case, the mere conception of God is made the same as his existence, and no proof of his real existence can ever be given.

The force of Kant's critique at this point may be admitted against those views which regard the idea of God as merely a general notion, which the mind itself forms by generalization, for simple conceivableness is no test of actual existence. But if the idea of God be a rational intuition, with a definite *a priori* quality belonging to it, then Kant's criticism is not effective at this point. It is evident that Gaunilo's "island" and Kant's "dollars" are not analogous mental possessions with the idea of God as that of a necessary being. This being the case, their criticism of the ontological proof here fails. Rightly understood, the type of ontological reasoning for the existence of God represented by Anselm, and in part by Descartes, holds good. It rests on the fact that the *a priori* factors of the human mind postulate the existence of their objects. Such factors have objective validity. Hence, the

theistic judgment is synthetic rather than analytic, and consequently connotes the actual existence of the object to which it points. In addition, the position suggested by Descartes, that the postulate of the divine existence is the condition of the reliability of human knowledge, is not in any way affected by the Kantian criticism. This is the very stronghold of certain aspects of the ontological proof, and theism need only surrender this ground when absolute *skepticism* ascends the throne of human reason.

4. In his criticism of the *cosmological* argument, Kant is very severe. He condemns it as full of logical fallacies. His attempt to resolve it into the ontological proof may now be passed over, inasmuch as we have already shown that that proof is not destroyed by Kant's criticism. His criticism of the cosmological argument turns mainly upon the philosophy of *causation* which he holds. He rightly holds that the argument in question rests upon the principle of causation, but his interpretation of that principle may be seriously questioned. Kant constantly asserts that the law of causation belongs to the realm of the phenomenal, and is valid only within the sphere of experience. Hence, there can be no inference beyond this realm based on causation, which is simply one of the categories that have meaning only in relation to the phenomenal. God, however, is noumenal, and not an object of experience in the sphere of pure reason. Hence, he says that when the category of causation is used to prove the existence of God, a transcendental use of it is made, inasmuch as it is taken from the realm of phenomena and applied to God as a noumenal object. This, Kant says, is illegitimate.

Concerning this criticism we make two remarks. In the first place, the absolute *separation* between phenomena and noumena in the fact of cognition is not justified, and it has done immense harm to the interests both of philosophy and theology. It logically led to subjective idealism in philosophy, and it has done much to produce mysticism in

theology. By means of this rigid separation between the phenomenal and the real, the problem of the relativity of human knowledge has been burdened with unnecessary difficulties, and the rational pathway to the cognition of realities has been beset with needless dangers. The result is that we are in danger of falling into the abyss of idealism so far as the contents of cognition are concerned, or of landing in the gloom of agnosticism so far as the knowledge of the reality of either mind or matter is concerned. Fichte and Spencer are the logical descendants of Kant's position in regard to the distinction in question. In a true theory of knowledge, the phenomenal and the noumenal elements must always be taken into account. The real and empirical so unite in true cognition that they ought not to be divorced in any sound epistemology.

In the second place, it is not conceded that the law of causation is confined to phenomenal *sequences* only. Such a view leads to a purely empirical doctrine of causation, and makes it nothing more than mere succession. If we take into account the feature of efficiency which is an essential factor in causation, we might be nearer the truth if we said that it enables us to transcend the line of mere phenomenal succession. Or if we confine causation to empirical sequences, we must deny the factor of efficiency in causation. This is to empty the principle of causality of one of its essential features, for we maintain that the quality of efficiency, potency or agency is the very essence of causality. This element of *efficiency* is given to experience as a rational *a priori* contribution which the mind itself makes to the experience of certain cases of sequence. It underlies the changes which causation implies, and it abides through every stage of any phenomenal series. Hence, it does not stand merely at the beginning of the series as the first step, but it grounds every succeeding step as well. Hence, Kant can only make good his criticism at this point by ignoring the fact of efficiency, as an essential factor in

causation. This we cannot allow him to do, and thus his criticism may be met at this point.

5. In criticising the *teleological* argument, Kant treats it with a measure of respect, and admits that it has some right to be held in esteem. He is careful to confine it to its legitimate sphere, and with some things Kant here says we can cordially agree. At the outset, his criticism of the design argument is *limitative* rather than destructive. He shows that this argument has often been taken to prove too much. He points out, quite correctly, that the inference from marks of design in the universe only justifies the conclusion that the universe has had an intelligent *arranger* or framer, but not a creator or originator. God can, at best, be but the architect of the universe, according to this argument. Kant further argues that the quality of *infinity* is not justified by this argument from the marks of design observed in a finite universe. It may require a very vast intelligence, but not necessarily one that is infinite, to account for the facts. Most careful writers on theism now frankly admit the propriety of this criticism. The design argument does not of itself justify the predicate of infinity. But it does not at all follow that the teleological argument has no value. The idea of a first cause and creator, and the attribute of infinity as pertaining to it, can be vindicated along other lines of proof. Then, we can very properly connect the intelligence which is necessary to account for the marks of design seen in the universe with this first cause, and clothe it with the attribute of infinity. With the limitations just noted, the teleological argument is valid in its own sphere, and yields very valuable theistic results.

6. One of the most important aspects of the Kantian criticism remains to be considered. This relates to the ingenious way in which Kant presents his criticism. He seeks to *reduce* the cosmological and teleological arguments to terms of the ontological, and then destroy them all at

one blow, by showing that the ontological is invalid. He maintains that before the theistic inference can be made, the ontological realm must be entered. If it cannot be entered by the gateway of pure reason, rational proof is not possible. This procedure is ingenious, but cannot be admitted. Kant reduces the stronger proof to the terms of the weaker, and allows no theistic value to the cosmological and teleological elements which he strips from these cogent proofs. He overlooks entirely the cumulative nature of the theistic proofs, and that each branch of the argument must be allowed to yield its own proper result. Kant really makes an undue analysis of the arguments, instead of giving a careful exposition of each, and then making a synthesis of the whole in the completed theistic argument. Each line of reasoning should be taken for what it is worth, and we should not reject all because any one of the proofs does not establish the whole theistic position.

It is also to be carefully observed that Kant allows the *a posteriori* to drop out of sight as he reduces the cosmological and teleological proofs to the terms of the ontological, and he entirely fails to give them any proper logical import. Even if we admit that these two proofs do rest upon the third, it does not follow that they have no independent logical value. More than this, it might be shown that in the cosmological and teleological proofs there is an *a priori* basis in the principle of causation, which has also to be reckoned with in reducing these proofs to the third. The proofs mutually *sustain* each other, and hence we conclude that Kant's criticism of the rational proofs for the existence of God is not nearly so destructive as it is generally supposed to be. We are very far from admitting that Kant has shown that all argumentation in the sphere of pure reason is contradictory, and leads to inevitable logical antinomies.

7. It now remains to be seen whether Kant can maintain his *logical consistency* as he proceeds to establish the

theistic position by what is usually known as the moral argument. According to Kant, the idea of God is merely regulative in the domain of pure reason. It is a rule which guides our thinking in regard to certain aspects of the universe, but it affords no rational ground to conclude that there is any real being corresponding to this regulative idea. In the *moral* sphere, however, Kant argues, it is otherwise. The categorical imperative of practical reason is a witness within the soul, testifying directly to moral law and order without. This law implies a law-giver, who is God, regarded as moral ruler.

We cannot enter fully into the merits and defects of the Kantian ethics. While Kant gave great prominence to moral law, and the authority of its categorical imperative in the human soul, yet there is reason to approve of the opinion expressed by Patton and Schurman, that Kant should scarcely be classed with the intuitionalists in morals, for the reason that the categorical imperative is an empty rule, void of ethical material, and that it can only have that material provided by entering the sphere of practical conduct. In doing so, however, Kant must virtually surrender to the utilitarian. Passing this point with its simple statement, we make three critical remarks.

In the first place, Kant draws the line too sharply between the *pure* and *practical* reason. The intellectual and moral faculties of the soul are different in many of their functions, yet such a rigid distinction between them as Kant makes cannot be justified. The intellectual and moral faculties not only touch each other at various points, but are often interwoven. There is an intellectual factor in conscience, and the intellect cannot be regarded as devoid of ethical capacity. The absolute unity of personality leads to this conclusion. Then, if truth be the object of the intellect, and right the object of conscience, it assuredly follows that the theistic inference may sustain the same relation to both. If God, as absolute *right,* be the postulate of conscience,

then God, as absolute *truth,* may be the postulate of the intellect. To be consistent, Kant must allow more than a merely regulative value to the idea of God in pure reason, or else he cannot justify his position in regard to the validity of the argument from practical reason. He cannot *barter* God away to the skeptic on the ground of pure reason, and expect to have him restored on the same terms in the sphere of practical reason. If the personality of man cannot reach God by the avenue of the intellect, it is not likely to do so by the pathway of conscience. It is surely more reasonable to maintain that both the intellectual and moral faculties open up logical highways for the theistic inference. God is surely the postulate of both intellect and conscience.

In the second place, practical reason, like pure reason, must enter the sphere of *experience* before it has its pure form filled with any empirical content. The moral law, with its categorical imperative, is as empty as the categories are prior to experience. To assume that the practical reason enables us to reach the noumenal sphere more readily than pure reason, is erroneous. In order to have content in cognition, both pure and practical reason must alike enter the realm of experience, where, according to Kant himself, all is phenomenal. Such being the case, conscience, with its law, brings us no nearer God than reason, with its regulative idea, does. On Kant's premises, neither gives us more than the phenomenal. In one case it relates to knowledge, in the other to conduct, but in neither case can the noumenal in the form of God ever be reached. But if it can be reached in one case, it can also be in the other. Kant is clearly inconsistent with himself at this point. The truth is that both forms of proof, rightly understood, are valid, and justify the theistic inference.

In the third place, the precise *basis* of the moral proofs is not clearly set forth by Kant. In criticising the cosmological proof, Kant confines the conception of cause in-

volved in it to phenomena, and constantly refuses it any transcendental validity. Nor does he allow any proper place in the concept of causation for efficiency or sufficient reason. Such being the case, it is difficult to see how Kant can justify the inference of the moral argument, unless he removes it entirely from any relation to the principle of causality. And even if he does this, the difficulty still remains as to how, by the moral pathway, the transcendental region, where God abides, is reached in an ethical experience. Our conviction is that the aspect of causation, known as sufficient reason, is involved in the moral proof; and if the law of causation in the intellectual sphere cannot be legitimately applied beyond experience, it is not easy to understand how it can be applied beyond experience in the moral sphere. Kant must fall back either on moral intuition or on faith; but if he does this he is on precisely the same ground as some of those whose views he so severely criticises. We maintain that if moral intuition and faith are valid, so also are intellectual. The theistic proofs do not generate a knowledge or belief in a God of whom we know nothing, but they rather serve to justify to reason the validity of the primitive intuition, or native belief, with which the soul, both in its intellectual and moral aspects, finds itself endowed. The moral argument, therefore, does not so much prove the existence of God, as enable us to attach moral attributes to the necessarily existing being who is the uncaused cause of the universe. Rather than stake, as Kant does, the rational vindication of the belief in God upon the moral argument alone, potent as it is, we prefer to place it beside the other lines of proof, giving all of them their proper rational and logical value. Then, having exhibited and tested the validity of each *strand* of proof, we also bind them together in a strong *cable,* and term it the theistic argument. To this goal we have now been brought.

II. *Summary of Theism.* § 102.

1. Thus far the discussion of theism has had three main topics under consideration. These were the *nature* of the belief in God, the *origin* of this belief, and the *proofs* for the existence of God. As to the *first* of these topics, it was found that in theistic belief there was a cognition of deity, a belief in the existence of God, a sense of natural dependence on him, a feeling of moral responsibility, and an instinct of worship. This being the case, man is able to frame the theistic hypothesis of the universe, to apply theistic predicates to natural objects, and is capable of receiving religious instruction by means of revelation. Theistic belief, with its idea of God, is not innate in the sense of a fully matured notion of God. At the same time, it is not the product of education merely, although it is capable of being educated. It is rather a native, connatural and constitutional aptitude which he naturally possesses, and into the maturity of which he grows as his various powers develop.

2. The *second* topic, which dealt with the genesis of theistic belief, was treated at much greater length. Three erroneous and three defective theories were considered. Fetichism, henotheism and ancestorism, as erroneous theories, were set aside. The function of revelation, reasoning and idealistic evolution, respectively, was unfolded. The true doctrine was explained with some care. It discovers the genesis of theistic belief in the human soul, and finds that it arises therein spontaneously on the presentation of its appropriate object. Then revelation and reflection may direct, purify and exalt this primitive spontaneous belief. There is thus an *a priori* and an *a posteriori* factor in theistic belief.

3. The *third* set of topics was discussed at still greater length. This consisted in a careful exposition of the

theistic argument. Here the correct logical attitude was clearly indicated. Three main lines of reasoning were followed out. These were the psychical, the cosmical, and the moral. The first found the materials of inference in the human mind and its conditions of cognition, the second rested on the principle of causation, and the third argued from man's moral nature and experiences. In each case the theistic inference was carefully vindicated in a variety of important particulars. Then the whole was bound together into a strong cable, which may very properly be termed the *theistic argument*, by means of which the belief in the reality of the existence of God is clearly shown to be rational and logical.

III. *Some General Conclusions.* § 103.

1. It has clearly appeared that man, by his very nature and constitution, is a *religious being*. By this it is not meant that man can, without the aid of special revelation, rise to a correct and adequate knowledge of God, and of the way of salvation from sin. It rather means that man is held to be distinct from the brute creation, in that he has a nature in which the primitive elements of religion form a constituent part. This implies that there never was a time when the human race was not religious in some sense. By reason of the disorder which sin has introduced, the race has lost the true knowledge of God, and of the way he should be worshipped and served. But the constitutional religiousness of his nature remains; otherwise the gospel would have no point of contact therein. Hence, revelation is needed to supply such a knowledge of God as may deliver man from the hopeless condition into which sin has brought him. All theistic discussion must recognize the native religiousness of the nature of man, and the necessity of revelation to supply a true knowledge of God, and of the way of escape from sin. It is a mistake to ignore

these facts, as is so often done by those who give purely naturalistic explanations of the origin and development of religion.

2. It is also evident that the theistic proofs do not *produce* the idea of God in the human soul, nor do they generate the religious consciousness. The theistic capacity must be presupposed in order to the possibility of reasoning or reflection concerning God. Even the skeptic has the idea of God in his mind when he is reasoning against the reality of the divine existence, which still further shows that reasoning does not produce the idea of God in the soul at first.

3. Nor do the proofs *demonstrate* the existence of God in a strictly deductive way. The various arguments are vindications of the rational reality and objective validity of primitive, spontaneous theistic belief. The method is expository rather than demonstrative, inductive rather than deductive. The result is moral rather than mathematical certainty. The denial of the theistic conclusion is illogical and irrational.

4. At the same time, the con-natural nature of theistic belief does not render supernatural *revelation* unnecessary. It is again insisted that such revelation is urgently needed to give man important religious instruction. This position is firmly held against all naturalistic theories which insist that the light of reason and the dictates of conscience are all that men need in order to the exercise of true religion. However true it may be that reason and conscience would have been sufficient had man not come under the blight of sin, it is unquestionably not true of him when his sinful state is taken into account. The only way to escape this conclusion is to deny the reality of sin, and to do this is to fly in the face of facts.

5. It has, further, been made plain that one of the important purposes served by the theistic proofs is to enable us to attach to the necessarily existent being called God

various *attributes*. This is specially true of the causal and moral proofs. The attributes of intelligence, power, wisdom, justice and righteousness are reached and connected with the necessary being who is the uncaused cause of the universe.

6. In addition, the true philosophy of the *universe* is exhibited. This philosophy supplies a *theistic cosmology*, so that theism is at once a natural theology and a theistic cosmology. Neither atheism nor materialism, neither deism nor pantheism, can supply such a philosophy. Theism holds that the universe exists contingently, and that God is its first cause and abiding ground. It also teaches that God is both immanent and transcendent in relation to the universe. The theistic philosophy enables us to say that God is both within and without the universe, both before and beside the worlds he has made. He originated the universe and sustains it at every moment of its existence. In this conclusion we firmly rest, and are sure that it affords an adequate foundation for revelation to be made, and for redemption to be effected. This foundation is at once a *natural theology* and a *theistic cosmology*.

THE ONTOLOGY OF THEISM.

THE SECOND SECTION.

THE ANTITHEISTIC THEORIES.

CHAPTER I

ATHEISM.

CONTENTS.

Antitheism Defined. — Many Types. — Classification of Theories. — Polytheism.—Atheism.—Materialism.—Positivism.—Agnosticism.—Pantheism.—Deism.—Pessimism.—Statement of Atheism.—Two Types.—Practical.—Cured by the Gospel.—Prevalent.—Dogmatic Atheism.—Attempts to Reason out its Case.—Refutation of Atheism.—An Unnatural State of Mind and Heart.—Psychologically Inconsistent.—Atheism Explains Nothing.—When it Attempts to Explain the Universe it Fails.—Logically it Must Prove a Negative.—Atheism lays no Basis for Morality.—It does not Abound in Benevolence.—It Fails to Satisfy Man's Religious Need.

LITERATURE.

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I. *Preliminary.* § 104.

1. WE now enter upon the *refutation* of the antitheistic theories. This may be regarded as the negative side of the ontology of theism. It constitutes quite an important part of the task of fundamental apolo-

getics. There are many theories and schemes which claim to surpass or supplant the theistic philosophy, so that a large task now awaits us. But if it can be shown that these various systems are inadequate or irrational, indirect proof in favor of the general theistic doctrine will be supplied. As these antagonistic systems marshal their hosts, the advocates of the theistic philosophy must enter an active campaign against them all, and it must not cease till they all are driven from the field.

2. It is not easy to *define* what an antitheistic theory really is. There are so many types and shades of opposition to the general theistic doctrine that it is not easy to give a definition which shall include all. Some of these theories relate to the existence of God, others to the nature of man, and still others to the relation between God and the universe. Some of the antitheistic systems are erroneous, some are defective, and some are one-sided. In some cases they are the product of a false philosophy, and in others they are the result of one-sided scientific views. Such being the case, it is not easy to define antitheism.

An antitheistic theory may be described as *any theory of God, of man, of the universe, or of the relations between them, which is opposed to theism.* This is little more than a general description, but it may suffice for the present discussion. It embraces any doctrine that denies the existence or the personality of God, it includes any theory that sets aside the spirituality or immortality of man, it applies to any scheme that asserts that the universe is self-contained, and it also designates any speculations that do not rightly construe the relations between God and the universe. Under this general description all forms of antitheistic speculation may be embraced.

3. It is not easy to secure a *classification* of the theories that are opposed to theism, for the simple reason that no common principle of division is at hand. To arrange them as philosophical, scientific, critical and historical scarcely

meets the case, as several of these theories partake of more than one of these features. Hence, we can do little more than enumerate these theories; and in the order of enumeration we may begin with the lowest.

Polytheism may be passed over with a mere mention of its real nature. Though the fundamental conception of God given by polytheism is essentially erroneous, yet every phase of *polytheism* is rather a testimony to the inherent tendency of men to believe in God, than an expression of antitheistic thought. The materials supplied by many of the polytheistic systems will have real apologetic value later on, in the introductory section of Christian Apologetics, under what is now termed Comparative Religion.

Atheism in all its forms, practical and theoretical, stands as the direct opposite of theism. Its great assertion is that there is no God. The same conclusion may be reached by other indirect paths, but atheism is the direct denial of the existence of God in any form.

Materialism is also direct opposition to theism, although it differs from atheism in directing its great denial against the reality of spirit. Here semi-materialistic theories, pure materialism, and psychological materialism, must be carefully considered. And, in addition, modern materialistic evolution must be critically examined.

Positivism comes naturally after materialism, for it very often rests on a materialistic foundation. Both in its ontology and its psychology it has much in common with materialism, and it often grows out of the soil of the physical sciences.

Agnosticism in our own day is prevalent in certain cultured circles, and needs careful examination. It is sometimes the older skepticism in new forms; and, in our own day, it is often openly advocated. That it is first a subtle theory of knowledge, and then an antitheistic scheme, must be carefully observed.

Pantheism is a decidedly philosophical system, and has

had a prominent place in the history of speculation. In several of its great historic forms it must engage earnest attention. The claims of ethical monism in our own day will have to be carefully weighed in connection with pantheism.

Deism, as a scheme which in some respects approaches theism, must be examined. Here rationalism, and infidelity, and all naturalistic schemes, must be explained and critically considered, for we have here a general doctrine of God's relation to the universe.

Pessimism, Secularism, Socialism, Communism and Spiritualism, though not very closely related, will all be considered under one head and in a single chapter; and their general bearing upon the interests of the Christian faith will be investigated. Then the whole will be concluded with a summary of Fundamental Apologetics.

II. *Statement of Atheistic Theories.* § 105.

1. Strange as it may seem, *atheism* has always had a place in the history of human speculation. It consists in the strict denial of the existence of any sort of a deity. It looks upon all theistic belief as groundless, and upon all religion as a baseless superstition. We find traces of atheistic thought among the Greeks, although the trend of the best in Greek philosophy was against it. It was sometimes regarded with such antipathy as to lead to the banishment of those who professed it. In recent times it is often coupled with materialism. Indeed, atheism and materialism are often the same general scheme of things, looked at from different view-points.

2. There are really two types of atheism. Each represents a distinct attitude and temper. The one may be called *practical,* the other *theoretical.* Practical atheism is largely a moral product. It consists in living as if there were no God, and in refusing to acknowledge the claims

of religion upon the attention of men. This form of atheism does not openly deny the existence of God, nor does it present any rational grounds for the rejection of the claims of religion. It contents itself with a mode of life which is an open repudiation of the authority of God, and from which the thought of God is virtually banished.

It is to be feared that even in Christian lands there are many more practical than theoretical atheists. The decent man of the world, the respectably indifferent, seen in multitudes on every hand, and the openly wicked soul, are all to be set down as belonging to this class. In most cases this form of atheism has a moral root. Men are living in open rejection of a God whose government is over them. They know that their lives are out of harmony with the law of God, and they naturally begin to wish that there were no God to call them to account. This wish becomes the father of the thought, and so the thought that there is no God takes firm hold of their minds. At the same time, it may be seriously doubted whether there are many really sincere atheists of this class. There is often a good deal of bravado in the profession of atheism, for when death stares the atheist in the face his atheism often fails him.

No attempt is made to refute this phase of atheism. It is mainly one of the sad consequences of human apostacy. Atheism of this sort is the legitimate fruit of sin, for on account of sin men seek to put God out of memory. This being the case, the true remedy for it is the *gospel,* and the best way to treat it is to preach that gospel in its bearing upon sin and all its evil results. This atheistic attitude is not the result of any reasoning process, as a rule, and hence it is quite useless to try to cure it by reasoning against it. But since it naturally grows out of the soil of the apostate heart that does not wish to retain the thought of God, the divine remedy which the gospel provides should at once be brought to bear upon it.

3. On the other hand, *dogmatic* atheism consists in a

reasoned attempt to justify the assertion that there is no God, and to show that man is not in need of any kind of religion. Though the number of dogmatic atheists has never been large, yet the attempt to prove the negative of theism has been made in various ways. Among the ancient Greeks the term atheist was applied to those who denied the reality of the popular pagan deities; and in some cases such atheism was punished by death or banishment. The general tendency of Greek philosophy was against atheism and towards theism. Of course Greek materialism was atheistic, as in modern times atheism is usually coupled with materialism. Some of the French materialists went so far as to say that the existence of God was impossible. And still more recently in Germany, materialism has boldly announced its avowed atheism. Feuerbach distinctly says that there is no God. His words, in part, are, "There is no God; it is as clear as the sun and as evident as the day that there is no God, and still more that there can be none." And he seeks to prove this remarkable statement as follows: "For if there were a God, then there must be one; he would be necessary. But, now, if there is no God, then there can be no God. There is no God, because there cannot be any." This is a caricature of the ontological proof for the existence of God, and assumes the very thing to be proved as between Atheism and Theism. In England, Bradlaugh and his school say that "there is only one existence, and that there cannot be more than one." This is simply an indirect assertion of materialism, or of some form of impersonal monism.

Dogmatic atheism usually tries to justify itself to reason by seeking to show that the problems of man and the universe can all be solved without assuming the existence of God. In various ways the universe is supposed to have its explanation in itself. If that explanation is cast in terms of matter and mechanics, then atheism and materialism are really synonymous. In such cases the fact of

the existence of God is said to be entirely superfluous; and since it is not rationally necessary to explain the universe and man, the theistic postulate may be laid aside. In addition, atheism has to give some account of the fact that religions of various sorts have always had a place in the activities of men. It usually asserts that all these forms of religion, the Christian among the rest, are mere superstitions. They are delusions of the human mind, and have no ground in reality. In particular, the existence of God is a simple hallucination, with no basis in fact.

III. *Refutation of Atheism.* § 106.

In the criticism and *refutation* of atheism now to be made, attention must be confined almost entirely to *dogmatic* atheism. An examination of practical atheism would lead to the consideration of man's perverted moral state. This belongs to Systematic Theology rather than to Apologetics. It need now only be remarked that this perverted moral state, by reason of sin, is the chief cause of atheism. Men put away God, and do not like to retain him in their thoughts, because of the natural evil heart of unbelief. They love darkness rather than light, because their deeds are evil, and become atheists by a bad moral propensity, rather than for good rational reasons. This being understood, some reasons for rejecting dogmatic atheism are now given.

1. First of all, it indicates an *unnatural* state of mind and heart. If the facts and phases of religion among men mean anything, they surely show that men are naturally inclined to believe in some kind of deities. If they do not believe in one living and true God, they believe in some sort of deity or deities. The tendency to make positive denial of every kind of a divinity does not appear among pagan peoples. The conviction of the reality of the deities may be vague and perverted, yet the negative attitude is seldom taken by untutored savages. Much that was said

in dealing with the psychology of theism shows that men are naturally disposed to entertain the belief in deity in some form. There are no tribes of atheists, as Flint and others have clearly shown against Lubbock, Tylor, and others. And even if the belief in divinity is often crude and perverted, it does not follow that men are naturally atheistic and non-religious.

And, further, if atheism be man's natural state, and if it be true that men must be taught to believe in God, it would be difficult to give good reasons for the persistence of this belief from generation to generation, for if one generation failed to teach it to the next, the belief would be lost. The belief is one of the most persistent in the life of mankind, and this indicates that it is a well-founded belief. A false belief is not likely to so definitely persist from age to age, else our nature would be deceiving us at its very foundation. The conclusion we reach from all this is that atheism is an unnatural temper.

And this conclusion is confirmed by observing how atheism seems to be reached by its advocates. As a rule, it is true that men must reason themselves into the atheistic frame of mind, and that they often stifle the deepest aspirations of their souls in doing so. It is a state into which men bring themselves by voluntary effort. It is the result of *volition,* not of spontaneity. Men believe in some sort of deity naturally, and they can only reach the denial of that native belief by a volition which usually springs from the morally disordered nature engendered by reason of sin.

2. On purely *psychological* ground, it is not easy to see how men can be consistent atheists. Before a person can intelligently deny the existence of God, there must be some idea of deity in his mind. Even the atheist must have the idea of God as a part of his mental content before he can rationally argue against the existence of such a being. This is surely an indisputable fact. It need not be decided how he obtained that idea. If it be a spontaneous mental

product under given circumstances, the objection to atheism is most forceful. But if the atheist is merely taking the idea of the theist, it does not really matter. The existence of that idea there has to be reckoned with and accounted for. This fact gives the basis for one of the Cartesian proofs for the existence of God; for the idea of God, being that of an infinite being, cannot be the product of the human soul. In addition, if the reality of the idea of God in the human mind in its full theistic sense be admitted, then again some form of the psychical proof has at least its starting point provided. Hence, if the true psychological nature of theistic belief be conceded, the atheist can scarcely hold his ground.

3. Atheism really *explains nothing,* so that it is valueless as a solution of cosmic problems. If it could be shown that theism is not needed to solve these problems, or that atheism can give better explanations than theism, then its claims might be at least plausible. But, as a matter of fact, atheism, being a purely negative scheme, can really explain nothing, and must content itself by assuring us that there is really nothing much to explain. It leaves the universe, so vast and complex, unexplained in regard to its cosmic origin, cosmic progress, cosmic order, and cosmic design. And it does injustice to some of the deepest rational instincts of the human soul. It must hold that the universe in some form is eternal, that it is purely mechanical in its development, and that it has before it no definite goal. Surely we can scarcely be expected to give up theistic belief, which explains all the proper problems of man and the universe for a world-view that does not even profess to give any adequate solution of all the pressing problems which the cosmos presents. This, indeed, would be a poor exchange.

4. And, then, when atheism does attempt to give explanations of the questions which reflection upon the cosmos suggests, it becomes *irrational* and *illogical.* This appears whenever it attempts to solve the problems of the cosmos.

It asserts that the universe is eternal, while reason demands a first cause, which is not also an effect, as its logical resting-place, for reason cannot be content with the infinite regress of causes. Atheism thus commits itself to the materialistic dogma of the eternity of matter, which cannot be proved, for if matter be limited as to space, it is likely limited as to time also. Further, it must at every stage derive the cosmos at one moment from its condition and resources the previous moment. This is pure materialistic evolution, and does injustice to the law of causality, which requires that there shall be as much reality in the cause as in the effect. Then, atheism is helpless to explain the problems of order and design, of life and mind, of morality and religion. These are problems which demand some sort of a solution. Atheism can give no sufficient reason, and must be rejected as irrational. Theism, on the other hand, fully meets the case.

5. Logically, in order to prove its position, atheism must *prove a negative.* The burden of proof rests on him who makes a denial. Atheism denies the existence of God, and on it rests the burden of proof. This is true in several respects. Men generally believe in some sort of deity. Atheism must make good its case against this fact. Then, since atheism asserts that there is no God, it must exhaust every possible sphere of evidence. The atheist must explore the universe far and wide, scan every nook and corner of it, before he can justify his negation, for if he does not he may overlook some of the evidence. But in the case of theism it is different. He only needs to pursue his observation and reflection upon the universe but a little way before he finds ample evidence to justify the conclusion that there must be a God. For example, suppose a man is cast on a lonely island, and raises the question whether there are any people on it or not. In order to be sure that there are no people on the island, he must explore it carefully in every part, while only a brief survey along

the shore may reveal to him abundant proof that there are people on the island. The man who undertakes to prove the negative in this case must explore the whole island to establish his conclusion. So must the atheist explore the whole universe, even to its utmost bounds, before he can justify his position. The eloquent way in which Chalmers and Foster have set forth this point, even if we make some allowance for the rhetoric, has much force. The theist who undertakes to vindicate the positive assertion that there is a God has the logical advantage.

6. Atheism leaves no basis for an authoritative *morality,* and it provides no secure bond to hold society together. If there be no God, under whose moral government man is a subject, there can be no absolute morality, nor any authoritative obligation. Morality can have no other sanctions than such as are human. There can be no abiding distinctions between right and wrong, and obligation must rest on considerations of self-love or utility. An atheistic state of society is simply anarchy. National life is hopeless in such a case. There is no bond to bind the social fabric into an organic whole on moral grounds. National ruin shall surely follow the prevalence of atheism among any people. If God be left out of our national life, it will not be long before every man's hand will be against his neighbor's. There is a warning here for the great nations of our own day, for should these nations forget God and become virtually atheistic, history would but repeat itself should the sceptre of empire pass from their hands to others more worthy. Religion is a national necessity, and the belief in God is a moral *desideratum* of the highest value.

7. Atheism does not abound in works of *charity,* and has never been the true handmaid of literature, science and art. Since atheism claims to provide all that is necessary for the welfare of mankind, we may justly ask to know something of her benevolent deeds. How many hospitals and poorhouses has atheism established? How much has

the dogmatic or theoretical atheist ever done to help the needy, to comfort the sorrowing, and to raise up the fallen? When it has done as much as Christianity, with its belief in one living and true God, then it may make its claim. So with literature, science and art. History plainly shows that these have flourished and reached their best only under the benign influences of the Christian religion. Atheism blights everything that tends towards the elevation of the race, and it removes all those agencies that heal the sores and remove the ills of this mortal life. How strange it is that the atheist opposes and denies the very things which make life comfortable for him and his. For this blessing he is indebted to the very belief in God which he earnestly repudiates. Here in this sphere theism, as the basis for Christianity, is entirely adequate.

8. From the *religious* point of view, atheism stands utterly condemned. That man has in his nature the sentiment of religion and the instinct of worship, can scarcely be denied, yet atheism provides nothing to meet these deep demands of man's spiritual nature. It has no message for the heart of man. It gives no hint of immortality, and it affords no consolation in the days of darkness and sorrow. It has no hand to bind up the broken-hearted, nor to wipe away the tears of sorrow. It simply ignores these evident facts in the experience of men, and compels men to live without hope, and be little better than the beasts. But the belief in God which Christianity announces supplies every need that man's head or heart can know. Nay, more, the atheist stifles every aspiration of the human heart, and blunts all the tender instincts of the soul of man. Atheism first puts to death man's religious nature, and then proclaims that there is no God, and that man does not need a deity. Such a system merits little serious consideration, and may be rejected at once.

CHAPTER II.

SEMI-MATERIALISM.

CONTENTS.

Materialism not New.—Its History.—China.—Greece.—Democritus, Leucippus, Epicurus.—Plato and Aristotle.—Rome.—Lucretius.—Mediæval.— Modern.— Hobbes.— France.— Spencer.— Germany.— Reaction. —Three Types of Materialism.—Semi-materialism.—Three Phases.— Soul of the World.—Formative Principle.—Immanent Rationality.— Semi-materialism and Semi-pantheism.—Criticism of Semi-materialism. —Idea of God Inadequate.—All Types of it are Monistic.—No Proper Place for Individual Personal Beings.—All Present a Mechanical Theory of the Universe.—Freedom is Destroyed Both as to God and Man.— The Teleology of the Universe Unexplained.—The Immanent Principles of the Cosmos Themselves Need Explanation.

LITERATURE.

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I. *Historical.* § 107.

AFTER atheism, *materialism* naturally comes to be considered, since they often mean nearly the same thing stated from different points of view. The former looks at the problem of existence from the view-point of God, the latter regards it in relation to the universe. Both agree in asserting that there is no spiritual form of existence.

1. Materialism in some form is no new thing. It is not an invention nor a discovery of modern times. As a world-

view, or a mode of thinking concerning the cosmos, it is as old as philosophy, and philosophy is as old as reflection upon the inner nature and cause of the existing universe of finite things. A type of thought, therefore, which is so old, and which has been so persistent, must arrest earnest attention in theistic discussions. While it must be conceded that writers like J. P. Lange, in his *History of Materialism,* give too much prominence to the materialistic phase of speculation in the history of philosophy, yet a serious mistake will be made in the interests alike of theism and Christianity if the significance of materialism be ignored. The apologete must give earnest and careful attention to it.

2. Some brief *historical* allusions will confirm this view. In ancient times there was a good deal of speculation which was dominated by materialism. We find distinct, though not widely prevalent, traces of it among the Hindoos and Chinese. The prevailing tendency of speculation among the Hindoos was undoubtedly pantheistic. Occasionally, especially in connection with certain types of Buddhism, it degenerated into a sort of materialistic belief, particularly so far as man is concerned. But in China, according to Flint, in his *Antitheistic Theories* (pp. 45–47), more than three hundred years before the Christian era, the materialistic view of man had a strong advocate in Yang Choo, who positively denied the separate existence of the human soul and its immortality. According to this writer, whom Flint quotes at some length, men "when alive may be good or bad," but when they are dead "they are only so much rotten bone." He says, further, that "while alive, therefore, let us hasten to make the best of life. When about to die, let us treat the thing with indifference and endure it; and seeking to accomplish our departure, so abandon ourselves to annihilation." The French materialists scarcely went further than this.

3. In Greek philosophy materialistic ideas prevailed from the *earliest* times. More than six centuries before Christ

they appeared in one form among the Greek physicists. These men, reflecting upon the manifold forms of finite things, sought some first principle, by means of which the universe of concrete existing things might be rationally explained. In many cases a material principle was postulated; and it was generally a concrete material form of existence. Thales (B. C. 636) posited water, Anaximines (B. C. 548) proposed air, while Empedocles (B. C. 444) assumed the four elements of earth, air, fire and water. Anaximander, with his *απειρον* or indefinite, and Pythagoras with the conception of *αριθμοι* or numbers, in the sense of mathematical relations, are not to be classed with the physicists proper.

It is quite evident that the thinking of the Greek physicists is at best quite crude, for the material first principles which they assume to explain existing things are already definite concrete forms of being, and consequently require for themselves rational principles of explanation.

But in later Greek speculation the materialistic type of thought became much more *mature* and consistent. Indeed, the Greek atomists presented materialism in such a complete form that modern speculation has added little that is essentially new to it. Some names here deserve to be mentioned. Leucippus and Democritus, both of Abdera, who lived about the same time (B. C. 460–470), may be named together, inasmuch as they set forth substantially the same opinions. They are the first thorough-going materialists in the history of philosophy. As their opinions will be fully explained in the next chapter, their historic position is now merely signalized. Epicurus (B. C. 340) added some important features in regard to psychology and ethics to the atomic doctrines of Democritus. With Epicurus, materialism reached its full maturity in ancient times. In his hands it was first a theory of the whole universe of existing things, and afterwards a theory of knowledge and a doctrine of morals.

4. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were the *opponents* of materialism in their day, and they rendered noble service in the interests of a true philosophy. It is to be observed, however, that neither Plato nor Aristotle clearly grasped the non-eternity of matter, and its origin by divine creation. Matter, as well as the deity, was eternal, and was by him moulded into the universe, according to the *ideas* of Plato or the *forms* of Aristotle. The Sophists often rested on the materialistic basis of Democritus and Epicurus, just as in our own day empiricism and utilitarianism are often allied with materialism. The physical opinions of the Stoics often tend towards materialism, for matter is often regarded as permeated by life. This is almost a suggestion of the hylozoism of our own day, which holds that matter is ever active, and really endowed with a form of life.

5. The Romans *imported* their philosophical opinions very largely from the Greeks, hence almost all the Greek schools of philosophy had their representatives in Rome. Lucretius, who lived in the early part of the century before Christ, became the leading exponent of Greek atomic materialism among the Romans. In his writings, which are mainly poetic in their form, there are certain modifications of the views of Democritus and Epicurus, yet there is nothing radically new. In the early centuries of the Christian era these materialistic teachings came into contact with the religion of Jesus Christ, and had not a little to do with the production of Gnosticism and Manichæism.

6. In *mediæval* times there was but little materialistic speculation. Various reasons have been assigned for this fact. Some suggest that there was little intellectual activity and freedom of thought; others attribute it to the fact that philosophy was seldom divorced from religion during this period; and still others are inclined to believe that the absence of devotion to the cultivation of the physical sciences explains the fact that there was little materialism in mediæval days. Occasionally the immortality of the

human soul was denied, but a thorough-going materialism is practically unknown among the scholastics. With the *revival* of learning in the sixteenth century, materialistic modes of speculation reappear. From this fact some have concluded that the study of the physical sciences is really dangerous, and hence Bacon and others are condemned for their influence in this direction. Now, while it must be admitted that the exclusive and one-sided study of the natural sciences, to the neglect of philosophy, and in entire disregard of the guidance of theology, may lead astray; but if the materials with which natural science deals be regarded as in some sense the handiwork of God, much may be gained alike for science, philosophy and theology.

7. In *modern* times materialism prevails quite widely. Bacon, Gassendi and Hobbes, though not avowedly materialists, yet gave certain impulses to this type of thought. It may be that Lange, in his *History of Materialism,* gives a more materialistic color to the speculations of Bacon than they deserve, still the fact remains that with the advent of the inductive method, and its application to the facts of nature, materialism has revived. Gassendi seems to have been formally committed to materialistic views in a modified form, for he sought to show that the doctrines of Epicurus were not inconsistent with the Christian faith. Hobbes was doubtless more decidedly materialistic than those just mentioned, for he adopted the sensational theory of knowledge in its baldest form, and was soon on the ground of materialism, so far as the nature of man is concerned. Even Descartes did not entirely avoid certain materialistic implications in regard to the *eternity* of matter and the nature of the soul. At the same time, Descartes' philosophy was essentially *spiritualistic,* and it did much to stem the tide of rising materialism, and lead to a sound philosophy and an orthodox theology.

8. Towards the close of the *seventeenth* century, materialism gained ground in several quarters. John Locke

(1632–1704), though he was far from being a materialist himself, yet in his philosophy he announced certain principles which, when developed in a one-sided way, led to materialism. In France particularly this development soon took place, so that materialism, skepticism and atheism arose and soon bore terrible fruit in that fair land. Condillac and Helvetius were followed by D'Holbach and La Mettrie to extreme materialism, where science, philosophy and theology were all alike wrecked. About the same time, Hartley and Priestley, both of whom did good work in the sciences, the former in physiology and the latter in chemistry, promulgated opinions which leaned towards a modified materialism.

9. During the *century* just closed, materialism can boast of many well-known names in Britain, France and Germany. John Stuart Mill and Charles Darwin, in different ways tended towards materialism, though not avowedly. Herbert Spencer and Thomas Huxley, though professedly agnostics in psychology, are virtually materialistic in their ontology. And the positivists generally are, in spite of themselves, bound to rest on a materialistic basis. In Germany, the reaction against idealism during the past twenty or thirty years has set in motion two currents, one towards materialism and the other towards a spiritualistic philosophy. Feuerbach, Hæckel, Wagner, Büchner, Vogt and Moleschott represent the former, and Lotze, with his school, represent the latter, and are very influential.

On the whole, the *outlook* in regard to a sound philosophy in opposition to materialism is brighter than it was half a century ago. Crude materialism is held now by few whose opinions have much weight. The danger now lies in that subtile type of refined materialism which endows matter with the attributes of spirit, while in certain quarters there is a tendency to fall back on agnosticism in regard to the whole problem of the reality and nature of matter. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that the intense

devotion of so many keen minds to physical science, the wonderful development of the material resources of the earth, the intense commercialism of our day, the tendency to luxurious living, and the decline of the sense of God in the minds of so many, are in great danger of producing a kind of practical materialism as deadening as theoretical materialism.

10. There are many *types* of materialism, so that for orderly treatment of a vast field some classification is necessary. Three main classes, not entirely distinct from each other, may serve present purposes. First, *semi-materialistic* theories, where the materialistic principle is accompanied with something else; secondly, *pure materialism,* where matter is said to be the only real existence, and hence neither God nor the human soul is admitted to have any reality; and, thirdly, *psychological materialism,* where the materialistic principle is applied only to man, and the reality of his spiritual nature is denied.

II. *Semi-Materialism: Statement.* § 108.

1. The historical sketch of the last section shows how persistent and how varied materialistic views have been. It also suggests that one of the dangers to which Christianity is exposed to-day lies in this fact. And this danger is all the more subtile when it is observed that materialism often supplies the soil upon which atheism, agnosticism, positivism and secularism grow. Of the three divisions of materialistic speculation mentioned at the close of the last section, *semi-materialism* is now considered. This is a somewhat mixed phase of materialism, which offers a general theory of the universe, in which all forms of existence are explained from materialistic premises and are construed in terms of matter. It proposes a modified monistic system, and thus seeks to meet reason's demand for unity. The eternity of matter in some form and with

certain endowments is assumed, and the existence of spirit as distinct from matter is denied. The reality of God is denied, and all mental facts are construed under the category of matter. But these theories assume that along with matter, and not divorced from it, some other principle must be presupposed in order to explain the phenomena of matter. Whether these principles are really material in their nature is not made very clear. But all these views agree in regarding *matter* as the only real existence, and at the same time it is supposed to possess certain qualities or *potencies,* which are necessary to account for the facts which appear in the universe.

2. There are at least three phases of semi-materialism. Some of these are decidedly materialistic, while others are more pantheistic in their scope. Indeed, some of them might almost be termed semi-pantheistic. Still, as the monistic basis in each case is conceived under the category of matter, it seems better to regard them as semi-materialistic theories.

3. The *first* phase of semi-materialism is found in the Stoic conception of the *anima mundi,* or soul of the world, and also, in nearly the same way, in modern *hylozoic* theories. According to the Stoics, matter is the basal reality of all things in the universe. But matter is not entirely alone, for it is animated, and has a life constantly throbbing in it. This life or soul of the world is sometimes called God, so that God, in this sense, is the immanent working power in the universe. In a quite monistic way, God is the soul of the world, and the world is the body of God. This aspect of Stoicism, which is by no means prominent in it, has led some writers to regard it as semi-pantheism. The world is a vast living machine, of which the active power is God. That the Stoics had a definite conception of God as numerically distinct from the universe seems scarcely probable, and to term the world-soul God is hardly justified. Stoicism in general is more properly represented

by modern hylozoism, which holds that matter inherently possesses a living principle of active development. A pantheistic doctrine looks upon the universe as a manifestation or modification in some way of the one primal independent existence. The primal existence is always first, and the universe second, in pantheism. This is scarcely the doctrine of the Stoics. They put the universe as material first, and endow the universe with vital activity. It is thus a vast organism with a soul. This phase of thought is properly represented by those modern refined materialistic theories which look upon matter as endowed with "the promise and potency" of all that comes into existence in the universe. This refined *cosmic materialism* seeks to avoid the difficulties which beset crude materialism, by presenting this hylozoic view of the cosmos. It may properly be called semi-materialism.

4. The *second* phase of semi-materialism springs from later stages in the philosophy of Plato and of Aristotle. According to both of these men, matter, in its essential nature, is not created, but eternal. This matter is formed into the concrete universe in accordance with the ideas of Plato's system or the forms of Aristotle's philosophy. In both the germs of a semi-materialistic theory of the universe are to be found. So soon as the idea is made inherent in matter, or the form is regarded as an endowment of matter, the germs have developed into semi-materialism. This is practically what took place. As these two great systems, which have not a little in common, declined in purity, matter came to be looked upon as possessing, in its inherent nature, a formative or moulding principle. The idea of a world-former apart from the universe faded away, and the ideal or forming principle in matter was all that was necessary to produce the universe. The universe then came to be construed in terms of matter, under the operation of some *plastic nature* or formative principle within it. In neo-Platonic speculations and in mediæval

Aristotelianism we have instances of this. Cudworth, the English Platonist, though he repudiates crude materialism in the interests of theism, yet is not free from refined semi-materialistic tendencies. In another way, the monadology of Leibnitz illustrates this tendency, for the monads were simply little particles of matter with a life or soul in each. Certain forms of modern evolution, which would repudiate the charge of crude materialism, presuppose that in the material substratum of the universe there is a principle which is at once dynamical or active, and teleological or rational, in its nature, and which is capable of accounting for the universe in its cosmic history, and in its present organized condition.

5. The *third* phase of semi-materialism is more subtile than the two just described. It is associated with later aspects of the Hegelian philosophy. In these aspects of absolute idealism, the question of the category under which the absolute idea or unconscious reason is to be construed, was raised. Some construed it under spirit, and others under matter. The latter tended quite decidedly towards semi-materialism. The basal reality of all things was matter, and in it there is a principle of *inner movement* which must be mechanical rather than logical. The result of the operation of this principle is the production of the universe. Hartmann and Schopenhauer, though their point of departure was certain aspects of Hegelianism, yet they have moved so far away as to be scarcely idealists in any sense. They are really semi-materialists, with a strong flavor of pessimism in the latter. Their materialism is so refined that it almost endows matter with life and rationality. In many scientific circles where evolution rules this philosophy of the universe finds favor. The universe, at its root, is conceived as matter, but in it are latent the germs of life, and order, and design, in a word of purposive intelligence. This immanent endowment is sufficient to explain the universe without the assumption of an extra-mundane

power and intelligence. If anything is to be termed God, it is this endowment in the universe. The life, the order or the design of the universe is the only God there is. But this imprisons God in the universe, and really robs us of God as extra-mundane altogether. All these refined semi-materialistic schemes agree in assuming that matter is the basal *reality* of all existence, and that this matter contains certain inherent *qualities* other than the mere physical or mechanical forces. It is this endowment which accounts for the order and reason which we discover in the cosmos.

III. *Semi-Materialism: Criticism.* § 109.

The examination of semi-materialism does not now need to be made at length, inasmuch as the criticism of pure materialism will cover many of the points. The general *criticisms* here offered are such as apply almost equally to the three types of semi-materialism described in the last section.

1. The *conception* of God which these schemes present is quite inadequate. To identify God with the soul or life of the universe, and to confine him within it, is to apply the name of God to something which it does not fit. To regard God as merely the formative principle in the cosmos, and deny to him any extra-mundane reality, is simply to juggle with the name of deity. To construe the natural or moral order of the universe to be synonymous with God, and give him no reality beyond this order, is to do serious injustice to the idea of God. All that these theories can possibly supply is a material substratum for the universe in which merely cosmic principles are operative. To *imprison* God in the universe, or to reduce him to a feature of the cosmos, is to destroy God altogether.

2. All these types of semi-materialism are really *monistic*. Neither the soul of the world, nor the formative principle

of the universe, nor the rational order of the cosmos, is numerically distinct from the universe itself. They are all alike immanent in nature, and in no case transcendent. Neither do these systems offer a rational *dualism*. Both matter and its several endowments are supposed to be eternal; and if God be identified with these immanent principles, then both God and matter are eternal. This presents an eternal dualism. Hence, all these types of semi-materialism present either a hybrid monism or a hopeless dualism. In either case reason rebels against the conclusion.

But *theism* gives the consistent conception here. It meets the demands of monism perfectly in its hypothesis of one infinite personal God, who is eternal, self-existent and independent of the universe. It satisfies all the conditions of a legitimate dualism in its postulate of the real, though dependent, existence of the universe. God is, hence, transcendent in relation to the universe; yet he is also immanent, and hence accounts for all the features of order, life and rationality which the universe exhibits.

3. Semi-materialism in every phase fails to leave a proper place for *individual*, personal human beings. The soul, with its personality, cannot find a consistent place in any of the schemes now under review. Man, at best, is but a part of the cosmos, and he can be nothing more. The universe, according to the first of these schemes, is a great living organism, and man is but a part of the great vital whole. On the ground of the second, the formative principle in the cosmos being at best physical, makes man nothing more than highly refined matter, so that he is corporeal, with no spiritual principle in him at all. Under the supposition of unconscious rationality as the endowment of the universe, man can only be quasi-spiritual at most, and never distinctly personal. According to any one of the three suppositions, the soul is robbed of its personality and reduced to the category of matter. Such being

the case, they all alike stand condemned, for they destroy the possibility of religion by obliterating its subject.

4. These schemes all agree in presenting a purely *mechanical* theory of the universe. Everything in the cosmos is reduced to mechanism, and free rationality is obliterated. The soul of the world moves without freedom or choice, the plastic principle operates blindly by chance or fate, and unconscious rationality lacks the conditions of free activity. The whole conception of the cosmos in any case is mechanical.

Such being the case, the universe is not under the government of a free, powerful and wise ruler. If any one of these principles which are supposed to be immanent in the cosmos be regarded as God, then he is bound by the iron law of necessity, or he is at the mercy of blind chance. The idea of the cosmos being under the control of God as transcendent and free, has no place. A world-soul non-free, a plastic principle working blindly, or an unconscious rationality incapable of self-direction, cannot supply such a world-view as theism presents and Christianity demands.

In like manner, man is robbed of freedom and reduced to a mere machine. The world-soul throbs in him, the formative principle moulds him, and the principle of rationality actuates him; but all is purely mechanical, and free self-determination, such as morality and religion demand, can obtain no foothold in any of these schemes. Hence, definite personality for man has no place, and freedom, with consequent responsibility, is excluded. The effect of this is disastrous, not only for the individual man, but for society. Any scheme which destroys the basis of responsibility signs the death-warrant of social and rational well-being. This these schemes surely do.

5. None of these phases of semi-materialism can give a sufficient explanation of the *teleology* or finality evident in the cosmos. That there is law, order, sequence in the universe must be conceded. That there are marks of plan,

purpose or design in the cosmos cannot be denied. At best, immanent finality is the only explanation of the marks of design which are observed in the universe. The soul of the world, the formative principle and the latent rationality are all within the universe, and, in the very nature of the case, they provide no ground for an extra-mundane explanation of the order and design which the cosmos exhibits. What was said in presenting the design argument for the existence of God fully justifies this conclusion here, and it is not necessary to repeat what was then said. A merely hylozoic view of the universe cannot account for those features of it which involve rationality. Life and mind are different things, and the former cannot fully account for the latter. So, also, a formative principle working spontaneously within the universe, and moulding matter mechanically, cannot explain marks of intelligence. Nor can an unconscious reason which is supposed to permeate the cosmos, and is shut up within it, account for marks of purpose and intention manifest therein.

6. It may be added that the world-soul, the plastic principle, and the immanent rationality all need to be *explained*. How came the cosmos to be thus endowed? What is the ground or reason for each of these principles? Is matter eternally permeated by them? If not, whence did they come? Then, too, we may ask which of these three conceptions is really correct? These are questions which may be reasonably raised, and to which semi-materialism gives no proper answer. Theism, with its postulate of an infinite personal God, whose efficiency and rationality is sufficient to account for all those features of the cosmos, is amply adequate. It provides a ground for the marks of design in the universe which is at once immanent and transcendent. This being so, theism is further confirmed.

CHAPTER III.

PURE MATERIALISM: STATEMENT.

CONTENTS.

Scope of the Exposition.—Method of Statement.—Historical.—Ancient Greek Materialism.—Democritus and Epicurus.—Matter and Matter only the Real Existence.—Matter Eternal.—No Creation.—Matter Indestructible.—Atomic.—The *Plenum*.—Atoms Qualitatively Alike.—Quantitatively Different.—Extended, yet Indivisible.—The *Vacuum*.—Bounds Atoms.—Gives Motion.—Motion Downward.—Atoms Overtake Each Other.—Impact.—Contact.—Commotion.—Combination.—Aristotle's Acute Criticism.—Epicurus' Reply.—Necessity the Law of Atomic Combinations.—Chance and Fate.—Human Soul Atomic.—Modern Additions.—These Slight.—Molecular Conception.—Prominence Given to Energy.—Conservation, Transmutation and Correlation.—Tendency to Endow Matter with the Germs of Life, Order, Design and Purpose.—Its Verdict is: No Soul; No God.

LITERATURE.

Encyclopædia Articles on *Materialism*.—Flint's *Antitheistic Theories*.—Lange's *History of Materialism*.—Harris' *Philosophical Basis of Theism*, Chap. XVII.—Fisher's *Grounds of Theistic Belief*.—Rishell's *The Foundations of the Christian Faith*, Div. I., Sec. I., Chap. II.—Stewart and Tait's *Unseen Universe*.—Bruce's *Apologetics*.—Spencer's *First Principles*.—Hæckel's *Natural History of Creation*.—Holbach's *System of Nature*.—Buchner's *Matter and Force*.—Janet's *Contemporary Materialism*.—Strong's *Systematic Theology*, Part II., Chap. III., Sec. I.—Hodge's *Systematic Theology*, Part I., Chap. III., Sec. IV.—Dabney's *Theology*, Chap. VI.—Birk's *Modern Physical Fatalism*.—Fraser's *Philosophy of Theism*, Vol. I., Chap. III.—Watson's *Christianity and Idealism*, Chap. VIII.—Christlieb's *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief*, Chap. III., Sec. II.—Strauss' *The Old Faith and the New*.

I. *Statement of Ancient Materialism.* § 110.

1. THE discussion of semi-materialism in the last chapter prepares the way for the exposition of *pure materialism* in this and the following chapter. This leads to the careful consideration of scientific or thorough-going materialism. There are so many types of pure materialism, that it is not easy to give a statement which is at once

compact and comprehensive. And there are also so many aspects of criticism which open up that its refutation cannot be properly made in brief compass. This being the case, two chapters are to be devoted to it. In one a general *statement* of materialism will be made, and in another its *criticism* will be presented.

In making a general statement of materialism, it may be instructive to give a careful sketch of Ancient Greek Materialism, and then to follow this by some account of the additions to the general scheme which modern materialism has made. To follow this plan may have some historical interest; and it may be surprising to some to learn how mature ancient materialism was. And to discover how little the moderns have added to the ancients in materialistic speculation may keep the moderns truly humble.

In the historical sketch of ancient materialism given in the last chapter, three names were mentioned as its main advocates. Democritus and Epicurus among the Greeks, and Lucretius among the Romans, ever stand foremost among ancient materialists. It is their views, in a general way, which are now presented.

2. The *first* question relates to the *nature* of the fundamental existence. Ancient materialism answers that matter is the only real and primal existence. The assertion is that matter, in some of its modifications and combinations, is the only permanent reality, and that there is no such a thing as spiritual modes of being. This matter is eternal, so that there never was a time when in some form it was not. The idea of the origin of matter by creation, or in any other way, is rejected. The *eternity* of *matter* is one of the first principles of ancient, as of modern, materialism. Even Plato and Aristotle did not rise above the conception of the eternity of matter to its absolute creation.

Indeed, creation *ex nihilo* is not deduced by reason, but derived from Revelation. It thus becomes a matter of

faith, so that both science and philosophy are helpless to solve the problem of the origin of matter.

3. The *next* point to be considered relates to the inner *constitution* of matter. What is matter? Ancient materialism asserts that matter, which is held to be eternal and uncreated, is also indestructible in its nature. It persists the same in quantity amid all the changes it undergoes, so that no particle of it can ever be destroyed. But the main feature of ancient materialism is the atomic conception of matter which it announces. In its inner nature, matter consists in little definite particles, known as *atoms*. These make the *pleroma* or *plenum*. It is not very easy to get a clear idea of what was meant by these terms. As far as one can gather, the atoms are the only real forms of existence. They only have true being, and they are the primal forms of existence. In number they are infinite, and in their nature extended, yet indivisible. They are all *qualitatively* alike, according to Democritus and Epicurus, though there is reason to suppose that Lucretius admitted some sort of qualitative differences among them. This seems almost necessary; for it is not easy to see how atoms that are all of the same essential nature could ever, by merely combining, produce bodies radically different. But the atoms differ quantitatively. Some are large, others are small; some are heavy, others are light; some are rough, others are smooth; some are square, others are round. It is supposed that the combinations of such atoms produce the different sorts of bodies found in the universe.

It is to be observed that the *atom* is not really an existing thing; it is rather a speculative conception of what matter in its nature is supposed to be. The atom is never actually observed; it is rather postulated. In addition, if the atoms are by hypothesis indivisible, they can scarcely be unextended. If they are extended, they are conceivably divisible. But if they be unextended in order to be indivisible, it is hard to conceive how any number of conceivably indivisible

and unextended atoms could ever unite to produce an extended body.

4. A *third* important factor in ancient materialism is the *vacuum* or *kenon.* This corresponds partly to the popular conception of empty space. The *vacuum,* just as the *plenum,* space as well as the atom, is eternal and infinite in extent. It is evident that the idea of empty *space* is involved in that of the atom. If there were no empty space, matter would be solid, and the atoms could not be bounded off from each other. In its nature, matter would be an absolutely impenetrable mass. And, further, if there were no *vacuum,* the motion of the atoms would not be possible. Hence, those changes of place and relation, which the atoms must undergo in combining into bodies, could not take place. Thus, the void as well as the full, empty space as well as material atoms, must be assumed. This *vacuum* is sometimes called non-being, as the atom is being. This being and non-being enter into the conception of ancient materialism, and both are supposed to have objective reality.

5. A *fourth* feature of ancient materialism is the place and function given to *motion* in it. The question at once arises as to how the atoms which exist at first, distributed throughout an infinite vacuum, are ever going to arrive at any sort of concrete combinations? The answer to this question is found in the fact of the atomic motion. According to Democritus, the atoms are all endowed with a downward motion, which is also eternal. Different atoms fall at different rates in the infinite void. The heavy atoms fall faster than the light. The result is that the heavy overtake the light, and by impact upon them deflect them out of their courses. The result of this is to produce a commotion among the atoms, as the impact of one upon another extends more and more widely. This produces that atomic state known as "the fortuitous concourse of atoms." In this commotion certain groups of atoms which

have some natural kinship for each other draw together, and by degrees material bodies are formed. Thus, out of this whirling and dashing of the atoms in a purely mechanical way, this varied, orderly and beautiful universe has come into its cosmic existence.

6. At this stage emerges an exceedingly acute piece of metaphysical *criticism*. It arises out of the speculations of Democritus, Aristotle and Epicurus. Democritus said that some atoms fell faster than others in the eternal and infinite *vacuum*. Aristotle, with wonderful insight, asserted that in an absolute vacuum, such as Democritus assumed, all atoms fall at the same rate. The heavy and the light, the rough and the smooth atoms, all move at the same rate, prior to the beginning of the commotion among the atoms. If this be so, then Aristotle claimed that no atom could ever overtake another, but that all would ever move on in straight lines eternally. In this case, the formation of concrete material bodies is impossible by this process. Epicurus comes to the rescue of Democritus from the hands of Aristotle. He sought to effect this rescue by assuming that some of the atoms are inherently *endowed* with a tendency to deflect from the straight downward motion. By this deflection, in even one atom, the impact necessary to secure the beginning of the concourse of the atoms would be effected, and the way was opened up for the mechanical production of material bodies or masses of matter. This tendency was a sort of spontaneity with which certain atoms are endowed; and this is taken by Epicurus to be the key to the free agency exhibited in the activity of man, who is simply refined matter.

It would not be hard to show that Epicurus does not successfully meet Aristotle's criticism, for the reason that the question could still be raised as to the reason for the *native tendency* of some atoms to deflect. On a purely mechanical view of things, no reason for this can be given. And Aristotle could still raise the deeper question of the

origin of the motion of the atoms, and ask whether a *first mover,* who is himself unmoved, must not be assumed?

7. The fifth main feature of ancient materialism is that the *method* or law by which the combinations of the atoms take place is that of necessity. Chance or fate rules throughout the system. Every teleological factor is rigidly excluded. There is no design, no rationality, in all the movements of the atoms. The atoms move and combine according to pure *mechanical necessity.* There is no plan nor purpose anywhere in the cosmos. There is no free agency anywhere. So far as there is any ground or reason for the atomic combinations which take place, it lies in the atoms themselves, and is in its nature mechanical. This is a marked feature of all types of ancient materialism.

As the materialistic theory of the human constitution is to be fully considered in a subsequent chapter, little need now be said on this point here. Suffice it to say that the Greek materialists were inclined to regard the *soul* of man as consisting in round, smooth, fiery atoms, which are scattered through the body, which in turn is made up of coarser atoms. The movements of these atoms produce the phenomena of life and thought, of emotion and volition. But as to the last there is no real freedom, for the will, too, is under the law of necessity.

II. *Additions of Modern Materialism.* § 111.

1. Modern materialism, in its widest sense, professes to be a philosophy of all existence and to present a reasoned theory of the universe. It makes large claims as to its ability to explain all things without the hypothesis of spirit; and it boldly asserts that it has no need of a God. It alleges that it offers a purely unitary principle which is perfectly adequate to explain all the phenomena of the cosmos. But when modern materialism in its varied types is carefully inspected, it is seen to be not essentially dif-

ferent from ancient forms of it. The modifications are not radical, and the *additions* are not of vital importance. It is practically the same thing in slightly different attire. The *nebular hypothesis,* upon which some modern materialists lay so much stress as the solution of the cosmic process whereby the universe was framed, is not in principle so very different from the Epicurean fortuitous concourse of atoms, by which the cosmos came to be what it is. Some of the modifications and the additions made by modern materialism are now to be noted.

2. First of all, the purely atomic conception of matter has been somewhat modified in recent times by the *molecular* view of it. This introduces into the constitution of matter the ideas of motion and energy. It regards matter as ceaselessly active, and as permeated by force. The atoms are simple, and are held together in groups, called molecules, by chemical affinity; and molecules are held together in masses, called bodies, by cohesion. This combines the ideas of *matter, motion* and *energy* in the modern conception of matter.

3. Then, next, modern materialism gives great prominence to the conceptions of *force* and energy. The ancients laid stress upon matter and *motion,* while the moderns give the accent to matter and *force.* The views of the former were chiefly mechanical, while those of the latter are mainly dynamical. The one constructs the universe with atoms and motion by means of mechanics, the other organizes the cosmos with molecules and energy by means of dynamics. Both agree in holding to the eternity of matter, motion and force, but the construction of these three facts as found in the universe is presented with varying accent on each. Yet, after all, there is no difference in principle, for the moderns, in the conception of energy, have simply pushed the view-point a step backwards, and have raised the question of the ground or cause of motion in the atoms and molecules. But as to the real inner relations between

matter and force, the moderns are not at all agreed. Some regard the atoms as fundamental, others place energy at the basis and give matter a secondary place.

4. Still further, modern materialism attaches great significance to the *conservation* of energy and to the *transmutation* and *correlation* of the forces in the universe. In some respects the moderns have here made a real gain over the ancients. The latter generally conceived of force as all of one sort and in a purely mechanical way; but the former, owing largely to the advance made in the physical sciences, have been able to take a wider view of the forces in the cosmos.

By the term *conservation* is meant the fact that the quantum of energy in the universe, as a whole, is ever the same. It may change its form and mode of activity, as this force or that, but the amount of energy which pervades the universe is always the same. No quantity of energy can be originated, and none can be destroyed. It is a fixed fact in the cosmos.

By the term *transmutation* is suggested the idea that one form of force may be changed into another. In physics the forces involved in heat, light and electricity are supposed to be interchangeable, and may be transformed from one to the other. Within certain well-defined limits this seems now to be made out, and one of the claims of modern physics is that all the physical forces are presumably capable of reduction to one simple basal force. This conception, as a very useful working hypothesis, is clearly brought out in modern materialism.

The *correlation* of the forces implies that all the forces are inherently related to each other, and are all essentially the same at root. With this conception in the purely physical sphere, we have no fault to find. But modern materialism often goes much further, and asserts that the *physical,* the *vital* and the *mental* forces are all in principle the same. It is here that some very subtile materialistic

speculation has arisen in our own day. According to this view, life and thought and volition are merely modified mechanical energy and chemical activity. The mechanical and chemical forces account for life, and these three, in turn, account for thought and volition; all of which simply means that life and mind are construed in terms of chemistry. Here the moderns have gone a good deal further than the ancients, and have introduced new factors into the problem.

5. Finally, modern materialism, especially in its refined forms, shows a tendency to *endow* matter with certain powers or potencies which are scarcely materialistic in their nature. The whole hylozoic conception of matter reveals a tendency to endow matter with the quality of life in some sort of latent way. The idea that matter has in its very nature as molecular the germinal principle of order, is one with which modern materialism has made us familiar. And some materialists in our own day have such remarkable insight that they can discover a sort of teleological instinct in the atoms and molecules themselves. They predicate an immanent design, or an unconscious purpose, in matter, even in its atomic simplicity, and in energy in its purely mechanical forms. Having done this, it is supposed to be an easy task to construe the cosmos in terms of materialism. But this looks as if modern materialism, under the stress of controversial storm, has felt that from the data of matter, motion and energy, the universe, with life and mind, cannot be rationally construed. Then, in order to be able to so construe it, the policy is adopted of introducing into matter the germs of life and mind, and all else that is found in the universe. But this is not justifiable; or, if allowed at all, it certainly modifies the purely materialistic foundations of the theory. The whole scheme becomes at least semi-materialistic. But we are now not criticising modern materialism; we are simply pointing out one of its marked *tendencies* in its refined circles.

6. This brief statement of pure materialism must suffice. It proposes to construe the universe in terms of matter, energy and motion, and to explain all its phenomena without the hypothesis of spirit. The philosophy of the cosmos is lodged in atom and molecule, in energy and motion. The only real existence is matter; and the verdict of materialism is *no soul* for man, and *no God* for the universe. It is simply a round-about way to atheism, and must be carefully examined.

CHAPTER IV.

PURE MATERIALISM: CRITICISM.

Contents.

Change in Type of Materialism.—It does not Provide a Principle of Unity for the Cosmos.—Matter is Multiple.—Of Different Kinds.—And Force Increases the Complexity.—Materialism is Unscientific.—It is Dogmatic Rather than Inductive.—Explains the Higher from the Lower.—Violates the Law of Causation.—Materialism not More Favorable to Science than Theism.—Its Epistemology is Unscientific.—Particular Criticisms.—Cannot Prove that Matter is Eternal.—Spirit may be Eternal.—Matter not Necessarily Independent.—If not Infinite as to Space, Matter may not be Infinite as to Time.—It cannot Prove that Matter is Prior to all Forms of Mind.—Cannot Prove Absolute Indestructibility of Matter.—Cannot be True to its Theory of Knowledge.—Cannot Explain Force or Energy.—Nor Order and Design.—Nor Life and Mind.

Literature.

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I. *General Considerations.* § 112.

IN the last chapter a statement of materialism as it appears in ancient and modern times was made. This chapter undertakes to present in outline some *criticisms* of this theory of existing things. At the close of the last chapter it was pointed out that in our own day there is a tendency to discard the older and cruder forms of materialism, which hold the atomic or corpuscular view of

matter, and to advocate a refined or cosmic materialism, which is rather dynamical and hylozoic in its estimate of the materialistic basis of all things. This should be kept in mind in all criticism of modern materialism, as this is the type of this antitheistic speculation against which Christianity must protect itself. In this chapter an attempt will be made to present as careful an examination of materialism as its limits will allow. Some *general* considerations will first be presented, and then several *particular* points of criticism will be outlined.

1. Materialism signally fails to satisfy the logical demand of human reason for a *unitary principle,* on the basis of which the universe may receive its best philosophical explanation. The philosophical instinct of human reason demands unity in the principle from which a *rationale* of the cosmos is to be given. Now, in spite of the claim of materialism that it does this when it denies matter and spirit, and asserts only matter, the charge can be fully sustained that materialism, whilst monistic in its claims, does not supply a definite principle which is adequate as a principle of philosophical unity.

First of all, matter itself is not unitary, but *multiple.* In general, as we look upon the universe we find matter existing in every conceivable form. In the heavens above there are the sun, moon, and stars in almost endless multiplicity. On the earth about us, there is immense variety in the forms of existing material things. To the senses, in this superficial way, there is boundless multiplicity, instead of proper unity, in the material universe. From the view-point of philosophy, the unity here claimed is spurious, not legitimate.

And if we take a deeper and more scientific view of matter, we discover in the atomic or *molecular* conception of its constitution still greater multiplicity. The atoms and molecules defy enumeration, and thus the notion of unity sinks almost out of sight. They differ in size, weight

and shape. Some are round and some square, some rough and some smooth. What kind of unity is possible here? If we take the atomic homogeneous of Spencer, or the supposed star-dust of the nebular hypothesis, how can any sort of unity be connected with it? Reason asks for a philosophical principle of rational unity, and materialism answers with its fundamental postulate of atomic multiplicity.

But, further, matter is not all of the *same sort.* Some of the Greek materialists asserted that the atoms were qualitatively, as well as quantitatively, distinct. The atoms were of different kinds. Empedocles asserted that there were four distinct elements: earth, air, fire and water. Anaxagoras asserted that the elements of various material bodies were in primitive matter, and that these were moulded into shape and order by intelligence. In modern times the conception of matter, as consisting in different kinds, is clearly defined. The simple substances, according to recent views in physics, are over *sixty* in number, and as chemical analysis is seeking to do its work, the number of simple substances is increasing. In their very nature these simple substances cannot be changed the one into another, nor can they all be reduced to some single material element. This being the case, the conception of *unity* really vanishes. It thus appears that, on a purely materialistic theory of existing things, there is no sort of absolute unity. The counter inference that such unity can be found only in the postulate of an infinite personal spirit, such as theism proposes, where unity and indivisibility may both find a rational resting-place, is confirmed.

In addition, if the fact of *energy,* and the various forms of force which appear in the universe are taken into account, the presence of a unitary principle in a merely materialistic scheme is still less likely. Materialism of all shades, and in every age, has always been perplexed with the conception of the physical forces, and how to construe them in relation to matter. If both are real and eternal, then

dualism, which excludes a unitary principle, rules in the system. Then the aspects of energy known as attraction and repulsion, and all the various sorts of physical forces, have to be reckoned with. Here, again, multiplicity pervades the whole cosmos. Then, in addition to the purely mechanical and chemical forces, there are the *vital* and *volitional* agencies which appear in the organic kingdom, and increase the notion of multiplicity very much. Now, unless all the physical forces can be reduced to one basal force, and unless the physical, vital and mental forces in the universe can all be correlated and reduced to one generic form of force, the foundation for a unitary principle does not exist in pure materialism, no matter how refined. Here, again, the theistic postulate is adequate; for an infinite *personal spirit,* with volitional agency in its personality, provides the basis for a rational unity, and for the dynamical activity which are latent in the cosmos. Absolute unity, both in its ontological and dynamical aspects, is found in the contents of theism. It cannot be discovered, in either aspect, in materialism.

2. Materialism may be charged with being *unscientific.* This charge, if it can be made good, is severe on materialism, because that system generally claims to be strictly scientific in its spirit and methods. And if theism is justly open to the charge that it is in some way inimical to modern science of a legitimate sort, it would seriously suffer from such a charge. The charge which we make against materialism is that, in spite of its claims to the contrary, it is unscientific. This charge is now to be made good.

First, materialism usually follows the *dogmatic* instead of the *inductive* method, and in so far as it does so it is out of harmony with the spirit of modern science. Its usual dogmatic assertion is that matter is the only real form of existence, and on this basis its theory is constructed. The true scientific, or inductive, method bids us investigate the phenomena of the universe, and if it can be shown that

these can all be rationally accounted for on the basis of the materialistic theory, then this conclusion might stand. On the other hand, if it should turn out that the facts cannot all be explained in a materialistic way, then it is clear that materialism is inadequate. In addition, if it is found that the postulate of spirit is needed, and is sufficient to account in a rational way for all the phenomena of the universe, we shall be justified in holding that the theistic hypothesis is thereby confirmed. But the point now made against materialism is that, in assuming its fundamental position, it is unscientific, inasmuch as it assumes dogmatically, prior to investigation, what should have been reached inductively as the result of a careful survey of all the facts. To assert dogmatically that matter is the only reality, exposes materialism to the charge of unscientific procedure.

Secondly, materialism is compelled to explain the *higher* by means of the *lower,* and is unscientific in its attempt to do so. Materialism asserts that matter is the primordial form of existence. Matter is reality in its lowest terms and in the simplest modes of existence. Out of the resources of matter all higher and more complex forms of existing things are to be derived and their reality explained. Matter is devoid of life at first; but, somehow, life supervenes. This is a higher and more complex form of existence. Again, the sensitive arises upon the basis of the vital, and reveals still further complexity. This, again, is followed by the rational, where entirely new factors, which greatly increase the complexity, come into view. To crown all, the facts of morality and religion supervene, and here the complexity reaches its maximum. At every step there are factors in the higher and subsequent stage which are not in the lower and prior stage of development in the universe. The question for the materialist is to account for that new factor by means of the resources of matter alone.

It may be justly charged that all attempts to explain

the higher and more complex forms of existence from the lower and simpler, in a purely materialistic way, are quite unscientific, inasmuch as the essential demand of the law of *causation* must be disregarded at every onward and upward step. That law requires that there shall be at least as much reality in the cause as appears in the effect, and that no new factor shall be admitted into the effect which has not its counterpart in the cause. The materialist admits no extra-mundane causality to account for that which is new in every more complex stage of the universe. Hence, he must explain the vital from the non-vital, the conscious from the non-conscious, the rational from the non-rational, the moral from the non-moral, and the religious from the non-religious. It is evident that at every stage the law of causation is transgressed, and the whole procedure of the materialist is, on this account, *unscientific*.

The attempt made by some refined types of materialism to avoid this charge, by assuming that the *germs* of life, and mind and morality, are all latent in matter, is equally unwarranted, inasmuch as this is merely putting into matter by hypothesis something which is not essentially material, but which is found to be necessary to account for the facts which emerge in the universe. This is practically a confession of failure on the part of materialism to explain what we now see in the universe. It is also a suggestion that the theistic postulate is needed to provide an adequate causality which can account for all the facts in a thoroughly scientific way.

Thirdly, little weight need be attached to the claim that materialism holds a more respectful *attitude towards science* than theism. It is sometimes alleged that theistic belief and Christian faith are real obstacles in the pathway of progress in scientific research, and the boast is often openly made that materialism has done very much to foster the interests of science. In reply to this it is sufficient to say that neither the nature of the case, nor facts which lie

open for observation, bear out this allegation. Much less do they justify the materialist's boast. It cannot be shown that there is anything in the nature of theistic belief or even of Christian faith which limits the human faculties, or hampers their exercise in any realm of rational inquiry. Nor do the facts sustain the charge in question. In those lands and ages where the belief in God is well defined and religious knowledge widely diffused, the activity of the human mind has been most marked, and its achievements in science and invention been most remarkable. Where religious ignorance has prevailed the opposite is undoubtedly true. And if the materialist ventures, with a degree of assurance, to give a long list of men who have been noted in scientific research, and who at the same time were professed adherents of materialism, we can match such a list with one containing an equal number of the names of men who have done quite as much for the advancement of science, and who were all the while humble believers in God and the verities of the Christian system. Arguing from the nature of the case, we might go further, and make good the claim that theism puts the human mind in a better condition and attitude than materialism can, to study nature in all her wide and varied aspects.

Fourthly, the charge that materialism is unscientific in its *theory of knowledge* may also be made good against it. That theory of knowledge must be the empirical in its cruder sensational forms. The only knowledge we can have must come through the avenue of the senses. That this theory is inadequate has been already shown. The criticism which goes to show that the sensational epistemology is unsound also goes to show that it is an unscientific psychology. If the human mind has knowledge or beliefs which are not derived from the senses, the materialist can give no explanation of these things. To assume the attitude of the agnostic towards these elements of cognition and belief, as the materialist often does, is equally unscien-

tific. As this point will emerge again in another connection, nothing more need now be done than to point out the unscientific and incomplete nature of the materialistic theory of knowledge.

II. *Particular Considerations.* § 113.

In the previous paragraph it was shown that materialism was neither philosophical nor scientific. It failed to give a unitary principle to explain all things from, and it also disregarded the method of inductive inquiry in various ways. A few *particular* points of criticism are now adduced.

1. Materialism cannot justify its *assumption* that matter is eternal. It is bound to do this in order to make good its case, for it is just as easy, and perhaps quite as rational, to assume that spirit is eternal. That some form of being has always existed must be assumed; and the question in debate between the materialist and the theist is as to whether this eternal reality is *matter* or *spirit*. When the materialist asserts that it is matter, he is bound, in the circumstances, to give some sort of rational justification of his initial assumption. The attempt to prove the eternity of matter must be futile, and yet the demand of the theist that this be done is legitimate, unless it can be shown that in its very nature matter has the elements of independency and permanency. This can scarcely be done.

If the materialist attempts, in an empirical way, to *prove* the eternity of matter, he can make little headway. His only instruments of observation are his senses. These enable him to go back only a few short years. And even the observation of the race as a whole goes back only a few thousand years at most. And when he goes beyond the period covered by the direct observation of the human race, and considers the strata of the earth as revealed by geology, he may infer great antiquity, but he cannot prove eternity for atom or molecule. And should he lift his eyes to

heaven, and with the astronomer study the planets and the stars, he cannot rise to the definite conclusion that the material elements of which they are composed are eternal. Empirically, therefore, the *eternity of matter* is an *unproved hypothesis.*

Again, that which is eternal must be *independent* in its conditions of existence. If there were a time when it was not, then it must depend on something else to bring it into existence. Now, unless it can be shown that matter is absolutely independent in its essential nature, there may have been a time when it was not. Hence, there may have been something upon which it is dependent, and in relation to which it may have had a beginning. As to the initial assumption which must be made, the theist has the advantage here. His assumption is that there is an eternal personal spirit called God. This possesses the element of independency and self-sufficiency much more clearly than the assumption of a multiplicity of blind crass atoms. If matter in any form has in it the features of change and decay, it is not easy to maintain its independency and consequent eternity.

In addition, it may be argued that if matter be not *infinite* in relation to *space* it may not be so in relation to *time.* That it is infinite in relation to space cannot be proved; and if it could it would be only a quantitative infinite that would be reached. This being the case, the infinitude of matter in relation to time cannot be reasonably maintained, for if matter be finite in one respect it is likely finite in all respects. In any case the burden of proof rests with the materialist to prove the eternity of the material basis of his system.

2. If materialism cannot justify its claim that matter is eternal, it cannot make good the contention that matter *precedes* every form of mind. From the very nature of the case it may be that mind has in it elements which suggest its eternity in some form. If this be the case, it may

be much easier to explain *matter* from *mind* than to derive mind from matter. It must be assumed that something has always existed, which is the same as to say that it is eternal. The only question is as to the nature of that something which is eternal. That the form of existence which has always existed is mind or spirit is an hypothesis which has many things in its support.

The assertion that historically, so far as our earth is concerned, there seems to have been a time when there was no forms of spiritual being in it does not go to the root of the problem, unless it can be shown that spiritual personal beings like men are derived from matter. But even then the question would still arise as to whether an infinite form of spiritual being did not antedate and condition all forms of finite being, both material and spiritual, in the universe. And it might be argued that even if the materialistic view of the human constitution were admitted, the question of an infinite or divine mind, which implies a spiritual form of being, would still arise. In a word, even if *psychological* materialism should be proved, *ontological* evolution would not necessarily follow, for there might still be a God, even though man had no soul.

3. The materialist cannot prove the *indestructibility* of matter, and the absolute *persistence* of force. Superficial thinking here is apt to be misled by the fact that, so far as scientific observation and experiment go, human agency can neither originate nor destroy an atom of matter, nor an element of force. All that the materialist has any right to say is that, so far as *man* is concerned, matter is indestructible and force persistent. With equal propriety can it be said that spirit and mental energy are persistent and indestructible, so far as man's observation is concerned. To assume that there is no other agency than that of man is to assume what is in debate. To deny that there is any divine agency that may do with matter and force what man cannot is to venture a bold denial. It may be that

the divine agency which brought matter and force into being can cause them to cease to be. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to make it plain that, in its essential nature, matter is inherently indestructible, and it has already been shown that this is highly improbable. All that can be allowed in regard to the atom is its relative indestructibility, which means that, so far as human resources are concerned, this seems to be true of matter and force.

It must also be kept in mind that the atomic conception of matter and the dynamic idea of force are more or less *ideal* or *a priori*. Both are hypothetic constructions of certain sets of facts which appear in nature. The atom does not really fall under the ken of the senses directly, and motion rather than force is what the senses realize in the dynamical realm. Both the atom and the forces are metaphysical principles. To assert the indestructibility of matter and the persistence of force is really to make an assertion about these principles. This is scarcely consistent with the materialistic theory, which usually denies the reality of metaphysical principles. Yet it would seem that materialism must assume the reality of such principles. But theism is under no such difficulty. By its fundamental postulate of an infinite personal spirit it provides an absolutely indestructible foundation for all finite forms of being, whether material or spiritual. This postulate also guarantees whatever of permanency and persistence there may be in these finite aspects of being. If the annihilation of matter and the cessation of force be not inconceivable, then the origin of both, under a theistic view of the universe, is possible. Here materialism has special difficulties. It must hold to the eternity of matter, for there is no infinite personal spirit to bring it into being. This means that matter always was and always must be. This is a conclusion whose metaphysical validity may, as we have seen, be seriously questioned, while its scientific correctness is more than doubtful. Theism consistently holds all that science proves

in regard to the relative indestructibility of matter, and it provides the *metaphysical basis* of an absolutely indestructible personal spirit in *God*.

4. Materialism cannot be *consistent* with its own theory of knowledge. Flint and others use this with telling effect against materialism. This theory is the sensational or purely empirical. According to this theory, the senses are the only avenues of knowledge, and the senses bring us into cognitive relation only with what is concrete and palpable. Now, it has already been seen that the fundamental conception of materialism is the atoms, and that these atoms are metaphysical conceptions which do not come under the ken of the senses. Even in the laboratory, where the closest inspection of various forms of matter is made, the atoms are never seen nor handled. Hence, materialism can only speak of knowing its fundamental conception by being inconsistent with its own epistemology. In like manner, force in itself is not cognized by the senses. What is observed thereby is only the facts of motion, which are the results of force. By the senses only the fact of change is observed. They do not bring us into cognitive touch with the force which effects the change. Hence, materialism has no right to assert the reality of force; and when it does so it must be entirely inconsistent. Both the *atom* and *force* are *a priori* conceptions, which can have value and validity only on the basis of the *rational theory* of knowledge whose main outlines have already been expounded in this treatise. For materialism to assert the reality of either is to proclaim its own inconsistency, or to go beyond the limits of its own principles.

5. Materialism has great difficulty in giving a good *explanation* of force or energy, and in indicating its relation to matter. The conceptions of force and matter are distinct even in the mind of the materialist. Both are abstractions or inferences from what the senses observe. Now, materialism is, at best, vague in its conception of force. And

in regard to the relations between force and matter the opinions of materialists differ widely. Some regard force as corporeal, others incorporeal; some hold that it may subsist independently of matter, others that it is to be found only in connection with matter. Some make matter fundamental, conditioning force; others make force fundamental, conditioning matter. According to the former, the *atom* is the great reality, and *force* is a quality or invariable concomitant of the atom; according to the latter, force is the real entity, and the atom is the resultant of force in some way. So long as this difference and confusion of ideas exists among materialists, we may well hesitate to accept their philosophy of existence. Here the theist has decided advantage. His conception of one infinite, personal Spirit is definite. He is the one eternal reality, and from him both matter and force can be adequately explained in such a way as to render it unnecessary to deduce the one from the other as materialism must. Theism has the merit of clear thinking on this point.

6. What is perhaps a still more serious objection to the materialistic construction of things lies in its inadequacy to explain the *order* and *design* seen in the cosmos. That the universe exhibits order and harmony, and has marks of adaptation and design, must be admitted even by materialism. Of these facts some explanation is needed. Here materialism is practically helpless. All that was adduced in a positive way in the exposition of the eutaxio- and teleotheistic proofs for the reality of the existence of God, tells negatively against materialism. Materialism must explain order without intelligence, and design without purpose. It must account for harmony and adaptation in the cosmos only by chance or fate. Such explanations are scarcely rational. A set of blind forces operating upon dead atoms cannot supply an adequate explanation of the undoubted facts of order and design. Neither the eutaxiology nor the teleology of the cosmos has any *rationale* on the basis

of materialism. Neither the fortuitous concourse of atoms in ancient materialism, nor the reaction of the atomic homogeneous of modern materialistic theory provides what the facts need for rational explanation. Every phase of pure materialism which begins with crass material atoms and blind mechanical force is open to this fatal criticism.

In addition, it may be further said that, to sustain the laws of nature which appear to express the order in the cosmos, something else than the *order* itself, and something other than *atom* and *force*, is necessary. To say that matter was originally endowed with the potency of order, and a tendency towards design, is to lodge in matter qualities which are not necessarily materialistic and dynamical. This supposition is really a confession that pure materialism cannot account for order and adaptation, law and purpose, in the cosmos. Theism, on the other hand, has no such difficulty with these problems. In its postulate of an infinite personal Spirit, with intelligence and volitional agency, theism provides the key to solve all these problems in the cosmos. All in this sphere that goes to *support* theism ***refutes*** materialism.

7. Finally, materialism finds its fatal test in its attempt to explain *life* and *mind*. The origin of life, and the development of living things, are inexplicable on the basis of materialism. Even chemistry cannot account for life, for living things can use the resources of chemical activity. Yet materialism is bound to bridge the breach between the vital and non-vital forms of being, or it must reduce the former to terms of the latter. Materialism has never yet shown how *atom* became *cell*, or how physical energy became vital force. All the force of the modern doctrine of biogenesis, which teaches that life always comes from preëxistent life, tells against materialism at this point. To speak of the physical basis of life as bioplasm or protoplasm is not to explain life itself in terms of matter, for protoplasm is never vital, save in connection with an organism already

vital. Can materialism explain this vitality? Even if we admitted that mere mechanical agency could account for the order in the cosmos, or explain the definite forms of the crystal, can this agency account for the life in a bee, a bird, or a beast? Even if we conceded that the mechanical forces could produce the complex lenses in the eye of a beetle, this would not explain the function of vision which this wonderful eye performs. In like manner, if mechanism can explain the organic structure of an animal, yet the fact of sensation must be accounted for, and materialism has never succeeded in doing so; and the vital processes of nutrition, growth and reproduction, instead of arising out of the chemical action involved in them, are rather produced by some agency which is capable of using this chemical action. Such considerations as these show how futile is the materialistic account of the facts of organic life.

The phenomena of *mind* or thought afford the materialist still greater difficulty. As many things which bear upon this point, so far as man is concerned, are to be discussed in the next chapter, what is now to be said will be of a general nature. The main point now to be discussed is not whether man can be accounted for without assuming that there is a spiritual factor in his constitution, but rather whether the whole frame of the cosmos can be accounted for without mind. The former belongs to the sphere of psychological materialism, the latter to pure or ontological materialism. Man may have no soul, yet there may be a God. There are knowing forms of being in the universe. Can these be explained by materialism? There are moral forms of being in the world. Can the materialist account for these? There are volitional forms of existence. What can materialism do with free responsible agents? *Mind, morality* and *freedom* are rocks upon which pure materialism goes to pieces.

CHAPTER V.

PSYCHOLOGICAL MATERIALISM.

CONTENTS.

A Particular Aspect of Materialism.—Its Import.—The Materialistic Theory of Man.—No Spiritual Principle in Man.—All Mental Facts Explained from the Basis of the Physical Organism.—No Personal Immortality for Man.—Criticism.—Common Traditions against the Theory.—Many Things not Observed by the Senses have Reality.—The Brain as an Organic Structure not the Seat of Consciousness.—Self-Consciousness Demands a Unitary Basis.—This Found only in a Spiritual Principle.—The Facts of Memory and Personal Identity Tell against the Theory.—Matter, as Atomic, as much an Hypothesis as Soul.—Perhaps Soul near the Seat of Knowledge.—Consciousness of Freedom the Fatal Rock.—The Immortality of the Soul.—Its Simplicity and Immateriality Suggest it.—Man's Instinctive Desire Argues in Favor of it.—General Belief Implies it.—The Demand for a Moral Equality Requires it.

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I. *Statement of Psychological Materialism.* § 114.

1. TWO chapters have been devoted to the statement and criticism of the materialistic theory of the universe. It was shown that this theory was open to some general criticisms, and that it was marked by various particular defects. At the same time, care was taken to indicate

at every turn that theism met the demands of the facts where materialism failed to do so.

A particular aspect of materialism remains for this chapter. It may be termed *psychological* or anthropological materialism, and it consists in an application of the the principles of the materialistic theory to the nature and constitution of man. In the interests of religion, it is very necessary for Apologetics to discuss this aspect of materialism with some care, for it is at this point that the assault is made upon the very foundations of Christianity. An opponent of Christianity may not hold the materialistic theory of the universe as a whole, yet maintain the materialistic view as to the nature of man. And even if we establish the divine existence as against pure materialism, proof may still be demanded for the reality of the *spiritual nature* of man. We must vindicate the reality of the human soul, as well as the fact of the existence of God, for the Christian religion not only requires God as its object, but also the human spirit as its subject. This being the case, the apologete must establish the reality of the human soul and its immortality, just as carefully as he does the existence of God. This is the attitude of the Bible towards these two problems. The reality of both is simply assumed as the basis of religion which pertains to the relations between them. Hence, psychological as well as ontological materialism must receive serious attention. And not only is this important in the interests of religion in general, but also of theism in particular. We have already seen that several of the arguments for the divine existence are based on the reality of the spiritual principle in man. The psychology of theism is the starting point for the ontology of theism. Hence, in the interests alike of the theistic philosophy and the Christian religion, psychological materialism has vital importance.

2. A few paragraphs will suffice to *state* the aspect of materialism now under discussion. In general, it consists

in an interpretation of the facts of man's constitution in terms of materialism. Of course, there are various ways in which this interpretation is made, from crude Epicureanism to refined modern theories. As they all agree in their fundamental tenets, it is not necessary to expound them in detail. Three main particulars will give an outline of the way in which psychological materialism regards man.

First, man has *no soul* or spiritual principle, distinct from his body, in his make-up. There is only one essence in the being of man, and that belongs to the category of matter. Psychological materialism asserts that what is called mind, soul or spirit in man is not a distinct entity from his body. The only reality in man is his bodily organism, with its material organic structure and complex functions. Man's personality does not include the two natures, one material and the other spiritual. Any personality possessed by man is such individuality as is competent to highly refined matter. In some types of the materialistic theory of man, an attempt is made to give a place to the evident duality in man's nature and experience, by assuming that both body and soul must be *construed* in terms of matter, but that the soul is a much finer sort of matter than the body. This view appeared in ancient Greek materialism, and it has emerged in various quarters in later times. This, however, affords no relief. It confesses some sort of dualism in man's constitution, yet offers, as the key for its interpretation, nothing but a dual materialistic principle.

Secondly, all mental facts are explained in some way as the product of the physical organism of man. All so-called *psychical* phenomena are construed in terms of their *physical* foundation. Hence, psychological materialism undertakes to explain all forms of mental activity on the basis of the brain and the nervous system. In this way thought, memory and imagination are to be accounted for, and the moral sentiments and the religious instincts are all to be explained in the same way. As each physical organ has

its special function, so the particular function of the brain is to produce all phases of thinking. Intellect, sensibility and will, in all their varied forms of activity, are all explained in this way. Even consciousness itself, as the invariable concomitant of all psychical facts, must be construed on a materialistic basis. In explaining all these facts, modern psychical materialism makes much of physiological psychology, and thinks it discovers the secret of consciousness amid the mysteries of the nervous system. Sensation, perception, memory, feeling, reasoning, volition and morality are all explained as products of brain and nerve. They do not need a spiritual entity to account for them at all, for they can all be explained without it. We have no fault to find with physiology in relation to psychology; but we are careful ever to keep in mind that an affection of nerve or brain is one thing, and consists in motion, while an affection of the mind is another, and consists in some form of consciousness. The problem arises as to how physical motion becomes psychical consciousness.

Thirdly, psychological materialism admits *no personal immortality* for man. This necessarily follows from the two positions already stated. If, in the present life and experience of man, there is in his nature no spiritual entity numerically distinct from the body, then when the body suffers death and falls into its original elements, that is the end of the individual man. There cannot be any immortality for him, since death ends all that made up the individual man. If all forms of psychical activity are inherently dependent on the physiology of nerve and brain, when nerve and brain cease their physical activity, psychical activity also ceases; though, of course, this theory of man has no good reason to speak of physical and psychical activities on the part of man. If there be no brain there can be no thought; then when the brain ceases to do its work, thought is suspended. But if thinking implies a

thinker, and if that thinker is other than matter, it is evident that a correct view of thinking makes it difficult to hold the materialistic view of the ending of man, and the denial of immortality. Turn the matter as we may, psychological materialism has no place for personal immortality. Most of its advocates plainly teach this, while others are ready to explain immortality as the permanency of our influence, as we live in the lives of those whom we have touched, and who survive us. In a few cases, as, for example, the French atheists and materialists, the materialistic view of man was stated in a crude and vulgar form, but we have no space to enter into particulars on this point.

Hence, the materialistic construction of man's nature teaches that there is no spiritual entity in it; that all its activities can be explained in terms of matter, and that there is no personal immortality for man. The rest of the chapter proceeds to careful criticism of this doctrine.

II. *Criticism of Psychological Materialism.* § 115.

As careful an *examination* of the materialistic view of man's nature as the limits of this chapter permit is now to be made. If man's nature be merely highly organized matter, and if immortality be but a dream, then religion is superstition, and our hope for the future is a mere delusion. But let us see.

1. Certain *common beliefs* and traditions among men suggest that in man there is something more than his bodily organism. These beliefs and traditions are found in ancient and modern times, and among savage and semi-civilized peoples. Some general suggestions that man has a soul, and some faint gleams of its immortality, are found widely diffused among pagan races generally. All those facts which form the basis for animism and spiritism, as theories for the beginnings of religion, arise here. These involve the native tendency in mankind to believe that man has a

double, or second self, and that the man in some form continues to be after death. This traditional belief in man's spiritual nature runs side by side with his belief in deity in some form.

It is vain to recite the manifold forms in which this belief appears. The general belief in *ghosts*, or the disembodied spirits of men who once lived, illustrates one general set of these facts. The varied and widely prevalent belief in *transmigration* of souls, or metamorphosis of individuals of the human race, presupposes belief in the reality of a spiritual and enduring principle in man. Transmigration does not relate to the body, but to the soul, so that wherever it appears it presupposes a well-defined belief in the spiritual element in the human constitution. Egypt, India and China give abundant evidence of this belief. In like manner, *ancestorism,* wherever it appears, implies a belief in spirit, as an essential element in man's nature. This belief, so widely prevalent in Asia, rests upon the fact that man is supposed to possess a spiritual factor in his constitution which survives the article of death, and comes to be regarded with reverence. This is the essence of ancestor worship in all its forms. All these primitive beliefs and traditions suggest the reality of the human soul, and tell against psychological materialism.

2. Crude forms of the materialistic theory of man argue in a very loose way when they assert that since the *soul* is not perceived by the *senses,* therefore it does not exist. Those who thus argue are out and out sensationalists in their theory of knowledge. They allege that what does not come under the observation of the senses does not exist. The soul is not seen, nor felt, nor tasted, nor heard, hence it does not exist. Others, who profess to be a little more scientific, assert that the anatomy of the human organism never reveals the presence of the soul, nor does the microscope reveal any sign of the spiritual principle in man. Scientific research, it is said, reveals only matter in more

or less highly organized forms, and to assert the existence of anything else is to go quite beyond the facts.

All this reasoning is entirely superficial. It assumes that only what comes under the ken of the senses, or can be made the subject of physical experiment, has reality. Not only is the sensational theory of knowledge, upon which this reasoning is based, false, but the very materialists who use it are often quite inconsistent with it. They often talk about things which are entirely supersensible, as if they knew ever so much about them. Thus they discourse about *atoms* and the *ether,* neither of which the senses ever cognize, and yet refuse to admit the reality of the soul, which is no more supersensible than is atom or ether. All we claim here is consistency at the hands of materialism.

But the fact that *anatomy* does not reveal any signs of the soul in man proves nothing, for it is entirely beside the point at issue. The anatomist deals only with a *dead body,* from which the spiritual principle, by the very fact of death, has departed. Anatomy, to make good its claim, must make and complete its observation in a living human organism. Those who hold that there is a spiritual principle in man maintain that the union subsists during life between the soul and body. At death that principle departs, and it is vain to search for it in the dead body. The absurdity of this procedure is evident. It is as if I should seek for a friend, who had gone to Europe, in his house in America, and then declare that because I found that house empty my friend was dead.

3. The fact that the *brain,* as an organic structure, is not conscious, nor itself the *seat of consciousness,* is a serious objection to the materialistic doctrine of man. Recent physiological researches in regard to the function of the brain in relation to thought have practically established the position that the brain, as a complex material organism, is not, and cannot be, the sphere of conscious experiences. Experiments in vivisection in various animals show that

large areas of the brain are not involved in sensation. Then, if a section of the brain be separated from the living organism, that section has no sensation whatever. Theoretically, large sections of the brain might be removed, and yet the seat of sensation might remain unimpaired. And even if the removal of brain matter were continued till death ensued, it would not prove that the seat of consciousness were in the brain, but simply that the bond between the brain and the real seat of consciousness was broken. In a word, the real sphere in which consciousness arises always eludes the search of the physiologist. All that physiology discovers is motion, or change in the white and grey matter of the brain, but such *motion* is not itself *sensation,* but must be transferred to the psychical sphere before consciousness arises. The materialist here must either show that consciousness arises out of brain, or that brain movement and psychical consciousness are identical.

If the materialist says to us that it is very difficult to locate the *soul* anywhere in the body, we may reply that he finds it equally difficult to locate *consciousness* anywhere in the brain. At best, the brain may, on the purely physical side, be the organ of the soul and of certain of its experiences, yet that organ needs the player, which is the spiritual principle in man, to bring forth the harmonious activities which arise in consciousness. If, as some say, the soul needs the brain in order to its activities as revealed in consciousness, it can be replied that the brain needs the soul in order to the possibility of consciousness in any form. But we might go further, and say that a brain from which the soul had departed is so much dead matter, doomed to decay, while the soul, set free by death from its union with the body, may continue, in a freer form, its spiritual being and activity. In support of this hypothesis, it may be pointed out that certain forms of consciousness are scarcely dependent on the body organisms at all for their exercise. The loftier emotions and abstract reasoning are cases in

point. Hence, the brain is not necessarily the seat of consciousness in all its forms, and this shows another serious defect in psychological materialism.

4. Against the materialistic view of man is may be further argued that consciousness demands a *unitary basis,* and that this cannot be supplied by psychological materialism. Consciousness is here taken, in its strict sense, to denote a certain psychical condition, which is an invariable concomitant or condition of all mental and moral experiences. It is not so much a single faculty as the common basis of the activity of them all. As such it involves unity of the highest and most definite kind. It is the unity of apperception or self-consciousness, and consists in that spontaneous power in the human personality by which it unifies all its experiences, and says that they belong to that personality. This is the ego, and its absolutely indivisible essence. All sound psychology now holds, in substance, to this view. It teaches that the ego, as the seat of self-consciousness, must be unitary in its nature.

We charge that psychological materialism in every form fails to provide such a unitary basis. Matter, as we have already seen, is *multiple,* not *unitary,* in its fundamental conception. The unity of self-consciousness cannot be found amid the physical multiplicity of the atomic or cellular conception of matter, inorganic or organic. The materialist cannot locate consciousness in that which is material, nor can he attach self-consciousness to that which has atomic or cellular multiplicity. In which of the atoms or cells is the throne of the ego, and the seat of self-consciousness to be found? To this question psychlogical materialism has no answer whatever.

5. The facts of *memory* and *personal identity* form another serious obstacle in the way of the materialistic theory of man. Memory is a fact in man's experience, and personal identity is implied in his intellectual and moral life. It is not necessary, therefore, to discuss the psychology of

memory, or the metaphysics of personal identity, in order to see the force of this argument against the materialistic view of man's constitution. Taking the two facts together, we recollect that we were the subjects of certain experiences in the past, and we are sure that we are now the same persons that we were then. If this be the case, it is not easy to see how the materialistic construction of the facts of man's mental and moral experience is sufficient. Physiologists tell us that our bodies, including, of course, the brain cells and fibres, are all changed by the vital processes which take place in the organism every seven, ten or twelve years. If this be the case, it is not easy to see how memory, if its basis be purely material, can survive and persist throughout these changes. And if personal identity must have the same organic basis, without reference to any spiritual principle, it is not easy to see how it can be preserved. If personal identity must have a purely organic, as distinguished from a psychical, basis, as psychological materialism contends, it is perfectly clear that the conception of that identity, together with the responsibility which it implies, must be greatly modified. In a word, psychological materialism does not so much explain, as explain away, the facts of memory and personal identity. It may be very safely said that the hypothesis of a unitary spiritual principle, such as the idea of the human soul implies, supplies a much more adequate basis for the facts of memory and personal identity. This supplies an indivisible and permanent factor amid all organic or physical changes in the body.

6. Another consideration has some weight in this connection. It is charged against those who hold the reality of the soul in man that this is a *mere hypothesis,* which can never be proved. The idea of the human soul, we are told, is a mere abstraction, and cannot be shown to have reality. In reply to this, and in refutation of the theory of man now under review, it may be said that the material-

istic conception is as really an hypothesis as the idea of the human soul. The atom, as we have already seen, is an abstraction which never comes under actual observation. If it be said that the *atom* is a necessary supposition to account for certain things which are observed in the physical realm, we can again retort by asserting that the *soul* is also a necessary hypothesis to account for certain facts which arise in the psychical realm. The one hypothesis is certainly as well grounded as the other, because just as much needed to explain the facts. It might be possible to go further, and say that we have a more immediate knowledge in self-consciousness of spirit than we ever can have of matter, and that the proof of the reality of the soul is stronger than for the reality of the atom.

7. But the crowning refutation of psychological materialism is found in the consciousness of *self-determination* which a man has. That man has free agency, and is himself the cause of his volitions, is an indubitable fact. Consciousness so testifies without doubt. This fact is utterly at variance with the materialistic view of man. If all psychical activity be the product of matter, then the law of necessity, which pertains to the physical, must rule in man. Volition must also come under the same law, and there can be no freedom in his activities. The consciousness of freedom is a delusion, and the reality of volition is a sham. And if such be the case, all moral responsibility is at an end, and man is but a piece of mechanism and a creature of circumstances. But this cannot for a moment be conceded, and on the rock of man's undoubted psychical and *moral freedom* the materialistic theory of his nature is wrecked. Freedom cannot be an attribute of matter, either in the universe as a whole or in man in particular. It belongs only to some form of spiritual being, to God in the highest sense, and to man as made in his image and possessed of a spiritual nature. Hence the fact of freedom excludes the materialistic view of man.

III. *The Immortality of the Soul.* § 116.

From the reasonings of the last section it was made clear that man's constitution was dual, having a bodily organism and a spiritual principle in union. The two together complete man's personality. It is also evident that during this life the two are in most intimate union, and that they interact on each other. But the human personality suffers death, and the question at once arises as to the continued existence of the soul or spiritual principle of man after death. This is the question of the *immortality* of the soul, with which, again, the resurrection of the body, as a doctrine of Christian revelation, is connected. In addition to what is implied in the reasonings for the reality of the spiritual principle in man, in favor of the immortality of the human soul, a few headings of direct proof of that doctrine are now added.

1. From the *simple* and immaterial nature of the soul its immortality may be argued. The very idea of the soul is that it is a simple, indivisible monad, incapable of being reduced to anything else, or anything lower. In that fact there is a suggestion of perdurability, if not of immortality; and the fact that the soul is not material, removes it from the conditions of decay which pertain to material forms of existence; and when we see the mental powers of a man clear and strong, while the body is very feeble, we have a strong hint that the spiritual principle is not liable to decadence as the body is subject to decay.

2. The fact that there is in most men an *instinctive desire* for continued existence is of some force also. Men shrink from the idea of cessation of being, and cling very firmly to the existence they desire. This may have little logical value, yet it cannot surely be that the Creator implanted this instinct to deceive or disappoint us with a delusive hope.

3. The almost *universal belief* in immortality, or con-

tinued existence in some form beyond this life, has much weight. This belief is widespread and persistent. It emerges in some form in almost every phase of religion among men. The Bible takes it for granted, as it does the existence of God, without giving formal proof of the fact. This general and persistent belief must surely have a basis in reality; and if this be so, there is a suggestion of a continuance of personal existence beyond this present mortal life.

4. The proof for natural immortality which has perhaps most cogency is that which Butler in his *Analogy* so ably presents. It may be termed the *moral argument* based on God's providential government. There are in this life many facts which show that God has established a moral government over men which is, on the whole, just and beneficent. Still, it equally appears that the justice and beneficence of this government is not absolutely balanced to what is just and good. There are moral inequalities which are, at best, anomalies. In order to rectify these, and *balance* the accounts perfectly, there must be for men another state of existence, where the inequalities of this life are equalized. If Lazarus has his evil things in this life and Dives his good, there must be a future state, where the tables are turned, and Dives has his evil things and Lazarus his good. Hence, the spirituality and immortality of man is securely fixed on rational grounds.

CHAPTER VI.

MATERIALISTIC EVOLUTION.

CONTENTS.

Materialistic or Cosmic Evolution.—Evolution Ambiguous.—Literal Meaning.—Ontological Evolution.—Biological Evolution.—General Description of Cosmic Evolution.—Starts with Matter, Force and Motion.—Atomic Matter Unstable.—Dissipation of Motion.—Integration of Matter.—Continuous Differentiation.—Coördination of Factors.—Adjustment to Environment.—Return to Homogeneous.—Criticism.—Terms Ambiguous.—Invalid Assumptions.—Needs Extra-cosmic Principles to Work the scheme.—Cannot Account for the Genesis of the Evolutionary Process.—Still less for its Continuation in any Given Direction.—Cosmic Evolution Reduces Vital Facts to the Category of Mechanics. Also Mind and Morals to Terms of Atom and Energy.—Rejecting Teleology, it yet Must Use its Terms.

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I. *Some General Explanations.* § 117.

THE formal discussion of materialism, in its three main aspects, has been completed. As a theory concerning God, man and the universe, the glaring defects of materialism have been made evident. At the same time, the rational sufficiency of theism has been more fully vindicated.

1. There remains an important question which *modern evolution* has started in connection with the materialistic

theory of the universe. This question relates to the way in which the universe, construed in terms of materialism, came to be what it now is. This raises the problem of materialistic evolution. It might almost be called *ontological* evolution. It has come into view already at several stages of the discussion of materialism. Among the ancients, the method by which the fortuitous concourse of atoms produced an orderly cosmos is a crude form of this type of evolution. In a more metaphysical form it appears in Greek pantheism, where the *many* were manifestations of the *one*.

The universe shows progress from the simple to the complex all along its history. There has been development in its entire cosmical career. The question at once arises as to the *mode* and agency of this development. Materialism gives its answer in terms of cosmic evolution. It is by this principle that the progress of the universe from its primitive simple condition has come to be what we now find it. Some are content to speak of evolution as the method by which the agency operative in the cosmos works; others, thinking less carefully, associate the idea of agency with the fact of evolution. According to the latter, evolution becomes an agent, with power and rationality capable of producing the cosmos at any stage. This puts evolution in the place of God, and is atheistic. The former regards evolution as merely the mode of the operation of the causal agency operative in the universe. If that agency be regarded as merely mechanical in its nature, then we have a purely *materialistic* type of evolution; but if that agency, be the operation directly or indirectly of one infinite personal God, then we have what may be termed *theistic* evolution. It is with materialistic evolution, strictly speaking, that the present discussion is concerned. Of this Herbert Spencer may be taken as the best modern representative. According to Spencer, evolution represents the method according to which the infinite and inscrutable

energy that lies at the heart of the universe operates in the production of the cosmos. John Fiske, in his *Cosmic Philosophy,* is the best American expositor of this general evolutionary scheme.

2. The term *evolution* needs careful explanation, for it is used in different senses, and is often quite ambiguous. The word itself means to *unroll,* but it is used in many secondary senses. Strictly speaking, it simply denotes the *process* by which the *simple* becomes the *complex*. It marks the progress of organization in the cosmos as a whole, or in any section of it. Strictly speaking, neither causality nor rationality pertains to it, thus understood. If there be causality or rationality evident in the process, this belongs to something else, and is merely exhibited in the process. As thus understood, there are two distinct spheres in which evolution has its important place.

First, there is its application to the *entire cosmos.* In this sense its sphere is all existing things. It professes to give a philosophy of the entire universe, which is little more than its natural history, from beginning to end. The law of continuity rules, and the process of evolution prevails everywhere. It is cosmic transformism, and it is first a scientific hypothesis, which is next made a philosophy of the entire universe. Comte represents this on the basis of positivism, Spencer exhibits it in terms of materialism and agnosticism, and Hegel suggests it in the form of idealistic pantheism. Spencer is perhaps the best representative of this type of evolution, which may be termed *cosmic* or ontological evolution on grounds of materialism.

Secondly, there is a much narrower application of the term evolution, according to which it is confined to the sphere of living things. It is in this sphere that modern biological science has made so very much of it. This may be called *organic* evolution. Its problem relates to the way in which one species or grade of living things has been produced in relation to other species in the vegetable and

animal kingdoms. The origin of new species by means of genetic descent, in accordance with the laws of organic evolution, is the single question here considered. Lamarck, Darwin, Hæckel, Wallace and Huxley are well-known representatives of this type of evolution. It is not with this that we have now to do. Later on in our discussions it will be carefully reviewed. We have now to do with *cosmic evolution* as represented by Herbert Spencer on a materialistic basis.

II. *General Description of the Theory.* § 118.

The particular problem which now arises is the mode or method according to which the universe from its simple, primitive, materialistic condition comes to exist in its various stages of ever-increasing complexity. Several particulars will exhibit the comprehensive scheme of cosmic evolution of which Spencer is the great modern exponent.

1. The starting-point of this scheme is that of pure modern *materialism.* According to this view, matter is eternal, and it exists in its early stages in the form of atomic homogeneity. From this primitive, atomic, homogeneous matter everything is derived. Along with this primordial matter, an eternal and inscrutable *energy* is also assumed. This is the agency which, as the ground of change in the homogeneous, effects the movements which constantly take place in the universe. Then the fact of motion has a definite place at the initiation of the whole process of the cosmic evolution now under notice. Matter eternal, force persistent, and motion continuous, constitute the fundamental facts of Spencer's system. This is the trinity of cosmic evolution. That evolution expresses the mode in which that force works in producing motion in the atomic material homogeneity.

2. The *process* of cosmic evolution is relatively simple. The problem is, How does the primitive incoherent homo-

geneous become the subsequent coherent heterogeneous? How do the atoms, as they are all mixed together in an indistinguishable mass, by degrees come to take definite form in this or that particular concrete object? How does the atomic homogeneous, under the operation of inscrutable energy, acting according to the law of cosmic evolution, produce gold and silver, hydrogen and oxygen, and all other inorganic concrete objects? The scheme of cosmic evolution indicates three stages in the process.

First, the atomic homogeneous is supposed to be in an *unstable* condition. In its primitive state matter is not in a rigid or immobile condition. It is the seat of energy, and this energy, constantly active, produces a ceaseless tendency in the homogeneous to change its state or mode of existence. This energy, either as an attribute of the atoms or as acting on them, gives rise to that condition of atomic or molecular activity which physicists tell us marks all material forms of existence. The atomic homogeneous, consequently, is in a condition of unstable equilibrium, whereby it is ready at any time to enter into new combinations, and become more complex in its nature.

Secondly, this instability is accompanied with a *reaction* in the atomic homogeneous. As the inscrutable energy acts on the atoms and molecules, they in turn react against that energy. The result of this is that some degree of the motion which this energy has produced seems to be dissipated. This simply means that some of the motion which was manifested in the atomic homogeneous is transferred from a kinetic to a potential form in the atoms. The motion which was previously exhibited seems to be lost, and this is what is meant by the reaction of the atomic homogeneous.

Thirdly, the *integration* or segregation of matter naturally follows. As the energy acting on, or among, the atoms is resisted or reacted on by the atoms, and the form of the energy so modified as to cause the losing of some

degree of atomic motion, the result is that the atoms come to rest to some extent, and hence they tend to cling together in little groups or masses. This is the integration of matter, by means of which aggregates of atoms, having certain inherent affinities for each other, come together. By this means the atomic homogeneous begins to pass to the complex heterogeneous, and the foundations of a material universe of diverse inorganic things are thereby laid. The instability of the homogeneous opens the way for the dissipation of motion, and this results in the integration of matter in concrete forms.

3. By means of the further *differentiation* of the less complex heterogeneous all the more complex forms of heterogeneity are brought about. After the first stages of heterogeneity have arisen the differentiation of these original segregations must be continued in order to account for the most complex forms of existing things in the cosmos as we now see it. Some further explanation is, therefore, needed of the way one grade of existing things, with higher organization and increased complexity, are to be accounted for. Here cosmic evolution announces two further principles to explain increasing heterogeneity.

First, *coördination,* which secures increasing and continuous integregation, appears. According to the law of coördination, things which have become so far differentiated are so coördinated that the differentiation continues. This simply means that things are so fitted or adjusted to each other under the oversight of cosmic evolution that the differentiation goes steadily on through successive stages until concrete material objects reach their completeness.

Secondly, the influence of *environment* is another important law which comes into play in this process of evolution through successive differentiations. Adaptation to environment has much to do with the nature and direction of the evolution. It also has much to do in lifting the process from one sphere or grade to another, and in effecting, by

successive differentiations, the passage from the non-vital to the vital, from the vital to the sensitive, from the sensitive to the rational, from the rational to the moral, and from the moral to the religious. Continuity rules throughout the process. There are no breaks, hence creation is not needed. The law of this *continuity* is evolution of a cosmic sort throughout. Adaptation to environment, along with coördination of the factors in the process, serve to account for all that the cosmos now exhibits, in all the complex and heterogeneous forms of existence therein observable. In this way cosmic evolution on a materialistic basis professes to explain the universe and all it contains.

4. It is proper to add that in Spencer's hands this theory also provides for the *return* of the heterogeneous to the primitive homogeneous again. This is sometimes overlooked in this scheme. Not only is there the passage from the atomic homogeneous through successive differentiations to the complex heterogeneous, but the cycle of evolution provides for the return of the heterogeneous to the homogeneous, whence it came. This is the whole cycle of the cosmic history. That history is the story of the rhythmic movement of the simple homogeneous to the complex heterogeneous, and of the return of the heterogeneous to the homogeneous, through long cycles of cosmic time. Matter is *eternal,* force is *persistent,* and motion is *continuous,* through it all. Nothing really new ever comes into existence, and nothing is ever lost. There may be an endless variety of combinations, but the fundamental factors are always the same. All these changes and combinations take place according to cosmic evolution, which is defined to be "the process of change from the incoherent homogeneity to the coherent heterogeneity through successive differentiations, accompanied by the dissipation of motion, the integration of matter, the coördination of factors and adaptation to environment." This is Herbert Spencer, the modern apostle of materialistic evolution.

III. *This Theory Examined.* § 119.

This general scheme is open to many of the *criticisms* already made of pure materialism. But it is also exposed to other additional objections, which can only now be briefly outlined. From the standpoint of pure *physics,* it might be criticised with fatal effect, by showing that it is a purely speculative scheme, rather than a strictly scientific interpretation of physical facts. The following points are noted in order:

1. The usage of the term evolution is *ambiguous* and often misleading in this scheme. Strictly speaking, evolution is an unfolding of one thing out of another, by means of some principle of development within that thing. In the hands of Spencer, cosmic evolution is rather the method of aggregating or combining atoms which already have a real existence assumed. It may be truly charged against this form of evolution that it does not present the true idea of evolution at all. The instability of the homogeneous, the reaction it exhibits, the dissipation of motion and the integration of matter, is not really evolution. Combination, aggregation, differentiation and dissolution are all that takes place in this cosmic process. To call these factors in the process evolution, is certainly to use the term in a very loose way. There is a process, and there is progress, but the relations of the factors in that process are external, not internal as evolution implies.

2. The notions of the eternity of matter, the persistence of force, and the continuity of motion, have no proper place in a scheme like Spencer's, yet he makes them the very foundation of his cosmic evolution. These notions are purely abstract or *a priori* ideas, and they have no place in a philosophy like that of Spencer's, which denies the reality of the *a priori* altogether. Even by the help of habit and heredity, Spencer can never successfully connect

the qualities of necessity and universality with any factors of human knowledge. Yet, at the threshold of his cosmic evolutionary philosophy, he does this very thing. He cannot justify his underlying notions of indestructible matter, persistent force and continuous motion.

3. To render cosmic evolution workable, certain *facts* quite inconsistent with it must be introduced. In the purely physical realm, certain *affinities* among the atoms must be presupposed, so that gold and silver may be respectively produced afterwards. This is inconsistent with the idea of an absolute homogeneous where things in their rudiments are all alike. In the organic sphere, generation and birth are means whereby individuals in any given species are produced and the species perpetuated. This can scarcely be harmonized with cosmic evolution as a series of successive differentiations of a somewhat external nature. How came all the organs involved in nutrition and assimilation to be originated by cosmic evolution? Then, when the highest forms of the heterogeneous are considered, the difficulty of explaining the facts by any cosmic process is still greater. The dissipation of motion and the integration of matter are purely *mechanical* processes, inherently incapable of producing certain forms of existence to which more than the mechanical pertains.

4. Spencer's cosmic scheme affords no proper explanation for the *beginning* of the evolutionary process. It assumes the instability of the homogeneous, but in this there is no *rationale* of the origin of the process of evolution. There being at first really no environment to anything, its influence cannot be called in to originate the cosmic process. Unless some extra-cosmic principle be introduced, this cosmic scheme can never show how the evolution makes a start. Why should the unstable homogeneous at any given time, and at some particular point, break away from its incoherent homogeneity and become a coherent heterogeneity? The homogeneous must remain in unstable

equilibrium continuously. If any change takes place, the ground and reason for this must reside in the atomic homogeneous, or in the energy with which it is endowed. Spencer's system has no such ground, for it does not give any place to an extra-cosmic reason or agency to originate the process of evolution. Movement requires a *first mover,* and this cosmic evolution excludes.

5. Still less can cosmic evolution give a satisfactory reason why the process should move in one *direction* rather than in another. If the homogeneous be absolutely unstable, it is as ready to move out in one direction as in another. If the evolution be equally likely to move in one line as in another, there is no reason to expect that it will keep on continuously in any given direction. There is nothing to prevent the movement going hither and thither, without ever reaching any definite goal. This scheme is really no better than that of the fortuitous concourse of atoms of ancient materialism. Chance rules, yet chance can effect nothing, for it is neither rational nor dynamic. Cosmic evolution is bound to give some good reason, from the nature of the case, why the evolutionary process keeps steadily on to an appointed result. It has not yet done so, and hence fails as a theory.

6. Another serious difficulty of cosmic evolution is that it reduces all vital facts to the category of the *mechanical.* It must either do this or assume that there is no generic difference between the vital and the mechanical. If the theory begins with atomic matter and purely physical energy, it must show how the *passage* can be made by repeated differentiations to the category of organic cells and vital energy. Such a passage has not yet been pointed out by cosmic evolution, and organic life can consist in naught else than the play of the purely physical forces. Cosmic evolution must show that there is a purely natural path from the non-vital to the vital. This means that it is face to face with the modern scientific conclusion that the living

always comes from the living, and not from the non-living. This blocks the path of this theory.

7. A still more fatal objection to cosmic evolution lies in the fact that it can give no rational account of the phenomena of *mind* and *morals,* of society and religion. It makes a labored attempt to do so, but with no real success. It is always compelled to construe all the facts in the last analysis in terms of atoms and energy, and this is itself a confession of the failure of the whole scheme. To examine Spencer's system in detail in psychology and ethics, in sociology and religion, is not now possible. But if such an examination were made, the force of this general criticism would be plainly evident. To rob the facts of some of their distinctive marks, in order to render them capable of explanation by a preconceived theory, is not scientific.

8. Finally, the very *terms* in which the theory of cosmic evolution is expressed are often quite inconsistent with the scope of the theory itself. We find adjustment, coördination and adaptation, terms frequently used, and these terms surely imply purpose and design. By a subtile turn, the impression is sometimes left that the cosmic evolution, which is really the product of what these terms denote, is the cause of these very things. But the question naturally arises as to what skillful hand effects the adjustments and coördinations? What do the terms adaptation and combination imply, if not a wisdom and power to effect what these terms express? Surely there are here marks of *teleology.* If the adaptations and adjustments involved in cosmic evolution are of chance, how do they come to be so constant and regular? Why do they produce results which look so much like the effects of intelligence? Denying teleology, cosmic evolution really implies it, and in its working cannot get on without it.

And a still more profound question may also be asked, and that is, How does *intelligence* itself arise? Even if we were to hold that this intelligence is intra-mundane, the

question of its genesis would sorely press cosmic evolution. Spencer has no reply to such a query as this that meets the rational demands of the case.

To take the conception of evolution presented by Le Conte in his *Evolution and Religious Thought* affords little relief to Spencer's perplexity. Le Conte defines evolution as "continuous progressive change according to certain laws and by means of resident forces." Only the first of the statements in this definition relates to what is now taken to be evolution in the strict sense as a method of cosmic progress, and not the cause of it. Both of the other statements in this definition lead to implications which transcend the cosmos wherein the progress lies. The question may at once be asked as to how the laws were planted in the cosmos, or whether they are inherent in it. Still more pertinent is the question as to the nature, origin and ground of the *resident forces* of which this definition makes so much. They certainly imply an extra-cosmic ground, for otherwise they are entirely hypothetical.

Hence, our conclusion is that cosmic evolution which excludes God, and construes all the facts in the cosmos in terms of matter, force and motion, is not competent to meet the demands of the case.

CHAPTER VII.

POSITIVISM.

Contents.

General Historical Statement.—Term Vague.—Relation to Other Systems.—Negative Features.—Denies Metaphysics.—Denies the Rational Psychology.—No Immutable Principles of Truth and Duty.—Its Positive Features.—Associated with Materialistic Evolution.—The Law of the Three Stages of Human Progress.—The Theological.—The Philosophical.—The Scientific.—Its Empirical Psychology.—Its Outline of Religion.—Examination of Positivism.—Denial of Metaphysics Futile.—Causes must be Sought.—Its Psychology Defective.—Its Materialistic and Evolutionary Basis Unsound.—The Three Stages Defective.—The Idea of Progress Inverted.—The Three Stages Coexist.—They are all Needed in Human Progress.—Positivism Gives no Ground for a Stable Morality.—Its Religious System a Confession of Failure.—It Asks Questions which Philosophy and Theology alone Answer.

Literature.

Encyclopædia Article on *Positivism.*—Flint's *Antitheistic Theories,* Chap. V.—McCosh's *Christianity and Positivism.*—Comte's *Positive Philosophy.*—Mill's *Comte and Positivism.*—Lewes' *History of Philosophy.*—Huxley's *The Scientific Aspects of Positivism.*—Fisher's *Grounds of Theistic Belief,* Chap. III.—Farrar's *History of Free Thought,* Chap. VII.—Pressense's *A Study of Origins,* Book I., Chap. I.—Bowne's *Metaphysics,* Part III., Chap. IV.—Miley's *Systematic Theology,* Vol. I., Chap. III., Sec. III.— Harris' *Philosophical Basis of Theism,* Chap. V.—Rishell's *The Foundations of the Faith,* Div. V., Sec. I., Chaps. I.–III.—Dabney's *Sensualistic Philosophy,* Chap. V.—*Modern Skepticism,* Chap. III.—Matheson's *The Gospel and Modern Substitutes,* Chap. VI.—Bowne's *Studies in Theism,* Chap. I.—Watson's *Christianity and Idealism,* Chap. X.—Shields' *Philosopha Ultima,* Vol. I., Part II., Chap. II.

I. *General Description and Statement.* § 120.

1. POSITIVISM, which is to be the subject of this chapter, is a somewhat vague and indefinite scheme. It often stands on the ground of materialism and speaks in the accents of agnosticism. Some of those who hold the cosmic evolution discussed in the last chapter might be termed positivists, while the distinction between the *agnostic*

and the *positivist* is often quite obscure. Spencer, the professed agnostic, is sometimes described as the English exponent of Comte, but this description he persistently repudiates. Writers like Lewes and Harrison, Congreve and Morley, are avowed positivists, while the teachings of J. S. Mill are in many respects like those of positivism. Some deists, too, who deny the supernatural and exalt the natural and the sensible, are practically on the ground of the positivist. And in our own day, some who are devoted to scientific research, rather than to metaphysical study, exhibit the temper of positivism, and insist that human investigation is to be concerned only with observed facts as they coëxist or succeed each other. It is evident, therefore, that positivism is a general temper or *type of thought,* rather than a connected scheme of things. This being the case, it can scarcely be called a philosophy of all existence. It is rather a method of scientific investigation, with no general agreement among its adherents. This makes it difficult to give a connected description of the general scheme which it denotes. Comte, of course, is usually taken to be the great modern exponent of positivism, yet many who profess to be positivists do not agree with Comte in many particulars. Among the Greeks, especially with the Sophists, and the adherents of later decadent nescience, the temper of positivism is found. But we have now to do with modern positivism, and, in a general way, the exposition will follow Comte.

2. The *relation* of positivism to other systems may be a little more fully elucidated. In relation to atheism, positivism is in Comte's hands practical atheism. By this is not meant that all positivists are atheists, but that the principles of positivism are entirely destructive of theism. When positivism confines our attention exclusively to sensible phenomena, and forbids any inquiry after causes and grounds, it blocks the way for any theistic theory of the universe, and renders religion virtually impossible. In rela-

tion to materialism, it may be said that in almost every case positivism builds on a materialistic basis. Materialism, indeed, is the soil in which both positivism and agnosticism usually grow. Comte and Spencer, in their ontology, have a great deal of materialistic resemblance, yet one is a positivist and the other an agnostic. This gives the materialistic scheme of things greater importance. In relation to agnosticism, it may be remarked that it and positivism are twin brothers. In their psychology they agree in both holding the empirical theory of knowledge, but they differ in their application of that theory. The agnostic asserts that there may be an absolute or supersensible reality, but says that we cannot know anything of its real nature. The positivist, on the other hand, refuses to make any assertion whatever in regard to the absolute or *real* which is supposed to lie behind the *relative* and phenomenal. In the sphere of religion, of course, there are other differences between the two systems.

3. In describing positivism, its negative features first arrest attention. These are simple denials.

First, in regard to *metaphysics,* as the science of first principles or necessary truths, both mental and moral, positivists, with great unanimity, deny the validity of any such science. They do not admit the reality of the *a priori* conditions of human thought which render experience possible. Hence, all metaphysical inquiry is futile, and can never lead to any reliable results. Comte distinctly takes this negative position, and Lewes has written an elaborate history of philosophy to discredit metaphysics in the interests of positivism. Positive science is exalted as the only reliable organ of truth, while metaphysics moves in the region of mere speculation, and never reaches certainty.

Secondly, in reference to *psychology,* as the science of the human soul and its conditions of cognition, positivism holds a negative position also. By not a few the materialistic view of man's nature is taken, and by such adherents

of the system the reality of the spiritual principle in man is denied. By others, who do not hold the materialistic theory of man, the sensational theory of knowledge is held, and the validity of the rational theory is frankly denied. All the objects of human knowledge are found in the circle of phenomena, and the cognition of noumena is denied. All inquiry into grounds, causes or essences is excluded, and the activity of the human mind is to be confined strictly to the sphere of the sensible. Its epistemology is empirical.

Thirdly, in the realm of *morality* and *religion,* similar denials are made. Positivism denies the reality of any eternal and immutable principles of morality. Man becomes, as with the old Sophists, the measure of all things. There are no abiding rules of duty, but the path of duty is to be marked out by experience and expediency. There can be no metaphysics of ethics, since there are no necessary moral truths; and so far as the knowledge of God is concerned, the negative position in some form is taken. At best, this knowledge can only be relative, for we cannot know God as he really is, but only as he is related to us. This virtually cuts up by the root any rational theism, and heads us towards agnosticism.

4. The *positive* features of this system can be briefly stated. These are associated with its peculiar theory of the progress of human civilization.

First, positivism is usually associated with some form of *naturalistic evolution.* It can scarcely be said that any very thorough exposition of the evolutionary philosophy is given by leading positivists, yet they generally assume its soundness, and construe the facts of human society according to the teachings of this philosophy. The idea of progress prevails in the positivist scheme, and this progress is a sort of natural development. Human society and institutions have developed through the centuries by slow degrees from the simple to the complex.

It is in this connection that the law of the *three stages* of human progress comes into view as one of the marked features of leading types of positivism. Comte gave much prominence to these stages in his scheme, but other positivists are content to interpret the progress of human civilization in terms of the evolutionary philosophy in a rather vague and comprehensive way. A very brief outline of these three successive stages will indicate the general drift of the scheme.

The first is called the *theological* or religious stage, which is associated with primitive man in his earliest condition of culture. In this stage, as men began to inquire concerning the world about them and the events which happened, they sought to explain the things that happened by referring them to certain supernatural powers or agents. These agents were personified, and then regarded as deities. In this stage men were theologians, and gave the religious explanation of the universe. Under the influence of this motive, the first stage of human culture was experienced. Positivists give elaborate descriptions of the way in which men in this stage of their culture sought to explain the various phenomena of nature. These events, sometimes sublime and terrible, sometimes gentle and beneficent, were explained by means of some real divine agency which was the cause of them all. In this way positivism accounts for the origin of religion in fetichism, and thus interprets the first temporary stage of the civilization of the human race.

The second stage was the *philosophical* or metaphysical. This is an advance on the previous stage. With the events of nature still before them, men in this stage have made such progress that they begin to discard the theological explanation of these events, and proceed to give a metaphysical instead. In the place of personal deities, occult causes or supersensible essences are assumed to supply a rational explanation. Impersonal essences take the place

of personal agents, and abstract causes are substituted for concrete beings. Men thus became philosophers in the second stage of their progressive civilization.

But the third stage follows, and constitutes the crown of it all. This is the *scientific* or positive stage. In this stage the supposition of causes and essences is discarded, and all search after them is declared to be futile. Hence, both theology and philosophy are rejected, and science is given the field. Phenomena in their coëxistences and sequences are all that men have anything to do with in this stage. This is the very highest stage of intellectual development in the human race, and to its lofty and serene elevation only a few, who call themselves *positivists,* have yet attained. When all shall have reached this elevation, then the race will have attained its goal and perfection.

5. Positivism presents, as has been hinted, a *psychology* of its own. On this a word or two only is now necessary. Its psychology is sensational; its epistemology is empirical. The *a priori* factor is entirely excluded, and all knowledge is gained by sensible experience, and all the contents of the various sciences that have any reality depend entirely on observation. The results of this observation in various spheres of human knowledge, and the outcome of the classification of these results, constitute the aim and end of science. The whole of human knowledge is embraced in the circle of the sciences thus understood, and Comte proposed an elaborate classification of the sciences on this basis. Indeed, the classification of the sciences is the only philosophy there is. How positivism can make any rational classification of the sciences, or suggest any kind of philosophy of them, is a real difficulty of the scheme, when it denies the reality of such first principles, as seem necessary to effect a true classification.

6. Finally, positivism outlines a *religion* and proposes a *cultus*. This may seem a strange statement after what has been said in regard to the repudiation of the religious view

of things made by positivism in its exposition of the law of the three stages of human progress. Yet, in spite of this, Comte undertakes to give an entirely new religious system. This system is entirely empirical, and has no place in it for a supersensible deity. The deity erected is man himself. Humanity is made divinity, and hence this system is sometimes called the religion of humanity. Positivists are usually content with the abstract conception of idealized humanity. Whatever this phrase may mean is the deity of the system, and man is bidden worship himself. Comte was much more concrete in his views, but they were so absurd as to be scarcely worthy of mention in this connection.

A cultus, or *ritual* of worship, was drawn up by Comte, though more sober adherents of positivism repudiate the prophet of the scheme at this point. Paris was to be the holy city, and a temple was to be built there. Other temples were to be built all over France, facing Paris. Priests were to be appointed and paid by the State. Prayers were to be offered and sacraments were to be observed. The whole scheme at this point is puerile, and has been well termed, "Romanism minus Christianity."

The State was to control everything, and the priests of this system were to have charge of education. Both religion and education were to be paid for out of the public treasury. The principles of positive science were to form the basis of all education, and for a time an attempt was made in France to put this scheme into practical effect. As might be expected, the attempt was an utter failure. In all of this there is a concession to the native religious instinct of men, which is entirely inconsistent with the principles of positivism. It is only fair to add that few, if any, of the positivists of to-day embrace these vagaries of Comte. They content themselves with fine phrases concerning *the religion of humanity,* and with hard words about metaphysics and theology.

II. *The Examination of Positivism.* § 121.

This examination can only be made in general outline, although there are several points which merit careful consideration.

1. The *denial* of metaphysics which positivism makes is futile. Every line of investigation, sooner or later, leads to first principles, and demands a philosophy. To deny the *a priori* is to repudiate the fundamental conditions of the possibility of rational cognition. In practical experience it is impossible to hold to the denial of the search after *causes*. The inquiring little child insists on asking questions about causes, that upset all the arbitrary denials of the right of the human mind to make this interrogation; and, in addition, it can be charged against positivism that it greatly limits the scope of scientific inquiry, and in some respects renders it practically helpless. Much of the inspiration of modern science arises directly from the impulse of the human mind to seek for causes, and to silence this quest is to deprive science of its romantic interest, and to make it prosaic in the extreme. In a word, all true science frames the materials of a metaphysic, and any scheme which puts up an impassable barrier between these two realms is arbitrary and irrational.

2. In like manner, its empirical psychology is *radically defective*. After what has been said in the Introduction to this treatise, but little need now be added in criticism of the empirical epistemology. Positivism is open to all the objections which lie against the empirical psychology, and it entirely fails to meet the conditions of a rational epistemology. In addition to all that was there adduced, it need now only be pointed out that the ability to frame scientific hypotheses transcends a purely sensational theory of knowledge. Take the law of gravitation to illustrate. The senses never perceived this great law. When first

proposed, it was a purely supersensible or rational product. The process of its mathematical confirmation was rational also, as it was worked out by Newton. Hence, the power to make and to prove any scientific hypothesis lies in a region of mental activity which transcends the senses. The senses simply observe the facts, which must ever remain single and unrelated if the human mind has no supersensible or rational power, such as is involved in making a scientific hypothesis. Hence, the positivist theory of knowledge is either erroneous, or, if true, it destroys the possibility of science itself, which relates facts to each other according to some general law or principle.

3. So, also, it need only be pointed out that, since positivism builds on the basis of *materialistic evolution,* it is open to all the criticisms of that scheme. We have seen already how defective that scheme is as a complete philosophy of all existence. In its attempt to provide such a philosophy, it must bid farewell to logic and reason. Just so far, therefore, as positivism rests on a materialistic basis, it is a house built on a foundation of sand, and cannot stand strict rational tests; and in the application of the philosophy of evolution to the progress of civilization in general, positivism is open to the objection that it introduces something new into each successive stage of the development of humanity. This new factor pertains to a stage of the progress which is an effect of the preceding stage as its cause. This construction of the facts of progress with increasing complexity, constantly contravenes the law of causation, which refuses to allow anything in the effect which has not its adequate ground in the cause. The higher cannot be explained from the lower alone, and an infinite regress, such as is involved in the positivist philosophy, in this view-point, is irrational.

4. Serious *objection* may be made to the law of the *three stages* in human progress, as outlined in positivism. It is largely a speculative view of the way in which the human

race has advanced in civilization. The evident absurdity of the manner in which Comte has presented the theological, philosophical and scientific stages of progressive human culture, has so impressed many more recent advocates of positivism that they reject it in its Comtean form, and are content with a purely empirical construction of the facts of the culture of the race, in accordance with progressive evolution. A few separate points may now be noted.

First, the very *idea* of progress is wrong. Comte regards it as an advance to go from the theological to the metaphysical, and from the metaphysical to the scientific. It may be more correct to say that the progress lies in the opposite direction. The lowest activity of the human mind may be to observe phenomena and their order. To give a true philosophy of these phenomena, by referring them to their causes, is surely a higher form of rational activity; and to construe the phenomena of the universe in relation to the agency and purpose of deity, is certainly a still higher form of human activity. This we take to be the true order, and this order is simply inverted by positivism.

Secondly, as a matter of fact, these supposed stages are not really *successive,* but contemporaneous. History does not bear out Comte's exposition at all. In every age these three stages have existed side by side and been influential. Any age may be observing facts, seeking their philosophy, and searching for their religious significance. Even a single individual, like Newton, for example, may exhibit all these stages in himself. The positivist must show how the one stage leads on to the next, and at the same time make it plain that that stage is left entirely behind; and, in the same connection, it is proper to remark that the view of evolution which positivism exhibits leaves no place for degeneration, while the facts of the civilization of the race frequently show that there has been decline as well as advance. Recent advocates of the evolutionary philosophy

admit this, and are more ready to do justice to the facts than positivism is.

Thirdly, as a matter of fact, science, philosophy and theology must always go *together*. In the activity of the human race, they cannot be divorced from each other. There are facts which pertain to each of these spheres, and of these facts in general the scientific, the philosophical, and the religious view may be taken. In this connection positivism does injustice, not only to history, but to the very nature of the case. These three departments of human inquiry inherently subsist side by side in all true rational investigation. We first explore the facts, and see *what* they are. We next search for their causes or reasons, and discover *how* they are. Then we finally raise the query concerning their purpose or end, and ascertain *why* they are as they are. At this point positivism is painfully one-sided and defective.

5. Positivism leaves no ground for stable *morality* or for national security. It rejects any fixed and immutable morality, and leaves no ground for the obligatory character of moral duties. This being the case, the very foundations of individual, domestic, social and national well-being are destroyed. It provides only an empirical type of ethics, and such a type must ever be intensely egoistic, clearly individualistic, and essentially utilitarian.

6. The attempts which certain types of positivism make to construct a *religious* system are not only in themselves absurd, but constitute a reluctant confession that man is, after all, a religious being, and must have some sort of religion. After denying that men need religion when they reach the positivist stage, it seems very strange to find a religion, with its deity and its cultus, proposed by positivism. Then, to find more moderate positivists speaking, as they do, of the religion of humanity, with some vague idealization of the race as its deity, is scarcely less absurd, and is equally a confession of the insufficiency of positivism,

and a testimony to the native religiousness of the human race. In this respect positivism is self-condemned.

7. To conclude, it may be added that positivism really asks *questions* which it cannot answer, and, like the dog in the manger, forbids either philosophy or theology to give the answer. Questions concerning the origin of the universe, of its inner grounds and meaning, are left without any answer. Problems concerning the human mind and the profound principles of human knowledge are not solved; and inquiries in regard to the moral sentiments and religious instincts of the spirit of man are left untouched. Now, these are questions and problems and inquiries which will not down at the bidding of positivism. On this account we must pronounce this scheme superficial, incomplete, and arbitrary in its nature.

Though Comtean positivism may have had its day, and be now no longer a potent power, yet the general *temper* which it has begotten abides as a baneful heritage in wide and influential scientific circles. This temper, we are sure, is not only most inimical to Christian faith, but hurtful to the best interests of science itself. The Christian philosophy, which is a sound theism, is needed to give the true explanation of the phenomena of the universe alike in their cosmic origin, cosmic progress, cosmic order, and cosmic design. At every one of these test places the positivist philosophy fails. It is, therefore, to be at once rejected.

CHAPTER VIII.

AGNOSTICISM: STATEMENT.

CONTENTS.

Agnosticism a Type of Thought.—It is Ancient and Persistent.—Greek.— Sadducees.— Modern.— Hume.— Kant.— Hamilton.— Mill.—Spencer.— Four Types.— Psychological.—Ontological.—Logical.—Relative.—Agnostic Theory of Knowledge.—Faculties of Cognition Somewhat Unreliable.—Always Empiricism.—The Laws of Thought Denied.—Reality not Subject of Cognition.—Uses the Relativity of Human Knowledge.—Various Aspects of Relativity.—The Agnostic Theory of Knowledge Leads to Antitheistic Results.—The Empirical Theory of Knowledge Rules Out a Knowledge of the Supersensible.—The Agnostic Use of the Doctrine of Relativity does the Same.—Agnosticism does not Deny God.—Asserts that He is not Cognizable.—The Human Powers Inadequate.—God Absolutely Inscrutable.—Arguments Balanced.—Relativity Excludes God.

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I. *Some General Explanations.* § 122.

1. AGNOSTICISM is a general *type of thought,* rather than a definite *system of things.* The term itself is quite modern, but what it denotes is really of ancient date. In general, it relates to the cognitive capacity of the

human mind, and it expresses a sort of universal skepticism in regard to the power of the mind of man to know reality. It consequently raises in a very direct way the question of the capacity of the human mind to know God, and the supersensible verities of the Christian religion.

In one form or another, it has had a place in the speculations of almost every age. Two centuries before Christ, in the decadent era of Greek philosophy, it appeared as a kind of universal skepticism or avowed nescience. The Sadducees of our Lord's day, among the Jews, represent, in the sphere of religion, many traits of agnosticism. They were, at least, skeptics in regard to the reality of the spiritual and unseen world. In modern times, Hume, though usually regarded as a universal skeptic, is really a typical agnostic, alike in the field of philosophy and in the sphere of religion. This accounts for the revival of interest in the philosophy of Hume in our own day. Even in the philosophy of Kant, and of Hamilton, too, there are features which open the way for a form of agnosticism. When the former held that we have no cognition of noumena, and that the categories of the understanding and ideas of reason are regulative only of phenomena, and have no cognitive validity in relation to things in themselves, or noumena, then idealism was the result on the side of psychology, and agnosticism or skepticism was the consequence in the sphere of ontology; and when the latter asserted that the unconditioned, in both its infinite and absolute aspects, was both inconceivable and incognizable by the human understanding, he set the door open for the agnostic to come in as an unwelcome guest. Herbert Spencer has not been slow in turning these aspects of the philosophy of Kant and of Hamilton to account in the interests of agnosticism. Spencer may have pushed his inferences too far, yet it must be confessed that these eminent thinkers left at least a loophole for Spencer. J. S. Mill, and those who hold similar sensational theories of cognition, and give prominence to

the relativity of human knowledge, bring tribute to the feet of agnosticism.

Spencer, of course, is the great *modern exponent* of scientific agnosticism, or of universal skepticism touching realities. Fiske, Huxley and Clifford are also familiar names in the same connection. This brief sketch will serve to show how extensive this antitheistic type of thought really is. It also makes it evident that agnosticism is merely a somewhat modest term to denote what is usually known in the history of human thought as philosophical skepticism, more or less complete. Agnosticism, skepticism and nescience mean nearly the same.

In the discussion of agnosticism, it must be kept in mind that it is first a theory of *knowledge,* and then an *antitheistic* theory. Antitheistic implications are necessarily involved in its epistemology. This being the case, it becomes necessary to discuss agnosticism as a theory of knowledge, and as a system opposed to theism. But before entering upon this twofold discussion, some explanation of the various types of agnosticism may be of advantage.

2. There are at least *four* distinct types of agnosticism. These are determined according to the different methods by which the agnostic conclusion is reached.

First, there is what may be called *psychological* agnosticism. According to this type of the theory, it is argued that the capacities of the human mind are not competent to come into cognitive relation with the supersensible objects of religion. God and the verities of the unseen world are beyond the grasp of the mental powers of man. He has no faculty by which God can be known. By reason of this mental incompetency agnosticism is the only conclusion in which the mind of man can rest.

Secondly, another type may be termed *ontological* agnosticism. According to this phase of the system, the objects of religious knowledge, in their own nature, are inscrutable. They necessarily are such that they are not capable of be-

coming objects of human cognition. God and supersensible realities are absolute entities that entirely elude the mental grasp of the finite mind of man. They are inscrutable and unknowable in their inherent nature; hence, the agnostic position in regard to them is the only tenable one.

Thirdly, there is another type of agnosticism, which may be denoted the *logical*. According to this type of the theory, it is maintained that the arguments for and against the reality of God, and the things of the spiritual world, are so nearly balanced that no conclusion can be confidently rested in. There are reasons in favor of believing in their reality, and there are reasons which look in the other direction, so that the judicial mind, carefully weighing these reasons, must at least suspend judgment, and hold the agnostic attitude towards the whole matter.

Fourthly, there remains the *relativist* phase of agnosticism. This is founded on an extreme application of the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge to the subject-matter of religion. This doctrine, in general, holds that we do not know things as they really are, but only as they are related to us. This is a sort of phenomenalism. Things are not really known as they are, but only as they appear to us. Hence, in the case of God, he is not known as he really is, but only as he appears to us to be; and there is no reason to believe that our knowledge of him is adequate. In this way, again, the agnostic goal is reached. The eternal verities of religion are only relatively known, and we can never be sure that our knowledge is adequate.

These four types of agnosticism are often found subsisting side by side, but taken together, they quite cover the field of modern agnosticism. The conditions of the first are found in Kant, the germs of the second lie in Hamilton, the third is announced by Huxley, who claims the honor of inventing the term, and the elements of the fourth are involved in Mill. But they all agree in representing the type of thought now under consideration.

II. *The Agnostic Theory of Knowledge.* § 123.

The *statement* of this theory can be made in comparatively brief compass, after what has been said in the Introduction on the theory of knowledge. The several points involved in the agnostic theory of knowledge need only be stated without any expanded exposition. The main gist of the matter is involved in what the term empiricism denotes. With this the readers of this treatise are already familiar. The real point in debate is as to whether the human mind possesses the capacity to transcend the senses, and come into real cognitive relations with what is supersensible. Hence, agnosticism raises a debate which goes to the very root of the doctrine of cognition.

1. First of all, agnosticism shows a tendency to attach a degree of *unreliability* to the operation of the powers and faculties of the human mind. The hint is thrown out that these powers can never lead to certainty in any sphere, much less in regard to things supersensible. By those who hold with the Pyrrhonists, certainty can never be reached in any sphere, and the only attitude of the human mind is that of absolute skepticism. It is said that the first impressions of the senses may not be correct, for they have to be corrected by the subsequent exercise of the understanding. This appears in the experience of the child as it acquires by degrees the conception of relative distance, from the first impressions made on the senses by objects. This, it is claimed, suggests that the senses are not accurate in their apprehension of realities.

2. The agnostic theory of knowledge is always more or less *empirical* in its nature. The empirical theory limits human knowledge to the resources of the senses. So far as the various senses extend their scope, so far we may have knowledge; but we cannot go beyond. Sensation is the source of all the materials of cognition, and the higher

forms of knowledge, which we regard as rational in their nature, are nothing more than transformed sensations. Habit, association and heredity account for the whole fabric of human knowledge, no matter how abstract it may appear to be. Everything grows out of experience, and those elements of cognition which are not directly sensational are only idealized experience. Just as Greek nescience and Hume's skepticism were associated with sensationalism, so modern agnosticism is connected with thorough-going empiricism.

3. The agnostic *epistemology* generally denies the *a priori* factor in human cognition. It steadily refuses to admit the real objective relation of the cognitive activity of the mind to the reality of the objects of cognition. The reality of the categories of the human understanding is not admitted by agnosticism. It does not concede that the spontaneity of the spiritual principle in man is determined by any rules inherent in its very nature. The laws of thought are not fundamental, and hence they are not necessary to condition the possibility of experience. Even these uniformities of cognition, like the causal relation, are the product of repetition and association, of habit and heredity. Modern agnosticism has no sympathy with any type of rational psychology. It repudiates the *a priori*.

4. Agnosticism, consequently, asserts that the faculties of the human mind are *inadequate* to cognize the reality of things at all. Human knowledge pertains to the sphere of the phenomenal; and man has no cognitive powers by the exercise of which he comes into rational relation with the non-phenomenal. Since man acquires all his knowledge, in the first instance, from the senses, he is severed, so far as cognition is concerned, from the supersensible or hyper-empirical. He knows appearances only, not realities, or things in themselves. The agnostic sometimes admits that there is or may be a supersensible world, but he uniformly insists that we cannot know aught about it. This is to

sever the whole rational activity of man from the realm of reality, and to commit him to the ever-changing region of appearances. This is what modern agnosticism uniformly does. It is a scheme of phenomenalism.

5. Modern agnosticism is usually coupled with the doctrine of the *relativity* of human knowledge. In many cases agnostics push this doctrine to an extreme in the interests of their views of cognition. It is not here asserted that there is not something true in the relativity of human knowledge, much less is it implied in what is now said that all who hold in any way this doctrine are agnostics. It is simply stated that the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge is unduly pressed into service by modern agnosticism.

It is scarcely necessary at this point to enter upon a careful *discussion* of the relativity of human knowledge. The doctrine is held in different forms. In some cases it is substantially correct, but in others it is held in at least a one-sided way. By some this doctrine merely denotes that we know only those things, and that we know them only in the manner, and to the extent, which our faculties enable us to cognize them. When used in this way, it is little more than a truism, for it leaves entirely unsolved the problem of the extent of human knowledge, and of the nature of the objects actually known. Others, by the relativity of knowledge, mean that we do not know things as they really are, but only as they appear to be to us. The human mind is directly related only to the appearances of things, and we can have no guarantee that things themselves are what they appear to be. Still others lay stress upon the view that all the contents of cognition must pass through the forms of the senses and understanding before they actually become matters of knowledge. This being the case, it is impossible to tell what changes these materials may have undergone in the process, so that we can have no guarantee that there is any real and accurate know-

ledge of things acquired. All is merely relative, and nothing assured. It is easy to see how the agnostic, pushing this doctrine to an extreme, uses it in favor of this theory.

III. *Agnosticism as Antitheistic.* § 124.

1. The agnostic theory of knowledge has been explained; its *antitheistic* bearings are now to be indicated, for agnosticism is first a theory of knowledge, and then an antitheistic scheme. Taking the contents of the preceding section, we now proceed to show how the agnostic theory of knowledge necessarily leads to entirely antitheistic results. As this is one of the cultured aspects of philosophical unbelief in our own day, it is of the utmost moment to have it clearly before us in this discussion. It prevails in many quarters in both Europe and America in our own time, and there are traces of it in much of the popular literature of our own day. It seeks to destroy the foundations of theistic belief by propounding a theory of knowledge which renders that belief impossible. It assumes the garb of humility and an air of modesty in regard to the capacities of finite human understanding, and confesses, most willingly, that there is much that is mysterious in the universe. It is not so irreverent as atheism, nor so consistent as materialism; but it bows before the mystery which lies at the heart of all existence, and in regard to God, pleads the agnostic attitude.

2. Agnosticism essentially consists in *an application of the theory of knowledge it holds to the subject-matter of religion.* It argues that since that subject-matter, broadly viewed, belongs to the realm of the supersensible or noumenal, it lies beyond the scope of human knowledge. It cannot be known. Hence, it follows that God, who is confessedly supersensible, cannot be cognized. The whole round of spiritual facts which pertain to religion transcends the senses, and so they cannot be known. The most that can be said, is that God may be existent; but as to what

he is in any cognitive way, agnosticism takes an entirely negative view. Even if there be a God, we could never know enough of him, and of our relations to him, to justify us in acting upon this supposed knowledge. *That* God is, may be conceded by agnosticism; but as to *what* he is, and *how* we are related to him, we have no real knowledge. This is the core of modern agnosticism. This general position may be elucidated in a few particulars.

3. The *sensational* theory of knowledge held by agnosticism renders the knowledge of God as the object of religion impossible. Pure empiricism, with its denial of the *a priori* factor in the activity of the spiritual principle in man, makes it unreasonable to expect a knowledge of the spiritual to be attained by mankind. If there be no necessary laws of human thought, there are no principles by means of which the mind can apprehend reality. If there be nothing real and permanent in the whole realm of existence, then the knowledge of God as such a being has no valid grounds. Hence, empiricism, which is the key-note of agnosticism, confines cognition to the sensible and phenomenal, and rules out the supersensible and noumenal. And since God pertains to the supersensible, he cannot be known.

4. Then, the *perversion* of the doctrine of relativity in regard to human knowledge leads straight on to the goal of agnosticism. If we know things, not as they really are, or as they are apprehended by the sublimation of the senses, then we cannot know God really, but only as he is related to our powers of cognition. At best, our cognitive content is but an appearance of God; and there may be no reason to believe that this appearance is at all congruous with the reality. It may merely be an idealized and anthromorphic construction of the mind of man, and one man's subjective deity may be just as near the truth and as good as another's.

We are not anxious to deny that there is not an element of truth in this doctrine. There is a sense in which we

know things as they appear unto us, though it does not follow that we do not know them truly and as they really are. So there is a sense in which we know God only as he relates himself to us in his works about us, in our mental and moral constitution, in the revelation of the Holy Scriptures, and in the experience of the Christian life. But from this it does not follow that we are bound to take the agnostic conclusion, for our knowledge of God as a fact, no matter how it has been acquired, is correct and valid as far as it goes.

5. A few brief statements may make the antitheistic aspects of agnosticism perfectly evident. *First* of all, agnosticism does *not deny* the existence of God. It differs from atheism in saying that there may be a God, but that there are no faculties in man's constitution to cognize God. Its real ground is that of skepticism. If there be a God, he must to us ever be an unknown being, not cognitively related to us.

If man has *no faculty,* "not even the rudiment of a faculty," by which God and religious realities can be cognized; if, in the very nature of the case, the object of religion, which is God, and the contents of religion, which are spiritual truths, are *inscrutable;* if the arguments for and against belief in God are almost evenly *balanced,* so that judgment must be suspended; and if we know things, especially the things of religion, only as they are *related* to us, then in each case the agnostic position is the only one to hold. Hence, confessed ignorance, inherent defect, or simple indifference, are the marks of agnosticism in our own day. Usually the strict agnostic rests in *suspension* of judgment, or rational indifference in regard to the reality of the existence of God. He argues that there is no good ground for bringing the thought of God into human life in any such way as may affect the conduct of that life.

CHAPTER IX.

AGNOSTICISM: CRITICISM.

Contents.

The Agnostic Theory of Knowledge Refuted.—The Human Faculties not Unreliable, but Trustworthy when Taken Together.—It Commits Logical Suicide, for it Cannot Make Good its Claim.—The Human Mind does Come into Cognitive Relation with Reality.—A Knowledge of Phenomena Implies Cognition of Noumena.—Relativity, Rightly Understood, Does not Support Agnosticism.—Things May be Known Truly, Though not Fully. True Knowledge Does not Require Identity of Subject and Object.—A Knowledge of Relations Implies a Knowledge of Things Related.—Agnosticism as Antitheistic.—Admit Mystery and Limitation.—Agnostic Conception of God at Fault.—God is not Merely the Absolute.—Or Unconditioned.—Gives no Proper Place to Faith or Belief.—Kinship of Nature Between God and Man Against Agnosticism.—Cannot Explain Religious Sentiments.—Nor Religious Rites.—Nor Contents of the Bible.—Bad Effects of Atheism.

Literature.

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I. *The Theory of Knowledge: Criticism.* § 125.

SINCE agnosticism is, first of all, *a theory of knowledge,* that theory must be carefully examined. It were folly to allow a doctrine of cognition to hold its place, if the

logical result of that doctrine were universal skepticism. Such a doctrine would make shipwreck of philosophy, morals and religion, for its logic would surely be nescience, nihilism and atheism. Hence, the epistemology of agnosticism challenges careful criticism.

1. The charge made by agnosticism, that our faculties of knowledge are more or less unreliable, *cannot be admitted.* We maintain that the powers of cognition with which the human soul is endowed, when taken together in their normal and healthy action, are trustworthy. If the senses have to be corrected in experience by the rational judgment, the result is that the combined action leads to certainty, not uncertainty. The view that our faculties are constituted to be true and trustworthy is firmly held against agnosticism. To hold that these faculties are inherently constructed to deceive and perplex is absurd.

It is not necessary, in maintaining the inherent reliability of our faculties, to hold that these powers are competent to embrace the whole field of possible knowledge, or that they are capable of fathoming its depths. Faculties of cognition may be reliable in certain spheres without being infallible in every realm, and knowledge may be quite trustworthy within its proper limits, and yet not be omniscient. The agnostic seems to demand infallibility and omniscience in order to reliability and trustworthiness. This we do not admit, but protest against it with great earnestness. We argue that our powers were made to be reliable, and their results trustworthy, according to their finite constitution; and if one set of faculties willingly receives correction from another in actual experience, this plainly goes to show that when the complete cognitive results are reached, certitude has been attained. This position is earnestly held in the interests of science, philosophy and religion. Unreliable faculties of observation would destroy *science,* uncertain powers of reflection would obliterate *philosophy,* and defective faculties to cognize deity

would annihilate *religion*. The agnostic commits treason against all three.

2. But agnosticism in this connection commits *logical suicide*. If the faculties of the human mind are unreliable, one may very properly ask the agnostic how he, in the use of these same faculties, ever reaches so surely his agnostic conclusions? If he had faculties of a different sort from those possessed by the theist, he might make good his contention; but he must rely on precisely the same sort of faculties of observation and powers of reflection as the theist. If, therefore, these faculties and powers are unreliable and untrustworthy in the hands of the theist, they must also be in the hands of the agnostic. Thus, we may turn the tables on the agnostic in the realm of his psychology. This contention may be pushed against the agnostic with fatal effect. If the human powers of cognition are inherently unreliable, not only is the theist frustrated in his views, but the agnostic is blocked in the contentions he makes. Nay, more, the possibility of certain knowledge in any sphere, and in regard to any matter, is destroyed. We cannot be sure that we do not know, nor can we be sure that we are not sure that we do not know. This is the absolute skepticism of decadent Greek philosophy, and it is the logic of modern agnosticism at this point. In both cases it is absolute *nescience*, which, having destroyed theism, commits logical suicide.

3. But we, further, contend against agnosticism that the human mind does come into *cognitive relation* with reality as well as with appearances. The theory of knowledge steadily maintained in this treatise justifies this statement. That theory is the rational, as distinguished from the empirical. According to that theory, the human mind possesses rational rules, according to which its cognitive activities come into exercise. In cognition, the mind of man comes into rational relation with the laws of things which constitute their real being. Hence, while the senses

bring the human mind into relation with the appearances of things, the rational rules of the spiritual principle in man bring the mind at the same time into rational relation with the realities of things. Only thus can the many and varied units of sense perception be unified into a whole of rational cognition. According to this epistemology, the spiritual principle in man has rational relation to the realities of things. Hence, reality is not entirely beyond the grasp of human knowledge.

If this doctrine of human cognition be carefully held, the agnostic theory of the incognoscibility of reality is no longer tenable. If human knowledge can in any measure penetrate the supersensible realm, the agnostic position is no longer defensible. It is not necessary to be able to perceive in an omniscient way all the inner secrets of real being in order to maintain the ground against agnosticism. It is enough if the human mind is able to look through the veil between the sensible and supersensible, and come into cognitive relations with the reality that is involved in phenomenal appearances. If the laws of thought and the laws of things are correlated in cognition, empiricism, on which agnosticism usually rests, is destroyed. The foundation being destroyed, agnosticism itself falls into ruins. Such being the case, the door is at least open for the human mind to come into real rational relation with God, even though he pertains to the supersensible realm. Unless the agnostic can show that God, as supreme personal reason, is superrational, he fails to establish his position in the sphere of religion.

4. Against agnosticism the ground may be safely taken that a knowledge of *phenomena* is possible only on the supposition of the reality of *noumena,* and that in the fact of the knowledge of appearances, the knowledge of realities is necessarily implied. We may not know both by the same sources of cognition, but each may be known by its own appropriate powers of rational apprehension. An

appearance suggests a reality, for there must be something to appear. A phenomenon witnesses to a noumenon. The separation between the appearance and "the thing in itself," which Kant made so rigid in his critical idealism, and which Spencer laid hold of in the interests of agnosticism, is artificial, and has done much harm both to philosophy and theology. The *idealism* of Fichte and the *nescience* of Harrison are the logical results of this unreal divorce between phenomena and noumena. A true doctrine of cognition gives a place to both, and binds them together in the activity of true knowledge. By the senses the mind apprehends the appearances of things, and by the rules of the rational spontaneity of the spiritual principle in man, the mind apprehends the laws of the reality of things. The complete act of cognition involves both. By this means, again, it appears that the door is open for the cognition of the supersensible involved in the sensible, and the agnostic has no rational right to close this door.

5. A right understanding of the doctrine of *relativity* in relation to human knowledge does not favor the agnostic contention. This doctrine has puzzled philosophers in all ages. It has been both understated and overstated. From the days of the Greek sophists and skeptics, down to the positivists and agnostics of our own time, this doctrine has been pushed to an extreme in one direction, while by idealists and certain intuitionalists it has been given undue stress in another. In both cases harm has been done to philosophy and theism. To secure a well-balanced position in regard to the doctrine of relativity is very important. Three simple remarks may be helpful to this end.

First, we may know a thing *truly* without knowing it *fully*. We may know very much about any object of knowledge, and yet be far from knowing all about it. Perhaps perfect knowledge of anything is possible only to omniscience. Since we are finite, absolute knowledge of anything may be impossible to us. But this does not justify

the agnostic's position; or, if it does, then the only deliverance from agnosticism is omniscience. The old distinction between apprehending a thing, and comprehending it, is of value here. The fact of space or extension may illustrate this distinction. We apprehend limited portions of space as extension; yet we do not, perhaps cannot, comprehend space in its infinite aspects. It does not follow, however, that because we do not fully comprehend infinite space, therefore we do not apprehend, in a real way, what extension is as a fact.

Secondly, true knowledge does not require *identity* of nature between the *subject* and *object* in cognition. This error dates back to Descartes, who suggested that essential distinction between mind and matter, which introduced a rigid dualism into philosophy. It also led to the one-sided solutions of it presented by idealism, pantheism and materialism, respectively. This same error is the underlying assumption in many phases of the doctrine of relativity. It is assumed that before we can have a knowledge of any object, either the mind must be reduced to the terms of that object, or the object must be reduced to terms of the knowing mind. This means *idealism* or *materialism*. It is maintained by the relativists that the only way is to hold that we know things only as they are related to us through our powers of cognition. But this does not justify the conclusion that we do not truly know things as they really are. The sound theory of knowledge already established enables us to hold that true cognition does not require absolute identity between subject and object therein. In such cognition there is a synthesis of the two factors, so that both appearance and reality, both the sensuous and the rational, are bound together in cognition.

Thirdly, a knowledge of *relations* implies some knowledge of the *things related*. This bears very directly on the question of the relativity of our knowledge. Relations apart from things related are nothing. They are pure

abstractions, and have no rational value. To say that we know things only as they are related to us is to imply some knowledge of the things related. Then, if we hold the rational as distinguished from the empirical psychology, a real knowledge of the object, as well as the subject, is attained. Thus, a knowledge of things is involved in a knowledge of their relations. A doctrine of pure relativity is consequently quite untenable. A doctrine of modified relativity enables us to hold that while we know things only as they are related to us by our powers of knowing, yet we know things truly in this way.

The conclusion is reached that the agnostic theory of knowledge *breaks down* at various points. The door of knowledge stands open towards the supersensible, and hence God is not necessarily beyond the rational grasp of the human mind.

II. *Agnosticism as Antitheistic: Criticism.* § 126.

1. In dealing critically with the *antitheistic* aspects of agnosticism, an important *admission* is cheerfully made. The spirit of humility in regard to the very limited scope of human knowledge, so far as it is just and sincere, is worthy of praise in agnosticism. It is also conceded that there is much of mystery in the things we know in part, and that in the case of the knowledge of God this is also the case. We cannot find out the Almighty unto perfection, and we can know only a little of his ways. Clouds and darkness are round about him. There is, therefore, a valid and a necessary agnosticism in our religious knowledge, which is the source of certain aspects of true reverence and deep devotion. But while all this is admitted as the necessary results of the relation of the finite to the infinite, it is still maintained that we do know God. The spiritual principle in man comes into spiritual relations with God as the supreme spirit, and hence in religion there is an element

of cognition. So far as the knowledge of God is concerned, both agnosticism and gnosticism have their place. There is mystery and knowledge, there is the known and the unknown, and the problem for the philosophy of religion is to define the limits of each, and to adjust their relations.

2. The agnostic *conception of God* is at fault. Passing by the point that one wonders how the agnostic has any idea of God at all, we raise serious objection to the way in which the agnostic arrives at the incognoscibility of God. He first of all identifies God with the absolute. God is the absolute form of being, and is consequently out of relation with all other forms of being. This being the case, God is out of all cognitive relation with the human faculties, and hence he is inscrutable or unknowable. God is the absolute, the absolute is unknowable, therefore God is unknowable. This is agnostic logic.

But this logical procedure is illegitimate. It takes the very point in debate for granted. The question relates to the knowableness of God. To say that the absolute is unknowable, and that God is the absolute, is an evident begging of the question. But, further, the agnostic idea of the absolute is at fault. It makes it an entity, whereas it is simply a quality of some form of being. God may be the absolute being, but it is not true that the absolute itself is a form of being. To speak of the absolute as inscrutable, therefore, is quite absurd. Then, the quality of absoluteness, as it pertains to God, does not place him out of relation with all other forms of being. It rather denotes that he is not dependent on any other being for his origin and continued existence. It means that he is self-existent and independent.

But the agnostic idea of God is mainly defective because it makes him a kind of abstraction when it describes him as the absolute. God is not an *abstraction,* but a real spiritual personal *being*. Agnosticism is at fault, because it always obscures this fact. God is the infinite personal

spirit who sustains definite relations to the universe, both as to its origin and continued existence. But he himself is of none and dependent on none.

Not unlike this agnostic reasoning is that which, following Hamilton, asserts that God is the unconditioned form of being, and that to think is to condition the object thought, so that God cannot become an object of thought. To think of God is to condition God; but God is the unconditioned, and hence cannot be thought, or become an object of knowledge. Reflection for a moment will clearly show that to come into cognitive or thought relations with any object does not in any way affect the conditions of the being of that object, unless we be idealists, and hold that the cognitive act of the mind creates the object. Hence, when the human mind comes into cognitive relations with God as the unconditioned form of being, the ontological conditions of his being are in no way affected by the psychological activity of the human mind. Here agnosticism greatly blunders.

3. Agnosticism gives no proper place to *faith* in the sphere of theistic and religious truth, and it overlooks the fact that between faith or belief, and cognition or knowledge, there are intimate relations. This has been pointed out in the Introduction of this treatise. Both have rational value and lead to certitude. In popular usage we sometimes say that we know when we believe, and believe when we know. We almost as readily say that we *know* that there is a God as that we *believe* in God. This shows how closely belief and knowledge are bound together, and that belief or faith is one avenue to truth and certainty.

The agnostic ignores this fact, and argues that because God is not, as he thinks, an object of knowledge, he lies beyond rational apprehension altogether. But this does not follow. Even if we concede to the agnostic that the door of cognition is closed in regard to God, it may still be true that the avenue of belief is wide open to reach truth and

certainty concerning God. At this point, it is evident that Spencer does but scanty justice to Kant and Hamilton, in the use he makes of them in favor of agnosticism; for while Kant and Hamilton denied that the understanding related us cognitively to God, they both strongly held that by faith, and on moral grounds, the human mind reaches undoubted certainty regarding God. This fact modern agnosticism quite disregards. It may be added that this faith factor may be the fundamental fact in our rational apprehension of God, so that the agnostic, by ignoring this factor, does serious injustice to the aptitude of the human mind for God.

4. If there be any *kinship* in nature between God and man, then agnosticism may be untenable. God, according to the theistic conception of him, is the infinite personal spirit; and man, on theistic and religious grounds, is in his inner being spiritual. This being the case, there may be established a real rational relation between God as a spiritual being and the spiritual principle in man. If this be the case, the door is open for man to come into real cognitive relations with God. The agnostic, unless he be a materialist also in regard to man's constitution, cannot ward off the force of this fact. Of course, if he be a materialist, debate with him ends; but, if materialism be refuted, his foundation is destroyed. The reality of God having been established as an infinite spiritual and personal being, and the reality of the spiritual principle in man having been made good, the agnostic contention for the incognoscibility of God is fully met.

And with this the Scriptures agree when they teach that man was made in the *image of God,* and that there are the conditions of rational and moral relations between God and man that do not exist in regard to the relations between God and the brutes. If man be the crown and glory of God's creative activity, and if he be made in the image and likeness of God, then it is reasonable to conclude that

man can have a knowledge of God. Of this high prerogative the agnostic robs man, and sends him on his dark pathway of ignorance to his unknown destiny. It blots out the sun from his heavens, and hides from man's eye the pole-star which guides him safely on. No such gloomy doctrine meets the needs of a being made in the image of God, and made for God.

5. Agnosticism is greatly perplexed with the *religious* feelings or sentiments. It is bound to admit the existence of these sentiments in the human breast. The experience of men everywhere testifies to the reality of these sentiments. There is a consciousness of the divine in some form in the human race. There is a feeling of dependence, and a sense of responsibility, in the heart of men generally. The agnostic is bound to construe these facts in some way. He must explain them in harmony with his denial of any cognition of God on the part of man. How he can account for a feeling of dependence on, and a sense of accountability to, a being who lies beyond his cognitive apprehension is almost absurd. The agnostic must admit this religious feeling and sentiment, and deny that it stands related in any rational way with the being of God. Religion can only be a purely subjective sentiment. It is really superstition, with no basis in objective reality. To this absurdity the agnostic is shut up.

But, further, the *feelings,* psychologically considered, are associated with some form of *knowledge.* In psychological analysis we have first the cognitive powers of sense perception, understanding and reason, and then we have the sensibility or feeling capacities of the human soul, followed by the will. Now, the sensibility is always related to cognition. If there be no content of cognition, there can be no affection of the sensibility. This is true alike in the intellectual, the moral and the religious spheres. The nature of the cognition will determine the character of the feeling. This being the case, agnosticism is convicted of

a false psychology in seeking to explain religious feelings or sentiments, without reference to the knowledge of God which these feelings imply.

6. Agnosticism has no proper explanation to give of the universal *prevalence* of religious rites and practices among men. Agnosticism is bound to admit that men in all ages and conditions have exhibited some form of external religious activity. There is a belief in some form of deity, and religious rites connected with the worship instituted. This belief and these rites, so universal among men, constitute a real problem for the agnostic. They are an outward expression of the feelings and sentiments described in the preceding section, and the agnostic is bound to construe these universal facts in harmony with his ultimate position in regard to the knowledge of God. Here the agnostic usually goes far a-field to account for the fact. He sometimes lays stress on the mythical instinct in the race, forgetful that even this instinct itself is a problem for him. He dwells on the effect of fetichism in producing religious belief and rites, overlooking the fact that fetichism has to be accounted for. He makes much of ancestorism, in other cases, and derives religion from respect paid to departed ancestors, apparently insensible of the fact that even ancestor worship involves religion. All such attempts to solve the problem of the universal prevalence of religious opinions, rites and practices are futile. The agnostic has no explanation of them to give. When he says that God, the object of religion, is quite beyond the knowledge of man, the subject of religion, he simply leaves universal religious belief and practice hanging in mid-air, without any rational support. Theism fully meets this problem. It holds that man comes into rational relation with God; and that, by reason of sin, there has been decline in the knowledge and service of the true God. Hence, all forms of pagan religion can be explained.

7. The contents of the *Bible* greatly perplex the agnostic.

Taking the Bible simply as a collection of remarkable religious literature, there are many things which the agnostic is helpless to explain. Here we have a great many intelligent and devoutly religious men and women whose experience is exhibited in the Bible. They had clear ideas of God. They felt very sure that they knew God, and that God had spoken to them. The sense of God in the Old Testament is very vivid, and in the New the knowledge of God stands out as clear as noonday. The prophets and apostles were more certain of nothing than that there was an infinite personal God, and that they had, by some means or other, a knowledge of him.

Now, if agnosticism be true, how is all this possible? Or if this knowledge was gained by men of the biblical era, how is agnosticism tenable? The agnostic seems to feel the force of this, and usually has but little to say concerning the contents of Scripture. In this he reveals prudence, if he does expose the defects of his theory. Yet we feel justified in calling on the agnostic to account for the gnosticism of the Bible.

In addition, the agnostic must, further, explain the undoubted fact that men may be *taught* clearer ideas of God by the contents of the Bible. This we see in the case of children, and is evident in the results of preaching. Very especially does it appear in heathen lands, where crude ideas of God prevail. These heathen, by the contents of the Bible, come to have their ideas of God elevated and purified. How this is possible on agnostic ground is not easily understood. And, above all, that saving knowledge of God which sinful men come to have by the preaching of the gospel, and through faith in Christ, stands as an insuperable barrier in the pathway of agnosticism. The fact of Jesus Christ, and his knowledge of God, has also to be accounted for. If he were but a man, how had he this knowledge? If he were more than a man, God was revealed in him in a way capable of apprehension by men; and all the experi-

ences of the Christian life have to be taken into account and explained by agnosticism. This cannot be done, so agnosticism is rejected. *Theism* meets all the conditions here. It provides a basis for the knowledge of God, it opens the way for the message of the Scriptures, and it gives all the conditions for a true religious experience in all respects. Hence, eternal life, which consists in knowing the one true God and Jesus Christ, whom he hath sent, is the very heart of true religion.

8. To conclude, agnosticism, if made universally operative among men, would have all the *evil moral effects* of atheism and materialism. Even if there be a God, if I cannot know him, this is practically the same to me as if there were no God. The unknown God will not long hold authority over the human heart and life. If reduced to practice, it would be as dangerous and harmful as atheism, and more subtile, for it wears a mask. Agnosticism seems very humble and modest, yet its influence is bound to be baneful. Let agnosticism rule the thought and life of any people, and its fruit would be exceedingly bad. This danger may threaten even now. Let a well-grounded theistic philosophy be held, let a firm faith in the Word of God be maintained, and let a pure gospel be faithfully preached, and all will be well.

CHAPTER X.

DEISM AND RATIONALISM.

CONTENTS.

Deism a Definite Scheme.—Prominent in Speculation.—In Greece.—In England.—In France.—Terms Explained.—Deism.—Theism.—Naturalism.—Rationalism.—Infidelity.—Statement of Deism.—Holds Existence of God.—God One, Personal and Intelligent.—Also Creator.—Denies God's Immanent Relation to the Universe.—No Constant Care.—No Supernatural Activity.—No Miracle.—No Prayer.—No Redemption.—Examination.—General, not Detailed.—Problem is God's Relation to the Universe.—Transcendent or Immanent also.—An Initial Difficulty.—How has God's Relation Changed?—Self-maintenance Difficult.—Deism Lays too Much Stress on Natural Law.—Natural Law Explained.—The Physical and Moral too Widely Separated.—Impairs the Scope of Freedom.—No Place for God's Love and Pity.—A Practical Objection.—No Good Ground for the Christian Facts as Supernatural.

LITERATURE.

Encyclopædia Articles on *Deism, Rationalism, Naturism* and *Infidelity.*—Butler's *Analogy.*—Leland's *View of Deistical Writers.*—Hurst's *History of Rationalism.*—Cairns' *Unbelief in the Eighteenth Century.*—Christlieb's *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief,* Chap. III., Sec. IV.—Bruce's *Providential Order,* Chaps. IX.–XII.—Bruce's *Moral Order,* Chap. VIII.—Harris' *God, Creator and Lord of All,* Vol. I., Chap. XIV.—Illingworth's *Divine Immanence,* Chaps. III., IV.—Bruce's *Apologetics,* Book I., Chap. V.—Farrar's *History of Free Thought,* Chap. IV.—Stearns' *Present Day Theology,* Chaps. XIII.–XV.—Draper's *Conflict Between Science and Religion,* Chap. IX.—Caird's *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity,* Chap. V.—McCosh's *The Divine Government,* Chap. II.—Fisher's *Discussions,* Chap. XIII.—Rishell's *The Foundations of the Christian Faith,* Div. I., Sec. IV., Chaps. I., II.—Bowne's *Studies in Theism,* Chap. VIII.—Fraser's *Philosophy of Theism,* Vol. I., Chap. VIII.

I. *Some Preliminary Explanations.* § 127.

1. DEISM, like materialism, is a definite scheme, and requires careful treatment as an antitheistic theory. It has had a large place in philosophical speculation in almost every age. The problem it raises does not relate to the existence of God, but rather to the relations subsisting between God and the universe. As to the former question,

deism and theism substantially agree, but in regard to the latter they differ at vital points.

The old Greeks frequently raised the question of the relation of the gods to the universe, and they often debated the extent of their control over the affairs of men. Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle incline to a definite theistic doctrine, while the Stoics and Epicureans in different ways represent the deistic type of speculation. According to the latter, the gods may have played an active part in first framing and arranging the universe, but they afterwards withdrew from its oversight, and do not now exercise any control over it. The affairs of men and the concerns of the entire universe are in the lap of chance or the grasp of fate. This was ancient deism. It represented the gods as now inactive, and the universe as running itself. In England and France, in the eighteenth century, there was a remarkable development of this type of thought. In England the chief exponents of deism in that century were Herbert, Hobbes, Blount, Toland, Shaftesbury, Collins, Woolston, Tindal, Morgan, Chubb, Bolingbroke, Hume and Gibbon. In France and Germany, men like Rousseau and Voltaire, who did not go to such extremes of atheism and materialism as did Le Mettrie and D'Holbach, are the representatives of deistic views. In our own day there is a tendency towards a deistic view of the universe in certain scientific circles. By these circles the laws of nature are made very prominent, and the universe under their control is almost self-regulative, so that the agency of God is at least kept in the background, if not excluded entirely. This tendency threatens to dethrone God altogether, and leave the universe to its own resources. If God does appear upon the scene at all, it is only in some occasional, miraculous way. In the interests alike of science, philosophy and theology, it is cheering to know that a sounder theistic doctrine is taking hold of other influential scientific circles in our own day.

2. Certain *terms* used in deistic discussions, and meaning nearly the same thing, need some explanation. The term *deism,* from the Latin, has the same meaning as *theism,* which comes from the Greek. But in discussions on the philosophy of religion they are used in widely different senses. Theism is the doctrine of one personal God, who sustains abiding relations with the universe. Deism is the doctrine of one personal God, who does not now sustain such relations with the works of his hands. The former asserts providential control, the latter denies it. The term naturalism is often used in this connection. This term denotes the view that everything that transpires in the universe is happening in a perfectly natural way under the laws of nature pertaining to the universe. Natural law and order account for everything, and there is nothing supernatural in nature or in religion.

The term *rationalism* is one very frequently used in the deistic controversy. This term indicates the place given to the reason and conscience of man in matters of religion, and it expresses the high functions they discharge for man in this realm. Reason, pure and practical, is the sufficient instrument of religion for men. No supernatural aid is needed, and hence special revelation is quite superfluous. The light of nature, which is the light in man's intellectual and moral constitution, is all the tutor he needs for his guidance in religion. There is no need of the Bible as a special revelation from God, for the inner light of reason and conscience which God has kindled in the human soul is sufficient.

Another term is *infidelity.* This is often used in a wide sense to denote religious unbelief in general, but it should always be used in its proper definite signification. The term infidel first came into common use in the days of the Crusades, when the Turks or Saracens were called infidels. This meant that they did not believe in the Bible, nor in Jesus Christ, nor in the supernatural realities of the Chris-

tian system. Hence, in the strict sense, an infidel is one who does not believe in the supernatural factors in Christianity. He thus corresponds to the deist, and infidelity is really the same as rationalism. It is this definite scheme, of which these terms denote different aspects, that is now under notice.

II. *Statement of the Deistic Position.* § 128.

Deism *asserts* certain things, and *denies* certain other things, in regard to the main topics of the theistic controversy. These are now to be set forth in order.

1. Deism asserts the reality of the *existence* of God. In this it differs with atheism and materialism, and agrees with theism. The spirituality and personality of God is held fast, and his separate existence from the universe is asserted. He is also set forth as the creator and framer of the universe. He at first brought it into being, and endowed it with all its powers and potencies. He also established the laws or fixed order of its activity, so that it works out its destiny apart from his hand. The fact of the existence, independence and wise creative power of God is strongly asserted by deism.

2. In regard to the nature of God, deism further holds that he is one, *personal* and *intelligent*. The monotheistic conception of God is clearly grasped, and the personality of the creator of the universe is distinctly asserted. The moral attributes of God are also given a place by the better types of deism, and in some cases the outlines of a moral government are announced. But in such cases the relation of God to the universe is extra-mundane and mechanical. God is external to the universe, in such a way that he does not exercise any direct control over its destiny. God is as an intelligent watchmaker who has made a watch, and having endowed it with the capacity of running so as to keep time, he leaves it to run itself.

3. In the sphere of religion, deism asserts that natural *reason* and *conscience* are amply sufficient. The conclusions of sound rational judgment, and the dictates of conscience, are adequate to guide men in all the paths of duty pleasing to God. This is that aspect of deism which is known as rationalism, and it denotes the fact that man needs no other instruction in order to know the will of God than what reason and conscience teach. This is the light of nature, which shines in the human soul, and is enough to guide men in the right path, and home to God at last. Special revelation is not necessary, and the Scriptures do not so much contain such a revelation as set forth moral and religious teaching which confirms the light of nature in the soul. Revealed religion, as it is called, grounded in Scripture, does not so much give new and needed truth, as confirm what reason has already propounded for human conduct.

4. Deism *denies* the constant *providence* of God over all his creatures. If there be providence at all, it is of the most general nature, and consists in nothing more than simply holding the universe in being. A special providence, with its constant, intelligent and tender care, is always denied by deists. It is sometimes argued by deism that the doctrine of theism, which holds that God has a direct and constant oversight of all his works, implies an imperfect condition of the universe, and is not entirely honoring to God. If God has made the universe complete at first, it does not need his sleepless vigil over it all along its history. The universe moves on according to definite fixed laws which God has imposed upon it, and any interference with the operation of these laws is unnecessary, if not impossible. Great stress is laid upon the uniformity of nature, and the rigid character of her laws. Some even go so far as to say that the author of these laws is not able to interfere and modify their operation. Hence, there can be no special providence in the universe.

5. In particular, deism *denies* the *supernatural* aspects of the activity of God in relation to his creatures. Since God is extra-mundane and transcendent merely, he cannot in any way introduce his activity into the cosmos or into the sphere of humanity. All that happens is purely natural; nothing whatever is supernatural. This is true in nature and in the realm of human history, and especially in the matter of religion. There is no such event as the miracle, since there can be no interruption of the laws of nature. Touching the *miracle,* deism sometimes contends that when our knowledge of nature is complete, the unusual nature of the miracle will disappear, and all will be seen to be natural. So there can be no such a thing as answer to *prayer,* if that answer implies any change in the supposed order of nature or of human history. All that prayer can possibly do is to bring our hearts into willing submission to the order of things as they were fixed under the hand of God. Above all, deism steadfastly refuses to admit the reality of any kind of supernatural *revelations* from God, such as are recorded in the Scriptures. The reality of those special messages from God which men in Old and New Testament times claimed to have received, is not admitted. It matters not how strong, reliable and abundant the evidence of such revelation may be, it is not competent to justify belief in its reality, for God is not now in such relations with his creatures as to make this possible; and so far as the experience of anything supernatural in personal religious life is concerned, the same general denial is also made. Religion is all natural, and it is morality rather than piety. It consists in living according to *the light of nature* shining in the soul; not according to the light of external revelation shining into the soul. The facts of theology are all construed as natural theology, and the facts of the inner life are all interpreted as natural religion.

Such, in broad outline, is deism. It makes God tran-

scendent merely, and denies all aspects of his supernatural oversight and activity in relation to his works.

III. *An Examination of Deism.* § 129.

The *examination* of deism now to be made can only be in general terms. Detailed criticism of individual opinions in regard to the deistical mode of construing the relations subsisting between God and the universe cannot be now undertaken. In a thorough review of deism in all its bearings, it would be necessary to make an estimate of divergent opinions, from the one extreme of a bald deism, which does little more than recognize the one infinite being as the first cause and ground of the universe, to the other extreme of that elevated deism, which is really advocated by some who hold the Christian name. But for present purposes it is not necessary to enter upon this large task, for all critical ends may be well served if the central position of deism be clearly seized and carefully examined. That central position lies in the question as to whether God's relation to the universe is merely *transcendent,* or not also *immanent;* and whether God's action upon the universe is merely *external* and mechanical, or not also *internal* and organic. All variant aspects of deism involve this question, and here lies the heart of its debate with theism. From this central position all controversy about general and special providence, about the natural and supernatural, about miracle and revelation, and about Christ and redemption, takes its rise; and at this point theism enters into controversy with deism. The debate, then, is as to whether the deistical interpretation of the relations of God and the universe is correct, and affords the sound philosophical basis for the Christian system as found in the Scriptures.

1. The deistical view has an *initial difficulty.* The deist admits that God, as the creator, organizer and endower of

the universe, must have been at first in very close relations with the work of his hands. His skill planned it, his wisdom arranged it, and his creative power brought it into existence. As it came at first from his hand, he must have sustained intimate operative relations with the universe. This arises from the very nature of the case. But the deist then goes on to argue that God is now removed from operative relations with the universe which he originated. If he does come into such relations, it is only occasionally from without, and in an extraordinary way. God's normal relation to the order of nature and the process of human history is not to guide and order all things therein, but rather to watch the order and the process, and to be prepared to interfere at critical junctures when disaster seems to threaten.

Now, the deist may very properly be asked to show how this change of relation to the universe on the part of God has taken place. He may be fairly asked to show why it is that God is now extra-mundane, though he at first was in close touch with the cosmos of nature and the order of history. Or we may ask the deist to make it plain how it comes to pass that, if God has now no providential hand upon the universe, he ever had a creative hand upon it. The unchangeableness and omnipotence of God, rightly understood, fully justifies these inquiries of the deist; and they go far to suggest that the relations of God to his works are always practically the same. Then, if God, as sound theism teaches, be the abiding ground and reason for the continuance of the universe from moment to moment, as well as its creator and first cause, his fundamental relation to his works must remain the same from moment to moment; and, in addition, if there be good reason to believe that God's creative activity was neither completed nor exhausted when the universe began to be, but that later on, from age to age, new forms of being were brought into existence by creative power, then the deist is bound to show

when and how God's initial organic relation to the universe was changed into the mechanical, and how it came to pass that the divine immanence was withdrawn.

2. The deist has also to face the fact that the *self-maintenance* of finite forms of being is scarcely more rational than self-origination. The deist admits that the universe did not create itself at first. The self-production of anything is unthinkable, and the self-existence of any finite form of being is scarcely conceivable. Theism asserts that there is only one self-existent being, and that is God. The materialist is somewhat consistent in holding that the universe maintains itself now, because he teaches that matter is eternal, that is, that it is infinite as to time. But when the deist asserts that the universe is finite, and not self-produced, but created by God, he is bound to show that the self-maintenance and self-regulation of the natural and moral universe is a rational belief. This he finds a difficult task.

The fact that not a few philosophers and theologians have proposed *continuous creation* at the hand of God, as the best explanation of the continued existence and providential care of the universe, indicates how hard it is to regard as reasonable any kind of self-maintenance of a universe that had a beginning in time and is finite in its nature. The deist must show, from the order of nature and the course of human history, that this order and course are self-sufficient, self-regulating and self-maintained. The assertion of the deistical doctrine requires this, and we are convinced of its error at this point.

3. From this it follows that deism lays too heavy a *burden on natural law*. It maintains that God, having framed the universe, and having endowed it with certain potencies, has placed it under certain definite laws, and has commissioned these laws to conduct nature and human affairs to their appointed destiny. There is no doubt much that is true in what deism has to say about the uniformity of

nature, and the fixity of natural law, still when the whole burden of regulating the natural and moral order of the universe is laid upon these laws, the load may be more than they can bear. In addition, deism is in danger of giving a wrong construction of the nature and function of natural law in the uniformity of nature. These laws, whether in the order of nature or in the course of human affairs, have in themselves no rational or executive power at all. They are neither physical causes, nor rational agents, nor moral rulers. They are merely the expressions of the uniform mode in which these causes, agents or rulers exercise their power or authority. In relation to God, they simply express, either directly or indirectly, his wisdom, his power, and his moral authority. Apart from divine agency, these laws would be empty abstractions, if not nonentities. If this be the case, it seems impossible to separate the agency from the law, or to transfer the agency to the law as deism does. The deist goes to the opposite error of the pantheist at this point.

4. The deist often lays too much stress on the distinction between the *physical* and the *moral*. He does this when he suggests that, while God may have now no control over physical events in the order of nature, he may yet exercise authority over events in the realm of human affairs. Indeed, one of the strong contentions of certain types of deism is that God holds men under moral responsibility, that conscience is the voice of God in the human soul, and that if its voice is faithfully heeded, the life will be pleasing to God, and reach its happy goal in the end. We have no dispute with the teaching of this type of deism upon God's relation to the moral order of which man forms a part. But we contend that the moral and physical are so intimately related that it is impossible to admit moral government and consistently deny physical control. If God governs in the one sphere, he also rules in the other. This is plainly evident in the case of man. He has a physical

organism, which relates him in various ways to the order of nature, and he has a moral constitution, by which he becomes a part of the moral order. If he is under God in the one sphere, he must also be in the other. To teach otherwise is absurd. The only consistent deistical doctrine is that God has no oversight in either sphere, and that as nature is self-contained under *natural law,* so human affairs are self-contained under *moral law;* but in neither case has God any interest in what takes place. This would be consistent; but the price of the consistency is the destruction of moral government. There is no alternative. The physical and moral are so bound up together that the same philosophy of both must be given. The choice is between the baldest deism, which makes God a perpetual *absentee* from the universe, and a consistent theism, which regards him as an abiding resident in it, and as ruling over all forms of being embraced in it, ever in harmony with the nature of each of these orders of being.

5. Deism makes it difficult to hold a sound doctrine of *human freedom.* Man becomes a part of that universe from which God is usually absent. In that universe mechanism generally prevails. All events are under the reign of law, and there is small place for man's moral agency. Even if we hold that the creator has endowed man with inherent freedom, yet man is placed by the deist in a universe where mechanism prevails, and not in a universe where all events are to be traced, in the last analysis, to the free activity of God, the author of all. Under these circumstances man's autonomy must be seriously impaired. He is placed in a universe where rigid law rules; and his own nature is also under a moral law which is imposed upon him. This cannot but hamper his freedom. Thus it also appears that the best and widest field for human freedom is found where a free, rational, holy God exercises control in the spheres of both natural and moral government. This is what theism provides.

6. Deism leaves no proper scope for the exercise of the *divine love,* pity and compassion towards men. God is far removed from the universe, and does not concern himself with the affairs of men. He is too far away to touch us with his tender compassion, and we are too distant from him for the eye of his pity to see us. There is no bridge by which our burdened souls may go to him, and no channel down which his consolations may flow to us. His hand is too far removed to wipe away the tears of sorrow, or to bind up broken-hearted grief. He cannot be a present help in time of trouble, nor a deliverer in seasons of distress. Deism presents a God *cold* and *distant;* too cold to love and too distant to help his creatures. This condemns it on emotional grounds.

7. Deism is open to this practical objection, that if God is not concerned in us, why should we *concern ourselves* with him? If God does not care for his creatures by his providence, why ought his creatures trouble themselves with obedience to him? If there be no other moral government than that which the law of my moral being expresses to me, why should I be troubled about obeying God, or be concerned about any rewards and punishments at his hand? Deism cuts the sinews of a moral life, and removes one of its strong sanctions.

8. In conclusion, deism leaves *no place for the supernatural* facts and experiences of a Christian life. The Bible as a supernatural revelation, Jesus Christ as the Son of God and divine Saviour of men, the atonement as a real sacrifice for our sins, regeneration as the work of the Holy Spirit in our souls, the contents of a truly religious life, prayer as a really efficacious exercise, the resurrection of the body and the life everlasting, have no real place on the basis of the deistical philosophy. This is its final and fatal defect; and, being marked by this defect, it can give no adequate interpretation of the facts of the history of the Christian religion. In this history we have a great

mass of facts pertaining to the affairs of men, which cannot be construed on the foundation of the deistic philosophy. Theism has no difficulty with these facts. God is the postulate of the moral order, as well as of the natural order. But deism, when weighed in the balances, is found wanting.

It may be well to add that the Apologetics of a century ago proceeded largely upon the basis of a modified deism. The result was that the distinctive supernatural features of Christianity were regarded in a somewhat external and mechanical way. With the advent of a richer theistic philosophy of the relation of God to the universe, a more vital Apologetic has come into existence. Even Butler did not entirely free himself from certain features of deism.

CHAPTER XI.

PANTHEISM: STATEMENT.

CONTENTS.

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I. *Preliminary and Historical.* § 130.

1. WE have now to consider *pantheism.* This great type of semi-religious philoscphy has always had a large place in speculative thought. It has been alike persistent and widespread in both ancient and modern times. It seems to have a certain attractiveness to many minds that delight to meditate on high themes. As a type of thinking upon these themes, it is subtile and potent. In some cases Christian thinkers of speculative instincts have

shown pantheistic tendencies. The Christian apologete must, therefore, inspect pantheism with some care.

The purer and nobler aspects of pantheism have certain points of affinity with theism. Like *theism,* it lays stress upon the fundamental *unity* of the absolute ground of all existence; but it differs with theism as to the precise nature of that ground. Like theism, pantheism maintains the immanent relation of what it calls God to the finite universe; but it is not in agreement with theism in regard to the real transcendence of God in relation to the cosmos. In certain respects, pantheism stands at the opposite pole of thought from deism. *Deism* insists on the positive transcendence of God, and almost ignores his immanence, while *pantheism* always emphasizes the divine immanence at the expense of his transcendence. But theism asserts both the transcendence and immanence of God in reference to his relations with the universe of finite things, and it seeks to construe both facts in a well-balanced way, and thereby to provide an adequate philosophical basis for the Christian system. Pantheism, however, lays insistent stress on the essential and generic unity of all existence, and it refuses to admit that the finite cosmos and its infinite ground are to be numerically distinguished from each other. This means that God and the universe are in some way to be identified. God is either hidden in the universe, or the universe is lost in God.

2. The *history* of pantheism is an interesting and instructive chapter in the trend of human thought. The Hindoo theosophy involved in both Brahmanism and Buddhism is perhaps the oldest type of pantheistic speculation. In Greek philosophy it appears in several forms. Anaximander, with his *απειρον* as the source of all things, came near to the notion of pantheistic unity. The Heraclitics, in quite another way, with their conception of all finite things ever becoming in ceaseless flow, sought for a monistic principle of existing things. Some of the Stoics, in their conception

of the cosmos as a vast vital entity, were nearly on the same ground. In later Platonic speculations, especially in the Alexandrian school of Proclus and Plotinus, very distinct pantheistic tendencies emerge. But the Eleatics, like Xenophones, Zeno and Parmenides, are the unqualified pantheists of Greek philosophy. In their conception of the one, or the all, or pure being, they assert the unity and reality of one unchanging essence, and at the same time they deny anything but a phenomenal reality to the many in finite forms of existence. This is pure monism in ancient times. In Gnosticism there are also distinct traces of pantheistic influences.

In *mediæval* times there was little pantheistic philosophizing, save as the neo-Platonic philosophy affected the thinking of certain scholastics. In the controversies between the scholastics who were Aristotelian in their philosophy, and those who were Platonic, the latter always inclined to what may be called idealistic pantheism. These scholastics, moreover, represent some of the very best aspects of mediæval speculation.

In *modern* days pantheism has widely prevailed. Bruno and Böehme, in Italy and Germany, respectively, in a vague way, were its modern precursors. But it was the philosophy of Descartes that set the problem which modern pantheism in Spinoza's hands sought to solve. Descartes asserted an inherent dualism between mind and matter, between spiritual and material forms of existence. To resolve this dualism, and to mediate between mind and matter, the occasionalism of Gueliux, the preëstablished harmony of Leibnitz, and the vision of all things in God of Malebranche, were proposed. But it was the Jew, Spinoza, who resolved this dualism by asserting the sole reality of a unitary substance, which underlay both mind and matter, and of which both spiritual and material forms of being were merely modes. There is only one essential reality, which, as eternal, self-existent substance, has for

us two attributes, thought and extension, under which attributes all modes of spiritual and material existence in the finite universe may be construed. This is typical modern pantheism, and it has had many adherents.

In more *recent* times, in that type of modern idealistic philosophy which sprang from Kant, and which, through Fichte and Schelling, culminated in Hegel, we have the latest type of pantheism. By Hegel, the monistic ground of all existence in the finite universe is unconscious reason or impersonal thought or absolute idea. This reason, thought, idea, or ego, takes the place of Spinoza's substance; and while, perhaps, it is not so clearly defined as was Spinoza's monistic principle, it was perhaps a more fruitful conception. All finite things in the universe are construed in relation to absolute reason, and, by a logical process, are deduced from it. This may be called idealistic pantheism, and by its denial of personality to its monistic principle, is radically opposed to theism. In our own day, those who are in sympathy with this doctrine are anxious to attach moral attributes to absolute reason, or unconscious thought, and in this way to provide a philosophical basis for the moral world and a valid ground for the ethical life of moral beings. In this way that aspect of idealistic pantheism which is called *ethical monism* has arisen in our own day. The aim of this effort is laudable; but so long as personality is denied to the absolute and self-existent ground of finite things, it is not easy to see how that ground can properly possess moral attributes, or establish and conduct a moral government over any forms of being. This very meagre historical sketch will suffice to show that pantheism has had a long history, and that it can claim the prestige of many noble names.

II. *General Description of Pantheism.* § 131.

While pantheism has assumed many variant historical and speculative forms, yet its essential principles are capable

of comparatively easy *exposition.* This section, in a brief way, undertakes to give that exposition, in the hope that a simple analysis of generic pantheism will suffice in its discussion as an antitheistic theory.

1. Pantheism of all types always asserts that there is only *one real and abiding existence* in the realm of being. There is only one absolute and self-existent essence, only one fundamental and eternal substance, only one real and unchanging being. No matter under what category this essence, substance or being is construed, it is always unitary. It is infinite, eternal, self-existent and absolute, yet essentially and inherently one. This monistic basis has in it all the resources that are necessary to explain the finite and changing universe; but amid all these changes, the ground of all change is unchanging, and suffers no decay in its real being. It is often called God, but this adorable name is not applicable to this one essence in any proper theistic sense, for the reason, mainly, that personality, and all it involves, are denied to this essence. But pantheism is always *monism,* impersonal monism, and wherever we have this conception of absolute reality we have pantheism.

2. Pantheism of all shades always *construes finite things in relation to this one abiding essence.* The precise mode of that construing may vary, but the fact is held fast by all pantheists. Finite things, which are many and changing, have no real abiding being in themselves. The many have no reality, the one only has real being. Finite things are derived in some natural and necessary way from the infinite monistic ground of all being. Any reality which these finite things has is temporary and derivative, not permanent and inherent. Views differ widely among pantheists as to the precise mode whereby finite things are derived from the monistic source of all being, but all are agreed that in some necessary way this derivation takes place. It is *never creation,* for no new essence or substance is brought into existence by this process of derivation.

These finite things are always phenomenal, and ever changing. The only temporary reality they possess comes from the reality derived from the one only real essence. They are a stream ever flowing on, a fire ever blazing up, a panorama ever passing by, a procession ever moving on. They have no abiding reality; they are derived in some inherent way from the monistic ground of all real being; and they are always to be construed in relation to that ground. The unreal and derivative nature of all finite things in the universe is common to all aspects of pantheism.

3. The *principle* of the derivation of finite things from their infinite monistic ground *is always within that ground.* That monistic ground is self-contained, and has in it the resources of all finite forms of being. By some immanent process, finite things arise out of the secrets of the one and only real essence. This process cannot be called creation, and hence its ground need not be called a creator. This monistic ground, either from its own inherent nature or because of the conditions of its existence, is so constituted as to express or exhibit itself in forms of space and time, of motion and thought, of order and end. This expression or exhibition constitutes the universe as it is from moment to moment. There is no extra-mundane agent, nor a necessarily definite intelligence, involved in the process in question, for out of the native immanent resources of primal being all things finite come. If this inner principle of derivation be called God, he is confined within the universe, or lies back of it, without ever transcending it in any respect. The universe and God, so far as real essence, at least, is concerned, are to be regarded as numerically identical. The universe is not created by God. The universe, at best, can only be the existence form of God at any given time. The impersonal ground of all existence expresses itself in the finite universe, and the reason, cause and end of that expression are to be discovered in that ground. The principle of the derivation of the universe is intra, not extra-

mundane, and the limits of the cosmos indicate the bounds of the activity of the absolute ground of all existence.

These three principles mark all kinds of pantheism. Pantheism is *monism*. Pantheism derives finite things by some natural *process* from its monistic ground. The *principle* of the process of derivation lies within that ground. Incidentally, it may be added that all forms of pantheism *deny the personality* of its monistic principle, refuse to admit that finite things have any save a phenomenal reality, and leave no place for a proper doctrine of free and intelligent creation. God and the cosmos are in some way to be regarded as identical. It may almost be said that the universe produces itself, and this is about the same as to say that God reproduces himself in the universe. Wherever we find a system of thought which involves these main positions, we are in touch with some one or other of the many types of pantheism.

III. *Four Historic Types of Pantheism.* § 132.

In the further exposition of pantheism, it may best serve our purpose to give a brief *description* of some of its great historic forms. There are at least four of these which arrest attention and invite inspection. A brief sketch of each of them will supply concrete illustration of the didactic statement made in the preceding section, and may, perhaps, serve to make our general view of pantheism more definite and clear.

1. Chronologically, the *Oriental type* of pantheism is the most ancient. It appears in its most definite form among the Hindoos in India, though there are hints of it in Persia, Egypt and China. It took its rise somewhere between 1500 B. C. and 600 B. C., and it supplies the philosophical basis of Brahmanism, and, to some extent, of Buddhism also. This type of philosophy has colored the whole life of many millions of the human race.

The primal essence, the one only reality, is thought of as a sort of *spiritual entity*. It is called Brahm, or primal essence, and it constitutes the basis of the Hindoo theosophy. It is usually conceived of under the category of spirit rather than matter, hence Hindoo philosophy has affinity with idealism rather than materialism. This Brahm is, however, impersonal and unconscious, yet it is the source of all finite things. These finite things have reality only as they partake in the essence of Brahm. This vague, shadowy, half spiritual, yet impersonal, conception of real being, is regarded as deity, and as the fountain of all finite being.

The *mode* by which finite things are derived from the resources of Brahm is *emanation*. Finite things, including the members of the human race, are eons which spring from Brahm by a process whose principle is inherent in Brahm. This process may be called emanation, although it is not quite the same as the emanation of the neo-Platonism which appears in Gnosticism. By this rather vague and speculative process finite things of all sorts and grades rise into phenomenal being; and, after they have served their day and generation, they fall back again into the bosom of Brahm, and their temporary existence thereby comes to an end. In an ever-recurring process this goes on through the ages.

2. The Greek pantheism is also of high antiquity and well defined in its form. It appears in the Eleatic philosophy, about 400 B. C., and it was potent in the speculation of that period, and long afterwards.

The fundamental essence which alone has reality is *pure being*. This is conceived of in different ways. It is sometimes called *the one,* as against the manifold of finite existence, and again it is called *the all,* as embracing the total reality in all finite things. This, in any case, is taken to be the sole, unchanging and underived existence. In it, as one, all real being abides. It alone is unchanging, and is pure noumenal being. In it lies the secret, and is found

the source, of the many as they appear in various passing forms of existence.

As to the *principle* and process by which finite things are derived from the one, the Eleatics were never clear, and their statements upon this point are not very consistent. Some went as far as to deny that finite things had any reality at all, but this was against both sense and reason. Others were content to give finite things a sort of unreal, phenomenal existence, and to rest in a quite empirical interpretation of their relation to the one, as the unity of real being. About all that can be said concerning the relation between finite things and real being is that in them real being is manifested. *Manifestation*, then, is the term we may take to denote the relation between the one and the many, between the noumenal and the phenomenal.

3. Spinoza, about 1600 A. D., represents modern consistent pantheism. It is stated by him in a wonderfully clear and logical way, so that there is not much difficulty in understanding his scheme.

The fundamental and only real essence is *substance*. This substance is one, real, infinite, eternal and self-existent. It is in itself neither spiritual nor material, though it becomes the source of both kinds of finite existence. By Spinoza, and those who think with him, this substance is always identified with God, and the one basal reality and ground of all existence may be described equally well by one of these terms as by the other. Not only is this substance infinite in its extent and resources, but it also possesses an infinite number of attributes. But for us, and our apprehension, there are only two attributes. These are extension for material things and thought for spiritual things. Each material object is a mode of substance exhibited under the attribute of extension, while each spiritual entity is a mode of this same substance under the attribute of thought. Hence, a tree is infinite substance expressed as a mode of the attribute of extension; while a human soul is the

same substance expressed as a mode of its attribute of thought.

The principle which marks the process of the derivation of finite things from their basal reality is here more clearly defined. It may be termed *modification*. According to this conception, finite things are modes of infinite substance, determined according to one or other of these two attributes of extension and thought. Substance is capable of many modifications under these two attributes, and in this way the multiplicity of finite things is explained. This substance is always impersonal, and this affords real difficulty to an otherwise attractive scheme. How any modification of an impersonal entity could ever produce a personal form of finite being is hard to conceive! The process, it must be added, by which this activity of modification takes place is never free and distinctly rational. It is always necessary, and mechanical in its nature. By such a process, however, the whole cosmos of finite things, in its origin, progress and end, is derived from the one all in all.

4. The Hegelian type is the most recent phase of pantheism. It seeks to avoid some of the rocks on which Spinoza's system suffers shipwreck, and in doing so comes into some affinity with neo-Platonism and Hindoo theosophy. Hegel's system may be well called idealistic pantheism, and in its better aspects it has some good features, especially as against materialism.

The primal essence, according to Hegel, is pure thought, *absolute reason* or unconscious spirit. This basal reality is construed under the conception of spirit rather than matter, of the idea rather than the atom. This pure thought is sometimes called pure being, and at first it is also regarded as impersonal. In this absolute unconscious reason there is a principle, or inner logical movement, which is its main feature. This process is a thought or rational, not physical or mechanical, process. In this process the secret of finite things is to be found.

The process of the derivation of finite things from their original source has been practically suggested. The phrase, *idealistic evolution,* may express it. This process is not material or dynamical; it is rather logical and rational in its nature. There is a spiritual principle in all finite things, whether we call them spiritual or material, or whether they be found in nature or in human spirit. In that fact resides the unity of all things. The rational which comes into finite things, and constitutes their passing reality, flows by a logical process which is a thought activity, and which may be termed idealistic evolution. This process, as expressed by Hegel, is quite complex, and in some respects it seems superficial. By means of it all finite things are construed in relation to absolute unconscious reason, which is the source of them all.

These are the great historic types of pantheism. They are *all monistic,* presenting a unitary principle as the primal essence of all things. It may be Brahm, pure being, infinite substance, or unconscious reason, but it is always unitary; and finite things are always derived from the unitary basis by means of a principle resident in that basis, and they have naught save a phenomenal and temporary reality. Whether it be emanation, manifestation, modification or evolution, it matters not. The principle and the process are in, and from, the basal reality; and are in no sense outside of it, so that finite things thereby produced cannot be thought of as numerically distinct from the fountain whence they flow, and into which they return when their finite career ends. We may now be prepared for some criticism of this great antitheistic scheme in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XII.

PANTHEISM: CRITICISM.

CONTENTS.

Criticism Necessary, for Pantheism Subtile and Attractive.—Defective on Philosophical Grounds.—Its Advocates Differ Widely.—No Absolutely Unitary Basis.—Does not Explain Finite Things.—Facts of Life and Consciousness Unaccounted for.—Personality Denied.—Defective on Moral Grounds.—No Basis for a Moral Order.—Obliterates Moral Distinctions.—Robs God of Intelligent Freedom.—Denies Freedom and Responsibility in Man.—Has all the Evil Results of Atheism in Practice.—Defective on Religious Grounds.—Destroys Religion as Well as Morality.—Idea of God Inadequate.—Relation Between God and Man Excludes Religion.—Gives no Basis for the Facts of Objective Revelation.—Nor Proper Place for the Subjective Facts of Religious Experience.—But Theism Adequate at all These Points.

LITERATURE.

Encyclopædia Articles on *Pantheism* and *Monism*.—Caird's *Spinoza*.—Saisset's *Modern Pantheism*.—Flint's *Antitheistic Theories*, Chap. X.—Bruce's *Apologetics*, Chap. III.—Caird's *Fundamental Ideas*, Chaps. VI., VII.—Hunt's *Pantheism*.—Miley's *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I., Chap. III., Sec. II.—Rishell's *Foundations of the Faith*, Div. I., Sec. III., Chaps. I.–IX., and Div. IV., Sec. I., Chap. III.—Strong's *Systematic Theology*, Part II., Chap. III., Sec. III.—Hodge's *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I., Part I., Chap. III., Sec. V.—*Modern Skepticism*, Chap. II.—Bowne's *Studies in Theism*, Chap. VII.—Fraser's *Philosophy of Theism*, Vol. I., Chaps. V., VI.—Girardeau's *Discussions*, Chap. VIII.—Christlieb's *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief*, Chap. III., Sec. III.—Cudworth's *Intellectual System of the Universe*.—Fairbairn's *Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, Chap. I.

THIS chapter undertakes to *criticise* pantheism in the interests of theism. That which is good in it, such as the emphasis which it puts upon the immanence of God in his works, may be freely conceded. But its *fatal defects*, as a philosophy of the relation of God to the universe, and of the nature of God as well, must be plainly indicated. The popular idea of pantheism, as that system which regards God as merely the sum total of concrete existing things,

must be set aside as a defective conception of this great system. Pantheism is a much more profound theory of existing things than this popular idea suggests. That it is in itself a subtile system is undoubted, and that it is attractive to a certain type of minds is evident. Especially in its attractive modern dress of ethical monism is it inimical to a sound theism which gives a rational basis for Christianity. Due care in its criticism is, therefore, necessary. This critical survey is made under three heads.

I. *Criticism on Philosophical Grounds.* § 133.

1. Some weight is to be attached to the fact that the adherents of the pantheistic view of existing things are *not in agreement* in regard to the main elements of their system. This, of course, in itself, is not a refutation of pantheism, yet it is a consideration which exhorts us not to accept it hastily. Especially will it have weight if it can be shown that theism is a more definitely conceived system, and if it appears that its advocates are in greater agreement with each other. This, we believe, can be done.

That pantheists are at variance with each other at many points is evident from the statement of the system made in the last chapter. It was incidentally brought out in that chapter that in regard to the nature of the one primal essence, in regard to the nature of finite things, and their relation to that monistic essence, and especially in regard to the way in which the fleeting things that make up the finite universe are derived from their monistic and impersonal source, there is not a little diversity of view among pantheists. Is Brahm, or pure being, or infinite substance, or unconscious reason, the unitary basis of all things? Then, is emanation or manifestation, modification or evolution, the mode by which finite things are derived from their infinite source? Have concrete finite things any actual reality, or are they entirely unreal, and the whole universe

merely a passing show? Is the Hindoo, or Parmenides, or Spinoza, or Hegel right?

Other deeper differences exist among pantheists. Some hold that the primal monistic essence has the attributes of both mind and matter, others that it has the attributes of matter only, and still others the attributes of mind alone. These differences are radical, and lead to entirely different constructions of the general scheme of things. Then, in regard to the place of personality in the system, in regard to the operation of secondary causes, and in regard to the relation of morality to the monistic essence, pantheists differ widely. So we see much diversity of opinion among them.

On the other hand, *theists are in closer agreement.* They practically agree in holding that God, as infinite, spiritual and personal, is the primal reality; that the universe of finite things has a dependent, but genuine, reality, due to the causal creative agency of God; and that God is both immanent and transcendent in his relation to, and operations in, the universe. Such being the case, theism has the rational advantage over pantheism.

2. It may be charged that pantheism *does not provide an absolutely unitary principle* to account for the system of existing things. That it does provide such a principle is its high claim, and as against materialism this claim has some weight. But it is very evident that in its explanation of finite things it requires two principles. It has its primal essence, and its principle for the derivation of finite things from that essence. Without this principle the essence would be absolutely impassive and immobile, and hence incapable of bringing the universe into temporal being. If it be assumed that the principle is not eternal, as the primal essence is, then the question as to the source of the principle of derivation, and the beginning of its activity, at once arises. To this question pantheism can give no good answer. Its advocates either ignore the question, or give the principle of derivation, whether it be

emanation, or manifestation, or modification, or evolution, a reality coëval with the primal essence. This necessarily lands in a rational dualism. In addition, if the primal essence be eternal, and if the principle for the derivation of finite things be coëval in its activity with that essence, then the finite universe, which is the result of the activity of that principle, is also eternal. This gives *three eternal forms of being,* and shows how far from providing a unitary basis pantheism is. To make it workable, it must become dualism; and when it does work, it becomes a sort of tritheism, which is, however, devoid of personality.

Theism has the *advantage* at this point. In its fundamental postulate of an infinite personal Spirit, possessing creative power in his very nature, theism provides in God an absolutely unitary principle to account for all existence; in its conception of creative power freely exercised, it propounds the philosophy of finite things in their origin, reality and end; and in its doctrine of immanence it announces the ground and explanation of the universe at every stage of it.

3. The *explanation* of finite things which pantheism supplies is *defective.* How are these things to be conceived? Are they in any proper sense real? If real, is their essence different from that of the primal essence? If different, what is it, and how does it become different? If the same, does the primal essence suffer any temporary loss of reality by the rise of finite things into existence? Further, if the primal essence is at first absolutely undifferentiated, and if finite things are derived from that essence in some natural way, how comes it to pass that finite things seem to be so greatly differentiated as they are in the various grades of these things? How does the distinction between the inorganic and organic, between the vegetable and the animal, between the sensitive and the rational, and between the rational and the moral, arise? At every turn pantheism either does injustice to the facts in finite things, or fails

to provide a rational explanation of them. In addition, pantheism fails to give any reasonable account of the *relation* of finite things in the universe to each other. How are the different grades of finite things to be regarded in their relations? How do social and moral relations among certain forms of finite being arise? In a word, pantheism provides no rational basis for either a natural or moral order and rule among finite things.

4. Pantheism cannot account for the *facts of life and consciousness,* and these facts themselves tell against it. As to the reality of these facts, there can be no doubt. Even pantheists cannot deny them. First of all, the question arises as to how vital and conscious forms of being first began to be. The primal essence of pantheism is always held to be at first non-vital and unconscious. Whether it be taken to be Brahm, or pure being, or infinite substance, or absolute reason, this is true. There was a time when, in the whole realm of being, there was not a single vital or conscious form in it. Creation in the proper sense being denied, no radically new forms of beings can arise. The germs of such forms of being must have been latent in the primal essence. Pantheists hesitate to say this plainly. And yet we are asked to believe that, in some mysterious way, a non-vital and non-conscious essence gave rise, out of its own resources, to certain forms of being that are vital and conscious. This means that the non-vital produced the vital, and that the unconscious produced the conscious. Such a supposition does utter injustice to the law of causation, and professes to derive the higher from the lower without any adequate cause for that derivation. Modern science fully confirms this criticism of pantheism by its doctrine of *biogenesis,* and no school of psychology, even the very latest physiological psychology, has been able to deduce the conscious from the unconscious. Life and consciousness can have only a phenomenal existence, and their reality is entirely obscured by pantheism.

This is a fatal criticism of all types of pantheism, for even the Hegelian refuses to admit that absolute reason is at first living and conscious.

Theism again *meets the conditions* here. In its postulate of an infinite God, it provides a living, active, conscious being, with power at least to create forms of being having the same attributes as himself. He, being the highest form of being conceivable, provides a causal ground to originate and endow all lower forms of being with the qualities they possess. Hence, theism can account for the facts of life and consciousness.

5. The *denial of personality* to the primal essence is a fatal defect of pantheism. This denial blocks its way in seeking to give a rational explanation of finite personal forms of being. That there are such forms of being is certain. Here we have the question of the personality of the primal essence, and the problem of a multitude of finite personal beings to deal with. As to the denial of the personality of the primal essence, it might be sufficient to say that this is a mere hypothesis, without anything to support it. But it can be added that the evidences of free, intelligent activity on the part of the primal essence imply that it possesses self-consciousness and self-direction, which are the essential elements of personality. Moreover, without the conception of personality, which pertains only to spiritual forms of being, it is impossible to secure an absolutely unitary principle, in relation to which all forms of finite being may be rationally construed. The denial of personality to the primal essence which pantheism makes, robs us of such a unitary principle as theism provides; and for the rise of self-consciousness and the genesis of personal forms of finite being, pantheism gives no philosophy. This is one of the most glaring defects of pantheism, and yet it is one to which its adherents hold with great tenacity.

Theism well *meets the case* here. In its postulate of God, it attaches self-consciousness and self-direction to the

basis of all being, and grounds its principle of absolute unity in the personality of God. This enables it to give a good account of all forms of finite dependent personality, and to meet all the conditions of a sound theory. On *philosophical grounds,* pantheism fails us.

II. *Criticism on Moral Grounds.* § 134.

If pantheism is defective in its philosophy, it is still more so when tested in the *moral realm.* It does scant justice to moral facts, and explains the terms which express moral order by really explaining them away. A few points are noted.

1. Pantheism provides *no adequate basis for a moral order* and government. Such order and government presuppose moral attributes in the ground of the order and in the nature of the moral governor. But the conception which pantheism gives of the primal essence of all things is entirely devoid of moral attributes. Brahm, pure being, substance and unconscious reason, are all non-moral conceptions. Not one of them possesses such definite moral attributes as to lay the basis for a moral order and government among finite forms of being; and being non-moral, this monistic essence can never constitute any finite forms of being in such a way as to make them fit subjects of a moral order. All of this is evidently felt by those in our own time who are in sympathy with pantheism, and yet feel the need of attaching moral attributes to the primal essence, in what they call ethical monism. This is a confession of need, rather than a solution of the problem. It really seems impossible to provide a ground for a moral order, unless the primal essence and ground of all things is moral. The postulate of theism is ample to provide this.

2. A still more serious objection to pantheism is that *it really obliterates moral distinctions,* and leaves no proper

difference between good and evil, right and wrong, holiness and sin. This appears in various respects. Everything that happens in the universe is the outcome of the activity of the primal essence, and its principle of activity, which is called God, and his mode of operation. All that comes into existence must be only either good or bad, for it is all the same in its essential nature. Then, all that these things do is really the activity of God; and if he is perfectly holy, then these things must be like him. Among men, all that they do is in harmony with God, and it is not possible for them to be otherwise than as God is. They are from him as to their nature, and the activity of that nature can never be really moral. To identify God and the universe as pantheism does, is to break down all moral distinctions, and to obliterate the radical difference which every moral consciousness experiences between right and wrong. There are no second causes under the pantheistic scheme. All that transpires is due to God's causal agency. What a man does is an activity of God in and by that man. If he gives a cup of cold water to the thirsty, or if he loves his neighbor, it is God's deed; and if he grinds the face of the poor, or if he kills his fellow, it is God's doing also. All the ingenuity of ethical monism fails to scale this difficulty.

3. Pantheism *robs God of freedom* with the intelligent self-direction that freedom implies. The fundamental postulate of pantheism always denies the quality of freedom to the primal essence of all things, and it also refuses to attach that quality, even to the principle of the derivation of finite things from the primal essence. This being the case, all the activities of this essence under this principle are necessitarian, and virtually mechanical in their nature. God is not able to set an end before him as the goal of the universe, he has no power to bring intelligence and wisdom to bear upon the development of the cosmos, and he is incapable of the exercise of free determination in regard

to what course the history of the universe shall take. Necessity of the sternest sort holds him in its grasp, and mechanism, in the strictest sense, marks out his course for him. This is sheer, blank, blind fatalism, under which morality never can come into being.

4. Nor is there any *freedom in the creature.* No member of the angelic host, nor any child of Adam's race, had, or ever can, possess freedom, which is the crowning glory of personality. Man is bound in the iron chains of necessity, and his supposed sense of freedom is a delusion into which he has fallen. His feeling of responsibility, which presupposes freedom, is entirely unreal. What he is, is as he must be; what he does, cannot be otherwise. He has no power of rational choice, or of freedom in action. He lives in a region of shadows, where twilight makes all sense of freedom unreal, and raises before him a mirage of responsibility which has no real existence at all. Pantheism robs man of freedom, and binds him to the chariot wheels of a stern necessity, which is driven by a blind charioteer down the steeps of fatalism.

5. It may be added that pantheism, though more respectable than atheism, has in its train *all the bad moral results of atheism.* An impersonal God is really no God. Pure necessity, carried into the sphere of morals, binds men helpless under mechanical law; but it, at the same time, gives them license to live as they list, and commit all sorts of excess. Pantheism gives no ground for moral order, and hence fosters moral disorder. Pantheism, denying freedom alike to God and man, takes away responsibility, and sets every man with his hand against his neighbor. It would, if reduced to practical effect, abolish the home, destroy stable government, and speedily obliterate modern civilization.

At every one of these points *theism suffices.* It gives a good basis for moral order and government; it announces, in no uncertain tones, the eternal distinction between good

and evil, right and wrong; it asserts that God has absolute freedom, and that man has dependent freedom from God's hand; and it has noble fruitage among men as the adequate basis for Christianity.

III. *Criticism on Religious Grounds.* § 135.

It is on the ground of *religion* that pantheism reveals its greatest weakness. We now make this its final test. Any scheme of existing things that fails here is radically defective. Only a few points are needed to make plain this defect.

1. If pantheism lays no foundation for morality, it provides *no basis for religion.* This is a general statement, yet it is profoundly true. Morality and religion, though not identical, are yet closely related. Morality is not the whole of religion, yet if man is not in moral relations with God, religion, on its ethical side, could never have risen. Now, pantheism, by destroying the basis of moral order, has left religion without a foundation.

2. The *idea of God* which pantheism announces is entirely *defective.* It makes God simply the primal essence of finite things, and then denies its personality. It asks us to love, worship and obey an abstract impersonal essence. It speaks of Brahm, pure being, substance and absolute reason, and then calls these God. This becomes little better than philosophical idolatry. It is a pure perversion of the sacred name to use it as pantheism does. Then, since all finite things, myself included, are aspects or modifications of God, I should worship nature and even myself, and still be guilty of no perversion of the sentiment of worship. To ask me to worship the impersonal ground of all finite being, is to ask what is absurd. To use such an idea of God as this, is to address man in terms of atheism, or to set his face towards polytheism, in the form of nature worship, or hero worship.

3. The *relation* between God and man which pantheism expresses *renders religion impossible.* For religion implies an object which is called God, and a subject, which may be man or angel. Now, to render religion possible, both its subject and object must have real existence, and be capable of numerical distinction from each other. If God be an abstract, impersonal essence, he cannot be the object which religion requires, and if man be but a modification of infinite substance, or, at best, a moment in the logical evolution of absolute reason, religion will be evaporated. If religion be a mode of knowing, believing, feeling and acting on behalf of its subject, in relation to its object, then pantheism fails to provide the essential conditions of religion. No absolutely monistic system, no scheme of abstract identity, can suffice for the basis of religion.

4. So far as Christianity is concerned, *pantheism does not provide any proper basis for its objective facts.* These facts, as they are peculiar to Christianity, consist specially in the contents of supernatural revelation. Now, pantheism gives no place for such objective facts, nor can anything be supernatural at all. Everything is natural or supernatural, according as the terms are used. There can be no special revelation, no miracle, no providence and no prayer. As there is no objective fact of sin, so there is no incarnation, and no redemption by means of God manifest in the flesh. As God is hemmed in in his activity by the limits of the universe, he can act in no transcendent redemptive way in relation to that universe. Hence, pantheism destroys every distinctive feature of Christianity.

5. Then, finally, pantheism provides no place for the *subjective aspects* of Christianity in *religious experience.* As man is but a mode or moment in the being of God, there can be in man no definite personal religious experience. In particular, the supernatural experiences wrought by the Spirit of God, in regenerating and sanctifying the heart of man, and bringing him into a genuine Christian experience,

have no rational place on the pantheistic scheme of things. Any attempt to construe the facts of such an experience as described in the Scriptures, or as realized in religious consciousness, must utterly fail. The fellowship of that experience must be between *two persons*. The communication and reception of truth, the exercise of repentance and faith, and emotions of joy and love, require what pantheism does not provide.

But *theism is adequate* as the religious basis of Christianity. It binds morality and religion together in their proper relations, it provides an adequate conception of a personal God, it construes the relations between the object and subject of religion in a correct way, it provides a secure basis for the objective facts of a redemptive revelation, which is supernatural in its nature, and does ample justice to the conditions of religion on its subjective or experimental side.

CHAPTER XIII.

PESSIMISM: THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.

Contents.

Some Hybrid Theories.—Spiritualism.—Mormonism.—Eddyism.—Dowieism.—Some Social Schemes.—Secularism.—Associated with Positivism.—Socialism.—Government Ownership of Property.—Communism.—Ownership by the People.—Pessimism.—Statement in General.—Ancient in Dualism and Specially in Buddhism.—Modern in Schopenhauer and Hartmann.—Existence Evil.—Life not Worth Living.—Criticism.—Exaggerated.—One-sided.—Overlooks Facts.—The Problem of Evil.—Lies at Root of Pessimism.—Dualism Defective.—The Real Problem for Apologetics.—Physical Evil.—Metaphysical Evil.—Moral Evil.—Last at Basis of All.—The Origin of Evil Mystery.—Its Solution and Remedy in Christianity.

Literature.

Encyclopædia Articles on *Secularism, Socialism, Communism, Pessimism, Optimism,* and *Sin.*—Woolsey's *Communism and Socialism,* Chaps. I.–VII.—Caird's *Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte.*—Hitchcock's *Socialism.*—Noyes' *History of American Socialism.*—Holyoake's *The Trial of Theories.*—Kidd's *Social Evolution,* Chap. VIII.—Sully's *Pessimism.*—William's *Buddhism.*—Schopenhauer's *The World as Will.*—Hartmann's *Philosophy of the Unconscious.*—Augustine's *The City of God.*—Flint's *Antitheistic Theories,* Chaps. VI.–VIII.—Fairbairn's *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion,* Chaps. III., IV.—Martineau's *A Study of Religion,* Vol. II., Chap. III.—Ebrard's *Apologetics,* Vol. I., Part I., Book I., Sec. II.—Rishell's *The Foundations of the Christian Faith,* Div. V., Sec. I., Chaps. III., IV.—Lindsay's *Recent Advances,* Chap. XVI.—Matheson's *The Gospel and Modern Substitutes,* Chap. VII.—Fraser's *Philosophy of Theism,* Vol. I., Chap. VII.—Calvin's *Institutes,* Book II.—Bruce's *Moral Order,* Chaps. II. and IX.–XI.—Pfleiderer's *Philosophy of Religion,* Vol. IV., Sec. II., Chap. IV.

I. *Some Hybrid Theories.* § 136.

BEFORE discussing, with some care, *pessimism* and the problem of evil, certain schemes which in practical effect are usually more or less antitheistic in their bearing may be merely noted. These schemes are not so much separate or independent theories, as inferences from, and applications of, some of the antitheistic systems already

expounded and criticised. It is proper to remark that some of these schemes are advocated in our own day by men who are not professedly antitheistic. In some cases they even claim to be Christian. They are all practical schemes or methods of a social and economic nature, which propose to deal with human society and property rights in certain ways. This being the case, the most of them will come up naturally for consideration in the third division of this treatise. Some of these proposals may be merely mentioned here, as they are in all probability entirely sporadic aberrations of a few erratic minds, and will soon pass away. How far these aberrations are to be viewed in relation to the problem of evil and Satanic agency, is a question of considerable importance.

1. *Spiritualism,* in its popular sense, is a perverted or exaggerated belief in the reality and activity of disembodied human spirits; and it has reference especially to the mode and extent of the communication of such spirits with those who are still in this earthly life. This communication is supposed to take place by means of those who possess certain peculiar powers, and are called mediums, and it is claimed to be effected by methods which quite transcend the natural conditions of our present earthly state.

This whole scheme, and all the seances connected with it, may be taken as an *indirect witness* to the reality of the spirit world, and a testimony to the fact of man's immortality. It is marked by all sorts of extravagances, well fitted to impress those who are in a morbid mental state; and sometimes it has been convicted of cunning imposture, which could delude only those who are willing to be deceived. Many are inclined to think that this whole system of delusion or deception is to be associated with the problem of evil, and that it is the perversion of a legitimate belief in the reality of the world of spirits.

2. *Mormonism* is another remarkable excrescence in modern thought and life. It claims, in a very irrational way,

to be the true religion; but it is a self-evident travesty of all that is worthy the name of religion, alike in belief and practice. It is a crude mixture of pagan and Christian elements, with a great deal that is sensual and materialistic about it. It makes an attempt to masquerade in the garb of Christianity in order to delude the ignorant and the unwary; and, in doing so, it is often brazen, and sometimes blasphemous. It is an eye-sore upon the fair face of this country, and a serious menace to our civilization and social well being. It demands the serious attention of our legislators, and it is a providential exhortation to the Christian churches to *evangelize* all our borders as speedily as possible. Rational *refutation,* national *legislation,* may be useful against this great evil; but the best weapon against it is the gospel, carried to every nook and corner of our broad and favored land.

3. *Eddyism* is another absurd and irrational development in this country. One hardly knows what to say about this system. Its very existence is an anachronism in this age, and an absurdity in this land. The woman who poses as its founder baffles psychological diagnosis, and the book of which she is the author, and which forms the basis of the system that bears her name, does violence to reason and common sense. The working of this system gives rise to much that is ridiculous. In practical effect, it is an American reproduction of Buddhistic pessimism, with much less to commend it than its Oriental original. There are some things which can be best laughed into oblivion, and this is surely one of them.

4. *Dowieism* is perhaps the crowning absurdity of these erratic schemes. It is, indeed, so absurd that it scarcely deserves mention in these pages. The man, the movement, and his methods bear witness to his cunning and resource, and his apparent success is a sad commentary on the readiness of many people to be deceived. His methods also leave the impression that some people like all the more to

be fooled when they have to pay handsomely for it. But his case is not an entirely new thing under the sun, for ever since the days of the Egyptian magicians, and the time of Simon Magus, the world has had such deceivers, and a credulous company ready to be deceived. It may be that the problem of evil and of Satanic agency has its illustration in such cases as these. Let alone, they will die of inanition.

5. *Secularism* is a scheme of human affairs which deserves much more respectable mention. It consists in a general view of this life, which refuses to allow any reference to the life which is to come to enter into its interpretation. It makes this life and its duties the main matter for the human race, and it gives a controlling place to the ordinary affairs of this world in the regard of men. It always ignores what we call religion and its sanctions, and it sometimes goes so far as to openly assail Christianity. At times it is willing to speak of *the religion of humanity,* but such religion is entirely secular. Christianity is only one form of superstition, is largely other-worldly, and not necessary for the well-being of men in this life.

Secularism is usually to be associated, as an inference, with atheism, materialism, agnosticism or positivism. Hence, it assumes different types. In most cases it seems to have a natural kinship with *positivism,* which practically denies or ignores the proper theistic basis of Christianity. As a practical scheme, it can be most naturally discussed in the third main division of this treatise. Its theoretic basis has already been examined, mainly under positivism. All we say now is that Christianity is not merely an other-world religion. It pertains to *both worlds,* teaching us how to live here, that we may fulfil our end in this life, and be meet for the world which is to come. Secularism entirely misconceives Christianity in this respect.

6. *Socialism* is another modern scheme to be mentioned here. It has, however, its ancient counterpart in Plato's

Republic, and its mediæval aspect in More's *Utopia.* But during the past few decades it has had its fresh and formal advocacy. It appears in various schemes to benefit the human race in their civic, social and economic relations. In some respects it resembles secularism, although it does not formally ignore or reject in every case the interests and claims of religion. It relates mainly to the affairs of men in this life, and it pertains to the ownership and use of property of all kinds in particular. Its negative position is the denial of all individual and personal rights to property. There should be no private property ownership. Its positive teaching is that *all property should be owned by the national government;* and by that government it should be used and managed for the advantage and welfare of the whole body of the people equally. Government ownership of land, railroads and telegraph lines, of manufacturing and mercantile operations of every sort, and the carrying on of these in trust for the people, is the gist of socialism. It does not necessarily imply the destruction of existing governments. It simply argues against private ownership of all the productive activities of the people, and advocates government ownership of all these things.

As this is also a practical civic, social and economic scheme, it belongs properly to Applied Apologetics, and its discussion may be safely remitted to the third division of this treatise. All we now remark is, that socialism may or may not be an anti-Christian scheme. Some of its advocates have broken entirely with the Christian system, but others claim that their scheme is really a return to primitive and apostolic Christianity.

7. *Communism* is closely akin to socialism, and in the popular mind is not always distinguished from it. Like socialism, it relates to the ownership and use of property. It sometimes goes further than socialism, and assails existing forms of civil government. Negatively, it agrees with socialism in arguing against private ownership of property;

but, positively, it differs with socialism in holding that *this ownership should be lodged,* not in the national government, but *in the body of the people.* They should hold the property of the community in common, and as a trust for the whole people. Hence, the name communism, which means that the property is to be held in common. In its extreme form, communism arrays itself against all civil government, and in doing so comes perilously near to the ground of the anarchist, who is really the modern social and economic Ishmaelite.

It is evident that this scheme has less regard for law and authority than socialism, and in its practical working is bound to be entirely impracticable. But a proper critical estimate of it may be reserved till we reach the discussion of Applied Apologetics, towards the end of this treatise. We pass at once to pessimism and the problem of evil.

II. *Pessimism: Statement.* § 137.

1. The term *pessimism* means the worst, or the worst that can be. In the discussion of theistic problems, it denotes that dreary system which lays stress upon the misery and misfortune of finite existence, especially of those forms of it which are conscious, and hence capable of pain or suffering. It is that strange doctrine which argues that the very *fact of existence is itself an evil,* and that it is better for finite forms of being not to be. It raises the question whether life is worth living, and argues against the worth of life as a form of finite conscious existence, wherein pain far outweighs pleasure. With an accent of its own, it declares, concerning human life, that it is vanity of vanities. With its ear open to the cries of pain, and its eye closed to the better aspects of life, it pronounces *life a failure,* and is ready to declare that *self-destruction* is a virtue. This remarkable view has had its advocates in both ancient and modern times.

2. In *ancient times* there was a latent pessimism in the dualism which widely prevailed. Dualism asserts the reality in the universe of two eternal principles, one good and the other evil; one conducive to happiness, the other leading to pain. As these two principles are eternal and in constant warfare, there is no hope of either triumphing over the other. Good can never get the victory over evil, and pain must ever mark the sphere of existing things. The effect of such a doctrine is to beget a hopelessness which gradually deepens into despair, and leads on to pessimism. In most of the pagan mythologies there are tinges of this view. But in Zoroastrianism without the Christian system, and in Gnosticism within it, we find typical dualism whose fruitage is pessimism and asceticism.

But it is in *Buddhism* that we find in ancient times a definite pessimistic doctrine; and this system continues to the present day, and is still dominant over the lives of millions of the human race. The germs of this system are found in the asceticism of Brahmanism, and its philosophical basis is Hindoo pantheism. According to Buddhism, there is pain and anguish everywhere in human life. This pain is an evil which is inseparably associated with the fact of finite existence. The *Kharma,* or law of consequences, implies this. The only way to end sorrow and suffering, pain and anguish, is to cause the fact of conscious finite existence to cease to be. This ending of existence is the highest virtue for man, and it is to be effected by the *Dharma,* or the moral pathway which leads to *Nirvana.* The Nirvana state is not necessarily annihilation of essential being, but it is rather the destruction of conscious finite being, and with this the ending of pain and suffering in the individual life. This form of pessimism regards existence in this life as an evil, and it makes the ending of it the goal of the highest virtue. The sad and burdened condition of the Oriental millions provided a suitable soil for this doctrine of despair, and its fearful

fruitage appears in the abject hopelessness of these millions. With them life is not worth living.

3. In *modern times* there have been certain very strange developments of pessimism as a formal philosophy of finite existence, especially as it appears in human life. These have arisen in recent times in Germany, where there has been so much speculation since Kant's day. It is a striking thing to observe that this modern pessimism is associated with the idealistic pantheism of which Hegel is really the founder, just as ancient pessimism arose in India in connection with the theosophic pantheism of the Hindoos. Is there any philosophical kinship between pantheism, with its denial of personality, and pessimism, which regards finite conscious existence as an evil to be gotten rid of?

Schopenhauer and Hartmann are the names which represent *modern pessimism.* The former makes the essence of real being consist in will; the latter discovers it in what he calls the unconscious. But the *will* of Schopenhauer is not merely volition; it is rather *desire,* striving or energy of any kind. It is the secret and cause of the development of the universe in all its stages, and when human will is reached the conditions of pain and evil are presented. On this basis, Schopenhauer declares that this world is the worst possible, and that life is not worth living. There are many points of likeness between this system and Buddhism, and all through it there is the note of the Cynic. Hartmann places the essence of all reality in *the unconscious,* which gradually rises through various grades of being till the stage of consciousness is attained; and here, again, the conditions of hopeless pain and misery are provided, and existence is a misfortune from which men would gladly be free; and the only way to mend matters is to end them.

No formal criticism of pessimism is now needed. The defects of its philosophic basis have been revealed in the criticism of pantheism. Any system which *denies person-*

ality to the ground of all existence, and which fails to do justice to the dependent reality of finite things, is destined to lead to erroneous and absurd views of human life; and any system which binds all its parts under the iron law of necessity, and refuses any numerical distinction between finite things and their infinite ground or source, is bound to interpret human life in terms of despair. Such is pantheism; hence pessimism.

On the practical side, pessimism, while it has some plausible features about it, certainly *exaggerates* the elements of pain and anguish in the world and in humanity. It still more certainly does *injustice* to the joy and happiness which also enter into human life. Any just statement of the conditions of sentient being in all its grades in the universe scarcely justifies the gloomy picture drawn by pessimism. Above all, pessimism overlooks the fact that there is *in nature remedial agencies* at work, and that even pain itself has beneficent results for the forms of being that are the subjects of it; and, in like manner, pessimism entirely ignores the fact that in the sphere of human life there is operative, through the agency of the Christian system, a redemptive and remedial force which surely cures the evils of existence here, and makes life worth living. As this remark brings us to the border of the problem of evil in its deeper moral aspects, the discussion may now enter upon that subject.

III. *The Problem of Evil.* § 138.

1. The cardinal fact which is involved in all forms of pessimism is that of *evil*. With this fact every system of philosophy and every scheme of morals has to deal; and all forms of religion find it necessary to give a place to some aspect of this sad and abnormal fact. This fact presses hard on the theistic theory, which holds to the existence of an infinite personal God, who is the source, the ground

and the end of the universe. There is special difficulty in construing the fact of evil in harmony with the goodness of God and the beneficence of his rule over the cosmos.

All forms of *dualism* are founded upon a recognition of the fact of evil, and dualism professes to give its best philosophy. Gnosticism, with its accompanying asceticism, wrestled with the same persistent fact in a one-sided way. In the theodicies of every age there are attempts, more or less adequate, to solve the problem or harmonize it with the theistic conception of God and the universe. But it is only in the Christian system that we have its solution, and by means of the gospel its assured remedy.

2. No theistic construction of the relations between God and his creatures *can be insensible to the fact of evil* in its various bearings. Perhaps much current theistic philosophy and moral theory have failed to do justice to the facts of evil in the universe, and to take fully into account the effects of sin in the moral order of the world. In the early chapters of this treatise, when setting in clear relief the problem of Apologetics, stress was there laid upon the fact that evil in all its forms, and especially as moral evil, must be taken into account in any adequate apologetical scheme. The fact of moral evil is abnormal in the universe, yet it must be allowed for in any adequate theory of existing things.

In these opening chapters it was also indicated that it was in relation to *this abnormal fact* that the essence and power of the Christian system appeared. Christianity was conceived to be the redeeming activity of God in the world. This activity is operative, first of all, in the members of the human race, and through them in the wider area of the cosmos. It is made effective through Christ by the agency of the Holy Spirit, and it has been operative in various ways along the ages. In this redeeming and renewing activity is the true theodicy.

3. It is important to understand precisely what is meant

by the fact of evil in the world. There are widely different aspects of it, and some writers lay stress on one phase of it, and some on another. This has much to do with the various solutions proposed for the problem in different theodicies.

Some lay the main stress on the *physical* aspects of evil, and hence make much of bodily pain and anguish in sentient beings in general, and on the sufferings of man in particular. The cruder conceptions of Buddhism, and some forms of asceticism, are to be noted in this connection.

Others incline to a rather *metaphysical* view of the nature of evil, and conceive it as defect, or privation, or as good in the making. This almost regards evil as inherent in finite forms of being, and renders it difficult to connect any moral quality with it. Perhaps Leibnitz best represents this general type of opinion; and modern evolution has its points of contact here.

Still others go nearer to the root of the matter, and regard that abnormal fact in the universe which is usually called evil as mainly *moral* in its nature. As such, it is something which does violence to the moral order which is established in the universe; and since this moral order is made up of personal moral beings, then evil must be a quality of the states and acts of such beings. The real nature of moral evil thus appears. It is essentially *a quality of moral agents,* not an entity of any kind. Viewed in relation to the other members of the moral order it may be *injury,* regarded in relation to the law of that order it is *wrong-doing,* and described in relation to the person of the moral governor it is *sin.* It is only when this deeper moral view of the evil in the universe is taken that we rightly conceive of it. From the standpoint of moral evil, both physical and metaphysical evil can be construed; but moral evil cannot be deduced from either of the other aspects of it.

4. As to *the mystery of the origin of evil,* not much need be said. It is a mystery before which we must bow in silence and with uncovered head. To guard against error, we may say that evil is *not due to the agency of God,* either directly or indirectly exercised. God permits it and controls it, and upholds the universe within whose bounds evil is operative. He never can approve of it, he has not prevented it, and it never gets beyond his hand. It may be added that the origin of moral evil, which is the source of all other aspects of evil, is to be discovered *in the mysterious powers of the free, personal, finite, mutable agency of moral beings.* This merely indicates the sphere in which it arises, but does not account for its origin. Some are content to say that, in the very fact of the freedom of such agency, the possibility of self-will, which may rise to disobedience, resides. Why God did not keep his moral subjects all in loyal obedience and service we do not know; that he often brings good out of evil is evident, and that all things are working together for the largest good in the end we may be sure.

5. It is not necessary to say much concerning the various *theoretical solutions* of the problem of evil that have been suggested. We are concerned rather with giving the fact of evil in all its aspects its proper place in the view of the universe which we present; and over against this we lay stress upon the fact that, in the *redeeming activity* of God which is operative in the universe according to his gracious purpose in Christ, is its remedy found. This, rather than any rational theodicy, is the best attitude to take towards the awful fact of evil, which otherwise would drape the cosmos forever in mourning, and drive moral beings to the abyss of despair.

In view of the present conditions in the universe of physical and moral being, we discover much that is chaotic. In brighter hours we may cherish a hopeful optimism, which can turn its face towards a better day;

but in gloomy moments we are almost forced to have some sympathy with pessimism, and to wonder what the worth of life really is.

But as we fix our attention on the indications given all along the ages that there is a *redeeming and renewing activity* working in the world, and that this is associated, historically and experimentally with Christianity, we may at least be *believing meliorists,* who are assured that things are slowly but surely getting better, and that the goal of a brighter era shall certainly be reached. Superficial thinkers may be merry *optimists,* serious but unbelieving souls are almost sure to be *pessimists,* but earnest believing spirits can be *meliorists,* and hold a reasonable hope of the ultimate triumph of the good. Evil is not good in the making, as evolution would say, but it is evil already existing. Christianity declares that, by its redeeming powers, the good is to overcome the evil. By the renovating and conquering power of the gospel of Christ, which is the secret and power of Christianity, is this to be effected. This brings us to the threshold of that system of truth, and that scheme of life, known as historic Christianity.

In this volume the secure rational basis of Christianity has been laid in the theistic philosophy. This basis is found in the objective validity of theistic belief, which vindicates the reality of the existence of God in immanent and transcendent relations with the universe and all that it contains. The soundness of this philosophy is confirmed by the insufficiency of all other theories. The second volume proposes to exhibit the historicity and divine authority of the Christian system, and to vindicate its transcendent nature and absolute divinity as the only truly redemptive religion for sinful men. A third volume may set for itself the task of interpreting Christianity in relation to various types of modern scientific thought, to the pressing problems of human life, and to the evangelization of the whole

world. In this way Christianity may receive its philosophical, historical and practical vindication, as the only adequate religion for sinful men.

In connection with Christian Apologetics, which is to be the theme of the second volume of this treatise, other religions than Christianity must be considered. The religious and theistic belief, whose autopistic and real nature has been vindicated in this volume, has, as a matter of fact, expressed itself historically in many diverse forms. Hence, the various religions of mankind have arisen.

The problem of the relation of these to each other and to Christianity is one which modern Apologetics is bound to consider. The real unique character of the Christian system, the inner principle of the other religious systems, and the right key to interpret their mutual relations must all be ascertained. This will form the opening topic of the second volume, and a proper introduction to the vindication of Christianity as the only truly redemptive and restoring religion for sinful men.

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